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A BRIEF LOOK AT THE DISCIPLINARY ISSUES ON THE UPPER RHINE FRONT DURING THE NINE YEARS' WAR 1688-1697

Abstract: The issue of discipline was very important for early modern armies. Considering the usual social background of soldiers, them being a surplus of the rural population, social outcasts, criminals who joined the army as a way to commute their sentences, or other "undesirables", the discipline was very harsh, sometimes bordering on inhumane. On top of that, the harsh conditions of the 17th century warfare led to further brutalisation of soldiers, which in turn necessitated tighter control over them. In this paper, we will analyse the disciplinarian problems faced by the Imperial forces on the Rhine front during the Nine Year's War (1688-1697), especially during the period of command of Prince Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden (1693-1697).

Keywords: warfare, soldiers, Holy Roman Empire

Non MeSH: Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden, Rhine, discipline, Nine Year's War (1688-1697), control

Introduction

One of the most important aspects of the warfare in the 17th century was the maintenance of cohesion and discipline among the armed forces. We shall approach this issue by observing the disciplinary situation faced primarily by Imperial, but also French forces, on the Upper Rhine during the Nine Years' War (1688-1697), in order to demonstrate the necessity for imposing discipline and strict regulations by contemporary commanders. Additionally, we shall explore how the introduction of the light infantry and cavalry (haiduks and hussars) from the Hungarian theatre of war and their practice of "little war" or *Kleinkrieg*, at the same time improved battlefield

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efficiency of the Imperial forces, but also worsened disciplinary aspect and increased difficulties of maintaining control over troops.

Military discipline in the 17th century

Ever since human societies have engaged in organised warfare, the issue of discipline in the armed forces – whether they were warbands, citizen-militias or larger armed forces of the empires of Antiquity – was of paramount significance. For example, Roman commanders went to great lengths to instil and maintain discipline among the ranks – a wide array of punishments and disciplinary actions were envisioned to keep soldiers in check. This was especially evident when the Roman army found itself on enemy territory: the commander had the authority over life or death of the legionnaires (*sacramentum*). It was not uncommon for them to execute their own sons for disobedience. Also, even whole units could face punishments for cowardice or disobedience, such as banishment, decimation or discharge from service. [1 p68]

If we advance into the future for some 1600 years, we could see that – *mutatis mutandis* – the core issues had remained the same. Of course, Europe and the Mediterranean of the 17th century were vastly different from the Roman times, however, the question of military discipline essentially remained the same. Military theorists of the late 17th century were well aware that for an army the quality of recruits was of utmost importance, as well as maintaining discipline. For example, Raimondo Montecuccoli advocated that soldiers must be healthy, bold, strong, in the prime of their age, used to fieldwork or laborious handcraft and by no means lazy, effeminate or dissolute. [2 p3] He further noted that the needed qualities for both officers and soldiers could be divided in two groups: natural and acquired. The natural qualities are bravery, a healthy and strong temperament, well-developed body, being spirited, courageous in danger, well-mannered on occasions where one must be presentable and tireless at work. Men must be of appropriate age, because young people lack wisdom and experience; on the other hand, those too old are not sufficiently agile and lively. Also, those of higher birth are more respectful towards authority. The acquired qualities are wisdom, justice, steadfastness and temperance. [2 p7]

However, if taken at face value, treatises such as this would imply that only fit and responsible men were recruited for service in various campaigns. This is mirrored in the older literature, which, admittedly, brings the financial and organisational difficulties of recruiting to the fore, but just glances over the quality and human potential of soldiers-to-be, accepting that they indeed were at an adequate level. [3 p267-71]

But, was it really so? Did reality correspond to these lofty ideals? Judging by the available evidence, it did not. The criteria for selection of soldiers were substantially lowered in order to satisfy the great demand for men in wartime, but sometimes also due to the lack of choice. For example, it was not rare to find boys aged thirteen or fourteen paired with middle-aged, or even old men, who were often disabled in some

way – whether they were lame, deaf or even blind. The average height of recruits in this era in the various European armies was barely 160 centimetres; quite a significant number of them suffered from rickets or had bad posture due to malnutrition. There is an opinion that colourful uniforms of this and subsequent century were an attempt to impose a semblance of martial order over short and deformed men. [4 p51]

If we look at some military treatises from the 1600s which deal with the issue of discipline, we can observe two very distinct approaches. For example, one such treatise is *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline* from 1675, which had subsequent revised editions in following years. It is interesting to note that the *Abridgement* wasn't a strict disciplinarian's guide book, but rather an instruction manual on soldiers' bearing in the training-ground and battle, presented in a relaxed manner. [5 p78-9]¹ It is interesting to note that the title was the only place the word "discipline" was mentioned in the book. Only at the very end of the manual, where organisation and procedures of courts-martial or counsels of war are discussed, there is a mention of enforcement of discipline and punishments. [6 p267-71] There the judges (higher-ranking officers) are instructed to deliberate culpability and punishment according to their conscience and the Ordinances or Articles of War. [6 p270] However, besides these general guidelines, there is no further elaboration. We shall return to this question later.

This stands in sharp contrast to Emperor Leopold's *Articelsbrief* (Articles of War) from 1668, which put a great deal of emphasis on strict discipline. Even a cursory look at the text reveals that almost every article demands corporal punishment or even death (*Leib- und Lebensstrafe*) in case of any wrongdoing. For example, Article 2. stipulates that the mutineers shall lose their lives without mercy. Article 3. specifies that the soldier who defies his officer's commands shall lose his life. Article 4. states that if a soldier speaks or acts blasphemously, he will be punished corporally or even by death, depending on the commander's judgement. Article 6. states that a soldier's duty is to take care of his rifle, and in case he gives it away or pawns it, he should be punished severely. Duels were also forbidden both for soldiers and officers, under threat of corporal punishment or death. Those who agreed to serve as seconds were also severely punished (Articles 7. and 8.). [3 p716]

Already mentioned work by Montecuccoli also stands in line with Leopold's *Articelsbrief*, asserting that nothing is more important for soldiers than discipline [2 p33] and that a soldier has to endure severe punishments if he does not do his duty, noting that it is certainly fair that he should hope for a great retribution. [2 p165]

It is interesting to note the difference between the two approaches. Also, one can question the possibility of issuing orders "leisurely" during the heat of battle. One explanation could be that this difference represents the reflection of specific conditions of the theatres of war in which the English and Imperial forces were mainly operating. There was a stark contrast between the relatively orderly warfare in the compact, rich and populous Spanish Netherlands (mostly present-day Belgium), and the vast and sparsely settled Hungary. The Spanish Netherlands encompasses an area of 273 by 160

¹ "The Words of Command are to be given leisurely, that the Soldiers may have time to perform the Exercise without confusion." [6 p8-9]

kilometres at its widest point on east-west and north-south axes respectively. It was predominantly a land of rolling plains that rarely rose more than 100 metres above sea level, interspersed with polders, canals and dykes. [5 p31] This territory was rich, fertile and populous, able to sustain foreign armies on its soil without much trouble, except for inconveniences due to increased taxation. Frequent campaigns during the 17th century created conditions for the appearance of professional victualling contractors, while local peasants and merchants used the situation to their advantage, selling their highly demanded products and services to visiting armies. [5 p34] About ten years before the events of the Nine Years' War, between 1676 and 1678, Spanish and French delegates met at the village of Daynze in order to arrange the control of levying contributions from the local populace, as well as to avoid incidents, excesses and damage to persons and property, which were quite common in this era, during the aforementioned process. Although there was no formal treaty, both parties agreed to follow the spirit of the talks: armed forces would levy contributions from a wider area, instead of individual villages or towns. Also, if an area was unable to pay the required sum or provide goods and fodder, an orderly exchange of hostages was envisioned instead of punitive burning or various other retributions. This, however, was not done just out of humanitarian concerns, although that element was also present, but primarily because commanders had realised that damage to property was counterproductive in the long run, and that looting and razing negatively impacted morale and discipline of their own men. There is a caveat, however, because warring parties have not always abided by Deynze tenets, and the Nine Years' War still abounded in reprisals and ravaging. [5 p34-7]

The French discovered that terrorising the countryside came at an unexpected cost. The devastation of Palatinate in late 1688 and during 1689 - the systematic destruction of towns, villages and fortresses on the eastern bank of the Rhine conducted with the intention to create a sanitary cordon² which would prevent the ability of the enemy to operate [7 p181-2] resulted in unforeseen consequences. Although the soldiers were instructed to carry out their orders in a disciplined manner, it soon became evident that this could not be executed in reality. It was impossible to order a soldier to, for example, burn down a house, but not to steal property or abuse inhabitants. Also, much of the destruction and burning was done by practically independent raiding parties, away from the overview of officers, which exacerbated the problem of control over men. Soldiers were also getting drunk on looted wine, which further goaded them towards excesses. [8 p198] Such behaviour caused resistance, as civilians took arms and tried to defend themselves as best as they could. Local German peasantry resisted and organised themselves as *Schnapphähne* (highwaymen), attacking the occupiers in guerrilla fashion. [8 p195] In turn, this infuriated the French, who committed further brutalities, thus feeding into the vicious cycle of violence. [8 p198] All this naturally had a negative impact on discipline, thus reducing the efficiency of the French army in the field.

² Here used in a sense of an area subjected to a scorched-earth policy.

On the other hand, conditions in the Hungarian theatre of war were quite the opposite of those in the Spanish Netherlands. Geographically, the Kingdom of Hungary encompassed a much larger surface area, with quite varied geography - ranging from great plains in the central and southern parts to mountainous north and east, criss-crossed with many rivers, including the second largest in Europe, Danube, which are characterised by numerous swamplands along their flow. Because of the intermittent wars between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans, Hungary was a desolate, sparsely populated and impoverished land. The road network was almost non-existent, which made the movement of units and supplies very difficult. Weather conditions were harsh and prone to seasonal change: springs were characterised by great humidity, summers by scorching heat, and winters by great cold. Snow could fall as early as October, which was also the month when strong and harsh winds started blowing. Also, daily temperature variations were common, so the temperature could plummet during the night, regardless of season. These conditions coupled with merciless, no-quarter combat led to the brutalisation of soldiers. [9 p24] The only way to impose discipline on men who fought and lived in such conditions, especially if we bear in mind that they were already of dubious personal quality, was by harsh treatment and cruel punishments.

It is also important to emphasise that, despite differences in the above-mentioned treatises, the reality of warfare was much closer to the points described in the works of the German military theorists than in *An Abridgement of the English Military Discipline*. Even more so if we bear in mind that a wide range of corporal punishments was utilised in the English army during the reign of Charles I (1600-1649), including riding the wooden horse,³ whirling⁴ and running the gauntlet. [10 p97-9] Furthermore, the first Mutiny Act, enacted in the wake of the Ipswich mutiny of 1688, envisioned the creation of courts-martial, tasked with dealing with the offences of desertion and mutiny, with expected severity. Although it was meant only for those acts of misconduct, the Mutiny Act allowed the crown to create ordinances or Articles of War in order to punish other military violations. Further Mutiny Acts, enacted under subsequent rulers, expanded the list of punishable military offences. [10 p203ff] By the end of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century, British Mutiny Acts and Articles of War evolved to contain a wide array of severe corporal punishments for soldiers, envisioned for various transgressions. [10 p224ff]

³ A wooden beam(s) or a log set up horizontally, supported by four posts about 1,80 metres high. The whole thing was arranged to resemble a horse. A punished soldier was made to ride the “horse” for several hours, sometimes even days. His hands would be tied behind his back, and frequently weights were tied to his legs in order to increase the severity of the punishment. [10 p98]

⁴ A type of wooden cage which could be made to rotate quite rapidly, so a punished soldier or camp follower would become very sick, “and commonly emptied his or her body through every aperture”. [10 p98 n2]

The Nine Years' War (1688-1697) – A short overview

In this section, we shall provide a short overview of the conflict and the way of waging war in general, without examining the minutiae of particular campaigns, battles, manoeuvres, sieges etc., unless related to disciplinary issues. The Nine Years' War could be seen as an episode of a continuous struggle in Europe between the expansionist France of Louis XIV and various alliances of states opposed to these developments. It could be argued that a sort of undeclared war was fought primarily between France on the one side and the Habsburgs, England and the Netherlands on the other, already in the decade between 1678 and 1688. Of course, there were also French hostilities towards other European states, but they were not as broad in scope as those directed towards these primary adversaries. [11 p223] Methods of this aggression were various – for example, Louis XIV employed *Chambres des Réunions*, a number of courts (chambers) tasked with issuing quasi-legalistic judgements (*arrêts*), which were then used as a pretext for peaceful annexation of territories adjacent to French borders. Three such chambers were set up: one at Breisach for Alsace, second at Besançon for Franche-Comté and third in Metz for Lorraine and Bar. Under their auspices, significant territories around Strasbourg, Kehl, Verdun, Toul, Saar (subsequently renamed Sarrelouis) and Luxembourg were annexed by France between 1680 and 1683. In 1684 there was a limited military action against the Spanish Netherlands – the siege of the city of Luxembourg – but after the successful capture of the city, an agreement was reached on August 15, 1684, i.e., the truce of Regensburg, which essentially confirmed the previous French conquests. [12 p219-20,8 p163-4]

Besides that, the French opted for a purchase of Casale from the Duke of Mantua, with the intent to encroach on Spanish possessions in Italy, more precisely the Duchy of Milan. [11 p223] It should be borne in mind that these manoeuvres weren't just a ploy for Louis's aggrandisement – they had strategic reasoning behind them. These efforts were aimed to obtain more defensible and better delineated frontiers, in order to consolidate the territory of France. [8 p162] Also, during the 1680s, France entered a three-sided tariff war with England and the Netherlands, in order to gain a foothold in competitive markets for exporting of manufactured goods. [11 p224]

By 1688 all these tensions flared up again, and France invaded the Palatinate on September 24, 1688. The *casus belli* was the issue of election of the Archbishop of Cologne: there were two candidates for the position, French agent and Louis XIV's advisor in German affairs Wilhelm von Fürstenberg, and Prince Joseph Clemens, nephew of the late Archbishop-elect and brother of the Bavarian Prince-elect Maximilian II Emanuel. As neither candidate received the required number of votes, the matter was forwarded to Pope Innocent XI for arbitration. As the Holy See had very bad relations with France at the time, the Pope confirmed Joseph Clemens as the new Archbishop-elect. Louis refused to accept the decision, and moved his troops over the Rhine, besieging Philippsburg. [12 p51-2] The initial plan was to conduct a sort of military demonstration coupled with an ultimatum in order to compel the opponents to accept von Fürstenberg as the Archbishop of Cologne and to convert

the truce of Regensburg into a formal treaty. However, this actually elicited resistance, prompting rulers of the German principalities to organise a defence. In turn, the French responded by devastating the Palatinate in order to intimidate their enemies and force them into submission, as well as to secure French possessions by creating a sanitary cordon that would prevent the ability of the enemy armies to operate. This has produced a counter-effect, as now the German princes and the Habsburg Emperor were even more resolute in their resistance, while a local guerrilla movement arose in the Palatinate. [14 p51-2] To complicate things further, Louis XIV declared war on the Netherlands in November 1688; in April 1689 France declared war on Spain, while Dutch Stadtholder William III, as the king of England,⁵ declared war on France in May 1689. In the same month, Bavaria joined the war against France via the Austro-Bavarian treaty, while in 1690 Savoy-Piedmont joined the anti-French alliance, i.e., so-called Grand Alliance, which was formed with the purpose to oppose the expansionist policies of Louis XIV. [14 p54]

Although the Nine Years' War saw a number of battles, such as Fleurus (1690), Leuze (1691), Steenkerk (1692), Neerwinden (1693), Marsaglia (1693), Namur (1695), [14 p55] to name but a few, the nature of fighting was fairly static, such limits being imposed by the nature of terrain, geography and limitations of supply and movement of the 17th-century armies. It has been noted that the military operations were not decisive, and that they were not even meant to be so. French armies never pursued defeated enemies in order to annihilate them. It was usual to pass the whole campaigning season without any significant combat. [8 p264] But such was the nature of fighting. There were numerous theatres of war where this conflict was fought: Flanders, Rhine, Northern Italy/Alps, Northern Spain/Catalonia, Ireland, the naval war in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, but also in North America and India. Because the fighting spanned over a significant part of the globe, the Nine Years' War is sometimes considered in historiography as the first world war. However, the fighting in North America and India was strategically insignificant. Fighting in these two theatres was mainly done in order to protect the trade of tobacco, sugar, fish and precious metals. It was characterised by small-scale actions, usually raids, conducted by local militias occasionally supported by small detachments from Europe. [7 p203-5]

By 1697 indecisiveness of fighting and exhaustion of manpower, materiel and finances had set the stage for peace talks. The negotiations were conducted at the Rijswijk palace on the periphery of The Hague, beginning on May 6, 1697. Nonetheless, military action continued in the Netherlands and Spain, with the goal of improving the negotiating positions of the respective sides. On September 20, the peace treaty was signed at Rijswijk, while the Habsburg Emperor added his signature on October 30, when it became evident that his allies were unwilling to support his request for the return of Strasbourg. The Treaty of Rijswijk essentially enforced the *status quo ante bellum*, with France surrendering all conquests except for Alsace and Strasbourg.

⁵ He became king of England in November 1688, by deposing his father-in-law and uncle James II, a Catholic monarch with "autocratic tendencies", in an event which was later called "the Glorious revolution". [14 p52]

Louis XIV also recognized William III as the king of England, renouncing the support for the son of James II. In historiography the conclusion of the Nine Years' War was seen either as a defeat of France or, rather, "a modest victory" for the Allies, [7 p205] or as a victory for Louis XIV, because he managed to keep most of what he had fought for. [8 p263] Whatever the case, the Nine Years' War could be seen as just one episode of the struggle for dominance between the European powers.

Nine Years' War on the Upper Rhine and disciplinary issues

The war on the Upper Rhine could be divided into two distinct periods. The first between 1688 and 1693 and the second between 1693 and 1697, the watershed being the appointment of Louis William of Baden-Baden (1677-1707) as the commander of the Imperial forces. From the point of view of the Imperial circles of Swabia and Franconia of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, the two areas adjacent to the river Rhine, the Nine Years' War was one of bare survival. The circles had no means to defend themselves from the French onslaught alone, so they turned for help to Vienna and Emperor Leopold. This was a necessary move, but it also entailed a whole new set of problems - namely, from the perspective of the Viennese court, the frontline could be allowed to shift ten or twenty kilometres in the eastward direction, in order to accommodate for strategic considerations. However, such moving of the frontline could spell disaster for the circles of Swabia and Franconia. [15 p164]

It was also understood that a single victory in battle over the French would not lead to their defeat in the war. Bearing in mind that even a victorious army can suffer great casualties, and that the much more resourceful French could replace men and material much easier, the two Circles rightfully concluded that the war would be decided elsewhere and that their primary task was not to win, but to survive the war, so they could fight in the next one. [16 p44] In order to fully grasp the disparity between French and German forces, it should be noted that in 1693 the French had between 50.000 and 80.000 men, while the forces of the German Circles had just over 20.000 soldiers. [15 p201] And the ratio did not really change in the following years.

Besides the help from Emperor Leopold, the Rhenish Circles received assistance from other principalities of the Holy Roman Empire and their European allies. However, this created a situation for potential disunity, because the army on the Upper Rhine was now a patchwork of various contingents with very different aims and perceptions of the war. [16 p44]

This was evident in the Imperial campaigns of 1689, 1690 and 1691, which did not bring much success, except for the reconquest of Mainz (1689), while French attacks and advances on the right bank of the Rhine constantly exposed the vulnerability of German positions. However, in line with the type of fighting which was a general characteristic of the Nine Years' War, these actions were indecisive. [15 p136] To complicate things further, Imperial command on the Rhine during this period passed between Max II Emanuel of Bavaria (1679-1726), General Aeneas Caprara (1631-1701)

and Charles V of Lorraine (1675-1690), which caused confusion and disorder. [15 p133-5]

This was exploited by the French, who won the battle of Ötisheim in 1692, capturing the Imperial commander Frederick Charles of Württemberg-Winnental. [15 p137] This defeat further underlined the necessity for a more unified command. The possible solution was to appoint an experienced commander who had enough martial authority and who enjoyed the trust of the Emperor, as well as of the Circles, in order to impose unity on otherwise heterogeneous forces. [16 p44]

Naturally, such a person was not easy to find. However, by 1693 such a commander had entered the picture - it was Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden. He had earned a great reputation and experience fighting the Ottomans and he enjoyed a special trust of the Swabian Circle, because he belonged to it, as the Margrave of Baden-Baden. [16 p45-6] This appointment was well received among the Circles. One can even speak of an outburst of optimism, or even euphoria, when Louis William took over the command on the Upper Rhine. [15 p195]

Regardless, he faced the difficult task of organising and managing the poorly and unequally equipped troops, while short on money, supplies, equipment and transport means. The tedious tasks also entailed countless admonitions, counsels, orders, pleas, dealings with suppliers, financiers and officers, all the while solving numerous odds and ends. [16 p48] Things were further complicated by the disproportionately high number of generals - 37 of them - which negatively impacted hierarchy and commanding order. [15 p213] This was additionally compounded by Ludwig Wilhelm's lack of command authority over the auxiliary contingents from Saxony and Hessen-Kassel, which remained under separate command of their leaders, Prince-elector and Landgrave, respectively. [15 p212]

The most important task was the enforcement of discipline, which was, of course, conducted top down, but it did not encompass only rank-and-file: officers and even generals were subjected to disciplinary actions by Louis William. Some of the officers were very lax in their approach to duty, so the Margrave insisted on the presence of officers in the regiments, and tardiness or absence from important meetings was threatened with severe punishment. On top of that, many officers were accustomed to a pleasant lifestyle, and they developed a habit of taking soldiers as their personal servants. This was also forbidden by Louis William's order. Colonels were explicitly ordered to take charge and carry out orders themselves in a punctual manner, instead of delegating them to lieutenant-colonels, as it was customary until then, especially because lieutenant-colonels were prone to further delegate orders to their adjutants. It also became mandatory for regimental commanders to send daily reports to their immediate superiors, usually brigade commanders or marshals of the camp (*Generalwachtmeistern*). During the campaign of 1693, reporting to superiors became mandatory for all higher officers. The exemplary trial of *Feldmarschall*leutnant George Eberhard von Heddersdorf, who was accused of dishonourable and contrary-to-orders surrender of Heidelberg, was one of Louis William's tools for instilling discipline in his officer corps and preventing similar behaviour among other generals in the future. Von Heddersdorf was sentenced to death, but at the last minute, the

sentence was commuted to exile. However, despite all these efforts, it was an uneven success, mainly due to Louis William's limited command authority. [15 p191-2]

In order to further bolster the strengths of his forces, Louis William ordered the transfer of troops from Hungary. However, this caused a concern among the Circles. When rumours spread at the beginning of 1693 that Ludwig Wilhelm plans to bring 8.000 Hungarian soldiers to the Upper Rhine, the Swabian Circle expressed its worries and asked the Margrave not to let them enter the territory of the Circle before the campaign began. Furthermore, German cavalymen were deployed to oversee them. [15 p280]

The concern was not unfounded, however, because hussars and haiduks⁶ from the Hungarian theatre of war had a particularly notorious reputation for indiscipline. Not undeservedly so - they were oftentimes closer to highwaymen in appearance and behaviour than to soldiers. This could be a good opportunity to quote impressions of Lady Mary Wortley Montagu, who was accompanied by such a unit of hussars during her journey from Petrovaradin (Peterwaradin) to Belgrade, during her husband's diplomatic mission to Constantinople in February 1717. "The Emperor has several regiments of these people [Rascians]; but, to say truth, they are rather plunderers than soldiers; having no pay, and being obliged to furnish their own arms and horses; they rather look like vagabond gipsies, or stout beggars, than regular troops." [17 p277]

However, it should be noted that these hussar regiments⁷ sometimes had a good reason for such behaviour. For quite a long time they received their sustenance from the Circles, while their salaries have not been paid in years. Advances from colonels and officers did little to alleviate this situation. As General Styrum noted "They wander around like shadows". So, they began deserting to the enemy, as well as trying to escape to Hungary, all the while causing various excesses against the civilian populace. The subordination could be only maintained by the harshest punishments. [18 p93]

Because of the above-mentioned limitations and issues, Louis William had no opportunity to seize the initiative, and was forced to fight defensively, in reactive combat, to simply parry the French, in essence. He skilfully used light troops, especially hussars, to cause small, but frequent manpower losses to the enemy, which in total amounted to a significant number. They also raided supply convoys and attacked minor fortifications and garrisons of the French. This practice was called "little war" or *Kleinkrieg*, which was primarily employed by both the Habsburgs and Ottomans in the Hungarian theatre of war. This kind of combat was not customary for Western European battlefields, so it provided a much-needed leverage to offset weaknesses of the Imperial forces. Meanwhile, Louis William's main army was entrenched in a camp by Heilbronn; it was so well fortified that the French realised it was impossible to conduct a successful attack. Casualties suffered at the hands of light troops, along with supply losses and losses of minor fortifications and camps forced the French to

⁶ Hussars and haiduks were irregular light cavalry and light infantry, respectively, who originated and were recruited in the Kingdom of Hungary.

⁷ There were two hussar regiments which took part in Ludwig Wilhelm's campaign on the Upper Rhine - they were named after and commanded by Adam Kollonitsch and Johann Palffy. [18 p93]

withdraw over the Rhine in autumn of 1693. This strategy was a blueprint for further campaigns conducted by Louis William between 1694 and 1697. He had ordered the construction of a network of trenches, fortifications, redoubts and blockades in order to further hinder the enemy's advances. It was not a glamorous way of combat, there were no great or decisive battles, but the Circles managed to survive in such a way, and successfully defend their territory until the end of the war. [16 p 48-50]

Conclusion

In conclusion, it could be said that disciplinary issues faced by numerous commanders of the Imperial forces on the Upper Rhine during the Nine Years' War were, on the one hand typical for the 17th-century armies, while on the other, they were manifoldly increased due to the organisational chaos that plagued the armies stationed there. One of the main sources of that chaos was the composition of units, which represented a patchwork of contingents from various principalities of the Holy Roman Empire, each under the separate command of its generals. Also, many officers had a very lax approach to duty, while at the same time being very keen to adopt, or rather keep, luxurious lifestyle, taking soldiers as their personal servants, thus reducing discipline. These issues were alleviated by the appointment of Louis William, Margrave of Baden-Baden as the supreme commander of the Imperial forces on the Upper Rhine in 1693, who had managed to restore order and instil discipline by harsh and resolute actions. However, due to the lack of absolute authority over contingents from Saxony and Hessen-Kassel, the impact of his measures was limited. The introduction of hussars and haiduks from the Hungarian theatre of war brought greater tactical flexibility to the Imperial army, but on the other hand, increased problems with the maintenance of discipline and control, stemming from the type of combat that these light troops were engaged in, the so-called "little war" or *Kleinkrieg*.

The French forces in the same theatre of war also had disciplinary issues, primarily caused by their ravaging of the Palatinate in 1688/89. This concentrated destruction of settlements and fortifications on the right bank of the Rhine led to the loss of control over their own troops, who lost cohesion and discipline during the looting, turning more into brigands than organised fighting men.

Rezime

Pitanje discipline je bilo veoma važno za armije ranog modernog doba. S obzirom na uobičajeno socijalno poreklo vojnika, koji su poticali od viška seoskog stanovništva, društveno nepoželjnih, kriminalaca koji su se pridružili vojsci kako bi ublažili kaznu, ili prisilno regrutovanih (press gang), disciplina je bila veoma oštra, ponekad na granici nehumane. Povrh toga, teški uslovi ratovanja u 17. veku doveli su do dalje brutalizacije vojnika, što je zauzvrat zahtevalo čvršću kontrolu nad njima. U ovom radu su analizirani

disciplinski problemi sa kojima su se suočavale carske snage na gornjoj Rajni tokom Devetogodišnjeg rata (1688-1697), posebno u periodu komandovanja princa Ludviga Badenskog (1693-1697). Disciplinski izazovi stavljeni pred brojne komandante carskih snaga bili su, s jedne strane tipični za vojske 17. veka, dok su s druge strane, bili višestruko uvećani zbog organizacionog haosa u kojima su se nalazile vojske. Jedan od glavnih izvora tog haosa bio je sastav jedinica, koje su predstavljale splet kontingenata iz raznih kneževina Svetog rimskog carstva, svaki pod posebnom komandom svojih generala. Takođe, mnogi oficiri su imali veoma nonšalantan pristup dužnosti, dok su u isto vreme bili veoma voljni da usvoje, odnosno zadrže, luksuzan način života, uzimajući vojnike za svoje lične slugе, narušavajući na taj način disciplinu. Ova pitanja su ublažena imenovanjem Ludviga Badenskog za vrhovnog komandanta carskih snaga na gornjoj Rajni 1693. godine, koji je ostrim i odlučnim potezima uspeo da uspostavi red i uvede disciplinu. Međutim, zbog nedostatka apsolutnog autoriteta nad kontingentima iz Saksonije i Hesena-Kasela, uticaj njegovih mera bio je ograničen. Dovođenje husara i hajduka sa ugarskog ratišta donelo je veću taktičku fleksibilnost carskoj vojsci, ali je, s druge strane, povećalo probleme u održavanju discipline i kontrole, uzrokovanih načinom borbe koju su ove lake trupe upražnjavale, odnosno takozvanim „malim ratom“.

Francuske snage na istom frontu takođe su imale i disciplinske probleme, prvenstveno uzrokovane njihovim pustošenjem Palatinata 1688/89. Ovo koncentrisano uništavanje naselja i utvrđenja na desnoj obali Rajne dovelo je do gubljenja kontrole nad sopstvenim jedinicama, koje su izgubile koheziju i disciplinu tokom pljačke, pretvarajući se više u razbojnike nego u organizovane vojnike.

Ključne reči: ratovanje, vojnici, Sveto rimsko carstvo, Ludvig Vilhelm, Markgrof od Baden-Badena, Rajna, disciplina, Devetogodišnji rat (1688-1697), kontrola

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