THE WINTER MARCH OF NIKOLA ZRINSKI AND JULIUS HOHENLOHE AND THE ARSON OF THE OSIJEK BRIDGE IN 1664

ABSTRACT: The year 1664 represented an important historic milestone in Southeast Europe. The Ottoman Empire reached its peak size in Europe, but at the same time the gradual decline of their rule began to be obvious. The Habsburg court, headed by the Caesar Leopold I, was not prepared to carry out an extensive military operation against the Ottomans. The latter, well aware of this fact, substantially raided the lands of Ban Nikola Zrinski, especially the beglerbeg of Kanizsa with his constant invasions into the surroundings of Varaždin. In order to protect his lands, the Croatian Ban decided to build fortresses at the borders with the Ottoman estates. However, the Habsburg court did not approve of those decisions. When the Ottoman Army decided to spend the winter in Belgrade, the Viennese court expected the extensive military operations to take place in the summer months of 1664. As the sentiment that the attack is the best defence prevailed, the preparations for the Winter March against the Ottoman units began. The instigator was the Croatian Ban Nikola Zrinski, who counted on the support and participation of Count Julius of Hohenlohe. The primary strategic goal of this military operation was to destroy or at least damage the renowned Suleiman Bridge in Osijek, which served as an entry point into the Hungarian region...
for all Ottoman military units, so its destruction would represent a huge logistic challenge for the crossing of the Drava River.

KEY WORDS: Nikola Zrinski, Julius of Hohenlohe, Fazil Ahmed Pash Ćuprilić, Osijek, Winter March, 1664

Introduction

The 17th century was one of the most turbulent centuries in European history. Both the beginning and the end of this century were marked by the war with the Ottoman Empire - the Thirty Years’ War in the first half and the final twist in Austro-Ottoman wars, in addition to a minor ”ice age” in the second half of the century. In the light of these facts, the fourth Austro-Turkish War (1663-1664) seems like a minor episode in the tumultuous 17th century. Nevertheless, it represented an important turning point in the history of Europe, as it took place during the time when the scope of the Ottoman power reached its peak in the old continent, but, at the same time, the decline of their power and supremacy in Southeast Europe began.

After the end of a long war (1593-1606), both the Habsburg monarchy and the Ottoman Empire could enjoy the blessings of peace only for a short period of time. The conflict between Catholics and Protestants between 1618 and 1648 practically devastated German lands and almost brought Habsburg economy to its knees. Almost simultaneously, the wars with Persia (1624-1639) and the war with Venice for Crete brought the Ottoman Empire to the brink of existence.1

In the second half of the 17th century, the relations between the countries became strained because of the pressing issue of Transylvania. Due to the decline of power and the crisis in the Ottoman Empire, the Turkish supremacy in Transylvania in the mid-17th century was barely noticeable. The Prince of Transylvania, George I Rákóczi, well aware of this fact, attacked Poland with the help of his allies in order to assume its throne, in spite of the opposition of the High Porte. The Grand Vizier Mehmed Paşa Köprülü, unhappy with the Prince’s self-willed actions, decided to intervene, which initiated a civil war during which Rákóczi succeeded in restoring his power with the help of Austria for the following two years. For the Ottomans, however, this was the last straw that broke the camel’s back: in 1660, the Grand vizier and his army invaded Transylvania and ravaged the land. In May 1660, the Ottomans defeated Rákóczi in the battle of Gyál, where the Prince received fatal wounds.

Mehmed Paşa’s death on October 31st, 1661, prevented the restoration of order in Transylvania. He was succeeded by his son Ahmed Paşa, who carried

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1 Bertrand Michael Buchmann, Österreich und das Osmanische Reich (Wien: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 1999), 25-50.
on with the preparations for war with Venetians in Dalmatia in 1662. However, the preparations for the campaign took place in the shade of dark clouds that gathered over the events in Transylvania. The Turks demanded that the Austrians immediately leave fortresses Kolojvar and Székelyhíd, but the latter wanted to retain their power in Transylvania at all costs and delayed their withdrawal, which further augmented the Ottoman dissatisfaction. The diplomatic negotiations between Turkish and Austrian diplomats consequently focused predominantly on the withdrawal of Austrian troops from Transylvania, the status of Székelyhíd fortress and the demolition of Novi Zrin fortress, which was erected by Nikola Zrinski on Turkish lands in the vicinity of the Ottoman fortress Kanizsa. Following the conversations between the Grand vizier and the Habsburg Ambassador Reiniger in the summer of 1662, the Ottomans prepared the proposition of a peace treaty, which, surprisingly, did not include any impossible demands. Vienna, however, refused to sign it and wanted to continue with the negotiations. Interestingly, this proposition was the basis for the peace treaty in Vasvár on August 10, 1664, but under much worse conditions than those that the Grand vizier offered in the summer of 1662.2

The Grand vizier, however, had enough and stopped the negotiations. During the spring of 1663, he decided to put an end to the conflict regarding Transylvania and chose the Habsburg monarchy and its Hungarian estates as the objective of the Ottoman 1663 military march. The result of the war in 1663 was very unfavourable for the Habsburg monarchy, as they lost a vitally important fortress Neuhausel (today Novy Zamky in Slovakia) right at the gates of Vienna, along with several smaller fortresses and some lands in upper Hungary. On the other hand, Austrians managed to retain the major part of the Caesar’s army intact, even though they were outnumbered, which, in such conditions, was a great success. Tatar invasions caused havoc in upper Austria, Moravia and Silesia, but they also uncovered a military shortcoming – the lack of cavalry in the Austrian Army.3

The Winter March

Shortly after the new year (1664), the Grand vizier received a message that approximately 30 thousand Hungarian, Austrian and Croatian troops with 30 to 40 cannons gathered and attacked palankas Babócsa (north of the

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Drava River in Hungary) and Pressnitz near Szigetvár (south of Nagykanizsa in Hungary) and occupied them. In the meantime, Mehmed Aga, one of the Grand vizier’s agas, who was sent to the commander of Kanizsa, settled in the Szigetvár fortress, as the road to Kanizsa had already been closed. Mehmed Aga sent messengers with letters for Tatar commanders, who were stationed in Bácska winter quarters asking for help, together with the report of the events for the Grand vizier in Belgrade. Almost simultaneously, Murad beg's messenger arrived in Belgrade and also asked the Grand vizier for help. Upon hearing the news, the latter was initially surprised, but later got mad at the border guards in the area, saying: "How is it possible that we have not received any news about the march of these infidels, neither from Kanizsa nor from Székesfehérvár or any other fortress by the border?"4

For the first time in the history of Austro-Turkish wars, the entire Ottoman Army spent winter in Belgrade and its surroundings. In this way, they shortened the journey (for their new campaign) from Hungary to Austria for two whole months, which meant that they could carry on with the

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military operations for two additional months. Since the balance of power remained practically the same, an even worse summer than the fall of 1663 was awaited Hungary and Austria. Consequently, the Viennese War Court Council decided to take the Turks by surprise by performing a military action during the winter of 1664, which would prevent or at least decelerate the Ottoman march. For this purpose, cannons, gunpowder, bullets and military gadgets needed for the Winter March were sent from Graz armoury to Novi Zrin. The aim of the military campaign was to destroy or at least damage the renowned Suleiman Bridge at Osijek, which crossed over the swamps by the Drava River and that all Ottoman armies traversed during their military marches to Hungary. The second objective was to seize the important Turkish fortress Kanizsa. If Austrians could achieve both goals, the Ottoman 1664 military march would be made incredibly difficult and most importantly, it would be delayed.6

Picture 2 – Count Hohenlohe7

6 Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv Graz, LAA, Antiquum XIII. Sch. 155.
Counts Wolfgang Julius of Hohenlohe and Nikola Zrinski embarked on the winter military march that started on January 10th, 1664, and ended on February 6th, 1664, with 6000 infantry and 110 mounted soldiers of the Rhein Alliance Army, 1200 infantry and 200 mounted soldiers from Bavaria, commanded by the cavalry General von Puchard, 700 infantry soldiers of the Imperial Infantry Spickishev Regiment, 1200 mounted soldiers of the Piccolomini regiment under the command of the Lieutenant Colonel Leslie (from Ptuj), approximately 10 000 Croatian border guards and around 10 000 Hungarian soldiers under the command of Count Budiani – altogether, approximately 30 000 soldiers.8

On February 9th, 1664, Count Hohenlohe, who spent winter in Ptuj (Slovenia), headed to Novi Zrin with the Rhein Alliance Army, where they arrived on January 10th and joined the troops of Count Nikola Zrinski. On January 13th, the Pressnitz fortress surrendered to them without fight. They confiscated five smaller 4- and 6-pounder cannons, one bigger 15-pounder cannon and one smaller mortar there.9

![Picture 3 – Nikola Zrinski, 1664](image)

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8 Steiermärkisches Landesarchiv Graz, I. Ö, Hofkammer Sach K. 133.
10 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, Zrínyi, Miklós: Nicolaus Comes Serini, Dux Exercitus Hungarici Contra Turcos Generalissimus etc: Diß ist Herr Graf Serin, der weitberümbte Rächer,
On the following day, the troops headed towards the fortress Babócsa. Before the siege even began, however, the Turks sent negotiators, who were granted a peaceful retreat of the inhabitants and their families, on condition that the defenders surrender the fortress. On January 15th, Babócsa surrendered peacefully, too.

In both fortresses – Pressnitz and Babócsa – Hohenlohe and Zrinski’s troops confiscated weapons and flags, but mostly food supplies, gunpowder and other military equipment. These two fortresses were not only well-stocked and prepared to survive long siege, but also had a large number of cannons at their disposal. The Ottoman crews in Pressnitz and Babócsa predominantly consisted of the border guards that were used to fighting in smaller conflicts in open fields, but had neither experience nor the zeal for long-lasting sieges. Furthermore, they did not expect an attack in the middle of harsh winter. Consequently, both strong fortresses surrendered without firing a single shot.\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^\text{12}\) Österreichisches Staatsarchiv – Kriegsarchiv, AT-OeStA KA KSP KS H III c 28, Übergab der Türkischen Vöstung Babotscha in Nieder Hungarn … … Anno 1664.
On the same day of seizing Babócsa, which had previously been under the Ottoman rule from 1555, Zrinski and Hohenlohe headed towards Siget (Szigetvár) with their armies; Count Zrinski did so on January 16th. The fortress (and city) Siget lies on three islands in the middle of a swamp that Almus River flew into and that also flew into the Drava River. Siget, connected to the land by two bridges, was located 7 miles (German miles – 1 mile is 14 km) from Lake Balaton and 10 miles from Kanizsa. The fortress and the city were surrounded by a strong defensive wall and trenches made out of wood and soil.

Zrinski and Hohenlohe thought that Siget would surrender as easily as the previous two fortresses, which would have probably happened, had it not been for Mehmed Aga, one of the Jannisary commanders of the Grand vizier. After two failed attacks with a great number of casualties and without realistic options to seize it, as the attackers did not bring heavy siege cannons, on January 17th, Zrinski and Hohenlohe headed towards Pécs.
The siege began on January 18th. Even though Hohenlohe and Zrinski’s troops managed to break in soon, the Turks fought fiercely in the streets and from defense towers and managed to resort to the main stronghold – the citadel. The enraged soldiers slaughtered all captured civilians, predominantly women and children. The Army spent the rest of the day looting and burning the city, despite a strict prohibition from the commanders (due to the possibility of accommodation and, of course, the loot). On the same night, Nikola Zrinski and the equestrian General Baron Puchard attacked the citadel, while Count Hohenlohe attacked a fortified convent and church.

As they were, however, unable to seize these strongly defended places, Counts Hohenlohe and Zrinski convoked a military consultation on January 20th, 1664, where the necessity to achieve the main objective of this winter operation – to prevent or at least withhold the Ottoman military march in spring of the same year – was emphasized. According

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**Picture 6 – The siege of Pécs, 1664**

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to the plan, Count Zrinski was to head towards Osijek with the entire Hungarian cavalry and half of the German one under the command of Colonel von Rauchhaubt and set the bridge over the Drava River and the swamps on fire. On their return, they were to burn and destroy all villages along the way and chase away or kill the inhabitants.17

In the meantime, the Grand vizier sent letters to all winter quarters where his army was stationed and ordered them to set off and join Mehmed Paşa, who he entrusted with the command of this army, in Osijek. However, only Yaliagasi, Tatar General, arrived to the assembly point of the Turkish Army in Osijek with around 2000 Tatars. Mehmed Paşa then rushed to the aid of the besieged Pécs along with the Tatars and some of his own troops.18

![Picture 7 – Tatar, 1664][19]

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17 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München, Res/4 Turc. 88/3, Relation wasmassen durch ...
18 E. Prokosch, gen. quote, 1-287.
Immediately after the military consultation on January 20th, 1664, Count Zrinski set off on the road and crossed Siklós Hills.20 The following day, Count Zrinski arrived to Darda fortress that was surrounded by a deep defensive trench. Nevertheless, he immediately attacked it and occupied both the palanka and the fortress, killed the crew and set the Suleiman Bridge on fire. The bridge was made of strong oak logs and was 8565 feet long and 17 (in certain areas even 24) feet wide, so that four wagons could drive on it side-by-side. A mile-long toughened road over the swamp led towards it. Even though the bridge was burning for two more days, only a small part of it burnt to the ground. Upon his return, Zrinski captured and burnt Baranyvar (today Baranji Vrh, north of Osijek in Croatia), looted, ravaged and burnt a great part of Baranya and Somogy district. Such fate befell practically all villages between Osijek and Pécs with the purpose of making the march of the Ottoman Army difficult, as they would not be able to get any food supplies. On February 19, 1664, Zrinski wrote to Caesar Leopold I and optimistically told him that the Ottoman Army would not be likely to cross these lands and would probably be stopped in Baranya due to the devastation that the Count caused in the area.21

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20 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München, 4 J.pub.e. 329,54/55, Feldzugs-Journal oder sonders-ausführliche Erzählung...

21 Ibid.

22 Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum Digitale Bibliothek, Außführliche Erzehlung, was bey der Herrn Grafen von Serini unnd Hohenloh, Hochgräfl. Excellenzen, gegen die Türcken bis an die berühmte Brücken zu Esseck bescheidenen Remarquablen Expedition denckwürdig passirt : mit Benennung aller derer Teutschen hohen Officiers, welche hierbey geblieben sind. Anno 1664.
However, the Turks crossed the renovated Osijek bridge without any problems, ended the siege of Kanizsa and, in a relatively short amount of time, captured the pride of Nikola Zrinski – the fortress Novi Zrin. The devastation of a large part of Baranya was unnecessary, as well, as the Ottoman Army’s food supplies did not depend solely on Turkish provinces in Hungary, but mainly on Turkish provinces in the Balkans, as well as Turkish vassal countries, mostly Moldova and Wallachia. Therefore, the arson and destruction of villages had no effect on the Ottoman Army’s spring march.23

When Count Zrinski left with the cavalry and headed towards Osijek bridge, Count Hohenlohe tried to seize the remaining parts of the city until January 27th, but his attempts were futile.24


24 Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München, Res/4 Turc. 88/3. Relation wasmassen durch...

After 12 days of besieging and the last failed attack on January 27th, the bulk of the Army withdrew from Pécs on Thursday, January 28th and set the city on fire upon their departure.26

![Picture 10 – Grand Vizier Fazıl Ahmed Paşa, 1664](image)

26 Ibid.
At the end of January 1664, the Grand vizier and his small army arrived to the village of Mitrovia (today Sremska Mitrovica, located on the left bank of the Sava River in Serbia), where they made a camp, hoping that the troops from winter quarters in Hungary would meet the Grand vizier there or Mehmed Paşa in Siklós. Around 10,000 soldiers gathered in Siklós, but there were no Tatars among them. When the troops from Bosnia and Kanizsa and the cavalry from Bihać and Zvornik joined Mehmed Paşa, the latter headed towards Pécs on January 28th. Only 12 hours prior to his arrival, the Christian army retreated from the city.\(^\text{28}\)

However, Mehmed Paşa managed to catch up with and surprise the German rearguard, which resulted in a large number of casualties among German soldiers. After receiving the news that strong Ottoman units are right behind the German Army and that they defeated a part of the rearguard, Count Hohenlohe hastily sent the cavalry and some of the infantry to the rear guard’s aid. Before these units managed to arrive to the battlefield, however, the Turks had already retreated.\(^\text{29}\)

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\(^{28}\) E. Prokosch, *gen. quote*, 1-287.


On February 3rd, hajduks from Mali Komorn (today Zalakomár) occupied the Turkish fortress Segesd, which, taking into account the prior occupation of Pressnitz and Babócsa, meant that the Kanizsa fortress was practically cornered.\textsuperscript{31}

As Hohenlohe was aware of the proximity of the Ottoman Army (but did not know how strong it was), he decided to carry on with the journey, despite the exhaustion of his soldiers. On February 4th, Hohenlohe’s army passed the Pressnitz fortress, bypassed Kanizsa and made a camp a mile away from Novi Zrin, where, on the following day, the troops crossed the Mura River, then individual units headed towards their winter quarters.\textsuperscript{32}

In the meantime, khan’s son Ahmed Giray Sultan finally managed to gather a part of his Tatar units. In the beginning of February 1664, they crossed the frozen Danube and joined Mehmed Paşa’s army in Pécs. Almost simultaneously, they were joined by Paşa from Timișoara and his troops, which meant that Mehmed Paşa had a relatively large army at his disposal. Since the gathering of the Turkish Army took so long, the Christian army managed to retreat and cross the Mura River safely. On February 21st, the Grand Vizier returned to Belgrade, which marked the end of the winter battles. The fact that the Sava and Danube Rivers not only completely froze over, but also the ice collapsed the bridge over the Sava in Belgrade, speaks volumes of the harshness of winter in January and February 1664.\textsuperscript{33}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{picture12.png}
\caption{The Winter March, 1664\textsuperscript{34}}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{31} Bayerische Staatsbibliothek, München, Res/4 Turc. 88/3. Relation wasmassen durch...
\textsuperscript{33} E. Prokosch, \textit{gen. quote}, 1-287.
\textsuperscript{34} Wolfenbütteler Digitalen Bibliothek (WDB), Situation der Festungen an der Drau im Januar und Februar 1664, "Hungaria Turcica" und "Sclavonia", Schlacht und Türken mit
Conclusion

Even though the Christian army with approximately 30000 soldiers did manage to invade the Ottoman territory and completely take by surprise not only the crew in Turkish fortresses in Hungary, but also the Grand Vizier himself, it can be said that Hohenlohe and Zrinski’s Winter March in the midst of an incredibly cold and harsh winter in the beginning of 1664 was, essentially, unsuccessful. They occupied a few of the relatively strong Ottoman fortresses that were in the middle of the winter slumber, but did not manage to achieve the main objective of the campaign, which was to destroy Suleiman Bridge in Osijek, as it only burned down partially. For over 150 years, it served as the gateway for the Ottoman armies into Austrian lands. The Winter March caused great losses among German soldiers; those who survived, returned exhausted and sick. And it was precisely due to the lack of skilled soldiers during the siege of Kanizsa in the spring of 1664 that this vitally important Ottoman fortress did not fall. Hungarian and Croatian soldiers already turned out to be practically useless during the siege of Pécs and that did not change during the siege of Kanizsa, where German soldiers needed to take over and replace Hungarian and Croatian soldiers from the areas they besieged. As German soldiers, who had the experience in besieging fortresses, were scarce, Kanizsa managed to persevere until the arrival of the Grand Vizier in the spring of 1664. The fall of Kanizsa would have had a decisive impact on the course of the war. The Turks would surely recapture it, but the question is how long it would take. In any case, Austrians would have much more time to bring backup, which would equilibrate the power balance. Such turn of events would have undoubtedly been reflected in the peace treaty.

The Winter March damaged the reputation and the authority of the Grand Vizier not only from the viewpoint of the Army, but also in the eyes of the entire Ottoman Empire and the Sultan himself. The fact that the soldiers from winter quarters in Belgrade and its surroundings and Tatars from Bácska completely ignored the Grand vizier’s order to join the military march in the middle of an incredibly harsh winter showed that the Grand vizier did not yet have a real authority among his soldiers, despite a successful campaign in 1663.

Tatars were a special part of this story. Although excellent warriors, they lacked discipline and were not as reliable as regular Turkish military units. The Grand vizier also punished those Tatars that did respond to his order, but only after the danger had passed by not sending them in the

interior of Croatia and Styria to plunder, so that they were deprived of the loot, which was the reason they took part in the campaigns.

For the Grand Vizier, Sultan’s reaction to the Winter March and the burning of the Osijek bridge presented a much bigger problem than the actual burning down of a part of the bridge itself. In a letter, Sultan offered to send additional units and money to the Grand Vizier if he could not even protect the Osijek bridge with the army at his disposal. For this purpose, Sultan sent him three beglerbegs with all their units.\textsuperscript{36}


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ЗИМСКИ ПОХОД НИКОЛЕ ЗРИЊСКОГ И ЈУЛИЈУСА ХОЕНЛОА 1664. ГОДИНЕ И СПАЉИВАЊЕ СУЛЕЈМАНОВОГ МОСТА У ОСИЈЕКУ

(Резиме)

Година 1664. представљала је важну прекретницу у историји југоисточне Европе. Отоманског царства достигло је врхунце ширења у Европи, али је у исто време почело да показује знаке постепеног слабљења. Хазбазурици двор на којем је столовао Леополд I. није још увек био спреман да предузме опсежну војну операцију против Османлија. Свесни те чињенице, Турци су стално упадали у земље бана Николе Зрињског. У томе се нарочито истиче беглербег Кањиже који је нарочито угрожавао околину Вараждина. Да би заштитио своје поседе хрватски бан је одлучио да подигне утврђења на граници према османским поседима. Међутим, бечки двор није одобрио те одлуке. Пошто је турска војска одлучила да презими у Београду, Бечки двор је очекиван да ће до војних операција већег обима доћу у летњим месецима 1664. године. Како је превладало мишљење да је напад најбоља одбрана, почеле су припреме зимског похода против Османлија. Иницијатор похода био је хрватски бан Никола Зрињски који је рачунао на подршку и учење грофа Јулијуса Хоенлоа. Примарни стратешки циљ ове операције био је да се уништи или барем оштети чувени Сулејманов мост у Осијеку, који је представљао улазну тачку у мађарске области за све турске војне јединице. Његово уништење представљало би велики логистички изазов за потоњи прелаз реке Драве. Иако је хрешћанска војска јачине око 30.000 људи успела да упадне на османску територију, и потпуну изненади не само посаде у турским твршавама у Угарској, већ и самог великог везира, може се закључити да је поход Хоенлоеа и Зрињског усред хладне и оштре зиме био у сушици неуспеши. Иако су освојили неколико јаких османских тврђава и уздрмали Османлије, они нису успели да остваре главни циљ похода, односно да уништите Сулејманов мост у Осијеку, који је био само делимично изгорео.

КЉУЧНЕ РЕЧИ: Никола Зрињски, Јулијус Хоенлое, Фазил Ахмед паша Ћуприлић, Осијек, Зимски поход, 1664.