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THE BALANCE OF POWER – THE SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Abstract

During the development of the international community changing the institutional models of security. One of the oldest, which is applicable to the present day, is a system of balance of power (power). The balance of power means the ability of preserving peace in the world, or better yet, the existing positions of the great powers on the basis of approximately equal power (primarily military and economic). Extremely important role in this security concept played in the new century state-balancer that the war puts aside those forces that wish to maintain the status quo. Important role for a long time in international relations as a balancer had England (United Kingdom).

Key words: the balance of power, force, security, international relations, war. Policies.

JEL Classification: N4, P37, K4

РАВНОТЕЖА СНАГА – БЕЗБЕДНОСНИ КОНЦЕПТ МЕЂУНАРОДНЕ ЗАЈЕДНИЦЕ

Апстракт

Током развоја међународне заједнице мењали су се институционални модели безбедности. Један од најстаријих, који је применљив до данашњих дана, јесте систем равнотеже снага (моћи). Равнотежа моћи означава могућност очувања мира у свету или још боље, постојећих позиција великих сила на основу приближно једнаке моћи (пре свега војне и економске). Изузетно значајну улогу у овом безбедносном концепту играла је у новом веку држава-балансер која се у рату ставља на страну оних сила које желе да задрже статус quo. Значајну улогу у дугом временском периоду у међународним односима као балансер имала је Енглеска (Уједињено Краљевство).

Кључне речи: равнотежа снага, сила, безбедност, међународни односи, рат. политика

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Instead of introduction – and security forces in international relations

In international relations, act many factors that influence the behavior of entities in these relationships and their interdependence. Special significance for relations between states has powers, as a factor of first class importance. (Ibler, 1971: 365) It is a complex phenomenon that consists of a series of elements, such as: geographic basis, the demographic bases, production capacity, ideology, political system, military power and so on. (Ibler, 1971: 366) Even the ancient world historians noted the importance of force in international relations. Thucydides believed that relations between states are based primarily on force rather than on law and morality. As above state there is no apparatus to maintain international order, each country must work to strengthen its power, to the time of the outbreak of the conflict could be as successful as possible to protect their interests. This ancient world view has not much changed until the beginning of the new century. The great German philosopher, Hegel, stressed the force as a universal value, giving war as a means of policy, of special importance. Quite a few modern scholars of international relations represents a similar view (of course adapted to the prevailing positive international order), and considers that the force, as well as the ability to impose the will of one person to another, the default constant in relations between states. In their view, in order to achieve their own interests the state is allowed to use all the means available to it, including those who are directly or indirectly related to the use of force. Route interest-force, they argue, is very important, even crucial for the distribution of power in the world. Attitude legalistic school, which is based on respect for the norms of international law in relations between states, has remained a dead letter. In practice, the prevalent opinion of the realist school that the main motive of the occurrence of the state in international relations, national interests, and that it can be defended only through force. A typical representative of this school, Hans Morgenthau („Politics among nations”) believes that the idea of the essence of interest policy and that all phenomenon in international relations boil down to a struggle for power, and such power that will successfully pursue our national interests. In such a social discourse, law and morality have a secondary importance. Unfortunately, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the role of law and morality is the same, maybe one notch and reduction.

The force is one of the key (default) security elements.

Concept of security includes multiple and different meanings. In the most general sense, it means freedom from fear, threats and physical violence. More precise definition is difficult circumstance that in a difficult sociological structure of the term, present moral, ideological and normative elements, and perhaps fairest to say that it is a socially constructed concept that acquires a specific meaning only within a given social context. (Avramov et al., 2003: 219)

In the context of international relations, security can be defined in different ways. In the view of Barry Buzan (Barry Buzan) it represents „the ability of states and societies to preserve their independent identity and its functional integrity“ Lipman Walter (Walter Lippmann) however, points out that “the nation is secure to the extent not in danger of sacrificing your core values in order to avoid war if it is capable of them, if challenged, to preserve the victory in such a war“ for Buta (Booth) and Wheeler (Wheeler) stable international security „can only be achieved by the people and groups

that other do not deprive it, and this can be achieved if the security is understood as a process of emancipation“.

Safety is and remains inextricably tied to the state and its defense. It is an essential feature of state sovereignty and the defense of its legitimate functions. Even in the year of the first countries we find the beginnings of jointly addressing issues of security of states; wartime alliance was one of the first institutions of international law in general. That is the issue of ensuring the security set with the emergence of the state and remains one of the most important issues of the entire history of international relations, to the present day, is evidence that life interest of the people to ensure their own security and independent development.

The balance of power and international security

During the development of the international community changing the institutional models of security. One of the oldest and most famous of the system please do not hesitate to protect certain universal values of the international community, is a system of balance of power (power). The system of balance of power is a concept with a long history of use but relatively short presence in official agreements between political individuals.

David Hume balance of power is seen as a scientific law; Glenn Snyder observed in the balance of power the central theoretical concept of international relations; Henry Kissinger, the balance of power compared with the „Iron Law of Politics“, indicating that it is more art than science, more skillfully practiced by some political leaders in relation to the other. Richard Cobden for the balance of power says that it's just a fantasy, just a collection of sounds without meaning; John Bright thinks that the whole concept of balance of power harmful illusion inherited from the past. According to him, the balance of power is impossible as it is impossible and the achievement of perpetuum mobile. If the balance of power is an illusion, then it is a long-term illusion, says Bright. Ernst Haas provides eight different meanings balance of power, more accurately describes eight different meanings which covers its use. Balance (Balance) indicates the distribution of power; equilibrium, hegemony, stability and peace, instability and war, a general (overall) policy of force, the universal law of history, as a state of equilibrium and balance system as a guide for policy-making decisions. Despite variations in meaning, all that converge into one, so that the balance of power often defined as the interaction between the state, which ensures the survival of the system by preventing domination or hegemony of any state or coalition of states. The most famous definition of the balance of power is the one that gives Hedley Bull. According to this definition, „the main function of the balance of power in international society is to preserve peace but to defend the independence of sovereign states from the threat of domination and to prevent the society of sovereign states winning is converted into a universal empire, and to do so if necessary, and war“. (Bull, 1965: 39)

The balance of power, relying primarily on the appearance of power, assumes that the power of one state or group of states, can not restrain anything else to be able to other states or groups of states. According to this view, piled power will inevitably be used to the detriment of other subjects, and the only way to prevent it consists in preventing such dominance by creating adequate amounts against power. From this it logically follows

that one region, and also for the entire international community, it is best that the power equal or balanced, because then no one will find the opportunity to reach for the values of others. Another way to limit the power does not exist, given that the international community, there is no higher authority which would restrict its owners and forced him to behave in accordance with the general interest.

When asked how exactly does the system of balance of power, there are gaps with regard to the establishment of a mechanism that leads to balance, and hence there are three main groups of view. Under the first, the system works automatically. States do not tend towards equilibrium, given that each of them wants to be as strong and so is the acting. This understanding was the most represented at the beginning of the nineteenth century, and has clearly indicated it owes the basic ideas of liberal capitalism. According to another view, the spontaneous processes of the so-called corrected. State balancers. In accordance with this vision of the functioning of the balance of power, the state balancer should be an exception to the other. Namely, while the latter only care to increase their power, to the detriment of other achieve gains, long state-Balancer has no such aspirations, but her only goal is balance, per se. In this way it describes the European system by the end of the fifteenth century to 1914. According to a third view, a balance should be aware that weight all countries participating in the international relations, the so-called. multiple equilibria. (Claude, 1962: 43) Its classic pattern we see in the eighteenth century, when in Europe there was a balance between Great Britain, France and Spain, in Central and Eastern Europe between Austria, Prussia, Russia and Turkey. In this game, teammates allies could easily be changed. The attempt of Napoleon to master Europe leads finally to an association of all the European powers against France and to its defeat. After that, the state winner trying to establish mutual balance. As a counterweight to the possible renewal of France, winner of the state create an alliance that has the role of tools to maintain absolutist order in European countries. However, as soon as they emerged contradiction between the major European powers, the multiple equilibrium replaces attempts to set up a simple balance between the states.

The firing system of balance of power is conditioned by the existence of the following socio-political circumstances:

- The system should be a greater number of equally powerful major countries that are usually called „great powers“ or „essential actors“.
- Decision makers who need to operate at the forefront of such countries should act rationally and in the interests of the system, which means to apply force only if they can not negotiate, to refrain from destroying any of the „essential factor“ to confront any of them when they want to be predominant or to create a supranational system. (Kaplan, 1957: 690)
- States should be similar among themselves in order to be replaced as allies, and among them there should not be any special kinship, affection, hostility and differences, other than those due to the current balance of power.
- Measurement of power should be feasible and reliable.
- Should be possible limited wars, which can take as long as it does not reach a precise objective (wars for balance).

The main principles for the peaceful exercise of the balance of power as compensation and interventions. The concept of compensation consisted in the fact that

none of the major powers could not allow the loss of other such forces without adequate "compensation" (compensation to) for yourself, because otherwise increased power of the first force and the balance would be undermined. The intervention is carried out within its own sphere of influence and in the system of balance of power tolerated by other holders of balance in the name of supposed higher interest. Whenever domestic political currents in the country, which belongs to the sphere of influence, in the opinion of hegemons threaten to expel the surface currents that would lead to independence, according to a hegemonic logic it can only be for the single purpose of joining another sphere. Such a change jeopardizes the whole system, ie relations between the holders of the balance, which then approved armed intervention and the violent suppression of internal political order. By understanding the holders of balance, orom governments within the state's sphere of influence is not a matter of its people.

As a product of policies generated the so-called balance of power buffer state. They are a function of the physical separation of opposing great powers or alliance. These are countries outside the spheres of interest, but in areas where the pretensions of two forces intersect. Since none is able to dominate the area, and thereby is able to prevent rival to do so, the buffer state allows a free existence without obligation of allocating between the opposing forces. In the history we have more examples. During the invasion of the Ottoman Empire, after the fall of Bulgaria and Byzantium to Constantinople reduction of environment, Serbia Lazarevic and Brankovic decades was a buffer state between Hungary and Turkey. Later in their border areas, Austria created the so-called Military Frontier, populated almost exclusively by Serbs, as a shield against the Turkish invasion. Switzerland is particularly interesting as a buffer state. Founded in the central Alpine area between France, Germany, Italy and Austria, during its existence, to this day, Switzerland has not entered into any world and local war experienced by all countries with which it borders. At the same time, it had held many talks warring parties; it is the headquarters of many international organizations and banks; today many important international negotiation water just in Switzerland. During the Warsaw Pact in northern Europe a buffer state between the alliance and NATO were Sweden and Finland, and in Central and Eastern Europe that were Austria and Yugoslavia. With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact lost and need to survive a multinational state as it was Yugoslavia. Finally we can mention that in Asia, Afghanistan was a buffer state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries between the Russian and British spheres of interest.

From the eighteenth century until the First World War, the balance of power was considered the best and unequalled way to preserve stability in the international community and to protect the security of its members. XVIII and XIX century are considered the „golden age“ of the balance of power in Europe, and are taken as a model system of balance of power. In Europe at the time of the adoption of the so-called balance of power existed. the concept of force, which was created with the aim of expansionist and imperialist aspirations of its member directed, regulated and stabilized to avoid mutual conflicts. „Power“ and „power“ as a measure of balance usually were not what would be under such names could be understood. The ruling powers had access to other entities, nations in areas that were annexed and turned into colonies or part of the spheres of interest. This concept was preserved security holders of balance, but this is not true for medium and small states and nations whose good sacrificed for the sake of some „higher“ principles. For the policy of balance of power has a special significance the Congress of

Vienna held 1814-1815. at which it was agreed settlement for Europe and the world after the Napoleonic wars. One can say that this is a good example of a multilateral meeting at which its dominance manifested Russia, Prussia, Austria and England. After the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo, signed the Final Act which contained a provision 121. According to this act, France has returned to the border in 1792. and listed the major powers were given territorial expansion as well as expansion of the area of influence. England's gains in the Mediterranean, the Far East and the Caribbean, strengthened its dominance on the seas, Austria got the whole Tyrol, Lombardy and possessions of Venice and Dubrovnik Republic; Prussia annexed Pomerania, Danzig, Poznan, parts of Saxony, Westphalia and Rhineland. Created a German alliance (in which the dominant role had Prussia and Austria) independent German states, which had a joint Assembly in Frankfurt am Main. Russia recognized the annexation of Finland, Bessarabia and a large part of the Polish (with the Duchy of Warsaw). Norway and Sweden have been merged into a single kingdom, in the same way and the Netherlands and Belgium. Shortly after that in Paris he created the so-called „Holy Alliance” consisting of Russia, Austria and Prussia and whose goal was to preserve the decision of the Vienna Congress, and preserving the balance of power, which is then established.

The conventional system of European balance can not be imagined without even explain the role that it played in Great Britain. It is right to say that for many decades in Europe, the United Kingdom constituted the backbone of the system. Unrivalled on the seas and oceans of the world, this empire preponderance of France and Russia, and Germany and the European mainland, managed relying on the role of the diplomatic tasa on the geopolitical balance of the time, so very successful and long protecting its interests primarily in the Middle East, Central Asia and India (in the narrow sense and in the Balkans generally supporting Turkey). United Kingdom maintained a balance of being „put your weight on this time, the time on the other side of the scale, but always on the side that was against the political dictatorship of the strongest individual country or group at any given moment”. (Claude, 1962: 43) As Churchill said this „beautiful, unaware of the tradition of British foreign policy“ is the very principle of the foreign policy of a country in its own interest. United Kingdom during that period had secured dominance outside of Europe, where they were positioned (stationed) its expansionist interests, given that it was not fully part of the European regional system, where her only goal was that no state realizes complete dominance, which could threaten the British Empire. The balance of European countries meant, in fact, their self-limited in comparison to the UK, with only wear their own energy, because she herself has intervened only once in a while.

Privacy balance of power leads today. The elements of this system are present in the work of personified (or it should do) the essence of the current system of collective security of the UN. The Security Council, normative and functional-political position in the organized international community today, is modeling the concept of balance of power in the nineteenth century, putting it in the epicenter of the Collective Security Council. But about this phenomenon on another occasion.

The balance of power and collective security – similarities and differences

The concept of collective security can be viewed in a wider and in a narrower sense. In a broader sense, collective security is a common defense security of each member of a related group of countries scheduled in advance that the known and unforeseen that an unknown enemy. (Gavranov, 1969: 7) In the narrow sense of „collective security is an obligation inflow to the aid of victims of the attack on the core values and exists in any case and against any attacker, who cannot be determined in advance, but the aggression being conducted, which means that in the first place must include the state which have established a system of collective security, not only external enemies“. (Dimitrijević et al., 1996: 378)

The concept of collective security was created as a reaction to the system of balance of power, but he is not diametrically opposed to this system, but it also represents his training. Between these two concepts there are some similarities, but also differences. In both cases, the force appears as an essential element, but as a system of balance of power rests on the symmetry of force and such a distribution of power that no participant in this combinatory would not be able to dominate the collective security system rests on the unity of world peace and joint action by all Member States. „The main function of the balance of power is not to keep the peace but to defend the independence of sovereign states from the threat of domination and to prevent the society of sovereign states winning is transformed into a universal empire, and to do so if necessary, and war“. (Bull, 1965: 39) Therefore, „...the balance of power manifests itself as a myth: the skills of professional diplomats not only do not prevent a catastrophic war – indeed, it is widely believed that the suspicion between the alliance and the underestimation of the value, which cannot be translated into the language of force, its main causes“. (Dimitrijević et al., 1996: 372) It is also clear that the advocates of the balance of power and do not expect her to secure peace, but to protect the safety of members of the international community. Leading policy of balance of power of the state and not as they want to avoid war, but to greet him ready for the party which will not lose.

Unlike the balance of power, which transposes the so-called? Preventive wars and wars to establish disturbed balance in the system of collective security can clear only real war between the attacker and the group of countries that defend the attacking, although it does not name. (Dimitrijević, 1973: 53-54) This armed conflict degrades in international tort who performed the attacker and the sanction applied by defense lawyers, which means that the war ultimately not be avoided by the infringer. Simply put, the essence is the following assumption - security is a security of all; an attack on one country means the attack and to all the others that she would come to the rescue, and thus anyone who is planning any attack on another country will advance prevented or stopped, intimidated by the consequences that such an attack would have, because the country will become aware that ultimately cannot fight against the whole world.

In relation to the collective security system, the system of balance of power shows the following characteristics:

- In the system of balance of power, alliances were created against any state that could become „too strong“, „meaning that the emphasis was focused on“

capacity" state. In contrast, in the system of collective security emphasis is placed on the aggressive policies of the State rather than its capacity,

- In the system of balance of power alliances were created in advance while in the system of collective security that is not the case because they do not know that the state will commit an act of aggression. Spontaneous acting member of the international community in applying the collective security system to this system too closer to the system of balance of power,
- In the system of balance of power of the state are governed solely by its own subjectively defined „national interests“, and the water completely separate policy, and the collective security designed to be global and universal, without neutral countries or those that played the 'lone wolf' 'international politics. If a large number of States in that role, „a coalition of good“ would look weak, and its ability to deter and punish aggressors would be reduced.

The similarities of these two systems consist of the following:

- In the collective security system should also be a larger number of equally powerful countries to not aggressive alliance functioned, because reality can never expect that all other countries come to the rescue of endangered,
- Among the states there should be no such distinction that prevents them to oppose the aggressor,
- The application of armed force shall be prohibited (except for the right to individual or collective self-defense),
- To be made a precondition that there are clear criteria for what can be qualified as an act of aggression,
- Affluence in aid for the victims of aggression should be an obligation other countries,
- Because the coercion is prohibited, must be provided the opportunity to be justified and lawful claims achieve a non-violent, peaceful manner.

Conclusion

The concept of balance of power from today's perspective it is theoretically poor, because it is based on the state as inviolable the subject of international relations and starting from only one of its size, power, and the assumed goal is always expressed through some kind of territorial possession. The system of balance of power is not able to keep the peace, however, often leads to conflict, either because they establish a balance of power requires war, either because the balance itself is no guarantee of peace. We can cite at least two reasons, the conclusion that the policy of balance of power similar to preserve the peace, which was the main reason for its occurrence. The first historical experience and other reasons are theoretical. European system of balance of power failed to prevent minor wars, even led to the First World War, and the neglect of the League of Nations and the policy of the rival alliance after World War paved the way for even more catastrophic Second World War. Also, recent experiences have convinced us that in addition to the state, there are other significant actors in international relations, and whose activities may not fit into the scheme of balance of power, because of their power, not only through military force, nor are their goals now always only expansionist.

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