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QUANTAE PSYCHOLOGIAE? – UNA VEL MULTAE?

ABSTRACT. Concerned with the study of empirical correlations between elements of behavior and external circumstances, and especially with the research of these empirical relationships in a much simpler manner than it would be suitable for their complex nature, many psychologies rarely look at the fundamental issues of capability, or assumptions, of their own noetic efforts. Instead, there are multiple “views” that pretend to be psychological theories. The concept of psychology as a study of soul necessarily relies on the concept of science, and on the concept of soul as its subject. It is still the case – especially in academic circles – that the ruling concept of science is the modern, Cartesian, scientific concept where natural science is the only paradigm of science. When applied to the science of soul, that scientific paradigm inevitably gives different variations of reductionist psychology: from experimental psychology to neurophysiology. The truth (or factual knowledge as content) of such studies of soul must inevitably be reduced and scarce, namely, a reduced and scarce knowledge of soul itself. General psychological theory, of course, cannot be a compromise formation of disparate attitudes, rules and principles, nor can it, epistemologically, be an eclectic knowledge of mental phenomena. If different psychological theories, approaches, and points of view, which are sometimes, pretentiously, being called *schools*, see each mental theme or content in a totally different way, then it is necessary to examine the type, quality and place of the truth

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those psychologies strive for. It is not logical to expect such different approaches to reach the same truth, the same understanding of the correlations of psychological facts. In that case, the most logical question that can be asked is whether it is the same area of research and whether it is the same science about psyche.

KEY WORDS: science, truth, divided subject, symbolic, one or more psychologies, psychic apparatus.

Perhaps it can be said that various psychological theories can justify completely different explanations of their subject – the mysterious *psyche* – as a necessary consequence of their gradual approach to the truth from various sides. It is, however, a completely different matter where and what kind of truth these theories seek for and, especially, how much is the given truth practically relevant. We know that behavioral and gestalt theses relate to a few people personally, in contrast to, for example, psychoanalytic thesis which concerns everyone. Discovered psychological objects in such contexts can never be the same. The context of psychological truth itself will determine how much a theory is capable to reach it with its own procedures. Of course, besides the way taken by experimental psychology, there must be some other way that does not come from postulates of positive science and that, therefore, it is not easy to be declared a doctrine. A significant question concerned with the problem of existence of one or more psychologies is, without a doubt, the question *where* psychology seeks the truth or, more precisely, where it *does not* seek the truth. Psychology does not seek the truth only where it does not speak it. Therefore, more attention should be given to Lacan's formulation, "I always speak the truth" (Lacan 1983, p. 119).

Entire classic psychology starts from equalizing the man and the thought – if I am if I think, then I am because I think I am. The problem is that, in psychology, many are still not aware that it cannot be that I am if I think, or that I am because I think I am. From psychotherapy we learn something completely different, very different indeed, namely, that I am not who I think I am – for the simple reason that I, just thinking that I am, think for some other person. I am someone other in relation to I who thinks that I am. For this reason, it is indicated that the speaking entity, revealed by the experience of analysis, is structured completely differently than every day's subject (Lacan, 1987, p. 122). Descartes' step did enable

the beginning of modern science, but it was only the first step, after which many psychologies failed to make the second one.

It seems that, in academic psychology, the dominant concept of soul, *psyche*, psychological, does not resist reductionism – by the principle *pars pro toto* – and it is still prevalently Cartesian. In fact, it is only one part of the thinking subject's soul, a part that is (wrongly) considered as a whole – it is *cogito*, which is as *res cogitans* taken for the whole of the soul, and it is thus reduced to cognitive, or rational. At best, such concept of the soul, if and when removed from the cognitive and rational, arrives farthest (only) to that of the conscious, that is, to the awareness, both of the rational and of everything else (physical and metaphysical, cognitive and precognitive, not only rational but also irrational, etc.). But, quite evidently, unconscious completely escapes such a concept of soul, and that fact cannot remain without consequences for epistemological dimension of this concept. But (Cartesian) truth to be told, (Cartesian) science cannot (even if it would take the unconscious for its subject) use scientific methodology in the scientific manner (*clare et distincte*) to get to (Cartesian) scientific, or true, knowledge of unconscious mental aspect. For psychology, which can no longer ignore the split of knowledge and truth, that raises a question (again) of its subject and its methods. The truth about the truth of soul, despite the fact that a man does not see himself as he is, is that a man pronounces the unconscious (psychic) structured like a language. But because (to borrow the title of a work by Julia Kristeva, 1988, p. 240) does not master the language, there is only incomplete knowledge, which is always different, to which we all regret, but each time because of incomplete sets a different subject. But because (let's borrow the title of Julia Kristeva's work, 1988, p. 240) *there is no language master*, there is only *incompleteness of language*, which is always different, and which we all complain about, and that incompleteness is the main cause for setting a different subject every time. By that different subject, however, the structure is being proved, but it does not entitle every vision or understanding of the structure to pretend to be a theory.

It seems that the question whether academic psychology, after a century of studying the soul, is on its way to perceive it as its subject, or the framework of academic psychology is confining, limiting, and not only dull, but also practically irrelevant and seeks to introduce new forms, is merely a rhetorical one. Introduction of the concept of paradigm, used to mark an example, a typical exam-

ple of a phenomenon that can serve as a model for discovering and identifying other similar individual phenomena which psychology uses to interpret some individual psychic, either attempts to blur or allegedly to extend the *theory* of psychic. Following the historian of science, Thomas Kuhn, who uses the term “paradigm shift” to describe attrition or decay of a specific set of key concepts and beliefs that prevail in a given stage (even in a particular culture), it is necessary to ask ourselves whether the expansion of scientific research boundaries within psychology goes in favor of psychology or against it. Among psychological theories it is difficult to find some common theoretical attitude that a paradigm failed to withstand the test of time, or that another paradigm gained legitimacy to replace a previous one. It seems that all paths of psychological theories express the fifth Euclidean postulate, the parallel postulate, so they will never meet nor cross – *ad infinitum*.

Psychologies create new paradigms, usually to cloud their failure to respond to the basic questions: what primarily determines a man, what makes him a man whose mental organization (soul, psyche) psychology deals with. And what is the main activist of psychic for psychology? It is not easy to explain why many theories don't ask their questions based on these issues. Parochial nature of psychological theories is their predominant characteristic. The need to protect their parishes is the cause of differences among theories about the same psychic. It is clear that psychology, that is, a psychological theory cannot speak like a computer, where every word means the same thing and where meaning is never foggy. But it's not just that. When some psychological phenomenon needs an explanation, it would be better to deal with the explanation of a *subject*, which cannot be done within the scope of the largest number of psychological theories because the given term – except in one of them – doesn't even exist in other theories. Here, we will only draw attention to the fact that psychology cannot primarily be interested in the conscious subject or, more precisely, in the consciously thinking subject, on which experimental psychology relies. Psychology should also be interested in that constant absence, that empty place, that non-existence as the basis for existence, non-existence that summons interpretation and filling the empty place with logic.² Giving such position to the subject as a function – but not as a function of the superior power of synthesis –

² The purpose of every therapy, as praxis of psychology, is speech, namely what the subject may say, with an analyst's interpretation of it.

would correct the psychoanalytical attitude attributed to the ego. Of course, perceiving the subject as a function of understanding bothers those who are (strictly) “scientifically oriented”.

In every psychology (or in all psychologies), regardless of differences among their various approaches and paradigms (or precisely because of these differences), a question should be raised of how it is possible to treat the given subject, the same subject – the soul, or the psychic – in so many different ways, that in the end they become mutually exclusive. Is a different thing at all possible? Is it possible to define psychology or, more precisely all those psychologies, like (other) sciences according to their subject, or using their so differently understood and determined subjects with even more various methods, adequate ways of testing and research? In the subject itself, what connects a classic psychologist, psychoanalyst and behaviorist? In short: almost nothing. Almost nothing because even those psychological phenomena that are the subject of classical psychology (which, according to popular deep-rooted understandings of these psychologists, include certain basic functions and mental abilities: perception, thinking, memory, intelligence... all of which belong to the conscious psychic) are not the direct subject of behaviorists’ interest, especially of extreme ones, interested only in behavior. Both classical as well as behavioral approach, as reductionist approaches to psychology, are unacceptable for psychoanalysis, not only because their concept of psychic is *psychic without soul*, but also because they cannot explain even those psychological phenomena within their own highly reduced concept of psychic.

All psychologies should have a common subject, whether they deal with determining the time needed for learning a certain number of words, or how people remember nonsensical syllables, or determining the way advertising influences audience, or psychological testing processes that run while observing the works of art, or the time an animal needs to find the way out of maze, or identifying how someone observes the trajectory of a falling rock, and also what is the meaning of a mental deviation, to those deviations hardest to understand, in the form of psychosis. A list of investigated subjects, which is difficult to imagine as closed because it is certainly inexhaustible, is not the problem, but the problem arises when there is a question which observations are of mental and which are of physical nature. Psychology cannot be interested only

in *self* that is observable, in more or less direct information of neither conscious enjoyment nor burdensome alienation.

Since psychology deals with, as Jung says (Jung, 1977, p. 305), „the most distinguished object of science” – human soul – the doctrine is also characterized by a specific type of knowledge about psychological contents (such as *imago*, fantasies, representations, impulses, cathexes, contra cathexes, narcissism, defense mechanisms) that can hardly fit into certain molds of a strictly positivist science. Therefore, not only that this knowledge should not be excluded from the field of psychology but, rather, it should be the subject of special interest for understanding the totality of psychic, it should be the subject taught by seeking analogies, parallels with similar phenomena with the support of other sciences' knowledge. Without their involvement in the sphere of psychic, psychology cannot claim its right to be the study of soul. Also, the knowledge of psychic, just like any other knowledge, is composed of different elements. Karl-Heinz Volkmann-Schluck (Volkmann-Schluck, 2001, p. 8) saw three elements that mutually determine each other:

- 1) Knowledge about what is being learned with that knowledge (about the subject or the object of knowledge);
- 2) Knowledge of a person who learns about the subject (of the mind, of knowledge);
- 3) Knowledge about the relationships between them (the object and the subject of knowledge).

Psychological functioning should be the main task of psychological reflection and learning, which is not the case in many psychological theories. Today's psychology should be above the naturalism of the past. The subject of today's psychology, as pointed out by the great philosopher Martin Heidegger (Heidegger, 2006, p. 54), is *life*, and not just feelings as the resulting effect of senses and memory. By examining the life *in its full reality*, a psychologist inevitably awakens vitality within himself. Our science of life “is also a real philosophy because it shapes life and because it is a way of looking at life and at the world; that examination of life anchors psychology in the area of facts, it goes from the bottom up and it doesn't move in empty space of other philosophies” (Heidegger, 2006, p. 55).

Provided that it focuses on the *whole phenomenon of life*, for psychology there is no greater question than how the psychic is imagined and which psychic represents a whole. Those psycholo-

gies that voice objections to any reference to the *totality* in the individual (Lacan, 1983, p. 76) – disputing it because the *subject* is the one who brings *division* in the individual, as well as the collective that is equivalent to the individual – have moved away from conscious as the sole definition of psychic. Some will find themselves in an extremely impossible situation of simultaneous rejection to accept the totality and of rejection to accept the unconscious. In such situation, it remains unclear how that which is set aside for research (or understanding) as special and unique, with the intention of looking for something general in it, has been limited to the conscious. In learning the pieces of a unity, a mistake can be made if one forgets the whole in which and by which the given piece is made and exists. Of course, that has to be used as a device for genetic understanding or the psychic has to be faced with as something completely incomprehensible. Spiritual life isn't just pure consciousness, nor can it be understood just out of consciousness. Those who entered psychology without passion for secrets or because they didn't know what else to choose, or after graduating in science (which was exactly the case with the first and many great psychologists), were welcomed by experimental psychology at the university and instructed only to psychic that can be just conscious. And their psychic needed only such psychic (that is understood as scientific psychic), like a mirror image.

The question of one or more psychologies largely revolves around whether an object of a study is only what is conscious, or something that can be understood as conscious in a wider scope. It is strange that the unconscious doesn't exist for all psychologies since it is undisputable fact that there are thoughts and feelings on the other side of conscious. But this fact is being ignored by many psychological schools that address only conscious. Conscious, says Freud (Freud, 1994, p. 25), may not be the most general characteristic of psychic events, but only of their specific functions. Conscious is a function of the psychic as a system – of the *conscious* part of psychic. We may wonder whether the time has come that all psychologies attribute the status of psychological structure to the unconscious and preconscious, because they consider them within the introspectively observed experience. Their independent position in relation to the *conscious* psychic, a place by which these elements of psychic fit into the understanding of mental apparatus composed of different instances or systems, is presented nowhere better than by Freud in *The Interpretation of Dreams*. The spatial relationship of psycholog-

ical systems is similar to the system of lenses in a telescope (Freud, 1970, p.189) – they are located one behind the other.

With such functioning of the psychic apparatus and the flow of mental activity, what can be said about the knowledge of the whole existence? Are only the things that *enter our consciousness* the subject of psychology and the sole being of our souls? Does everything that fails to enter the consciousness represent the non-existent, like it does not exist at all? Is the thing that may become conscious also consciousness or should it be classified as the unconscious? Everything that exists for us has to receive some form in order to be conceived or experienced in consciousness. More specifically, as Jaspers says, it has to be presented, using the objectivity of being, to exist in the mind as objectivity at some time, to become language and thus gain form of communicability. The fact that the whole being is conditioned by the possibility of entering into the consciousness is keeping us trapped in this comprehensive can-become-conscious (Jaspers, 2000, p. 38). If it wasn't for that can-become-conscious, it would be difficult for the power of psychotherapy to establish itself rationally. A man is capable to make that power articulate to himself as a border, and to use that awareness of the border to become open to the possibility of another man whom he does not know (Jaspers, 2000, p. 38), which actually speaks about that universality. Since we never understand our existence as comprehensive, we cannot equate psychic life with pure consciousness, nor can it be wholly grasped from the consciousness. The fact that the conscious mind is directed towards objects through their appearance doesn't mean that appearances have to be directly available to the conscious subject. It is exactly the other way around. Appearances deprived of consciousness remain causatively active although they are not included in the network of conscious mental states, for example, in a symptom.

The golden age of materialistic psychology, related to Wundt's (Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt) *physiological psychology*, did not consider the whole area of ??human nature as its subject matter, and thus, with such a partial approach, it remained in the position of pre-scientific psychology. Neglecting a large part of mental, soul, psychic, resulted in an area of ??nature, the human spirit, remaining under the influence of religious and magical thought. It was like the spirit of Saint Augustine was hovering over psychology, whose goal was – same as the goal of the human mind in general – to acquire some knowledge about God. The essence of Augustine's

philosophy, when it comes to human nature and man's action, consisted of referring to the inside of a man as the place where his truth was. Thus, such a method of psychology would consist in *turning inwards*, which can also be observed in subsequent methods that were imposed on psychology even though the Augustinian source was not clearly visible. That was the course of Descartes' sharp opposition of mind and body, thinking thing (*res cogitans*) and extended thing (*res extensa*), where the position of spirit was experiencing passions that come from the body, an understanding which held on for a very long time afterward. Wundt's graduate work at the medical school, immersed in the natural-scientific method, dealt with tactile (contact) sensitivity of hysterical patients, which was the first step towards the experimental work in psychology. It is known today what was the theoretical foundation of hysteria as a disease.³ Wundt's approach satisfied the criterion that experimental and research methods, which are comparable to those of natural sciences, are used in psychological research. However, it is clear today that the real center of the human being is not in the same place that Wundt's tradition allocated to it. Nowadays we understand that the field psychology should investigate will always exceed approaches postulated by such a research. Emphasizing approaches and methods instead of desire and subject actually means diverting attention from the central issue of existence of the psychic apparatus. Lacan determined that situation saying that the trees of technical developments hide the forest of theory (Lacan, 1983, p. 116).

Is psychic a system? What are the theoretical implications of an affirmative answer? Even though it is still unthinkable, from psychology's point of view, not only the constructing, or shaping, of a unified theory, but also the existence of any similarities among different theories – similarities that are usually not so few, nor all small and insignificant – these similarities still do exist and they have to exist because the subject is *the soul*, the same case study. It seems that the issue of 'psychological organization', psychic system or structure, is one of the issues that makes it possible to gain insight into similar or same relationships between some different theories of psychic, or mental life. Due to the large influence of empirical and rational atomism, which oppose the existence of psychic structure, in a good number of psychological schools it is

³ It seems that this theoretical lack or shortage represents a big problem of experimental approaches.

hard to find a positive answer to the question whether the psychic is a system. It seems that no theory disputes (or it shouldn't dispute) that the psychic as a whole, and its individual functions, is not a simple system. Rather, it is considered that psychic is located on different *levels*. For psychology as a science, the question of *method* actually is the question of *how the mind functions* as a system, namely, how structural changes and reorganizations, which help the mind grow, occur by "learning from experience". This "growth", according to the inherent openness of the system, looks like there are no limits in any respect: in complexity, integration and abundance, according to Donald Meltzer and Meg Harris Williams (Meltzer & Williams, 2000, p. 13). It would be difficult to imagine the existence of different *levels* of psychic and their acting together without the existence of "the psychic organism", or psychic structuring, whose function is to bridge the gap between instincts and rationality. Knowledge of these functions allows us to understand how biological organisms acquire the ability of self-consciousness, thinking, purposeful and moral behavior. When it is known that this transformation of a biological specimen into a person, or spiritualized body, takes place through *language*, as the most important human uniqueness, which levels are so clearly pointed out by linguistics, it becomes clear why the study of soul is inevitably and always based on the existence of a psychic organism (system, structure). Regarding the psychic organization as a structure means primarily two things: a) existence of different parts (instances, aspects, places, entities, functions) and b) gradual differentiation, appearance of different systems.

Since almost all psychological theories, even when it is not explicitly stated, speak about the human experience, it is important to look at how they understand the psychic. More or less, all of them deal with *behavior*, even when they add the label of "latent" (eg. psychoanalysis). For all of them, every behavior is *comprehensive* and *indivisible*, even when talking about the different systems. Also, all psychologies consider that every behavior has to be the behavior of the *whole personality*. But all these common elements do not pave the way to a unique theory about the psychic.

Starting precisely from the assumption that the psychic life is a function of an apparatus, psychoanalytic psychology is, by the way, the only one that starts from the idea of ??the psychic apparatus, seeing the apparatus composed of multiple components. Actions of the apparatus are triggered by two opposing forces – one of which

creates the desire and the other censors – thereby causing a distorted expression of wishes (Blanck & Blanck, 1985, p. 29). Specifically, the existence of a spatially developed, composed and purposeful psychic apparatus adjusted to life is assumed, thanks to which in a certain place and under certain conditions phenomenon of consciousness may occur (Freud, 2006, p. 499). Linking the spiritual life with ‘the multiple part apparatus’ is the moment that allows it to be said that psychoanalysis shares “a gestalt point of view”, which took over the whole modern psychology, and according to which any behavior is comprehensive and indivisible. “Systems” and “institutions” implied by “parts of the apparatus” are not “entities”, but aspects of behavior (Ricoeur, 2005, p. 343). When this behavior occurs between different structures, or when it is transferred to a number of structures, we speak of “superior” behavior. The “supremacy” allows understanding that every behavior is always a behavior of a complete personality, in which interconnections between systems and institutions of a subject are being established; in this psychoanalysis was supported by “organismic” point of view.

Speaking about mental apparatus means discussing primarily two things: *what it is consisted of* and *how it is built*. And for that, it is necessary to define the core of the human being – the biological or, more accurately, the inherited (constitutional) – which, from the beginning of extra uterine life, is in a direct “collision” with the outside world surrounding it. The body is in contact with the outside world from the beginning to the end of its response, starting with the *perception of stimuli*, and ending with the *motoric or glandular relief*. However we imagine the psychic apparatus, it is necessary to see its surface as that which receives stimuli, which is in contact with the surrounding world and which has to do something with those stimuli so it transmits them into the interior from where the *reactive* impulses are being sent back to the surface. Between these two extremes, the “real” psychic has settled. Nevertheless, almost all psychological theories, ignoring this huge invisible area, take only these endpoints as the subject of their research. During the development of every child it can be clearly seen that this “area” of the psychic apparatus is gradually being differentiated, precisely in the functions of *receiving stimuli* and *relieving tension*. When and how the differentiation happens? What is the product of this differentiation? It would be inaccurate,

though not wrong, to say *the personality*, though it would probably be better to introduce the concept of the *subject*.

Bearing in mind all these aspects, we still must start from the point that scientific psychology interprets mental phenomena as results of the interaction of *primitive physical needs* – rooted in the biological structure of a human being and developed during the course of its history (therefore, they are changeable during further biological history) – and *environmental influences* on those needs. There is no place, as Otto Fenichel said, for some third factor (Fenichel, 1961, p. 4). Of course, there has to be an agreement on *what* is understood as biological structure, *which* environmental effects are considered as formative by psychology and *how* to interconnect environmental effects and biological structures. It could even be said that the psychic, as the subject of interest in psychology, is just a way of connecting influences of environmental and biological structures (because, there is nothing else besides these two).

It is entirely reasonable to think that the differences between psychological theories would be less pronounced if psychology is understood as *praxis*, because the application itself would verify the theoretical value. It was exactly the psychology as *praxis* that revealed to the psychology as science that the whole truth about soul is not truth about conscious and that only non-freedom and a part of intellectual freedom could be achieved by the conscious. The path to scientific knowledge of soul can hardly be trodden with the aid of natural-scientific method; and when it is the only way, it indicates disregarding the nature of the subject, only because of “scientific orthodoxy”, since it is much easier to link the natural-scientific method to science (understood as Cartesian). Insisting – in the name of scientifically valued psychology – on such scientific methods and neglecting the issue of appropriateness of such methods to the subject of psychology as the science of soul, many psychologies, as Ugo Vlaisavljevic says, “lost their souls” (Vlaisavljevic, 2014, p. 10). That is why it is necessary to thematize the type of psychology’s scientificity. And since we cannot talk about the science of soul, the question is whether all psychologies can claim the status of science. Which psychology is a science and which is not a science? But it is also possible to deny psychology the right to answer the question about its scholarly credentials, precisely because it is still not known what psychology is. Psychology in the gap between science understood as Cartesian and the whole truth

about soul is the first issue of which we have to start before we may even think about the issue of freedom.

Following Deleuze's view that the problem of knowledge cannot be solved by invoking the consent or agreement (Deleuze, 2010, p. 146), the question of how many psychologies should exist will depend on the answers to at least the following questions:

- Is it possible to access the inner experience in an accurate and objective way?
- What is a man, or psychic, as a subject of psychology: a man in a concrete situation, in a reality of diverse tangle of daily existence (in environment, action, dreams, games, myths, religion, literature, art)?
- What are the basic laws of psychological functioning and from what do they derive?

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МИЛОРАД В. ТОДОРОВИЋ

УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У ПРИШТИНИ СА ПРИВРЕМЕНИМ СЕДИШТЕМ

У КОСОВСКОЈ МИТРОВИЦИ, ФИЛОЗОФСКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ

КАТЕДРА ЗА ПСИХОЛОГИЈУ

РЕЗИМЕ

QUANTAE PSYCHOLOGIAE? – UNA VEL MULTAE

Закупљене истраживањем емпиријских корелација између елемената понашања и спољних околности, и то истраживањем тих емпиријских односа на много једноставнији начин него што одговара њиховој комплексној природи, многе се психологије ретко када осврћу на темељна питања било могућности било претпоставки сопствених сазнанајних настојања. Уместо тог осврта умножавају се „погледи” који претендују да буду психолошке теорије. Концепт психологије као науке о души нужно зависи и од концепта науке, и од концепта душе као њеног предмета. Још увек – нарочито у академским круговима – владајући концепт науке јесте онај модерни, картезијански, сцијентички концепт, у коме је природна наука једина парадигма науке. Примењена на науку о души, та научна парадигма неминовно даје само различите варијанте, увек нужно редукционистичких психологија: од експерименталне психологије до неуропсихологије. Истина (или истинито сазнање као садржина) таквих наука о души неминовно и сама мора бити редукована, оскудна, то јест редуковано и оскудно знање о души. Нека општа психолошка теорија дакако не може бити компромисна творевина диспаратних ставова, правила и принципа, нити епистемолошки сме да буде еклектичка целина знања о душевним појавама. Ако различите психолошке теорије, приступи или гледишта, који се некада претенциозно зову и школама, сваку тему или садржај психичког виде на потпуно различит начин, онда је нужно запитати се о типу, каквоћи и месту истине којој теже те психологије. Није баш логично очекивати да тако различити приступи долазе до исте истине, то јест истог разумевања међусобне повезаности психичких чињеница. Најлогичније питање које се онда мора поставити јесте да ли се ту ради о истом подручју истраживања и истој науци о психичком.

Кључне речи: наука, истина, подељени субјекат, симболично, једна психологија или више њих, психички апарат.