Impact of Reverse Globalization on the Competition in EU Digital Markets

Abstract: This paper aims to analyze the relationship between reverse globalization, the digital markets, and competition policy within the EU. Based on the review of contemporary literature, this paper provides an insight into the EU adaptation to the changes caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Reverse globalization is identified through the trends in the international trade and FDI flows, while the digital markets' development is evaluated through the Number of individuals using the Internet to order goods and services and E-Commerce sales. While this paper uses secondary data sources, it uniquely connects the identified reverse globalization and digital markets expansion with necessary changes in the competition policy pre and during the COVID-19 pandemic. Additionally, this paper provides policymakers and business owners with relevant information and possible avenues to improve the competition policy and business strategy.

Keywords: Reverse Globalization, Digital Markets, Economic Development. COVID-19, Competition Policy

Uticaj reversne globalizacije na konkurenciju na digitalnim tržištima EU

Apstrakt: Cilj ovog rada je da analizira vezu između reversne globalizacije, digitalnog tržišta i politike konkurencije u EU. Na osnovu pregleda savremene...
literature, ovaj rad pruža uvid u prilagođavanje EU promenama izazvanim pandemijom COVID-19. Reversna globalizacija se identifikuje kroz trendove u međunarodnoj trgovini i tokovima stranih direktnih investicija, dok se razvoj digitalnog tržišta procenjuje kroz broj pojedinaca koji koriste Internet za naručivanje roba i usluga i prodaju putem e-trgovine. Iako ovaj rad koristi sekundarne izvore podataka, on na jedinstven način povezuje identifikovanu reversnu globalizaciju i širenje digitalnog tržišta sa neophodnim promenama u politici zaštite konkurencije pre i tokom pandemije COVID-19. Pored toga, ovaj rad pruža kreatorima politike i vlasnicima preduzeća relevantne informacije i moguće načine za poboljšanje politike konkurencije i poslovne strategije.

Ključne reči: reverska globalizacija, digitalna tržišta, privredni razvoj, COVID-19, politika zaštite konkurencije

1. Introduction

During the last decade, trade wars, security concerns, and fast technological advancements caused the scientific and business community to evaluate current business practices and economic policies. Sanctions and policy changes, mainly between globally dominant economies such as the USA, China, Russia, and the European Union (EU), stirred up by the global pandemic of COVID-19, have indicated the turn towards establishing self-reliant national and regional economic environments (Free & Hecimovic, 2020). Additionally, new technological advancements brought by Industry 4.0 have improved cost-effectiveness, enabled capital-intensive production and centralization of the previously distributed value chains (Schwab, 2016; Popovic, 2020; Popovic & Milijic, 2020). The necessity for transforming and virtualising socio-economic activity in general (Sulkowski, 2020), brought by the COVID-19 pandemic, is also suitable for further developing a newly established but still poorly regulated digital economy (Schiliro, 2020). Therefore, it is necessary to determine possible implications of the combined effects of mentioned developments on the national, regional, and global economies and discuss further regulation and policy changes.

Today, the research has been mainly focused on the different aspects of globalization, digitalization and their respective effects on the competition policy. The interest in reverse globalization was stirred by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), but only in the last half of a decade it was brought in the focus of attention. This paper aims to provide initial insight into the dynamics of reverse globalization and digital markets in the EU and its ramifications on the Competition Policy.
This paper's structure will initially provide an understanding of reverse globalization and the digital markets' development, followed by the logical analysis of their connections, concluding with the remarks about the COVID-19 effects and policy implications.

2. Literature Review

Globalization of the world economy, as possibly the most discussed topic in contemporary policy debates (Andersen & Herbertsson, 2003) and the vessel of the higher level of global economic integration (Merriam-Webster, n.d.), took significant hits during the last couple of years, which allowed reasonable discussion about the trend of reverse globalization (Ashby, 2016; Hammes, 2016; Voitau & Novikova, 2019; Coeurderoy & Yang, 2020; Stanojević; 2020). The term "reverse globalization", initially used by Nasser al-Shaali, the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Dubai International Financial Center, illustrates the expected trend of business entities from emerging markets acquiring companies from developed countries (Setser, 2007, March). However, following the 2008 global financial crisis, the term dissipated only to emerge again when GFC effects were alleviated, representing the decline in global trade and international investing (Chen & Hsu, 2012; Anand, 2015). It is necessary to mention that depending on the analysis aspects, the terms de-globalization (Hammes, 2016; Coeurderoy & Yang, 2020; Sulkowski, 2020), regionalization (Voitau & Novikova, 2019; Enderwick & Buckley, 2020; Yaya et al., 2020), and reshoring (Ashby, 2016; Delis et al., 2017; Ancarani & Di Mauro, 2018) represent phenomena with highly overlapping features as reverse globalization.

The current research pool regarding previous developments is shallow, and most of the papers are dated within the last five years. The reshoring that tackles the economic logic of relocating manufacturing capacities back to the origin country was the focus of the research. The aftermath of the GFC and the fast development of automation technology instigated the discussion about the wasted potential and rising social issues within developed nations (Kinkel, 2012; Fratocchi et al., 2014). The discussion gained traction due to technologies for automated production becoming cheaper, the global environment more challenging, and the internal pressure from rising inequality, unemployment, and internationally induced inflation (Ashby, 2016; Delis et al., 2017; Ancarani & Di Mauro, 2018).

Following the reshoring line of questioning, several authors started further inquiries about the implications outside the manufacturing industry spectrum. Therefore, there are numerous papers with regional, national, and sectoral
reviews on reverse globalization. Adopting regionalization as the main effect of the rising challenges in the global economy, Voitau & Novikova (2019) indicated that the main reason for the “regressive transformation” is the lack of regulation in digitally integrated geo-economics. Building on the global approach, Stanojević (2020) gave a regional overview of the effects on the Western Balkan countries, which are traditionally swayed by international trends. Additionally, Enderwick & Buckley (2020) included the COVID-19 pandemic into the analysis and proposed that through more intense regional focus and the implementation of emerging technologies, the current challenges can be overcome by creating more resilient and efficient systems.

Similar to the previous authors, Hammes (2016) analyzed global fluctuations in international trade and concluded that there is evidence for the de-globalization, and identified emerging technologies as the main drivers of the future local and regional focus. Adopting the de-globalization perspective, Coeurerdroy and Yang (2020) combined micro and macroeconomic elements of globalization’s retrograde trend. By including the COVID-19 implications, they indicated that multinational enterprises might be the main de-globalization agents through their local and regional production orientation. Finally, in his research, Sulkowski (2020) combined the COVID-19 pandemic effects with the virtualization of socio-economic activities, and through the sectoral approach, identified the government policy as the crucial determinant of future globalization trends.

The research about regulating the virtual sphere competition is lagging behind the discussion about reverse globalization and digital markets. However, in the last couple of years, the development of the digital markets and the misuse of the dominant positions to influence public opinion have instigated both institutional and scientific inquiry about potential changes to the competition policy to include further digital improvements and COVID-19 impact. In this light, several authors indicated that the regulations regarding competition, consumer behaviour, and data protection lag behind the development of the digital economy, potentially leaving consumers vulnerable and the big internet intermediaries in the position of unprecedented power (Van Gorp & Batura, 2015; Drexl, 2016; Kerber, 2016). The changes in the European Commission (EC) and national governments’ attitude and activities towards improving the competition regulation in digital markets were interrupted by the COVID-19 crisis. During the pandemic, many socio-economic challenges have stimulated the scientific community to raise questions regarding the implementation of the competition policy within the EU, emphasizing the network externalities and the effects of the centralized platforms (Calvano & Polo, 2020; Costa-Cabral et al., 2020; Meunier & Mickus, 2020).
Considering the previously discussed literature and the lack of research targeting the combination of reverse globalization, digital economy, and competition, the purpose of this paper is to provide a perspective in this common area by analyzing the widely accepted globalization and indicators showing the size of the digital economy.

3. Research Methodology

The main goal of this study is to provide an insight into the implications which reverse globalization has on the competition in EU digital markets.

This research combines the approach Andersen & Herbertsson (2003) and Stanojević (2020) used for the analysis of the de-globalization worldwide and applies it on the regional, EU level, thus identifying Trade as a ratio of GDP and FDI as a ratio of GDP as the main indicators for the confirmation of the reverse globalization phenomenon.

Furthermore, this paper combines the approaches that Sulkowski (2020) and Antras (2020) used to analyse digitalization globally and applies them on the regional level. Therefore, the E-commerce sales and Number of individuals using the Internet for ordering goods and services were identified as the main indicators to evaluate the level of the EU digital markets development.

The combined effect of these two phenomenons on the competition in the EU markets was not researched thus far. Therefore through the qualitative analysis of the available data and literature, this paper aims to provide a foundation for further research.

The analysis will be focused on the 2008-2020 timeframe. However, the research is limited by the lack of consistent secondary data for digitalization and competition for the analysed timeline.

4. Reverse Globalization and Digital Markets Trends

The trend of reverse globalization can be identified only by the analysis of the established indicators of globalization. However, there is no existing consensus regarding the comprehensive analysis framework. Depending on the research’s comprehensiveness level and geographical focus, the number and dimensionality of indicators vary (Andersen & Herbertsson, 2003; Stanojević, 2020; Sulkowski, 2020). For the purpose of this paper, the two most accepted indicators will be used:
Export + Import of Goods and Services as Ratio of GDP

FDI as Ratio of the GDP

4.1. The Trade as an Indicator of Reverse Globalization

According to Stanojević (2020), the rapid growth of international trade after World War II was the key feature of the globalization process, which continued uninterrupted until the global financial crisis in 2008. During this time, international trade reached a staggering 61.52% of global GDP in 2008. However, after the crisis, world trade never wholly recovered. In comparison, as shown in Figure 1, trade in the EU gained relative significance, which is notable considering that GDP continued to fluctuate and never came back to the levels before the crisis. However, the trade as a ratio of GDP continually increased, and from an initial drop to 69.43% in 2009, it increased to 91.47% in 2019 (UNCTAD, 2021a).

![Figure 1: EU-28 Export + Import of Goods and Services as Ratio of GDP](image)

Source: Authors' interpretation based on UNCTAD. (2021a).

The available statistical data on world trade does not include the data set regarding 2020. However, the data published monthly shows a significant drop in the EU's imports and exports compared to 2019. The most significant discrepancies coincide with the lockdowns worldwide, but they decrease towards the end of 2020, indicating the recovery of the world and EU economies. In this context, we need to address the question of internal and external EU trade. According to EUROSTAT (2021a), internal trade for the January-November period decreased by 8.4% compared to the previous year. The same but more pronounced trend is present in the external trade of the
EU-Imports in 2020 have a recorded decrease of 12.3%, while EU-Exports decreased by 10.3% compared to the previous year.

Antras (2020) indicates that the trade data is not enough to show the current and future globalization trends. However, restrictive trade measures introduced by developed economies can be used as an indicator of reverse globalization. Global trade reduction after the GFC, shown by the decreased trade ratio in GDP, can partially be explained by the rise in protectionism. Protection of national economies through trade restrictions indicates an essential structural change in the current world economic environment (Stanojević, 2020). In its 2019 report, the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2019) indicated that the number of import restrictions in G20 countries for the 2008-2018 period significantly escalated, and the 2020 report shows their growth to the end of 2019 and during the initial wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. It is estimated that from 2009 to mid-2020, the restrictive measures had a 10.3% reduction in G20 imports (1.6 trillion USD). Based on this data and the fact that during 2020, in addition to the COVID-19 related trade restrictions (60% of all restrictions), G20 countries introduced 31 non-COVID-19 trade-restrictive measures, it can be concluded that the overall global attitude toward globalization is changing.

4.2. The FDI as an Indicator of Reverse Globalization

Cross-border investments are another essential aspect of globalization, and for the assessment of EU integration in global trade, both inward and outward investment flows need to be considered.

Global FDI forecasts show a significant drop in investment activity of approximately 40% during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 and are expected to drop an additional 5 to 10% in 2021 (UNCTAD, 2020a). Developed countries have suffered the hardest blow, while Europe had had negative FDI inflows during 2019 and 2020 (UNCTAD, 2021b, January). Figure 2 indicates that the initial drop in FDI inflows to the EU after the GFC shows slow recovery to date. The post-crisis EU FDI inflow performance decline began in 2016, and according to Stanojević (2020), this trend can partly be explained by the natural economic flows of investments towards more profitable opportunities in developing countries. However, investment activity in developing economies has also been reduced during the COVID-19 crisis, indicating a global slump.
Additionally, EU FDI outward flows for the same period show similar activity as inflows but with significantly steeper changes. Considering the previously discussed global decline in investment activity, it is logical that EU FDI outflows are also suffering since the opportunities are scarce.

4.3. Development of Digital Markets

The second important part of the world's and EU economy's new trends are the cyber-physical systems, digital platforms, and overall interconnection of the physical and digital world, which are the Fourth Industrial Revolution's main features. These features enabled the existence and the rise of digital markets (Schwab, 2016; Popovic, 2020).

Even though there are tools for policy evaluation and harmonization (Petrović et al., 2018), there is no existing set of indicators for evaluating digital markets development. However, for this paper's purpose, E-commerce sales as a ratio of total sales and the Number of individuals using the Internet for ordering goods and services will be taken as the relevant indicators on the supply and demand side, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the digitalization intensity of the EU economy demand side. Participation of individual customers in the online marketplace shows the changes in the dominant means of communication and behaviour patterns (Sułkowski, 2020; Schiliro, 2020). Although the analyzed period is relatively short, considering that the period for R&D, Innovation, and Digital product development is 1 to 5 years, the changes exhibited since GFC are significant. In just ten years, the number of individuals participating in the online marketplace on the demand side doubled. Additionally, all EU countries' COVID-19 crisis and lockdown measures have boosted E-commerce through subsidies, marketing campaigns, and movement restrictions (Antras, 2020; Sułkowski 2020).
Due to the lack of other available information, the EU digital markets' supply side is represented through enterprises using the E-Commerce channels in Figure 4. It is clear that the adoption of E-Commerce by EU enterprises is advancing slowly compared to the consumer side. Figure 4 shows that even in the light of the COVID-19, the percentage of enterprises using E-Commerce did not reach a quarter. Simultaneously, if we consider the EUROSTAT data, except for the Internet, the adoption of Industry 4.0 technologies by enterprises in the EU has not come far. The highest adoption is of the Cloud Technology (36%), but Big Data Analysis (13%), 3D Printing and Robotics (5%), Internet of Things (18%), and Artificial Intelligence (2%) are not widely accepted.

In this paper, the digital market is discussed as the enabler of the reverse flow of globalization. However, some authors claim that the digitalization of markets and business processes enable the new phase of globalization instead of reversing the globalization flow (Voitau & Novikova, 2020; Schiliro, 2020). Nevertheless, regardless of the terminological differences, in essence, the flows of trade, investments, and orientation towards encompassing socio-economic digitalization show the existence of reverse globalization.

5. Reverse Globalization, Digital Markets and Competition

The second part of this paper is dedicated to reverse globalization and digital trends' effects on competition in digital markets. The question's importance is
reflected through the fact that from the Top 10 companies with the highest market capitalization, six technological companies are from the USA and China (Statista, 2020) and no companies from the EU area. This fact is even more concerning for the EU area when we have two unique digital economy features: network effects and contestability (Van Gorp & Batura, 2015).

Network effects mean that product or service consumption is directly affected by the total demand or market share and can be divided into direct and indirect. While the direct effects can be seen through the direct value gained by both consumers and businesses, the indirect effects are felt by other parties. The classic example of the indirect effects is the operating system's value to its applications (Calvano & Polo, 2020). These network effects are why the EU economy's digitalization can increase value for the end customers and businesses. Cyber-physical systems and the integration of the consumer, business, and institutional information and service networks can significantly benefit the EU economy. However, considering that a small number of multinational corporations own the most used digital platforms (Apple, Alphabet, Microsoft, Amazon, Alibaba and Facebook), the EC concerns regarding the single market competition are well placed (UNCTAD, 2019).

In theory, contestability means that new entrants can challenge any incumbents in digital markets (Van Gorp & Batura, 2015). Information availability and the features of digital products force competitors to innovate and provide a better user experience. However, the data shows that Amazon, Apple, Alphabet, Facebook and Microsoft combined have made more than 400 acquisitions globally (Palomino, 2019, October), thus preventing potential entrants' challenge.

Combined network effects and contestability enable creating value web, which provides multiple optional routes for delivering content or service to the consumer. Even though the value web should ensure competition within the EU area, there are concerns regarding the competition in the platform and service provider market. The Digital Markets Act (DMA), introduced by the EC in December 2020, is primarily concerned with "the rules for platforms that act as the "gatekeepers" in the digital sector" (European Commission, 2020b, December, p.1). Through this act, three criteria bring the company under the scope of the DMA:

- The size of the annual turnover within the European Economic Area (EEA) or the average market capitalization/equivalent market value that impacts the internal market;
- The control of an essential gateway between business users and final customers;

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An (expected) permanently established position;

The "gatekeepers" represent the major concern on both supply and demand side of the European market. However, the single market's concerns translate to the competitiveness of the European firms, and challenges imposed by the state-regulated Chinese companies, American unilateralism, and retreat from the liberal international order (Meunier & Mickus, 2020). The increase in demand through digital channels (Figure 3) and the slow rate of E-Commerce implementation in everyday business practices by the EU enterprises create significant potential for foreign competitors. Additionally, the EU lagging behind the USA and China in terms of digitalization and the reduced investing levels in the EU area (Figure 2) make it unlikely to catch up short term, while the superstar effect's presence makes it difficult for the potential competitors from the EU to rise to the levels of "digital giants" of today (Preta, 2018). This leaves currently un flexible and unadjusted policies and practices as the main instrument of the competition regulation in the EU.

Therefore, it is essential to point out that reverse globalization on its own might not have a significant effect on the EU. However, the digitalization changes, the implementation of cyber-physical systems, and the creation of the value web provide a challenging environment even for the most innovative economies. The EU challenged on multiple fronts, and with rising EU scepticism and national protectionism in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, might face significant challenges regarding the regulation of individual players and the digital markets as a whole.

6. Implications of COVID-19 on Digitalization, Digital Markets and Competition

Reverse globalization and digitalization have created significant challenges for the EU policymakers. However, the COVID-19 pandemic amplified current issues and the need for fast adjustment to the new reality. In the context of this paper, the analyzed effects of the pandemic can be differentiated into three segments:

- the effects on globalization,
- the effects on digitalization and digital markets, and
- the effects on competition policy.

The COVID-19 effects on globalization can be evaluated through the impact on trade and the flows of FDI. The reverse globalization trends are noticeable globally, but within the EU, they became more pronounced when the COVID-19
19 pandemic struck. According to the WTO's analysis (2020), the decline in global trade and GDP is unavoidable. The overall orientation towards protectionism regarding essential medical resources and equipment is expected to spill over to other industries through the law of cause and effect (Irwin, 2020, April). Sulkowski (2020) suggests that except for the pharmaceutical, medical and ICT sector, other sectors will suffer losses of various degrees.

The reduction in EU FDI flows, in both inward and outward direction, that started after GFC, was also amplified by the COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the UNCTAD (2020a) and the available data, the fall in the investment activity in the EU, shown in Figure 2, is expected to continue. This trend depends on external events and is highly influenced by the EC strategic approach. Through the FDI Screening Regulation 2019/452, EU member states are, for the first time, invited to establish screening procedures for all FDI inflows. Due to these restrictions and the expected reaction from EU partners, a more significant fall in investment activity can be expected (European Commission, 2020a, March).

The process of digitalization and development of the digital markets due to the COVID-19 pandemic became a necessity. The role of digital technology in the facilitation of daily life, economic and social activities, and the recovery of industries and business is unprecedented (Schiliro, 2020). The pandemic transferred education, administration and communication in general into virtual space. Companies and large organizations were already using digital technology and analytics, but the COVID-19 incentivized all business entities to integrate new data sources with their insights to improve their decisions, products and services. Additionally, manufacturing companies began to implement, or at least consider, centralization and production automation based on the Industry 4.0 technologies. Meanwhile, all companies started implementing remote work and available e-learning platforms, thus becoming even more dependent on the previously mentioned platform and service providers - "gatekeepers" (Popovic & Milijić, 2020; Schiliro, 2020; Sulkowski, 2020).

Technological advancements after the GFC caused deeper concerns about the violation of the competition. Even though Industry 4.0 has started the transformation and provided options for faster sustainable development of developed economies, as shown in this paper, it has yet to reach comprehensive implementation in the EU. With the rise of the digital markets, competition authorities face the most significant challenge in assessing the participating entities' relevant market and dominant position. The traditional (legacy) approach cannot be applied to the digital markets due to the constant development of new and innovative business models, making boundaries
changeable and new markets possible (Van Gorp & Batura, 2015; Prüfer, 2020). Thus, the EC concerns that dominant incumbents will use their position caused a more radical attitude toward antitrust regulation (Meunier & Mickus, 2020). The same radical attitude inhibits competitors who are native to the EU.

The weak points of the EU competition policy were only emphasized when the COVID-19 crisis struck the world. The pandemic emphasized the public sector’s role in the support and regulation of socio-economic and R&D activities. Additionally, massive monetary and fiscal incentives have brought up the question of protectionism and fair competition in the single market (Schiliro, 2020).

The pandemic relief measures’ proposed draft came relatively early during the pandemic, but the lack of supranational decision-making power delayed reaction and the potential significant relief of the COVID-19. Simultaneously, the question of the State Aid impact and its relation to the competition policy was raised. Due to exceptional circumstances caused by the COVID-19, the need for healthcare, economic and social relief, and the lack of EU members unity, the primary decision regarding the scale of the implemented measures is left to the individual countries. At the same time, other supranational stakeholders have a complementary role. Despite the fact that the final decision is left at the country's discretion, the EC provides the general framework for all member countries. Furthermore, the Commission stated that all measures would be temporary and only relieve the pandemic's impact (KPMG, 2020).

The potential implications indicated in this section of the paper only scratch the surface of the encompassing subject. The COVID-19 implications are yet to be fully understood, but this section provides a clear insight into the current dynamics between reverse globalization, digital markets and competition policy, and notions of future trends.

7. Conclusion

The discussion regarding reverse globalization, digital markets and competition policy and their reaction to the COVID-19 are gaining traction over time. This paper aimed to provide evidence of the reverse globalization and the development of digital markets as well as examine the issues and necessary changes to the EU competition policy in order to adapt to the new environment. Additionally, the paper also includes the COVID-19 effects into the analysis.
The trade and FDI flow analysis suggest the existence of a reverse globalization trend in the EU. While the trade data indicates that the EU managed to adapt to the environmental changes, while the report on the rising trade barriers and increasingly restrictive policies indicate the decline in the global market integration. Reduced FDI flows and proposed restrictive measures due to COVID-19 also confirm the starting assumption of reverse globalization.

Digital markets are profoundly influenced by technological advancements, reverse globalization and the COVID-19 pandemic. The digital markets' expansion is facilitated by the dominant international ICT companies ("gatekeepers"), which are the biggest threat to a healthy competitive environment. An increasing number of digital customers in the EU provides companies with an incentive to adopt and implement e-commerce systems. However, at this stage of the digital markets' development of the EU, it seems that companies are reluctant to invest in the digitalization of their sales channels.

Reverse globalization and the rapid development of digital markets left many issues to be addressed by policymakers. Therefore, based on the legacy approach, the current EU competition policy is complemented with additional ad hoc regulations, which are insufficient to provide adequate protection to the consumers and small competitors.

Finally, the paper shows that the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to deteriorate world trade further and inhibit capital flows while providing an incentive for fast digitalization and expansion of the digital markets. These developments are creating even more challenging circumstances for EU policymakers.

This paper provides a relevant perspective for both policymakers looking to improve the competitive environment in the EU and business leaders looking for the opportunity in the digital sphere. However, it leaves an open question of the correlation intensity between reverse globalization trends and competition in digital markets. Therefore, future research includes the more detailed empirical confirmation of the presented phenomena and the concretization of the governmental policy approach to digital trends.

References


