

Creator of the present in an attempt to understand the future or what can be counted as, but not reduced to, Kissinger's legacy



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Abstract:

The text was written with an idea of reviewing the book *The Age of A.I. and Our Human Future* (2021/2022) by Henry Kissinger and his eminent associates Eric Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher, which was published in the USA when Kissinger was 99 years old. Since in the meantime this US statesman passed away at the age of 101, it was impossible not to take into consideration and, at least briefly, not point to Kissinger's main accomplishments in international relations and diplomacy, his attitudes relevant for the Yugoslav crisis, and then look at this diplomat's attempt in the book about artificial intelligence to perceive its potentials and, by understanding its advantages and shortcomings, to model the direction of the development of humanity. That is why this paper consists of two parts. The first part sketches Kissinger's influence of US foreign affairs and making far-reaching foreign policy decisions of the USA, which created the world we used to know in the second half of the 20th century, with a particular emphasis on the establishment of relations between the People's Republic of China and the USA, and the détente policy of the USA and the USSR. In the second part, attention is dedicated to Kissinger's analyses and warnings about the emergence and development of artificial intelligence. Although he delved into this field at a rather advanced age, his insights are extremely important, particularly given his striving for international cooperation in the regulation of this matter.

Keywords: Henry Kissinger; diplomacy; artificial intelligence

1. CREATING THE PRESENT

Famous American diplomat Henry A. Kissinger (1923–2023) was called, primarily by his critics, the hawk of US foreign affairs. His role in political violence in different parts of the world – as the national security advisor and the US Secretary of State in the administrations of President Nixon¹ and President Ford – is rather contentious, to say the least. From his influence on the ending of the Vietnam War, direct involvement in overthrowing from power Salvador Allende, the legally elected socialist president of Chile² and the coup³ in which Augusto Pinochet, the profascist dictator, came to power in the CIA scenario, via his support to the Argentinian neo-Nazi regime (“the worst of all Latin American monsters those years” [Chomsky, in: Chomsky, Waterstone, 2022, p. 42]), participation in the decisions about the interventions in Cambodia and Laos, which caused the death of tens of thousands of people, to his support to Indonesia in East Timor, to Pakistan against Bangladesh, the coup against Archbishop Makarios in Cyprus etc.

On the other hand, those in favour of somewhat different allegories, described him as a pigeon (of peace), having in mind his creator role in the end of the Vietnam War, when the USA needed “an honourable exit” from it. Kissinger ensured the end of the conflict through negotiations with Lê Đức Thọ, the leader of North Vietnam, in Paris in 1973, which earned them both the Nobel Peace Prize that year⁴. Kissinger certainly contributed to the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict which broke out because of Israel's occupation of the Golan Heights. That is when the so-called shuttle diplomacy was promoted, which produced results due to Kissinger's skilful performance. Finally, there is and the détente policy with the Soviet Union, and reaching agreement SALT I signed by Nixon and Brezhnev. Some time before that, Kissinger also reached agreement about the normalization of relations between PR China and the USA in the negotiations with the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai. Namely, in 1972, Nixon and Mao Zedong signed the agreement, reaching the position of the recognition of “the policy of one China” – the People's Republic of China, which was preceded by its membership in the OUN, when China replaced Taiwan in this organization, with the ritual opposition of the USA. During his last visit to

China in 2023, several months before his death, where he was welcomed as an “old friend” (Xi Jinping), Kissinger said that the USA and China “cannot afford being hostile to each other” (BBC NEWS, 2023). This message sounds substantially different from the conclusions of the analysis performed by Brzeziński (Brzeziński, 2013) (Figure 1).




Figure 1.

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum. Richard Nixon resignation letter to Henry Kissinger and transcript of Ford's oath of office to become president, Michigan, USA
Photo: Shutterstock

It should be observed that in his diplomacy Kissinger was guided by pragmatics. He did not hesitate to change his initial position in the course of the process to the point of unrecognizability. It was important for him to achieve the set goal of US foreign policy, while, in line with the Machiavellian principle, any means justified the ends. If something could be decided in negotiations. Fine; if a war was necessary, there was no need to hesitate; if the war has begun – America must, at least in some way, end it successfully. Therefore, the question of moral principles in *foreign policy* (italics by the author) was not the guiding one; it was necessary to achieve the goal. We call it Machiavellianism, some others speak about moral relativism, even “amorality” (Visković), while Kissinger’s followers call this approach Realpolitik, and the same is done by the largest number of theoreticians of international relations.

It should also be said that Kissinger was an oldtime statesman. It means: he was very well educated, which is not the characteristic of the members of the political class in modern Europe⁵ and the USA. He earned his PhD at Harvard University, where he also worked as a professor. Among other things, he wrote *Diplomacy*, one of the best and definitely most translated textbooks of the history of diplomacy and international relations, drawing both on the presentation of different theoretical positions and on his own experience acquired in his practice of being involved in diplomatic affairs.

This education was exactly what helped Kissinger to understand the Yugoslav crisis, or at least the essence of its stages so far, since the author of this text does not believe that this crisis has ended yet. However, it should be noted that Kissinger’s youth in Germany, and even his subsequent conservative attitude ideology, also caused his, so as to say, “historical misconceptions” which he kept until his death, for example, that the assassination of Ferdinand in Sarajevo was “an act of terrorism” (Kissinger, 1999a, pp. 174–175) and that the assassin was a “Serbian nationalist” (Kissinger, Schmidt, Huttenlocher, 2021/2022, p. 83). This is definitely a German paradigm of war instigators who transferred the blame on those refusing to be enslaved, the view of the historians of the country that does not accept the defeat in the First World War⁶; however, the historical truth is diametrically opposite: the assassination against the occupier was an act of liberation, and Gavrilo Princip was a Yugoslav nationalist by all parameters of that time. In the above-mentioned textbook, this is how Kissinger describes the formation of Yugoslavia after the First World War, while at the same time listing causes for it:

“The new Yugoslavia fulfilled the aspirations of South Slavic intellectuals. But to create that state, it was necessary to cross the fault line of European history, which divided the Western and the Eastern Roman empires, the Catholic and the Orthodox religions, the Latin and the Cyrillic scripts – a fault line running roughly between Croatia and Serbia, which had never in their complex histories belonged to the same political unit. The bill for this came due after 1941, in a murderous civil war which started all over again in 1991” (Kissinger, 1999a, p. 202).

It is due to the application of the principle of historicity in interpreting events, i.e., contextualization⁷, that he understood the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina

much better than other politicians and theoreticians in the West (Figure 2).



Figure 2.

US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger at the reception by Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito, in Belgrade, on 4 November 1974.

Photo: Museum of Yugoslavia, Photo-archives of Josip Broz Tito

“We act as if we’re trying to force the Serbs back into a mythical Bosnia that has never existed in history. There is no Bosnian language. There is no Bosnian culture. Bosnia is an administrative entity which contains Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, artificially created as a subdivision of Yugoslavia and foolishly recognized as a state by the Western powers in 1991. If you had looked at Serbian history, for 600 years they have fought not to be dominated by Muslims. And why the United States should violate its own principle of self-determination to bomb them back, why our media should call them the separatist Serbs, what are they separating from that has ever existed? So I believe that what we should do is create a Muslim state or recognize a Muslim state, permit the other nationalities either to make themselves independent or join Croatia and Serbia, as the case may be, and not get ourselves involved in a Balkan war that cannot end, even if we win it. We cannot stay there in permanent occupation. The Germans required 17 divisions to police Serbia in the last war, and we do not have a stomach for anything like that, nor should we have” (Kissinger, 1994)⁸.

From this slightly longer quote we may see that Kissinger was extremely familiar with the Yugoslav situation and the relations in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that he advocated for its solution in the most democratic way possible – by applying the principle of self-

determination of a nation, which is an “American principle” in foreign policy ever since Woodrow Wilson⁹. The statements from this interview with Kissinger are in full compliance with the policy pursued by official Serbia of the time (as well as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) and that, if they had been accepted in the past, they would have meant stability in the Balkans and in contemporaneity.

He will even more sharply oppose the NATO aggression against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999. We believe that Kissinger’s assessment of the document (or so-called agreement), offered by Madeline Albright to the Yugoslav delegation in the castle of Rambouillet, presents its essence most concisely and precisely, while at the same time he expresses indignation at the fact that it was the product of the US diplomacy of the time. It is clear that Kissinger’s assessment, just as the document itself, constituted integral part of the history of diplomacy of the 20th century:

“The Rambouillet text, which called on Serbia to admit NATO troops throughout Yugoslavia, was a provocation, an excuse to start bombing. Rambouillet is not a document that an angelic Serb could have accepted. It was a terrible diplomatic document that should never have been presented in that form” (Kissinger, 1999b)¹⁰.

Moreover, he thoroughly analyzed Clinton's address on the occasion of beginning the aggression, placing it, of course, into the context of the document offered in Rambouillet, as well as its potential implications. Establishing, first of all, that, contrary to the US mainstream propaganda, "Slobodan Milošević is not Hitler", and that, contrary to Clinton's claims, "neither Milošević nor any other Balkan leader is in a position to threaten global balance", Kissinger emphasizes that, "unlike Bosnia, Kosovo is a war for the territory considered by the Serbs a national sanctity. That is why in Belgrade there were few, if any signs of opposition to Milošević's policy regarding Kosovo. The Serbs have rejected the Rambouillet agreement because they see in it a prelude to independence for Kosovo. They also see the presence of NATO troops as the sort of foreign occupation Serbia has historically resisted against the Ottoman and Austrian empires, Hitler and Stalin. Even if they are bombed into capitulation, they can hardly be expected to be willing supporters of the outcome. As for the KLA, its goal is independence, not autonomy; it acceded to Rambouillet as a tactical device to unleash NATO air power against the hated Serbs. The KLA is even less likely to agree to autonomy under

Serbian rule now that Serbia has been so weakened by the NATO air campaign. The KLA will not turn in its weapons to NATO forces. And NATO forces will have no domestic support if they fight the KLA to impose disarmament. Nor will the KLA acquiesce to Serbian forces policing its frontiers" (Kissinger, 1999c). In the same text, Kissinger predicts that "as Kosovo moves toward independence, the pressures on Macedonia, a third of whose population is Albanian, will increase. Namely, they will want to be granted the same self-determination as their brethren inside Serbia".

Despite such understanding of the problem, Kissinger advocated for the continuation of the air campaign – so as to prevent the compromising of the NATO – while at the same time passionately rejecting the beginning of the land invasion, but also leaving the possibility of its consideration for the purpose of maintaining "the NATO credibility". Finally, he predicted the outcome: long-term presence of the NATO in Kosovo and Metohija or in Macedonia¹¹ "to prevent the Balkan conflict from widening", as well as long and difficult negotiations which he believed would result in "some form of Kosovo independence" (Figure 3).



Figure 3. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, chairman of President Reagan's Bipartisan Commission on Central America, presides over a meeting at the State Department, Washington DC, January 6, 1983

Kissinger similarly addressed the problem of Ukraine. Ten days before the referendum in Crimea in 2014., where a decision was made to return this strategically important peninsula to the territory of Russia, in his text published in the *Washington Post* Kissinger point-

ed to the premises as a starting point in preventing the conflict, since it was likely to occur in the near future. He also analyzed the history of Ukraine, showing that it was a country with only 23-year-long history of independence. In addition, he recalls Kiev Russia and the

fact that the Russians received Christianity in that territory, stressing that “the Wests must understand that for Russia, Ukraine can never be just a foreign country”. He asserts that Ukraine was part of Russia for centuries and warns that this country is divided into western and eastern parts in terms of identity, and that the differences are huge: while the western part is Catholic and speaks Ukrainian, the eastern part is Orthodox and speaks Russian. He believes that the problem is in the fact that both parts are trying to impose itself to the other one in terms of rule, but that “any attempt by one wing of Ukraine to dominate the other – as has been the pattern – would lead eventually to civil war or breakup. To treat Ukraine as part of an East-West confrontation would scuttle for decades any prospect to bring Russia and the West – especially Russia and Europe – into a cooperative international system” (Kissinger, 2014). Unfortunately, Kissinger’s warnings, issued in a timely manner, were not taken into account. What he had predicted actually occurred and today there is an ongoing war between the NATO (the USA + the EU) and Russia in the territory of Ukraine (see Šuvaković, 2023), which has lasted two and a half years and its end cannot be predicted. In the same text, Kissinger opts for a solution that will not be “absolute satisfaction but balanced dissatisfaction”, considering it a test for the agreement sustainability¹². Accordingly he advocated for Ukraine’s right to access different international organizations, including the EU, but not the NATO since he opposed any change in Ukraine’s borders as it would undermine the world order and, in that respect, he was in favour of keeping Crimea as its integral part, but with the guarantee of great autonomy for the people living there and for resolving the status of Sevastopol as the base of the Black Sea fleet in the long run. Finally, he believed that Ukrainian government should be a reflection of the national will and that it would be wise for the government to take a position similar to the then position of Finland: being turned towards the West, but not challenging Russia¹³. Two years later, he revised his position and advised the then US President Donald Trump to accept that Crimea belonged to Russia, but without any official recognition, thinking that Crimea must not be a problem on the relation Washington–Moscow (Kissinger, 2016).

After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, several statements by Kissinger were differently interpreted. However, evolution existed and was evident throughout the length of the conflict: he became inconsistent that Russia must not be allowed to have benefits from the war; he advocated for negotiations and allowed for the possibility of Ukraine becoming a

member of the NATO after the end of the negotiations. Therefore, the negotiations were his primary choice but as the conflict escalated, his attitude also shifted closer to the attitude of the collective West.

2. LOOKING AT THE CHALLENGE OF THE FUTURE THAT HAS ALREADY STARTED

It is difficult to predict social consequences of artificial intelligence.
(Kissinger et al., 2022, p. 56)

Being accustomed to seeing Kissinger’s practical and academic work through the prism of dealing with diplomacy and international relations, our academic public did not show particular interest in the book by Henry Kissinger, Eric Schmidt¹⁴ and Daniel Huttenlocher¹⁵, *The Age of A.I. and Our Human Future*, published in the USA in 2021. In our country, it was translated and published in 2022 by Klub plus, which serves a credit to this small publisher. In Serbian social periodicals, as far as we know, only three reviews of this quite important monograph have been published – one from the perspective of political science (Orlović, 2023), the second from the aspect of the safety relationship between man and artificial intelligence (Marković, 2023) and the third from the perspective of historical science (Dimitrijević, 2024). This book certainly deserves more attention for minimum two reasons: first, it was written by the people who have plenty to say about this issue, so that much can be also learned from them and, not less importantly, the issue of artificial intelligence goes deep not only in every science and scientific discipline, but the question of its emergence and development also goes into the foundations of science as a human creation, ultimately questioning it and radically changing human society. Therefore, artificial intelligence is a technological challenge, although being a revolutionary technology¹⁶, but it is much more than a social challenge poses, because it revolutionizes our life and our view of humanity, even our existence. That is exactly what is suggested by the authors of this book and it is absolutely a pity that the book has not been sufficiently recognized by our scientists.

It is too bad that the authors did not clearly which of them wrote specific parts of the book, thus leaving us to make conclusions about it on the basis of knowing their work in the past. However, Kissinger’s signature is recognizable in certain parts (historical development, worldview from human perspective, international agreement on regulating nuclear weapons, how

to control the development of artificial intelligence etc.), just as that the final editing of the text seems to have been done by him (definitely not without the co-authors' consent)¹⁷. That is why the introductory pages contain the note that there is no full agreement among them: "to some degree, we three differ in the extent to which we are optimists about artificial intelligence. But we agree that technology is changing human thought, knowledge, perception, and reality – and, in so doing, changing the course of human history" (Kissinger et al., 2022, p. 3). However, as it can be subsequently seen from the book, the authors do not ascribe these revolutionary changes to every technology. On the contrary, they indicate that the emergence of various new technologies has led to changes, but that "only rarely has technology fundamentally transformed the social and political structure of our societies" (Ibid., 12). The authors mention Gutenberg's printing press as an example of a revolutionary technology (Ibid., 125)¹⁸. The potential for such dramatic change, according to the authors, is possessed by artificial intelligence¹⁹, whose "outcome will be the alteration of human identity and the human experience of reality, at levels not experienced since the dawn of the modern age" (Ibid., 2).

The authors of the monograph first present AI successes using the examples of several programs based on it: AlfaZero in chess, against the previously most powerful form of artificial intelligence created for this game; the discovery of a novel and most comprehensive antibiotic – halicin, at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), in which artificial intelligence participated; finally, GPT₃ creation by OpenAI. What was new here? Unlike previous chess playing programs, based on fast processing of *human understanding* of this game, acquired during a millennium-long period, AlfaZero only knew the rules of the game. The rules were given to it and its instruction was to win or get the best position possible. Hence this program in some games also sacrificed those pieces human players considered vital, including the queen. "It had a logic of its own, informed by its ability to recognize *patterns* of moves across vast sets of possibilities human minds cannot fully digest or employ" (Ibid., p. 6). As for the discovery of halicin, according to Kissinger et al., as shown on the example of 2,000 different molecules, AI, "*learned* the attributes of molecules predicted to be antibacterial". What is pointed out by the authors of the monograph is that AI simultaneously, without being asked, established new attributes of those molecules, neither identified nor encoded by the researchers. When faced with 61,000 different mole-

cules, FDA-approved drugs, and natural products for molecules:

- "1) that AI predicted would be effective as antibiotics,
- 2) that did not look like any existing antibiotics,
- 3) that AI predicted would be nontoxic",

AI chose only one molecule fitting these criteria, and it was named halicin. The same scenario was repeated once again: "artificial intelligence identified relationships that had escaped human detection – or possibly even defied human description" (Ibid., pp. 7–8). Even after the antibiotic was discovered, humans could not articulate precisely why it worked²⁰. Finally, with the introduction of GPT₃, AI progressed to the level of a *generative model*. It is now able to offer the end of a sentence, to write a passage or a shorter tractate, to answer the questions posed about everything that has corresponding information contained on the Internet. That is why it may be classified as a *virtual autodidact* – "it learns" from the information left by humans – consciously or unconsciously – about themselves or others in the web-space. However, there is also an important limitation here: what does not exist on the web can hardly be a subject about which GPT₃ will be able to discuss²¹.

Kissinger et al. found their book on three above-mentioned examples of AI application in chess, pharmacology and language, pointing out that *in those cases* AI proved to possess the possibilities which are *similar to human ones or exceed them*, while humans *do not understand the methods, or procedures through which AI achieves that*. Furthermore, it rightfully causes their concern for the future of everything created by man – from the existing relations between countries to the meaning of existence of science, philosophy and even man himself. Namely, even if the development of AI does not reach the degree of AGI²², in the light of Descartes' maxim "I think, therefore I am", the authors quite reasonably wonder: "Who are we here?" Is human identity brought to question since the intellect has always been (and still is) what distinguished man from other living beings on the planet. Now, all of a sudden, there is something that "understands>", but it not the human intellect? Is man encountering competition on planet earth? Will man still create his own future? Will he rule the technology or vice versa? How will AI affect our culture, our concept of humanity and, after all, our history?" (Kissinger et al., 2022, p. 11). All

these questions are raised by this monograph while offering possible answers to some of them.

The authors point to AI being based on the previously created computers and the Internet, as well as on networking²³. According to them, artificial intelligence “learns”, and the basis of that are big datasets, which are digitalized, networked and available for machine learning. It is stated that there are three forms of machine learning currently used: a) supervised, b) unsupervised, and c) enhanced learning (Ibid., pp. 40–42). These models have been applied in the creation of different types of AI which were very well selected by the authors for the purpose of illustration. They point out that “AI fragility” lies in the “shallowness of what is learned”, since the connection between *input* and *output* in supervised and enhanced learning is essentially a different property from “true human understanding with all its numerous levels of conceptualization and experience”. In addition, it also derives from the fact of its “unreasonableness” – “AI does not know what it does not know” (Ibid., p. 50). Different kinds of machine learning and the pace of AI development assert that in the future decisions will be made in three main manners: „via people (known to human minds), then via machines (which is becoming known) and via cooperation between people and machines (which is not only unknown, but also unprecedented)” (Ibid., p. 14). Due to the unprecedented nature of the process, machines transform from human tools into – *human partners* (Ibidem). The main challenge is, to put in in the language of management, how people will manage to preserve the status of the “older partner”. The development of procedures which will reliably test whether AI will function in line with our goals and expectations is imposed as imperative (Ibid., pp. 50–52).

The authors particularly address the question of network platforms and the “network platform geopolitics”. They indicate that the most significant global network platforms were made in the USA or in China, which are, together with Russia and India as a “new power in this arena”, also the “main stakeholders” in the creation of artificial intelligence, while the EU²⁴ has not even entered the race yet, if we exempt the adoption of certain European regulations in this field (Ibid., pp. 74–77). The result is that network platforms are created so as to cover the regions which are, primarily in commercial terms, a priority for the USA and China²⁵. According to the authors of the book, this adds another important segment to making foreign policy decisions – the commercial interest of different platforms, which is further compounded given that the interest is

often based on “the priorities of buyers and research and technological centres, both of which may be far from capital cities” (Ibid., p. 60). The key question for the authors is platform administration, giving priority to some content while disturbing or removing other content, criteria by which selection proceeds, which is increasingly less human and being left to AI. Platforms are the creations which cannot be compared to anything in the “predigital age”²⁶. It results in the “standards of their community becoming equally influential as state laws” (Ibidem). However, “what seems intuitive to a software engineer may be confusing to a political leader or inexplicable to a philosopher. What a consumer greets as an amenity, a national security official may see as an unacceptable threat, or a political leader may reject it as unfavourable for national goals. What one society may accept as a welcome guarantee, the other society may interpret it as a loss of choice or freedom” (Ibid., p. 61). Here it is definitely necessary to take into account the role of network platforms in the placement of disinformation, the possibility of AI doing it quite convincingly and beyond state borders, globally, but that it can also be used in the defence against such “attacks”. However, here a question also arises: what is truth and what is a lie in the age of semi-truth? The authors wonder whether there is a legitimate interest of the public in reading “lies” generated by AI. Isn’t their prevention actually censorship in a new guise? Or in an old guise, through taking protectionist measures for certain platforms, e.g., TikTok-y in the USA and India (Ibid., p. 73).

In our opinion, the key chapter of this extremely important book is the one addressing the question of security and the world order, which is questioned by the advent of AI. Namely, the existing system is based on different agreements; it is the result of numerous and laborious diplomatic negotiations, secret and public connections which have created current international relations. It is particularly important when it comes to nuclear weapons, their control and relations between nuclear superpowers. “No great country cannot afford ignoring security dimensions of artificial intelligence. The race for the strategic advantage of artificial intelligence is already underway, particularly between the USA and China and, to a certain extent, Russia” (Ibid., p. 85). The authors point to the existence of nuclear, cyber technologies and artificial intelligence technology, and that each of the will no doubt play its role in the security strategy. That is why they apodictically believe that “the USA should further try to shape them” (Ibidem). Just as in the Cold War period, it is necessary to achieve the “balance of powers”. This is something typical of Kissinger. However, during

the Cold War, the danger was measurable, at least roughly. It was possible to count the number of missiles in someone's possession, their range, their ability to carry nuclear warheads and how many at the same time (Ibid., p. 93). With the warning that the principle of the "non-use of nuclear power is not an inherently permanent accomplishment" and that "it requires real and recognized balance" (Ibid., p. 92), the authors also point out that with the advent of cyber weapons and, so as to name it as the general concept of *artificially intelligent weapons*, it is substantially more difficult. First of all, cyber weapons are non-transparent. They may also be used from an office or a forest. It can very easily fall into the hands of terrorists (just as access to AI) or smaller countries which cannot develop nuclear potentials, but can have relatively significant possibilities for e.g., cyber warfare. Cyber weapons activation does not require large computers, although computer systems with a large memory power are definitely necessary to support their functioning. Kissinger et al. illustrate cyber warfare with the example of DDoS attacks, which look like legitimate requests for access to information, but are emitted simultaneously in such numbers that the system falls²⁷. The authors point to the similarity between cyber weapons and chemical and biological weapons, in terms of effects of the attack expanding horizontally, and on the victims which were not the target of the attack, thus causing harm "in unintentional and unknown ways" (Ibidem).

Kissinger et al. emphasize that AI introduces "new horizons in the information space, including the field of disinformation. Generative artificial intelligence may create huge amounts of fake, but convincing information. Disinformation and psychological warfare with the aid of artificial intelligence, including the use of artificially created persons, images, video-clips and speech, are ready to produce upsetting new weaknesses, *particularly to free societies* (italics by the author)²⁸. Widely shared demonstrations produced seemingly realistic images and video-clips of public figures who say things they have never said... If a synthetic image of the national leader is manipulated by an opponent in order to entice dissent or issue misleading instructions, the question is whether the public (or even other governments and officials) will observe the deceit in a timely manner"²⁹ (Ibid., p. 97).

The authors rightfully express concern about who controls artificial intelligence. Regardless of whether artificial intelligence is used in conventional or (God forbid) nuclear warfare, "it is imperative to ensure an adequate role of human judgment in the supervision

and use of force". But it will be insufficient and one-sided, and that is why it is necessary that the "governments of technologically advanced countries explore the challenges of mutual constraint with the aim of applicable examination" (Ibid., p. 101).

In its strategy, the USA has distinguished between *artificial intelligence guided weapons*, "which make war led by men more precise, deadly and efficient", and *artificial intelligence weapons*, i.e., those "which make deadly decisions autonomously and independently of human operators. The USA have announced its goal of limiting the use to the first category" (Ibid., pp. 104–105). Kissinger et al. assess this distinction as "wise", while expressing a dose of fear that AI's ability of self-learning "might render insufficient the limitation to certain abilities" (Ibidem). The authors believe that defence "will have to be automated, without conceding the basic elements of human control" (Ibid., p. 106). In that respect, they propose that countries should define "six primary tasks in the control of their arsenals":

1. "Leaders of rival and enemy sides *must* (italics by the author) be ready to regularly speak to one another", as it was done during the Cold War, "about the forms of wars they do not want to wage";
2. Nuclear strategy must be once again be dedicated attention and recognize it as "one of great strategic, technical and moral challenges";
3. "Leading cyber and AI powers need to strive to define their doctrines and borders (even if all their aspects have not been publicly announced) and to identify points of coincidence between their doctrines and doctrines of the rival powers". Of course, the terminology sometimes needs adapting to the "characteristic aspects of cyber intelligence and artificial intelligence";
4. Internal revision of own weapons by the states which possess them, primarily in the domain of "commanding and control, and early warning". This would act preventively against potential cyber-attacks, as well as reduce the danger of "unauthorized, unintentional or accidental use of mass destruction weapons";
5. It is necessary, particularly for technologically most developed countries, to create "robust and accepted methods for maximizing the decision-making time during the period of enhanced tension and in extreme situations... Opponents should particularly try to negotiate

a mechanism which will ensure that decisions that may prove to be irrevocable are made at a pace corresponding to human thought and consideration – and survival”;

6. The authors suggest that the chief AI powers should consider “how to limit continuous expansion of military artificial intelligence or whether to make systematic efforts in its non-expansion, with the support of diplomacy and the threat by power” (Ibid., pp. 106–107).

The conclusion reached by the authors in this chapter is actually the guiding idea of the entire book. That is what it was created for. Everything else is more or less an analysis, but this is Kissinger’s message to the generations of future leaders:

“The will to achieve mutual containment of the most destructive capabilities must not wait for tragedy to strike. While humanity is beginning to compete in creating new, evolving and intelligent weapons, history will not forgive the failure in an attempt of establishing boundaries. In the era of artificial intelligence, permanent search for national advantage must be based on the *ethics of maintaining people* (italics by the author)” (Ibid., p. 108).

In the following chapter Kissinger et al. address the effect of AI on the transformation of human identity. They point to faith and reason as two traditional ways in which people knew the world. Now there is a new way as well: AI, which “understands” what man is unable to understand and which is a non-believer since it has no embedded values. Therefore, it decides by some criteria that are not understandable to people (at least majority of them) or, to put it mildly, unclear. One of the consequences is certainly the transformation of professions. Not only will they not be the same as we know them today, but many today’s professions will no longer exist at all, and they will be replaced by some others, the performance of which we cannot even assume today. Does it mean that we will face a new Luddite movement? Perhaps, although for modern man it would much less reasonable than for man more than two centuries ago, when workers in England destroyed their machines, believing that they, and not capitalism, were to blame for their social status. Therefore, not because something by humans would be unreasonable (just as the attempts to prevent development of AI at all costs), but also because it would be inefficient. Man must face the consequences of its emergence. AI will definitely create a large number of unemployed people whose work tasks will be taken over and performed by AI, perhaps

more successfully than them. The authors offer society’s care for helping people affected by such consequences. Of course, the question is whether such interventionism will please people in the 21st century. On the other hand, we should also ask whether it may be an occasion for Marx’s de-alienation. Will such technological change also lead to the change of the social system from global capitalism to the maximum developed by artificial intelligence, in emerging global society towards a different system – new, fairer and better? I will not write down its name because you will remember it. Namely, as Merton used to assert previously, apart from manifest functions (in our case, AI manifest functions), there are also those latent ones, which no one has anticipated. It remains to be seen.

The authors also look at the subcultures such as the Amish. They point out that some societies can simply decide not to apply AI achievements. However, they believe that the omnipresence of AI will be such that with time its use will become inevitable, despite our strong will not to use it.

Observations regarding scientific discoveries are extremely important. “Science has traditionally been the ultimate amalgam of human professionalism, intuition and knowledge. In a deep mutual relationship of theory and experiment, human intellect moves all forms of scientific research” (Ibid., p. 115). AI brings something new: “a non-human, different-from-human dimension to scientific research, discoveries and understanding of the world” (Ibidem). What was not written by the authors but only indicted in an earlier passage is that “contextualized information becomes knowledge. When a belief is based on knowledge, it is called wisdom... Only beliefs – in combination with wisdom – enable people to access and research new horizons. *The digital world has little patience for wisdom; its values are determined by the degree of acceptance, and not by thinking. It fundamentally disputes the Enlightenment thesis that reason is the most important element of consciousness...* The digital world does not offer a thesis that connectedness itself is important” (Ibid., p. 33, italics by the author). This implication unconditionally means that knowledge is unnecessary and, accordingly, that science as “objective, critical, methodologically derived knowledge” is excessive (Marković, 1994b). Why do we need knowledge when it is enough to be networked and to have information? The sea of information in which it is impossible to distinguish the important from the unimportant. Why do we need re-examination and criticality when all of it is done by AI instead of us, as the authors of the book warn?! Even if in the beginning professors and scien-

tists have a role in the development of criticality towards received information, if they make effort to inspire some human values in their students or own children, it will no longer be possible in the following generations: how will those who consider networking instead of knowledge a value be able to consider knowledge and science a certain value? And why would they do it? There is no doubt that science has been gravely brought into question, much more than the authors of this book pointed to or were ready to perceive. And, together with it, our, human paradigm of life. It is also related to the dramatic changes in the sphere of education and upbringing. "AI can serve as a playing mate when a child is bored and as a monitor when the parent is absent. With the introduction of education provided by AI, average human abilities will be put to test or they will increase.... With time, individuals may start preferring their digital assistants to people" (Kissinger et al., 2022, p. 117). However, the authors are right in noticing that "irony is in the fact that even while digitalization makes available an increasing amount of information, it reduces space necessary for deep, concentrated thinking" (Ibid., p. 118).

Answering the question posed about the new human future, the authors believe it is necessary to ensure supremacy of people over AI, but in that respect, they show special care when it comes to what we call *political democracy*. It means ensuring that "key government decisions should be separated from the structures permeated by artificial intelligence and limited to human administration and supervision...; ensuring human supervision and decisive participation in basic elements of power will be of essential significance for maintaining legitimacy...; democracy must preserve human qualities. At the most basic level, it will mean protection of integrity of democratic debates and elections" (Ibid., pp. 120–121). The main fear expressed by the authors is the development of AGI. "Access to certain powerful artificial intelligence, such as general artificial intelligence, will have to be strictly protected in order to prevent its abuse" (Ibid., p. 122, italics by the author). This actually means that the USA must keep such monopoly for itself. The USA believes that it will be too expensive and that is why its expansion will be market limited, but it also advocates for reaching international agreement about the limited use of artificial intelligence in some fields, such as the production of biological weapons. In fact, here we can also see Kissinger's Cold War view of the world: reach agreement and consensus between countries, impose their binding quality, naturally with the exception of the USA. However, there is no answer to the question: What will happen if machines begin to communicate

on their own?! Is that futurism? Perhaps, but that is exactly what AI used to be about half a century ago.

TOWARDS A CONCLUSION

Henry Kissinger indisputably had a very important role in the shaping of the world in the second half of the 20th century, even the world in which we are still living nowadays, in the third decade of the 21st century. His diplomatic accomplishments brought him plenty of recognition and honour: he pursued both political and academic careers; the education he had and the wisdom he gained gave him the foundation for broad generalizations, sometimes made while even neglecting certain facts, but drawing proper conclusions on the whole. There is no need to speak too much about his moral principles and ethics concerning his politics, since his sole imperative was forever to defend the position of the USA, even when it was opposed to his view of the US national interests (as was the case with the Yugoslav crisis, both when it comes to the USA wanting to preserve Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole, and when it comes to the 1999 aggression against Serbia and FRY). It seems that he accepted (although he would not have admitted it even if tortured) the Leninist principle of "democratic centralism": "In discussions I defend my own attitude, giving arguments for it consistently and firmly, but when a decision has been made – I will defend it although I was against it previously". The trouble is that in a certain period he was the figure with the greatest influence on decision-makers and that some of those decisions were fatal for many people, as well as for his ethical credibility. On the other hand, some solutions created by him have stood the test of time and he will certainly be remembered because of them.

His co-authored book *The Age of A.I. and Our Human Future* is an extraordinary view of the understanding of today's degree of AI development. It is clear that virtually everyone who claims to know something about this technology and wants to stay "in the saddle" of new technological achievements, must read this book very carefully and try to understand it. It is exactly why we have made an unusually detailed overview of the conclusions and attitudes, findings and data contained in this book.

The reader will naturally wonder why we have not written a special review of the book but instead connected the analysis of Kissinger's accomplishments in diplomacy and international relations and Kissinger's

insights into today's degree of AI development. There are several reasons for it.

First of all, Kissinger remains remembered as a statesman, even more than as a professor, although he was able to pass much of this theoretical-practical knowledge to his students. That is why this book has been insufficiently perceived in our academic community.

Second, the feature of all Kissinger's efforts was to organize the world order, to create a system which was primary in the interest of the USA. These efforts of his are evident in this book, particularly when he writes about the development of AGI.

Third, his warnings about the potentials of artificial intelligence and warfare with artificially intelligent weapons (particularly because Americans classified and declared their renouncement, *weapons* of artificial intelligence), are quite convincing. No one would survive an "ordinary" nuclear war, let alone the one in which decisions about the use of nuclear missiles are not made by humans, but are relegated to a generation of artificial intelligence.

Fourth, his requirement for regulating the use of AI in warfare, despite other topics opened up by the book, crucial in it and its guiding idea, is the consequence of his role during the Cold War. Without knowing that role and Kissinger's Cold War logic, it is difficult to understand the recommendations and ideas presented by him in relation to AI.

Fifth and last, a question arises as to whether it is possible to use Cold War means of communication, balance of powers and deterrent effects of nuclear potential to prevent potentially undesirable effects of AI in the 21st century wars. Kissinger et al. offered the solutions based on the experiences of the previous century and on the hypothesis that legitimate democratic decision-making is "reserved" for humans, that it must not be transferred to artificial intelligence. We will see whether they will function in this century as well.

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Endnotes

¹In President Nixon's administration, during a period of time, he had two most important state functions at the same time: the national security advisor and the US Secretary of State, while President Ford left him in charge of the latter function. Chomsky paraphrased Kissinger's definition of an expert as someone who is able to "articulate the consensus of the powerful", concluding that it consequently enables him also "to manage jobs on his behalf" (Chomsky, in: Chomsky, Waterstone, 2022, p. 51). Although this is certainly an exaggeration, which is also indicated by Professor Visković in the same source, we cannot help pointing out the extent to which Kissinger's influence was valued – there is a famous anecdote from the 1970s: "What would happen if Henry Kissinger suddenly died? Richard Nixon would become President of the USA!" (RTSa, 2023).

²"An example of a successfully elected Marxist government in Chile would definitely affect other parts of the world, and even the value of the precedent, particularly for Italy; in addition, it would substantially affect the world balance and our position in the world", wrote Kissinger in his confidential memorandum to Nixon, after which Nixon decided to support the coup against Allende (according to Chomsky, in: Chomsky, Waterstone, 2022, 86–87).

³A long time ago, Dragan Simeunović established a characteristic distinction between a coup, as a higher gender concept, and a *military coup*, "as a particularly militant form of a coup d'etat" (Simeunović, 1992, p. 139).

⁴There are three historical curiosities in relation to the Nobel Peace Prize that year. The first one, relevant for us, is that Kissinger's main counter-candidate was Yugoslav President Tito, and that the voting result was 3 : 2 in Kissinger's favour, whereas two members of the Nobel Committee publicly resigned, and the announcement of that decision provoked protests in the USA and worldwide. We do not agree with B. Dimitrijević, who believes that the decision of the Yugoslav top leadership to nominate Tito for this prize actually resulted from their sycophancy, and not from Tito's role in the establishment and promotion of the Non-Aligned Movement (RTS, 2023). On the contrary, Tito's merit in that respect was inambiguous and the decision adopted by overvoting would certainly not have caused the protests. Of course, this does not exclude the attempt of sycophancy a, but cannot be reduced solely to it. In fact, Serbia is still benefiting today from Tito's Non-Aligned politics since this large group of countries is considered the successor of SFRY and, although without a particularly solid foundations, is associated with Tito. The second curiosity was that the formal award ceremony was not attended by either of the Nobel Peace Prize winners. Namely, Lê Đức Thọ refused to accept the prize because of the continued US support to Saigon after the signing of the Paris Peace Accords. Finally, in 1975, after the troops of North Vietnam entered South Vietnam, Kissinger himself wanted to return the Nobel Prize. As a matter of fact, he immediately donated the prize money to charity – to the children of the US soldiers killed in the war.

⁵Apart from few honourable exceptions, which include President Vučić, President Putin and Prime Minister Orban, and I apologize to all those current European leaders who did not occur to me while writing this paper.

⁶And in the Second World War as well, as it seems to us?

⁷Here we can recognize his sentence in the book about artificial intelligence: “To be useful or at least sensible, information must be understood as an objective of culture and history” (Kissinger, Schmidt, Huttenlocher, 2021/2022, p. 33), which confirms our claim about the methodological approach to understanding problems applied by Kissinger.

⁸Explaining “Yugoslav freedom of action” in relation to the USSR after the Second World War, Kissinger admits that it derived from the fact that “Yugoslavia liberated itself from German occupation thanks to its own guerilla forces” (Kissinger, 1999a, p. 342).

⁹In fact, before him, if we take into account the American “independence war”, Wilson converted this principle in a typical professor’s way into the principle of foreign policy, which was at that moment in line with Lenin’s principle of “self-determination of a nation”. Finally, the OUN Charter included two equally important principles: respect for the territorial integrity of the UN member states and a nation’s right to self-determination.

¹⁰It would be good if those from the ranks of the current opposition in Serbia and, unfortunately, from parts of the current academic community, who claim that we could have accepted this document as a state, from time to time, read this statement by Kissinger, just “for the sake of being smarter”. All of them should thoroughly think about this statement.

¹¹As it has turned out, in both regions.

¹²If we are able to follow the guiding idea of President Vučić’s policy regarding Kosovo and Metohija, then it coincides with Kissinger’s idea. When searching for a compromise, “it is impossible for someone to gain everything, and for someone to lose everything” – that is exactly what the West keeps “offering” to Serbia.

¹³Unfortunately, Finland has recently abandoned this position and become a member of the NATO. We firmly believe that this decision will prove to be rather bad for the Finns in the future.

¹⁴CEO and President of Google Company (2001–2011) and subsequently its executive manager and technical advisor. He deserves credit for convincing Kissinger to attend a lecture about artificial intelligence at the Bilderberg Meeting in 2016 (Bisenić, 2021).

¹⁵The first dean of MIT Schwarzman College of Computing. He worked on the foundation of Cornell Tech, post-graduate studies in the field of digital technologies within Cornell University, New York, where he was the first dean and the vice-chancellor.

¹⁶This insistence on *artificial intelligence technology* is of great relevance because every technology is value neutral, so it can be used both for noble and destructive purposes, unlike science which is value “utral”, i.e., based on at least some most common human values, such as humanism (Marković, 1994a). This is exactly what the authors of this book insist on, from its introductory pages onwards.

¹⁷That is why in the paper hereinafter, as well as for the sake of applying the principle of economy, when citing this book, we will mark it as (Kissinger et al., 2022), without the slightest intention of minimizing the contribution made by Eric Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher to its creation. As far as we know, their work on this monograph lasted for as many as five years and we must honour it by saying that their work was quite fruitful.

¹⁸About the impact of the media on the change in the social structure, see Debray (2000) and Vučković (2020).

¹⁹Hereinafter: AI.

²⁰It is not clear from the book whether AI may have been assigned the task of finding a medicine against COVID-19, since it derives from the context that the discovery of halicin coincided with the peak of the pandemic or immediately before it. If so – what was its result? If that task had not been assigned at all – why not? Kissinger’s co-authors who are still alive would have to answer this question.

²¹That is, for example, what escapes the attention of colleague Dimitrijević (2024) in his review of the book, when he writes about the dangers borne by AI to historiography. Dangers definitely exist (not only when it comes to historical science), but they are related only to what is available in any way through the web. Of course, in the large historical archives worldwide, all most important collections have been digitalized, and thus everything has become available; it is by no means the case either in the largest Serbian archives or in the local ones. Therefore, what has not been the subject of digitalization will still be explored by humans. It does not mean, of course, that in the forthcoming period the archive material will not be digitalized, but I only point to the fact that the human researching space has not been exhausted and, moreover, that our findings about ourselves would be expanded if our historians were slightly more involved in local history, or even social history, which have somehow escaped their attention in favour of political history, either general or national. Naturally, this also refers to the research in the fields of other sciences, at least from the domain of social sciences and humanities, where scientific methods in the research of certain subjects will still have to be applied by humans. It is certain, for example, that the meaning of many archaisms or Turkish words in the Serbian language is not familiar to GPT₃, so that the functions it can have in the modern language remain reserved solely for it, at least for some time in the future.

²²AGI (Artificial General Intelligence), which is rather unlikely having in mind the speed of the development of AI to date, which has occurred exponentially. The predictions speak in favour of the fact that this degree will be reached in the next several years, and that it will be followed by Artificial Super Intelligence (ASI) that, by all accounts, surpasses human potentials. About classification see (Mandić, Mišćević, Bujišić, 2024, p. 6). Kissinger et al. do not consider the degree of ASI in this book, but aspire to find, so to say, *modus vivendi* between AI and man, and to offer options as to how to ensure security of humanity from the huge possibilities of (ab)use possessed by the still unachieved AGI.

²³We might safely claim that Castells by no means considered this implication of networking when, inspired by the “success” of the Arab Spring, he wrote his monograph *Networks of Outrage and Hope* (Castells, 2012/2018), particularly not the countless possibilities of the personal identity abuse offered by AI nowadays.

²⁴As for the role of the EU in this field, it is important to observe the statements by the authors of the book, as well as the terminology used by them (italics by the author of the paper): “So far *historical global powers* such as France and Germany have appreciated freedom and independence in their technological politics. However, *peripheral European countries* with the recent and direct experience of foreign threats – such as post-Soviet Baltic and Central European countries – have proved more willing to identify themselves with the ‘techno-sphere’ led by the USA” (Kissinger et al., 2022, p. 77). This is Rumsfeld’s division into “old” and “new” Europe, only communicated somewhat more impertinently. Regardless of that, this definitely makes it more difficult for the EU to assume the role of the unique actor in this domain of competence.

²⁵The largest Chinese platform is WeChat, with the purpose similar to WhatsApp. Last year, during my visit to China as a representative

of the Foundation for the Serbian People and State, at the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Communist Party of China, I asked my kind hosts why they had their own application instead of using the globally existing one. "Why would Americans collect data about our market when we can do it on our own?!", they answered, thus actually explaining everything in a counter-question. Of course, this is the interest, as admitted by the authors of the book as well, only great powers which make unique regions-continent, since a small number of users of a platform would by the authors of the book would render meaningless the interest in its existence.

²⁶This dichotomy in pre-digital and digital age, analogously to pre-industrial and industrial age, points to the importance assigned by Kissinger et al. to the change occurring by the creation of the digital world. In an earlier text dealing with the matters of surveying public opinion and the use of the Internet for these purposes, we established the distinction between *virtual* and *real* public opinion, which becomes evident in the countries where the Internet is insufficiently developed, so that it is not possible to develop a representative sample in that manner (Šuvaković, 2008). Serbia used to belong to this group of countries, while the situation is completely different nowadays.

²⁷Elon Musk's interview with Donald Trump, who is once again running the candidacy for the US President, was scheduled within Trump's campaign on 13 August 2024 on Musk's network X. The interview was delayed by as many as 40 minutes due to, as Musk explained, a mass cyber-attack, DDoS attack.

²⁸Another term remaining from the Cold War. The author of this paper thinks that the countries with most freedom nowadays are exactly those countries definitely not seen as such by the authors of the book (Russia, China, Serbia, Hungary, Slovakia, Turkey, to name but a few), while the least free countries are those which have been considered "the free world" ever since the end of the Second World War (the collective West countries in general, without singling out any particular one).

²⁹"Colourful revolutions", including the one in Maidan, by its consequences the most destructive European revolution, primarily to Ukraine, used manipulations and disinformation placed through "networks of outrage and hope". Today we can only imagine the potential for provoking unrest caused by cyber warfare, with the use of generative AI. It seems to us that those who would use it would be exactly the same as those in Maidan in the past.

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Креатор садашњости у покушају да разуме будућност или о ономе што можемо убројати, али не на то и свести, Кисинџерово наслеђе

Сажетак:

Текст је настао као идеја да се учини осврт на књигу Хенрија Кисинџера (Henry A. Kissinger) и његових веома угледних сарадника Ерика Шмита (Eric Schmidt) и Данијела Хатенлочера (Daniel Huttenlocher) *Доба вештачке интелигенције и наша људска будућност (2021/2022)*, која је објављена у САД у Кисинџеровој 99. години живота. Како је у међувремену овај амерички државник преминуо у 101. години, било је немогуће не узети у обзир и, бар у кратким цртама, не указати на главна Кисинџерова достигнућа у међународним односима и дипломатији, на његове ставове који су релевантни за југословенску кризу, а потом се осврнути на покушај овог дипломате да у књизи о вештачкој интелигенцији перципира њене потенцијале и да, разумевајући њене предности и мане, моделира правац развоја човечанства. Стога је рад структуриран из два дела. У првом се даје кроки Кисинџеровог утицаја на америчку спољну политику и доношење далекосежних спољнополитичких одлука САД, које су креирале свет какав смо познавали у другој половини XX века, где се посебно истичу успостављање односа НР Кине и САД и политика детанта САД и СССР. У другом делу, пажња је посвећена Кисинџеровим анализама и упозорењима у вези са настанком и развојем вештачке интелигенције. Иако се у то подручје упушта у веома позном животном добу, његови увиди су веома значајни, посебно када се има на уму његово залагање за међународну сарадњу у регулисању овог питања.

Кључне речи: Хенри Кисинџер, дипломатија, вештачка интелигенција