Cyberspace as a domain of conflict: The case of the United States - Iran and North Korea

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Abstract:
Modern society is critically dependent on information as a strategic resource and information and communications technology, which carries out its transmission, processing and exchange. Information and communications technology has created a new environment, cyberspace, in which tensions, disagreements and incidents are becoming more frequent. In recent years, the mentioned area has increasingly appeared as a domain of conflict between the leading world and regional powers. The paper gives a brief description of the concept of operations in several domains and elements of the new concept of joint warfare of the US Armed Forces. The importance of cyberspace for the US has been pointed out with a review of organizational changes and the adoption of certain strategic and doctrinal documents. The paper presents certain events and activities in cyberspace, in recent years, between the United States on the one hand, and Iran and North Korea on the other. The United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) was created in 2009. USCYBERCOM was elevated to the status of a full and independent unified command in May 2018. It indicates the importance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the separation of USCYBERCOM from Strategic Commands, which oversees strategic rejection, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from “defensive” to “persistent engagement.” The United States is still the strongest force in cyberspace and shows ambition to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. It is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States into a large-scale military conflict and wage a direct war in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its ability to operate in cyberspace, and it is estimated that this trend will continue. The imbalance can prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and its allies. Greater action is expected with an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks. Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both countries undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. Whereas Iran usually had a motive only to cause disruption to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial and political retaliation. Certain discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks. Numerous examples show that some activities have been prepared over the years and with the support of certain state bodies. Regardless of the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from giving up further activities and will pose an increasing threat to the US security.

Keywords: cyberspace; conflict; US; Iran; North Korea

INTRODUCTION
Most countries have substantial resources based on information and communications technology, including defence systems, public administration systems, complex management systems and information infrastructures that encompass control of electricity, telephone system, money flows, air traffic, oil and gas flows, and other information dependent fields. The society is becoming more and more dependent on information and communications technology [1], which results in its increasing sensitivity both due to the growing number of users and due to the trend of interconnecting computer net-
works [2]. Therefore, the protection of information infrastructures is imposed as one of the priorities of national security [3].

As a result of social needs and technological innovations, cyberspace has been created - an intangible, unlimited interactive space created by computer networks [4]. It is essentially a globally connected information and communications infrastructure [5].

Enemies, whether states, groups or individuals, try to threaten critical information infrastructures using non-traditional methods. It is precisely such attacks that could significantly threaten both the military and economic power of the attacked state. Geopolitical disagreements spill over into cyberspace [6]. States are engaged in the increasing competition in cyberspace "at a level below an armed conflict" [7].

THE CONCEPT OF MULTI-DOMAIN OPERATIONS

In the era of rapid human progress, the US Armed Forces are in a situation where different, connected, elements of the operational environment converge, creating a situation where trends in the diplomatic, information, military and economic sphere quickly transform the nature of all aspects of society, including the character of war. The US strategists estimate that the current US comparative military advantage and capacity to conduct operations against a sophisticated enemy is diminished.

Potential adversaries, above all Russia and China, but also Iran and North Korea, have taken numerous steps to distract the efficiency of the US military power, which creates a more unfavourable situation for the United States. The growth of air, land and naval capabilities of potential adversaries with developed strike capabilities in space and cyberspace enable them to fight the US forces in those areas where the US dominance has long been assumed. The US reliance on cyberspace in the process of command and control of joint air operations can be particularly under threat, having in mind the fact that the main adversaries make great efforts to improve their capabilities in such domain.

Joint Vision 2020 calls for full-spectrum dominance, with the US forces having to conduct fast and synchronised operations with combinations of forces tailored to specific situations, access and freedom to operate in all domains (land, sea, air, space and cyberspace). The ability to achieve superiority in all domains is emphasized as a key factor of dominance [8].

At the end of 2019 the US Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, ordered the relevant services and the Joint Staff to prepare a new Joint Warfighting Concept for operations in all domains (areas, spaces) by the end of 2020. That concept should describe the capabilities and attributes necessary for action in the future, in all domains, which directs the development of the Ministry of Defense in the coming decades.

General John Hyten, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during his lecture on August 12, 2020, organized by the Hudson Institute and reported by Defense News, spoke about the new concept, emphasizing that the greatest difference will be in that there will be no line on the battlefield in the future [9].

The increased, primarily technological development, requires new concepts, so the terminology itself has developed rapidly in recent years - from multi-domain (multidimensional) battle through multi-domain (multidimensional) operation to operations in all domains (Multi-Domain Battle; Multi-Domain Operations; All-Domain Operations).

The concept of a multi-domain operation basically explains how the US forces will deter and defeat an adversary in a situation "below the level of an armed conflict", as well as in the armed conflict itself. This concept enables the US forces to physically, virtually and cognitively overpower their adversaries,
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using combined weapons in all domains. It also provides recommendations regarding the capabilities that commanders need to defeat an advanced enemy and proposes a new framework for better understanding of the 21st century battlefield. A multi-domain operation is necessary for the US forces together with allies and other partners in order to successfully deter and defeat adversaries in future conflicts.

The US strategists estimate that better integration of all forces has to be accomplished in order that the US Armed Forces can maintain superiority in capabilities over advanced enemy technologies and concepts. According to expert estimation, the current system does not integrate all domains enough, such as e.g. technological integration. Certain weaknesses have also been noticed in the real time command and control system.

The concept of the U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 [10], developed by the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 2018, proposes a range of solutions to conflicts in various domains. The main idea is the rapid and continuous integration of all domains of warfare in order to deter the adversary and gain an advantage in an armed conflict. If deterrence failed, military formations as a part of the Joint Staff, would penetrate and disintegrate enemy systems, use the freedom of manoeuvre resulting from such a situation and achieve their own strategic objectives and consolidate profit to force the enemy to return to a more favourable position for the United States, its allies and partners.

**SIGNIFICANCE OF CYBERSPACE FOR THE UNITED STATES**

The establishment of the US Cyber Command in 2009 and obtaining the status of an independent operational command in May 2018 (until then it was a part of the Strategic Command), shows the significance of cyberspace for the Pentagon. In many ways, the exclusion of the US Cyber Command from the Strategic Command, which monitors strategic deterrence, is a symbol of the change in the US attitude in cyberspace from "defence" to "persistent engagement." The United States, still being the most prominent cyber power in the world, has expressed ambitions to carry out cyber operations at all levels of command. The US Cyber Command has the capacity of several thousand members, who can be engaged in planning and carrying out attacks. In mid-2018, the Joint Publication 3-12 Cyberspace Operations Regulation, which defines the evaluation, preparation, planning and execution of cyber operations, was adopted [11].

The Cyber Command presents its objective that the United States has to defend themselves as close as possible to the source of enemy activities and actors before they achieve tactical, operational and strategic advantages. This belief is reinforced in the National Cyber Strategy published in September 2018 [12]. It states that the objective is to identify, counter, distract, degrade and deter behavior in cyberspace that is destabilising and contrary to the national interests of the United States, i.e. achieving the US dominance and supremacy in cyberspace. If fully implemented, the Strategy would involve taking actions against certain actors in cyberspace, which was the case against Iran for allegedly shooting down the US drone.

The US strategic documents emphasize the right to countermeasures and self-defence in the case of a cyber attack. In the previous period the US attitude towards cyberspace was more defensive and aimed primarily at deterring potential attackers. The United States has believed that the perception of their offensive capabilities could deter adversaries from attack. The concept of strategic deterrence in cyberspace has not proven to be effective in practice. Distracting and harassing major competitors in cyberspace, as opposed to deterrence, have become a more attractive option for the US strategists.

In August 2018, the US President Donald Trump issued the order (PPD-20) repealing policies of the former US President Barack Obama, which established a complicated procedure for the interdepartmental process that has to be followed before the United States could launch a cyber attack.
Although the US adversaries believe that in the case of a cyber attack on the United States, this would lead to a response, knowing the difficulties of attributing those attacks to certain state actors, they are increasingly engaging non-state actors to carry out offensive actions against the United States and its allies.

In order to improve deterrence, the United States is increasingly bringing charges against individuals from China, Iran, North Korea and Russia. It is believed that a number of suspects will never face extradition and prosecution, but public disclosure of their names could change their decisions and deter other potential assailants. Moreover, the United States endeavours to impose economic sanctions against individuals and organisations. Several countries, including the United States, publish data on their cyber capabilities and readiness to use them for national defence [13].

US-IRAN RELATIONSHIP

On January 4, 2018, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace published a report in which Iran was identified as a source of threats in cyberspace. The authors state that despite Iran's success with the Shamoon malware and the phishing attack on Deloitte and several other corporations, the Iranian attacks are mostly poorly concealed. As a result, the experts investigating the event did not have much trouble finding the perpetrators. The evidence indicated that the perpetrators were from Iran, both because of the IP addresses and the Persian language terms in the malicious programmes. Iran's capabilities are estimated to be relatively small compared to Russia and China, but they certainly pose a threat to the United States [14].

Some experts believe that with the development of cyber attacks as asymmetric weapons, states will become more involved. The sale of certain conventional weapons to Iran and Syria also indicates the possibility of supply and training when it comes to cyber tools. According to certain sources, the United States and Israel have already had such cooperation related to the malicious programme Stuxnet, which weakened Iran's uranium enrichment capacity in 2010 [14]. This kind of assistance and knowledge transfer has happened in the past, primarily in the field of the development of nuclear weapons [14].

Cyber attacks will not replace terrorism as an asymmetric weapon. Many characteristics that make terrorism attractive to perpetrators can also be related to cyber attacks. The cyber attacks that have been carried out so far, aided by certain states, have not been accompanied by an appropriate negative reaction, detection and prosecution of the perpetrators. Low costs, time and effort to implement, will undoubtedly encourage more states to opt for this type of attack [14].

Just as it is unlikely that Iran will provoke the United States in a large-scale military conflict, it is also unlikely that it will wage a direct war in cyberspace. The comparison of the complexity of the malicious programmes Stuxnet (related to the US and Israel) and Shamoon (related to Iran) illustrates the difference in capabilities. Despite that fact, the United States is vulnerable to cyber attacks. Despite that reality, both sides will continue to prepare for a cyber war. Iran, as well as other countries (China, Russia, North Korea, etc.), and certain non-state actors, have been monitoring the critical infrastructure of the United States and the West for many years. Furthermore, Americans and their allies are engaged in reconnaissance of Iranian infrastructure. At the Aspen Security Forum in July 2018, the director of the US National Intelligence Service, Dan Coats, noted that Iran is preparing to target electrical networks, water dams and technological companies in the US, Europe and the Middle East [15].

Surveillance does not mean that an attack will happen for sure. Like any war plan, cyber plans are updated in order to take into account changes in operating systems, the vulnerability of security and other measures. Iran, i.e. the Hezbollah militant groups with which it cooperates are also engaged in these activities. While cyber warfare is still unlikely, lower-level Iranian attacks against the US government institutions, private companies and organisations are likely to increase. At the end of 2018,
the representatives of the Italian oilfield services company Saipem said that they were endangered by a cyber attack, i.e. a malicious programme that is a variant of the Shamoon malware, which indicates that the perpetrators are probably from Iran. The Saipem's greatest client is the national oil company Saudi Arabian Oil Co., a competitor to the Iranian company, which is probably the reason why the Italian company was attacked. In addition, the London company Certfa, which specializes in monitoring Iranian activities in cyberspace, has published a report that indicates Iranian phishing attacks aimed at the financial infrastructure of the United States. The attacks are also aimed at the Brussels-based Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication-SWIFT), which facilitates global financial transactions [15].

Iran often uses militant lawmakers such as Hezbollah to do "dirty work" for them and give Tehran the opportunity to deny it. In a similar way, it can supply and train them to operate in cyberspace. Iran has rapidly improved its capabilities to operate in cyberspace, so it is estimated that it will continue this trend. That is one of Iranian responses to the US sanctions and their efforts to weaken Iran [15].

The media war between the United States and Iran has also affected certain events in cyberspace. On July 20, 2018, unnamed US security officials warned the US television network NBC News that Iran was preparing to launch the Distributed Denial of Service - DDoS attack on the US infrastructure. Moreover, on July 25, 2018, Symantec Corp warned of a new Iranian hacker group called Leafminer. The group relied on the well-established tactics to target hundreds of public and private organisations across the Middle East, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan [16].

Iran has well-documented history of phishing attacks. Phishing involves persuading a target to open a certain file in an email, allowing a malicious programme to enter a specific device or network, thus allowing attackers access or control. In 2016, Iran redistributed the Shamoon malware, which led to the destruction of thousands of Saudi Aramco computer terminals in 2012. The malware destroyed data and disrupted organisations across the Middle East. An analysis of the 2017 attack by IBM shows that the malicious programme was distributed by sending resumes, cover letters and other job application materials, which contain hidden malicious scripts in seemingly harmless Microsoft Word documents [16].

In 2017 an Iranian group called APT33 (abbreviation for Advanced Persistent Threat) sent materials with malware to the employees in the aviation sector in Saudi Arabia. According to the March 2018 data, an Iranian cyber operation compromised 8,000 accounts of approximately 100,000 targeted academics. Although the success rate of 8% is relatively low, it can give great numbers when the target group is large enough. In the mentioned case, academics from 21 countries received an e-mail expressing an interest in their work. The messages contained links to the websites that mimicked their university application page. The information obtained in this way could be used to access legitimate university websites, revealing emails, research results and contact lists [16].

The same group accused of targeting academia has compromised the accounts in 36 US and 11 foreign companies by simply scanning corporate e-mail accounts and using some of the most common passwords. At least 47 employees have used extremely weak passwords (123456789, or even "password"). The Leafminer group has used this tactic, as well. A slightly more sophisticated tactic involves scanning databases and trying to link previously compromised usernames and passwords to similar usernames on other accounts [16].

One of the most active cyber groups in Iran called Charming Kitten is associated with at least two attacks by making fake websites. The websites of the Lebanese government, the Saudi health service and the University of Azerbaijan have been compromised. Charming Kitten has also designed websites with addresses that imitate the legitimate ones. The German news service Deutsche Welle has been compromised by adding a "net" subdomain to the domain name to deceive visitors and make them think they have visited a legitimate site. In addition, they have created a fictitious website of the Brit-
ish News Agency with the aim of enticing visitors to visit the site and download malicious software [16].

Unnamed senior US officials say the Iranian hackers have the ability to carry out sophisticated cyber attacks on the US and European infrastructure and private companies. The German intelligence agency has also reported an increasing frequency of attacks in recent years, which are probably of the Iranian origin [17].

The imbalance of power will prevent Iran from a direct military conflict with the United States and their allies, but greater action by an asymmetric arsenal such as e.g. cyber attacks is expected [15]. However, in order to develop advanced cyber capabilities, the state needs many resources: a strong high education system, investment in research and development, public-private cooperation, etc. There is little chance for the states such as Iran and North Korea to have all the resources and attract world-class cyber experts. What they lack in resources, they make up for with ambition and great desire, as it was the case with nuclear weapons. With some external expertise, they could overcome their limitations and become a far more serious threat [14].

**US-NORTH KOREA RELATIONSHIP**

In July 2018, it was reportedly spotted that the Islamic Republic of Iran was playing a number game in cyberspace, using relatively simple techniques to access computer systems, targeting thousands of users in the hope that at least a small percentage of those at risk would become victims. The US Justice Department officials have repeatedly accused North Korea of similar incidents [18].

Certain sources state that North Korea is the most likely perpetrator of the attacks on Sony Pictures in 2014, Bangladesh Bank in 2016, WannaCry in 2016 and 2017, and dozens of other attacks. The operations carried out by North Korea and Iran have a lot in common in terms of targeting and tactics, but there is a key difference in how the two countries approach their cyber campaigns. While Iran tends to play a game of large numbers, North Korea prepares attacks for months or sometimes years [18].

Iranian and North Korean operations are similar in target selection, planning and exploitation of attacks. Both states target the US companies working for the defence system and financial institutions. Iranian DDOS attacks on the US financial institutions from 2011 to 2013 cost the US companies millions of dollars, while Iranian costs were minimal. A series of North Korean attacks on financial institutions around the world have allegedly caused damage amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars [18].

Both states undertake different variants of phishing attacks in an attempt to deceive their victims into downloading malicious software by presenting it as a legitimate link or file. The alleged $81 million theft of North Korea from the Central Bank of Bangladesh, by sending a malicious programme hidden as resumes and cover letters sent by e-mail to employees, represents its "greatest success" in cyberspace. While Iran used to have a motive only to cause disruption or disturbance to the functioning of financial institutions, North Korean motive was both financial one and political retaliation. Both states have shown a propensity to launch devastating attacks. The 2017 WannaCry attack, which is believed to be conducted by North Korea, disguised as a ransomware attack, was aimed at shutting down the system [18].

However, differences between North Korea and Iran arise in their approaches to monitoring the system. Using non-intrusive surveillance, attackers often conduct passive surveillance of the target network, while by intrusive surveillance they illegally access the target network to monitor an activity from the inside. Entering the network often precedes the main attack, whose goals could be the theft of information or money, distribution of malicious software, etc. Certain, discovered incidents indicate that North Korea devotes much more time to conducting invasive surveillance before carrying out attacks [18].
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In carrying out their numerous attacks, North Korean attackers often use the same attack infrastructure in order to reduce costs and increase efficiency. Attackers, of course, obscure their identity using proxy servers, Virtual Private Networks - VPNs, etc. The use of the same e-mail addresses, devices, IP addresses, etc., indicates the fact that North Korea is responsible for certain attacks in cyberspace. It can be expected that in the future, it will modify its tools and look for other targets in the US and the states with which they cultivate "close relations" [18].

Cyber capabilities are becoming a powerful instrument of national power. For a state to be a superpower in the 21st century, it should have respectable capabilities for cyber warfare [19]. In addition to the United States, Russia, Iran and North Korea, according to cyber security experts’ assessment, there are between 20 and 30 countries that have respectable capabilities for cyber warfare [20][21]. The experts Clarke and Knake have given a measure of capability for this type of warfare on the basis of the evaluation of offensive power, defence capabilities and dependence on computer systems. Addiction refers to critical information systems that do not have an adequate replacement, and that are dependent on cyberspace6.

According to Clarke and Knake, the United States does not have the ability to disconnect from the rest of cyberspace, which is a negative aspect in terms of security. In addition, the United States is heavily dependent on cyberspace while North Korea has a small number of systems dependent on cyberspace, so a potential cyber attack would not cause more serious consequences. According to the mentioned authors, North Korea has the greatest capabilities for cyber warfare among the analysed countries, followed by Iran and the United States. Today the United States is far more vulnerable to cyber attacks than Iran and North Korea, so possible cyber warfare is currently a disadvantage for the United States [21].

CONCLUSION

The military presence in cyberspace is unquestionable. Incidents between countries are becoming more numerous and serious. These examples show that some activities have been prepared for years and with the support of certain state authorities. Despite the fact that an investigation has been launched against certain groups, which have been most often sponsored by states, it is unlikely that this will deter countries such as North Korea and Iran from further activities and it will pose an increasing threat to the US security.

Geopolitical disagreements and different interests will be reflected in the events in cyberspace, as well. Threats in such a space are constantly evolving and they will undoubtedly be more sophisticated, dangerous and more frequently sponsored by states in the future. The future is also characterised by more "serious players" in cyberspace, who will use this field against each other. The digital revolution has produced a new area in which certain segments of society are being spied on, sabotaged and threatened in various ways. In that sense, critical information infrastructures, which are in a large percentage in private ownership, and which the society significantly depends on, will be particularly sensitive.

The digital revolution has produced a new domain in which there will undoubtedly continue to be spying on, sabotaging or clashing in various ways. Future enemies, whether states, groups or individuals, may attempt to threaten information infrastructures using non-traditional methods, and precisely such attacks could significantly threaten both the military and economic power of the attacked state. The information revolution and related organisational and functional changes are changing even the nature of conflict, especially between states, as well as the way they are resolved. The relations between world and regional powers in cyberspace will largely depend on the relations of those countries in the real world.
Acknowledgement

The paper is the result of work on the scientific research project "Physiognomy of modern armed conflicts", which is conducted on the basis of the Plan of scientific research activities in the Ministry of Defence and the Serbian Armed Forces for 2021, number 2-2.

Endnotes


2. The Shamoon malware (W32.DistTrack) was discovered in August 2012 by Kaspersky, Symantec and Seculert. In relation to other malicious programmes, it is characterised by great destructiveness and the necessity of high costs and recovery time of the target system.

3. IP address (Internet Protocol address) is a unique 32-bit number used by various devices to communicate with each other over the Internet, using certain protocols.

4. Stuxnet is a malicious computer programme, discovered in 2010, which endangered Iranian nuclear programme and it is suspected to have been made by the United States and Israel.

5. Ransomware is a type of malicious software that restricts the access to computer systems or stored files, and a ransom is demanded from a victim in order to obtain the parameters to access them.

6. A less dependent country gets a greater number of points when being ranked. The measure of cyber warfare capability of the considered countries is shown according to the following:
   - US – cyber attack = 8, cyber addiction = 2, cyber defence = 1; total: 11.
   - Iran – cyber attack = 4, cyber addiction = 5, cyber defence = 3; total: 12.
   - N. Korea – cyber attack = 2, cyber addiction = 9, cyber defence = 7; total: 18.

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Sajber prostor kao područje sukobljavanja - slučaj SAD - Iran i Severna Koreja

Sažetak:
Poslednjih godina sajber prostor sve češće predstavlja područje sukobljavanja vodećih svetskih i regionalnih sila. U radu je prikazan njegov značaj i ukratko je opisan novi koncept zajedničkog ratovanja Sjedinjenih Američkih Država. Razmatrani su određeni događaji i aktivnosti u sajber prostoru, u poslednjih nekoliko godina, između SAD sa jedne, odnosno Irana i Severne Koreje sa druge strane. Navedeni predmet istraživanja je u direktnoj vezi sa ciljem rada koji je usmeren na ukazivanje i objašnjenje oblika i karakteristika napada, kao i određenih aktera sukobljavanja u sajber prostoru. Osnovna hipoteza jeste da sajber prostor predstavlja područje sukobljavanja svetskih i regionalnih sila u kome one često koriste nedržavne aktere kao posrednike, uz neprekidno usavršavanje tehnika i metoda izvođenja napada. Pored opših naučnih metoda, s obzirom na predmet i cilj istraživanja, težišno su korišćene komparativna metoda kojom su analizirane i upoređivane sličnosti i razlike realizacije napada na informacionu infrastrukturu strana u sukobu, kao i metoda analize sadržaja, imajući u vidu da su kao izvori saznanja korišćeni zvanični i referentni ekspertski izveštaji, naučni radovi i druge publikacije. Na osnovu iznete argumentacije u radu, može se zaključiti da su incidenti u sajber prostoru između SAD i Irana, odnosno Severne Koreje, brojni, često dugo pripremani, uz aktivno učešće nedržavnih aktera.

Ključne reči: sajber prostor; sukobljavanje; SAD; Iran; Severna Koreja