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ROLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF TURKEY AND THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND IN CURRENT CRISIS IN AP KOSOVO AND METOHİJA***

Abstract: Observed through a historical prism, the crisis in the Kosovo and Metohija region of Serbia is determined by geopolitical interests of regional and global powers, historic processes and ethnographic changes, in which constantly, but with varying intensity, Albanian and Serbian people confront and defend each other's right over the territory. The NATO aggression in 1999 on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and the ensuing proclamation of “Kosovo” independence in 2008, incited and encouraged the Albanian political elites to act in accordance with the Prizren League Declaration from 1878 so as to undertake intensified measures for the establishment of Great Albania, which in line with the Albanian strategic culture would foster the principles of fascist ideology: “One state, one language, one nation, one religion.” To prove that such an ideology is conducted in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, we mention several facts reflected in the violence committed daily towards Serbian and other, non-Albanian population, along with their properties, cultural and religious buildings, which has led to a shift in national structure and systematic destruction of Serbian cultural heritage.

The subject matter of this paper covers the wider context of the expressed interests of Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (hereinafter: Great Britain) in contemporary security circumstances, characterised by the presence of hybrid threats with focus on the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija (hereinafter: AP KiM) within the security agenda of these powers.

Keywords: Great Britain, AP KiM, Republic of Serbia, hybrid war, instruments of national power, national interests.

INTRODUCTION

From the point of current crisis in KiM, within the context of the most prevalent display of power with the aim to strengthen the Albanian and reduce Serbian factor in that territory, at the moment Great Britain, as the traditional factor of stability and

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instability in Serbia, stands out. This synergy actions of the instruments of powers of “Kosovo” and Great Britain, in the plans of interior and foreign policies, indicate that at the territory of the Province, as well as towards the Republic of Serbia, currently hybrid activities are being undertaken in order to create the conditions for establishing the fully fledged independence of the so-called Kosovo, which under present circumstances seems to be an inevitable condition for the realisation of the British geopolitical interests in the territory of Western Balkans. Those interests mainly concern the prevention of potential strengthening of the influence of the Russian Federation and the Federal Republic of Germany in that area, recognised as the bridge between East and West, but also as the possible market place for the expansion of the British capital and new positioning in international relations, forced by the British exit from the European Union (EU), along with the special military operation in the Ukraine.

In the context of the instruments of power of Great Britain regarding the fulfilment of the mentioned national interests in the Republic of Serbia (AP KiM), traditionally the British diplomacy, intelligence apparatus and the British capital stand out as the inevitable factors of the British economic power, which not only created economic bonds with Serbia for profit, but also simultaneously used its economic clout as the means to shape up the political situation in the country and international organisations. Thus, the use of intelligence and diplomatic instruments of power were additionally legalised through indirect support to certain political and security structures, lobbying for certain political decisions and even direct interference in political processes under the excuse of the protection of rule of law, democracy, citizens’ standard of living and improvement of regional economic cooperation and accession to EU (NATO), both of the Republic of Serbia and “Kosovo”.

This paper is relevant since it chronologically presents the most important security events in Kosovo and Metohija, which significantly deprive the Serbs of their rights and create the conditions for their moving and displacement from that territory, with the tacit agreement of international community and indirect involvement of the Republic of Turkey and Great Britain. Owing to such an approach to examining this security issue, the concrete role of Turkey and Great Britain will be identified. Finally, that will confirm or refute the purposefulness of supporting *the frozen conflict* as the short-term solution for protecting and preserving territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia in the Kosovo-Metohija space.

The basic hypothesis of this paper is that complexity and mutual connectedness of internal and external factors of security, guided by the so-called *Great Albanian Ideology* and national interests of individual representatives of the international community, especially of the Republic of Turkey and Great Britain, constitute the essential factor of current instability and endangering Serbian national interests in Kosovo and Metohija.

1. IMPORTANCE OF KOSOVO AND METOHIJA AND TENDENCY TO CREATE AN INDEPENDENT STATE IN THAT TERRITORY

Kosovo and Metohija represents a complex geosystem of multilateral and centralising anthropogeographic, ethnographic and geopolitical position in the region of Western Balkans, occupying the area of approximately 10,887 km², which is about 12.3% of the entire state space of Serbia. It stretches at the junction of the Central Balkanic

Morava – Vardar corridor and its Ibar – Kosovo parallel, at the crossroads with Transbalkan communication, from Lješ and Skadar, via Prizren and Priština and further on over Podujevo, Kuršumlija and Prokuplje to Niš (Радовановић 2006: 7–34), the northern borderline of The Project of Great Albania.

Due to its geographic position, unique mine wealth of lignite, chromium, lead, zinc, silver, gold, bismuth, nickel, cadmium and huge amounts of pyrite, antimony, indium and manganese, as well as exceptional agricultural potential and water supplies, Kosovo and Metohija has been the land of interest and the battlefield of great powers since ancient times. The right over the property of Kosovo and Metohija was, among others, claimed by the Ottoman and Austrian Empires, France, Great Britain and Germany, which today considers it as its main geostrategic zone in Southern Serbia. Nevertheless, all those powers were coming and leaving, but since the 17th century, Albanians have tended to take over the dominance over the territory, which in the history of the Serbian people and national tradition has had special historic, national, civilisational and mythological meaning in the sense of crucial historic, even fatal point – the Kosovo Battle that took place on Vidovdan, the 28th of June 1389, which divides the historic destiny of Serbs into the periods *before Kosovo* and *after Kosovo* (Степић 2020: 7–30). It is no coincidence that this term exactly (Kosovo) has become a part of the name of separatist Albanian movement in an attempt to form another Albanian state in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, as a part of The Project of Great Albania, by what the measures have been taken to fully exclude the term Metohija from the name of the Province, because “it symbolises Serbian – Orthodox, in the wider sense Serbian – Byzantine cultural historic foundations” (Радовановић 2006: 7–34). Albanian hegemonism towards Kosovo and Metohija is quite pragmatic, reflected in the tendency of great powers to form two national corpuses in Western Balkans, which would rival each other in demographic, religious and cultural sense with the starting elements necessary to cause crises artificially, depending on the need to maintain *the strategy of balance* in that territory. The background of that strategy is the confrontation of national interests and alternating shifts of “supremacy” between East and West, which often was the root cause of the conflicts between the Serbian and Albanian people.

Considering that, one may conclude that Albania without Kosovo and Metohija cannot fulfil its strategic role assigned to it from some centres of power in the geopolitical Balkan games. Albania lacks all the necessary resources that key elements and indicators of state power are based upon, such as territorial depth, demographic potentials, economic and natural resources as the foundation of state economic power. Within the context of satisfying those needs through accomplishing full independence of the so-called Kosovo and achieving the strategic aim of great powers, under the excuse of human rights and the rights of national minorities, as well as the need for internal democratisation and joining the EU, it is utterly clear that the pressures and blackmails on Serbia will continue from one side of one part of international community, so that it would concede and accept the change of the state – legal status of Kosovo and Metohija.

Regardless of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and following the signing of the Kumanovo Agreement, they deployed the mission named Kosovo Force

– KFOR, with the aim to preserve peace, i. e. create and maintain security in the territory of AP KiM, where peace does not exist today (Павић и др. 2024).

2. CHRONOLOGICAL OVERVIEW OF THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENTS AND INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT CRISIS IN KOSOVO AND METOHİJA

Following the election of Aljbin Kurti for the president of the government of the so-called Kosovo in the second mandate (from the 22nd of March 2021), the security situation drastically worsened in the Serbian communities in Kosovo and Metohija, in particular in the north of the Province. With Quinta countries' tacit approval, Kurti was continuously engaging strong police forces in the north of Kosovo and Metohija and with constant provocations towards the Serbian population, he kept a very high level of tensions with the ultimate goal to displace the remaining Serbs and to divert the attention of international community from the obligation to form the Community of Serb municipalities (serb. ZSO) and from his domestic public the extremely poor economic situation and corruption in the "state".

Aiming to resume the full control over the municipalities in the north of the Province, on the private properties illegally expropriated from the Serbs, the bases were put up for "Kosovo Borderline Units" near the administrative crossings Brnjak and Jarinje, the bases for special units in the villages of Gornji Jasenovik (municipality of Zubin Potok) and Košutovo (municipality of Leposavić), permanent checkpoint with the bunkers near Bistrica Bridge for the control of traffic communication Kosovska Mitrovica – Raška, as well as the point close to the bridge in the village of Gazivode (municipality of Zubin Potok), for the purpose of controlling the traffic communication Kosovska Mitrovica – Ribariće.

Since March 2022, within "Kosovo Borderline Units", an intervention unit has been formed only to have the most extreme members of "Kosovo Police" special units at its core. That has created the conditions for the persistent engagement of the trained and extremely heavily armed corps near the administrative borderline. Grouping and engagement of the strong forces in the north of the Province was "justified" in front of international community by Priština as the alleged anti-crime fight, but also with spreading the misinformation on organised and armed "Serbian para-military groups" and the alleged plans of the Serbian Armed Forces and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia for the land intervention onto the north of Kosovo and Metohija, following the example of the Ukrainian conflict. They had a strong operative and technical support of intelligence services for the placement of misinformation, from the aspect of planning and organising actions just like for the very coordination of field work and training the members of certain police and "military" specialities.

The majority of those trainings were related to "Kosovo Police Special Intervention Units",¹ which comprised of sniper training, anti-terrorist training, as well as the training in planning and executing "high-risk" actions. Parallel to strengthening the action

1 In the media most often mentioned as "FIT" (First Incident Team).

capacities of special police units north from the Ibar, repressive measures were intensified towards the Serbian population in terms of confiscating consumer goods and medicines, searching people and vehicles, arrests, detaining for interrogations with the aim to identify the bearers of self-organising and the members of Civilian Protection, which was marked as a terrorist organisation. These actions were characterised by the engagement of extremely strong forces, unnecessary in proportion to potential risks, by which Priština purposefully demonstrated force, often followed by excessive brutality due to the fervour of the engaged manpower. Additionally, aiming to humiliate and terrify the local Serbian population, the members of special units several times broke into schools, kindergartens and hospitals.

Closing the alternative roads leading from Central Serbia to Kosovo and Metohija, the artificial running out of basic food items was caused in the shops in Serbian communities, even in the north of the Province, which exerted pressure on the Serbs to trade with the goods produced in the south from the Ibar and in that way to legalise the increased Albanian presence in that territory. Simultaneously, every attempt of the Serbian population to resolve the lack of essential supplies of Serbian production was abused by Priština to further criminalise the Serbian population and health care institutions of the Republic of Serbia that operate in Kosovo and Metohija. Later on, it turned out that the background of such propaganda activities by Priština was the planned integration of health care institutions into the “Kosovo” system on January 1st 2024.

The formation of “Institute for War Crimes”, increased number of “Kosovo Police” directorate in charge of investigating war crimes (from 19 to 41 people) and allowing the court trials to be conducted in the absence of the prosecuted, intensified the pressures on the Serbs, while the arrests for the alleged war crimes dominantly were connected with the procedures that the arrested initiated exclusively because of the demands to repatriate or bring back the usurped properties. These activities were conveying the message to all the other people who on different grounds participated in combat activities in 1999 in Kosovo and Metohija, the members of the Military and Police, to leave their dwelling places or not to enter the Province territory.

Because of all repressive measures of Priština, in order to divert the attention of the international community and responsible international organisations, during the November of 2022, the Serbs from Kosovo and Metohija were forced to abandon all municipality positions (especially those presidential ones in the north), along with the positions and duties within the other Priština institutions (“Kosovo Police”, “Kosovo Customs”, legal institutions etc.), all of which contributed to creating an institutional vacuum. However, instead of taking some measures to overcome institutional crisis in the municipalities in the north of the Province, Priština organised snap local elections on the 23rd of April 2023.

Intensifying police repression prior to the election, Priština consciously tended to provoke reactions and incidents with the local Serbs in order to accuse Serbia of destabilising the situation and to discredit Serbia before international community, which at that moment started to criticise Kurti more, though not loud enough, for the worsened security situation in the north of Kosovo and Metohija. Almost all intelligence capacities were engaged with that aim, including a greater number of “Kosovo Police Special

Intervention Unit”, who in the north from Ibar were engaged in civilian clothes. Moreover, special “teams” of intelligence examination police officers were formed, so they detained more persons for hearing for the alleged commitment of criminal acts, with frequent undertaking of repressive measures and they began to be interested in political representatives of the Serbs from the north of Kosovo and Metohija, along with the other persons held as the bearers of Serbian self-organising in that territory.

After the snap election where no Serbian political party took part, Priština took some measures to violently take over municipality premises in the north of the Province. In the context of those activities, “Kosovo Police” blocked the entryways of the municipality buildings on the 26th of May 2023. They also placed checkpoints on the roads leading to Zvečan, Zubin Potok and Leposavić, at the same time endeavouring to arrest some protesters who demonstratively defended municipality buildings, again aiming to warn international community about the need to get engaged in a more agile way so as for the crisis to be resolved in that territory.

For further repressive measures towards the citizens in the north of the Province, Priština used the 29th of May 2023 event when, in front of the Zvečan municipality building, a group of protesters confronted the KFOR members, when Dragiša Galjak, a local Serb, was shot from behind by some “Kosovo Police” member. The conflict was caused because “Kosovo Police” in the presence of KFOR tried to exert force to arrest those peacefully protesting in front of the municipality building in Zvečan. On that occasion, with the intention to trigger the confrontation between the citizens and KFOR members, “Kosovo Police” members from the municipality building started to throw various pyrotechnic devices that caused the injuries of several dozens of KFOR members. Nonetheless, for that KFOR member wounding – the local Serbs were blamed and the entire event served to Priština as an excuse to legalise the arrests of previously targeted, respected Serbian citizens.

After the political measures and pressures from international community, the security situation seemingly calmed down, and in July 2023 the increased KFOR engagement and presence in the north of the Province was registered, which allegedly had the aim to prevent the obstruction of security situation and the emergence of the conflicts between the citizens and “Kosovo Police”. In that period Priština tried to implement their measures to “resolve” the crisis also related to the possibility of the new local elections, in the way that on the 1st of August 2023 a work group was designated to create “administrative instruction on the procedure for the removal of municipality president from office” (removal from office by citizen initiative).

Furthermore, in that period, Priština declaratively accepted the reduction of its presence and engagement of “special police forces” in the north of Kosovo and Metohija, with the alleged displacement of municipality buildings, but the total “Kosovo police” engagement of forces remained roughly on the same level, with constant repressive measures against the Serbs, most frequently in the form of arresting, maltreating, verbal insults and similar. However, the real intention of Priština was just delaying the implementation of the arranged agreements, while trying to criminalise Serbian political factor before international community and to introduce the suitable persons of Serbian nationality to the political circles in order to legalise the moves of Priština towards the north of the Province.

3. ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN CURRENT CRISIS IN KOSOVO AND METOHİJA

If we take into consideration that only in the period from 2021 to 2023, during the previously described period of Aljbin Kurti's "authority", in Kosovo and Metohija the Albanians caused at least 128 ethnically motivated incidents (disregarding the year of 2023, when that number was the highest), where several dozens of persons were wounded or ungroundedly arrested, and the Serbian properties were looted or destroyed, there remains the question if that is truly possible if in the Province territory there are international community representatives, which within their jurisdiction have the legitimacy and the ability to act ahead.

One of key aims of KFOR and EULEX missions was to serve as security forces, having at their disposal the capacities and abilities to maintain stability, without NATO engagement, to secure safe environment for all the citizens in the Province. However, the latest events and rejection to undertake adequate measures to prevent constant repressions of the "security" structures of Priština in Serbian settlements, indicate that the inactivity of KFOR indirectly contributes to the realisation of Kosovo independence and displacement of the Serbian population from that territory. To support that, there is the NATO declarative attitude that the time is not right for the changes in the "Kosovo Security Forces", which did not prevent temporary institutions in Priština on the 14th of December 2018 to adopt a set of laws that *de facto* enables the creation of military formations, or transitions of "Kosovo Security Forces" into "Kosovo Armed Forces".

The tendency of more pronounced KFOR engagement in training and schooling the members of "Kosovo Security Forces", as well as the tacit approval of that parasecurity formation being armed with the most modern weapons, which is neither in line with SC UN Resolution 1244 nor with Military-Technical Agreement from Kumanovo, obviously indicates that they resumed both the functions of political and military powers of Priština. In the context of all those "partial" KFOR and EULEX (in)activities, one should disassociate a bit and claim that this is the characteristic primarily of certain individual members of international organisations in Kosovo and Metohija, out of which the most distinct roles are held by the Republic of Turkey and Great Britain, which tend to accomplish their strategic national aims in the KiM territory.

3. 1. Role of the Republic of Turkey in supporting Priština

Guided by their own economic and foreign policy interests in line with the proclaimed Neo-Ottomanism of Ahmet Davutoglu, ex minister of foreign affairs and Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey has been trying for a while to impose itself as the influential factor in the region, where the Republic of Serbia with Bosnia and Herzegovina stands as one of the foci of its activities (Давутоглу 2014). The changes inside the Turkish society in the last couple of years, dominantly with the strengthening of religious factor, conditioned the engagement of the Turkish diplomacy, beside the economic, more and more could be felt in the religious plan, aiming to position more firmly in Serbia, and by using religion and participation in international KFOR mission,

to impose itself as the authority and factor of cohesion within the Muslim and Bosnian population, just like it was done in BiH and Albania. Anyway, in its activities towards “Kosovo”, and in general to Balkan states, Turkey does not accentuate publicly the religious connection with the Turkish minority and Albanians, whom they regard as part of their own people and Muslim world, as it could damage the relationships with the West, even in the context of confrontations with the Orthodox. In Turkey, there is a numerous diaspora of the Albanians and Turks from these territories who emigrated, and who outnumber the current number of inhabitants of Kosovo and Metohija. Turkey counts on them, especially in its domestic politics. According to the estimates of the western military-political analysts, the return of Turkey to the Balkans and its engagement to support “Kosovo” is carried out exclusively under the patronage of the USA, which makes concessions in order to ensure the stronger connecting of Turkey to NATO and its distancing from the Russian Federation.

Using the public excuse of acting in the interest of European security, Turkey has increased its military presence in Europe, through the mission of KFOR, from about 780 to over 1,000 members of this national contingent. At the same time, for the first time it has been allowed for a member of the Turkish Armed Forces to occupy the position of the head of the NATO mission. The confirmation of Neo-Ottoman tendencies and demonstration of “soft” power, in the context of the message to Serbia not to make any attempts with military intervention in the Province, the Turkish contingent was placed in Prizren, the old Serbian capital, in the barracks symbolically named “Sultan Murat” (*Murat the Sultan*).

Supplying “Kosovo” with military equipment and weapons in recent years has become a traditional practice in the relations between “Kosovo” and Turkey,² where we may infer that the culmination of that form of cooperation has been reached in the second half of 2023, when Turkey, contrary to all international contracts, delivered to “Kosovo” five unmanned aerial vehicles TB2 “Barjaktar”, which is beyond doubt another example of Turkish demonstration of “soft” power directed at Serbia, but at the West Balkans region, too. Under those circumstances, even this year, Turkey has continued the tradition of donating 10 million dollars to “Kosovo Security Forces” for the purpose of providing “individual equipment”. Besides, the members of “Kosovo Security Forces” have been educated for a number of years at military academies in Turkey, and they are present at diverse professional development courses and trainings for operating helicopters (T129 ATAK), along with unmanned aerial vehicles of Turkish production.

Immediately after the delivery of unmanned aerial vehicles to “Kosovo”, Sabri Tunc Angili, the “ambassador” of Turkey in Priština, stated that the unmanned aerial vehicles *Barjaktar* TB2 are no donation to “Kosovo Security Forces”, and that Turkey, in line with possible requirements of the “Government of Kosovo”, is ready to provide (sell) the other equipment (drones). Also, he said that Turkey is the strategic partner of “Kosovo”

2 During 2018, Turkey donated 20 armoured *Kobra* transporters, in 2021, “Kosovo” allegedly bought from Turkey four *Vuran* armoured vehicles and 10 armoured *Kirpi* vehicles. During 2023, “Kosovo” bought from Turkey five unmanned aerial vehicles TB2 *Barjaktar*, several dozens anti-aircraft OMTAC systems of 160 mm (range 4,500 m), *Boran* howitzers of 105 mm (range 17 km), *ALKAR* mortars of 120 mm (range to 8 km), which are characterised by high mobility. Procurement of additional 40 *Vuran* armoured vehicles is planned, though they have only been solved to “Kosovo” so far.

and that it will participate in the development of all areas, including defence. Thus, Turkey, as a mediator, in the context of the diverting strategy of “Kosovo”, sent an even more precise message to Serbia – that Serbia must not deploy military forces in the Province or it would enter into an armed conflict with Turkey (*Nedeljnik*, the 27th July 2023).

Soon afterwards, the commandant of KFOR, whose primary duty concerns the air space of Kosovo and Metohija, approved that “Kosovo Security Forces” more than once in the region of Djakovica use unmanned aerial vehicles TB2 *Barjaktar*, which is not in line with SC UN Resolution 1244 and Military-Technical Agreement.

3. 2. Role of Great Britain in Supporting Priština to Establish the Independence of “Kosovo”

In the context of supporting “Kosovo”, demonstrations of “soft” power and diversion of the Republic of Serbia from the possible military intervention in the Province, it is necessary to distinguish the activities of the armed forces of Great Britain, which in 2021, when they had 35 members in KFOR, raised that number to 400, only to announce the increase to 600 members under the excuse of the latest crisis in the north of Kosovo and Metohija during the 24th of September 2023, which would make their contingent, apart from the Turkish, one of the most numerous national contingents within KFOR.

What characterises the British armed forces in KFOR is their intelligence – reconnaissance engagement within the units and forces of “operative reserve”, while they mostly have some special plan not demanded by the KFOR mission, they perform intelligence – reconnaissance activities in the Serbian settlements close to the administrative line by using tactical unmanned aerial vehicles and civilian vehicles without any KFOR or their own country identification labels.

Such their activities, along with the engagement in the formation and immediate training of the members of “Kosovo Security Forces” from the company for “civilian operations”, whose tasks are of strategic importance and refer to the execution of psychological operations and special warfare, the British also show that they whole-heartedly back up Priština in the activities regarding resuming full control in the north KiM. To raise the level of abilities, at the end of 2019 and in early 2020, a part of the company for “civilian operations” studied the Serbian language at the Centre for Foreign Languages of the Command for Training and Doctrine of the “Kosovo Security Forces”, financed by the British “embassy” in Priština. If we take into consideration the time span of forming and training this unit as a necessary period for enabling it, a conclusion is derived that a planned and well organised operation of parasecurity structures in the north of the Province, started in 2021, was probably guided by the engagement of that unit, though the members of “Kosovo Security Forces” are not allowed to operate in that territory without the KFOR permission.

Besides, hitherto experiences indicate that during the execution of high-risk actions in the north of Kosovo and Metohija from “Kosovo Police”, the members of the British KFOR contingent, in most cases, were directing several of their members to police operative centres and bases, with the task to plan, organise and coordinate such actions. In addition to this, so far in more cases there has been the training of diverse staff of “Kosovo Security Forces” in military centres in Great Britain.

Early in July 2023, British MP and Chair of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee of the British Parliament, Alicia Kearns accused the Republic of Serbia of smuggling weapons in ambulance vehicles to “Kosovo”, only to store them in the Serbian Orthodox Church facilities (*Vreme*, 3rd July 2023). Not long after, an intensified presence of the KFOR British contingent intelligence structures was registered near the administrative line in the north of KiM, and on the 24th of September 2023, exactly in that region was the occurrence of the clash between the local Serbs and the members of “Kosovo police”. All of this leaves some space for suspicion of the possible British involvement in psychological or intelligence operation of Priština parasecurity organs because there is no doubt that after it, Serbian negotiation position was hardened concerning the resolution of the status of the Serbian southern Province.

In order to comprehend and confirm the (intelligence) activities of Great Britain in Kosovo and Metohija, one ought to go back to the past and perceive that the political clout of Great Britain, as a colonial power, never happened without the accomplishment of its economic and political interests.³ We as the country significantly witnessed such an experience with the British at the end of WW1, when then the Kingdom of SHS / Yugoslavia was a great debtor, mainly to the USA and Great Britain. The war debt to Great Britain was regulated by the contract from the 9th of August 1927, by which the Kingdom of Yugoslavia accepted to pay off the sum of 25,591,428 pounds sterling in 62 years, along with the sum of 3,103,848 pounds sterling to be paid in 15 years, in the name of help in kind (Гњатовић 2016). At the same time the British company “Selection Trust LTD” expressed interest in the exploitation of mine wealth of the *Stari Trg* mine in present-day Kosovo and Metohija. The contract on concession was signed in 1927 for 50 years and a mutual company “Trepca Mines Limited” was founded. In that way, the British ensured that the war debt will be definitely paid back with significant “interest” – it was in fact a clear insurance placed directly by Nikola Pašić, the most influential politician in Serbia of that time. The later appearance of Paris and London Club continued to deal with the inherited financial problems, so Serbia eventually returned its debts to the London Club of creditors on the 30th of April 1918 (Лондонски и Париски клуб). Yet, the British “appetites” for KiM mine wealth increased and the Priština “Government” representatives as an expression of “gratitude” for mentorship and international support, with private British companies signing an array of new contracts regarding the ore exploitation in the Province.

CONCLUSION

Although the West distributed its military force within the international forces in Kosovo and Metohija, with constant sponsorship of the secessionist Albanian movement, they tried to establish a new actual state and to extort from Serbia the recognition of the seceded part of the territory, we may conclude that they have not succeeded so far, but they have been stimulated to radicalise their work so as to accomplish such

3 See more: British capital in Yugoslavia 1918–1941 – its economic, political and intelligence role, Directorate for Work Coordination of Science Institutes, Institute for Historic Matters, Belgrade, 1951.

a goal. Numerous facts point out that the latest crisis in Kosovo and Metohija is a part of the coordinated psychological-intelligence operation of parasecurity structures and certain representatives of international forces, which under the cloak of KFOR and EU-LEX, tend to achieve their national strategic interests, mainly contained in squeezing out the influence of the Russian Federation from their fields of interest, along with satisfying some economic interests in the form of exploitation of mine wealth or providing transit traffic lines and hubs, establishing military bases etc.

However, there are many reasons for refuting both of those propositions, which might have been best described by Milomir Stepić from the Institute for Political Studies in Belgrade. In his article “Kosovo and Metohija: a geopolitical aspect of a quick solution and frozen conflict” Stepić stated at least 14 reasons why Serbia is not to accept the imposed resolution. Each of his explanations is equally important and that is why the concept of “frozen conflict” is imposed as the only acceptable solution, especially if we keep in mind the trend of the decreasing demographic potential of the Albanians in Kosovo and Metohija due to mass migration, poor standard of living and increased mortality rate caused by the consequences of NATO bombardment. Apart from that, in favour of “the frozen conflict” goes the fact that the world order has got closer to “multipolar bipolarism”, in which the world has been divided into pro-American (the one whose majority recognised “Kosovo”) and anti-American part (the one that did not recognise “Kosovo”), in which the USA and EU relatively become weaker, while the relevance increases around the axis gathered around the largest, richest in resources and most populated countries – the Russian Federation, PR China, India, Indonesia, and a great number the other countries in Africa, Asia, Latin America and even Vatican, as one of the most influential countries in the world.⁴

In that sense, it is essential on the national level, from the state professional agents and through case studies, to study all forms of manifesting modern asymmetrical threats, their causes, development, characteristics, principles and aims achieved via them, and to register the weaknesses and failures of their bearers and commanders. Hence, a national data base would be formed to present the quality foundation for re-examining the existing normative – legal and doctrinal documents in order to contemplate the possibilities of developing the concepts of hybrid operations in Kosovo and Metohija, which could make avail of the use and effects of all instruments of power of the Republic of Serbia, even in military-security context.

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4 So-called Kosovo independence is not recognized by the countries that make 71.5% of world population and 65.4% world territories. *Ibid.*, p. 23.

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УЛОГА РЕПУБЛИКЕ ТУСКЕ И УЈЕДИЊЕНОГ КРАЉЕВСТВА ВЕЛИКЕ БРИТАНИЈЕ И СЕВЕРНЕ ИРСКЕ У АКТУЕЛНОЈ КРИЗИ У АП КОСОВО И МЕТОХИЈА

РЕЗИМЕ

Посматрано кроз историјску призму, криза у косовскометохијском делу Србије детерминисана је геополитичким интересима регионалних и светских сила, историјским процесима и етнографским променама, у којима се константно, али са различитим интензитетом, албански и српски народ сукобљавају и бране једни другима право над тим простором. Агресија НАТО 1999. године на Савезну Републику Југославију (СРЈ), а потом и проглашење независности „Косова” 2008. године, подстакао је и охрабрило албанске политичке елите да, у складу са декларацијом „Призренске лиге” из 1878. године, предузму интензивније мере на успостављању „Велике Албаније”, у којој би у складу са стратешком културом Албанаца био заступљен принцип фашистичке идеологије: „Једна држава, један језик, једна нација, једна вера”.

Проблематика рада је да се сагледа шири контекст испољених интереса Турске и Уједињеног Краљевства Велике Британије у савременим безбедносним условима, које карактерише присуство хибридних претњи, са тежиштем на Аутономној покрајини Косово и Метохија у безбедносној агенди ових сила. Посматрано из угла актуелне кризе на Косову и Метохији, у контексту најприсутнијег испољавања „меке моћи” у циљу јачања албанског и умањења српског фактора на том простору, посебно се издвајају Република Турска, Уједињено Краљевство Велика Британија и Северна Ирска.

Кључне речи: Велика Британија, АП КиМ, Република Србија, хибридни рат, инструменти националне моћи, национални интереси.