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ARE THERE INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON LIBERTY? BERLIN'S VS. GREEN'S AND TAYLOR'S UNDERSTANDING**

Abstract

The subject of this paper is the question of liberty, which occupies a central place within philosophical and socio-political debates. The problem of liberty has been a subject of consideration since ancient times; however, we still cannot speak of the existence of a single definition of liberty that everyone would agree upon. Different definitions of liberty are the result of different understandings of what can be considered the subject of liberty, as well as what can constitute a limitation of liberty. This paper deals with the definition of liberty in relation to how we define its limitation. The starting premise of this paper is Isaiah Berlin's definition of negative liberty as the absence of external obstacles, or coercion. We will then analyse the critiques of this conception of liberty, which amount to the claim that, in addition to external, we can also speak of internal obstacles to liberty. These include Thomas Hill Green's normative theory of liberty, as well as Charles Taylor's conception of liberty as autonomy. What these critiques have in common is their abandonment of the idea that liberty consists in the right to do as we please, or the view that there is a necessary connection between an individual's liberty and their motives and ends. The aim of the paper is to show the advantage of the negative conception of liberty over the positive one, namely the definition of liberty as the absence of external, and not internal, obstacles to liberty.

Keywords: Isaiah Berlin, Charles Taylor, Thomas Hill Green, autonomy, positive liberty, negative liberty

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INTRODUCTION

This paper addresses the question of what can constitute a limitation on liberty. Accordingly, it is of crucial importance to address the following problems: Does liberty relate only to the relationship between the individual and the state, as well as to interpersonal relations, or does it also presuppose certain internal conditions? Does liberty consist in the right to do what we want? Is there a connection between an individual's liberty and their ends, motives, and preferences? The answers to these questions depend on the starting assumption of whether, in addition to external, there are also internal obstacles to liberty.

BERLIN'S DEFINITION OF NEGATIVE LIBERTY

The starting point of this paper is Berlin's definition of negative liberty as the absence of coercion, or external obstacles to liberty.¹ Negative liberty, according to Berlin's conception, represents the absence of interference, that is, the interference of other people within the sphere in which an individual could act differently. It is important to emphasise here that only people can limit our liberty, and not other factors. If, for example, bad weather has prevented us from leaving the house, we cannot call that a lack of liberty. Whereas the meaning of positive liberty consists in the answer to the question: 'Who rules over me?', the meaning of negative liberty is contained in the answer to the question: "How much does the government interfere in my life?" (Berlin 1992, 215). From this, it follows that positive liberty relates to the source of control, while negative liberty relates to the sphere of control. Negative liberty, therefore, represents the sphere of individual liberty that lies outside state interference, within which individuals freely choose their own goals and do what they want, or what they are capable of.

Berlin favours negative liberty, as opposed to positive, as the basic meaning of liberty, on the grounds that the meaning of positive liberty can be distorted, i.e., it can be turned into its opposite – the defence of power (Berlin 1992, 51). If we define positive liberty on an individual level as self-mastery, or rational self-direction, we thereby presuppose that there are two selves within a person – a lower and a higher one. The lower self is composed of our irrational impulses and desires, while the higher self is the reason within us, or our ideal nature. This definition of liberty is therefore based on the assumption of a specific structure of the personality (Stančić 2020, 26–29).

If we extrapolate this understanding to the collective level, the question arises regarding higher and lower factors within society, that is, of those who are more rational, competent, and educated, and those who need to be led and guided (Berlin 1992, 218). Consequently, the higher

¹ For further insights into Berlin's definition of positive and negative liberty (see Stančić 2020, 21–36).

elements in society have the right to coerce the lower elements in the process of rationalisation. As Berlin adds, the higher self can be identified with a certain collective entity, such as the state, a party, the church, a race, or a nation (Berlin 1992, 48). In this way, a positive conception of liberty can serve as a justification for coercion, or indeed oppression, by those in power. These are the reasons why Berlin gives primacy to negative liberty as the fundamental meaning of liberty: “Liberty in its basic sense is liberty from chains, from prison, from servitude to others. Everything else is an extension of this meaning or a metaphor” (Berlin 1992, 61).

Berlin’s definition of liberty as *liberty from* is inextricably linked to his understanding of human nature itself. As Berlin points out, it is necessary to preserve at least a minimal area of individual liberty, so as not to deny our own essence: “Of a being whom others prevent from doing even the slightest thing of his own accord, there can be no moral speaking; he can be regarded as neither a legal nor an ethical human being” (Berlin 1992, 248). From this, it follows that the concept of negative liberty implies an individualistic conception of human nature, as opposed to an organicist one.

GREEN’S NORMATIVE THEORY OF LIBERTY

In this part of the paper, we will analyse the concept of liberty of the nineteenth-century English philosopher Thomas Hill Green. The socio-political circumstances in which Green considers the problem of liberty are those of the late Victorian period, which was characterised by the development of the capitalist market and economy, and increasingly pronounced social inequalities. Consequently, Green’s position should be viewed through the prism of a specific socio-historical context.

Green addresses the question of liberty on both an individual and a collective level. In his definition of liberty, Green starts from the concept of negative liberty, seeking to expand its meaning. According to Green’s understanding, negative liberty, understood as the absence of external impediments, represents the starting point for our very conception of liberty. Liberty, therefore, primarily implies the absence of coercion (Gaus 2000, 83). Liberty, understood in this way, however, is merely a means and not an end in itself; that is to say, it has instrumental, but not intrinsic, value.²

What, then, is true liberty for Green? When we speak of liberty as something we ought to value highly, we are speaking of a state in which people have realised their full potential,

² In this sense, Green cites the example of a savage, who is able to do as he pleases and who has no master. Although he is not a slave to other human beings, he is a slave to nature, and we do not consider him free. The first step towards true liberty is to submit to the laws of society, in order to develop the capacities with which he has been endowed as a human being (Green 2011, 371).

that is, have become the best version of themselves, Green emphasises. True liberty, therefore, consists in the exercise of the capacities with which people are endowed. At the collective level, liberty consists in the development and exercise of those human powers and capacities that contribute to the common good (Green 2011, 371). The common good, therefore, represents a normative ideal, which should be the prevailing motive of every individual (Green 2007, 31).

According to Green, positive liberty is, therefore, an extension of the negative concept of liberty and has intrinsic value. Unlike negative liberty, which can be characterised as morally neutral behaviour, positive liberty does not imply the right to do what we want, but rather what we ought to do. This conception of liberty can be characterised as normative. Consequently, liberty consists not only in the absence of external constraints, but also of internal ones, such as a morally defective, irrational, or heteronomous will (Green 2007, 30). Liberty on the individual level, Green, therefore, defines as autonomy: we are free if we are not governed by our lower impulses which we cannot control, if we are not driven by our delusions or irrational fears. When we determine whether someone is truly free or not, we are therefore assessing the nature of their ends and preferences.

According to Green's conception, true liberty at the collective level does not imply only the absence of external obstacles or coercion but also the possession of certain capacities and resources (Blau 2004, 548). It is precisely the presence of certain capacities and powers to act that distinguishes the positive from the negative conception of liberty. Consequently, the task of the state consists in providing the resources, or conditions, without which the free exercise of human capacities is not possible. Green's understanding of the state's role is based on his conception of liberty: if liberty is a value to be pursued, it must incorporate a demand for social justice (Dimova-Cookson 2004, 559). It is shown, therefore, that true liberty possesses a social dimension.

Accordingly, with regard to the institution of private property, according to Green's understanding, it is justified only as a means that enables the free exercise of the social capacities of all citizens. In other words, there is no true right to property if the given right prevents a group of people from such practice (Green 2011, 372). This stance of Green's reflects the aforementioned socio-political context in which Green considers the problem of liberty. Namely, increasingly pronounced social inequalities led Green to re-examine the notion that a society's liberty consists of the absence of state intervention, a notion characteristic of the teaching of classical liberalism. When it comes to the role of the state, Green, therefore, advocates the redistribution of resources.

Green's appeal for a greater role for the state is also reflected in his proposal to limit the liberty of contract in certain cases.³ Referring to the disadvantaged position of workers, Green argues that the liberty of contract in employment should be restricted in order to improve the workers' position. Green here refers to limiting the number of working hours for women and children, improving working conditions in factories, and banning the purchase or rental of residential units that endanger people's health (Green 2011, 373).

In response to such proposals, Green points out that "some political speculators" ask the question: 'Shouldn't it be left to individuals to judge for themselves, and over time learn not to accept jobs that are bad for them, to avoid buying houses that do not meet basic standards, and that children should attend school?' Green certainly agrees that it would be better if all this were to happen spontaneously, that is, if there were no need for legal compulsion. However, as he points out, we must accept people as they are at present, and until such a state is achieved, we must entrust the state with the task of providing better living and working conditions (Green 2011, 375).

Green also proposes limiting liberty of contract when it comes to the sale of alcohol – 'in the interest of general liberty' (Green 2011, 382). Green justifies this right of interference, that is, of preventing people from doing what they want, on the grounds that it is justified to restrict the liberty to buy and sell certain goods, if the consumption of such goods leads to a breach of public order or if it prevents people from developing their potential (Green 2011, 383). As Green further states, drunkenness, besides endangering the individual, also endangers others, such as family members (Green 2011, 384). The experience of certain communities shows that the removal of alcohol shops contributes to a reduction in alcoholism. In contrast to Green's proposal, critics of the state interventionist position argue that people should be left to their own devices. Green, however, emphasises that state interference in individual liberty is justified if the exercise of such liberty constitutes an obstacle to the common good (Green 2011, 384). Green concludes his lecture on liberal legislation and liberty of contract with the following words: "When all the temptations which the law can remove have been removed, there remains enough room for the play of our moral energies" (Green 2011, 386).

Summa summarum, Green's theory of liberty can be characterised as normative, on the grounds that on a collective level it presupposes the existence of the common good, which

³ In this sense, Green notes how we condemn slavery, even when one has voluntarily consented to it. Consequently, we deem it right to limit the liberty of contract whereby human beings, willingly or unwillingly, are treated as commodities, on the grounds that such contracts undermine the very purpose of contracting within society (Green 2011, 373).

represents a normative ideal. This determination of liberty is undeniably attractive, thanks to its connection with a value such as social justice. We can also accept Green's view that for a person on the brink of existence, the liberties provided by law are of little importance. If, for example, we are given the right to liberty of movement, so that every citizen can travel to Mauritius, someone who is unwell or poor will be unable to exercise that right. It is therefore indisputable that we need to possess certain capacities and resources in order to be able to practise negative liberty. Can we, however, consider the absence of these capacities to be an absence of liberty?

If we accept Berlin's thesis on pluralism of values, it implies that the essence of values lies in their incommensurability and potential incompatibility. In other words, not all good things necessarily go together – values, not only in practice but also in principle, are not and cannot be harmoniously reconciled. Berlin bases this position on the fact that we do not, and cannot, have any a priori knowledge that there is a mutual consistency between all human ends (Berlin 1992, 255). We must therefore rely on empirical experience, which tells us that values can come into conflict: liberty can jeopardise the realisation of some other value, just as some other values, such as justice or equality, can jeopardise liberty itself. Consequently, Green's advocacy for the state to redistribute resources should not be called a demand for more liberty, but rather a demand for equality and social justice. What, therefore, makes Green's conception of liberty inadequate is its identification of liberty with other attractive values, such as equality and social justice.

On this occasion, it is important to emphasise that Berlin himself agrees with Green's position that it is the state's task to provide citizens with certain resources. In this sense, Berlin shares Green's view that the position of the worker should be improved, stating that they require certain resources in order to realise negative liberty – which would otherwise represent merely a 'barren achievement' (Berlin 1992, 54). Berlin, however, does not share Green's view that providing such means should be considered an increase in liberty, but rather an increase in capacity and resources, such as education, health, and material well-being. Accordingly, if someone is unable to travel to Sicily, for example, because they are unwell or lack the money to do so, we cannot call this an absence of liberty.

In this sense, we agree with Berlin's view that it is necessary to avoid equating liberty itself with the conditions for liberty, or extending the concept of liberty to encompass other values, such as happiness, social justice, or equality, since the values are incommensurable and potentially mutually incompatible. As Berlin emphasises, one should not call 'every desired

change in man's position' liberty, because the term 'liberty' would thereby become too broad and imprecise (Berlin 1992, 246).

On the individual level, the normativity of Green's theory of liberty is reflected in his definition of liberty as the right to do what one ought, rather than what one wants. Liberty is, therefore, equated with another desirable value – morality. If we accept Berlin's premise of an irreducible pluralism of values, this moralisation of liberty proves to be inadequate. Like any other value, liberty should be valued as an end in itself, regardless of whether it produces some good or contributes to the realisation of some other value. Furthermore, as we have already pointed out, all good things do not have to be mutually compatible - values can come into conflict. Consequently, Green's critique of negative liberty as a value that represents only a means and a condition of liberty, and not an end in itself, proves to be unsuccessful. The demand for individual liberty is founded on an understanding of human nature itself; liberty of choice is an inherent characteristic of human beings. It is precisely in this that the intrinsic value of individual liberty lies, which, therefore, does not depend on the nature of our goals and preferences.

TAYLOR: OPPORTUNITY-CONCEPT VS. EXERCISE-CONCEPT OF LIBERTY

In his definition of the concept of liberty, the contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor departs from Berlin's distinction between two concepts of liberty – positive and negative. Namely, Taylor shares Berlin's view on the existence of two distinct concepts of liberty, highlighting how behind this dichotomy lies a bigger difference in doctrines. This is the difference between the concept of possibility and the concept of practice. As Taylor notes, Berlin defines negative liberty as the individual's independence from interference by the authorities or other persons, while positive liberty is essentially concerned with the question of who has control over our lives. Taylor, however, seeks to reformulate these views, emphasising how positive theories of liberty rely on the concept of practice, which implies that to be free is to actively shape one's own life, or to exercise control over it. In contrast, negative theories of liberty can simply be based on the concept of possibility, where being free has to do with what we can do, or which solutions are open to us, regardless of whether we actually do anything (Taylor 1979, 177).⁴

⁴ It is important, in this regard, to emphasise that, according to Taylor, negative theories of liberty can rely on the concept of possibility, but not necessarily; certain theories of negative liberty involve some form of self-realisation. Thus, whilst negative theories can be based on both the concept of possibility and the concept of practice, the same is not true of positive theories of liberty, which exclusively imply the concept of practice (Taylor 1979, 177).

As an example of this conception of liberty, Taylor cites the views of Hobbes and Bentham, according to which liberty consists in the absence of external physical or legal obstacles. This view, in Taylor's opinion, neglects the less obvious limitations on liberty, such as a lack of awareness or false awareness; consequently, it implies that to speak of internal factors of liberty is a 'misuse of language'. If, however, liberty implies self-realisation, then, in addition to external ones, we can speak of internal limitations on liberty, Taylor points out, adding that, in this sense, Hobbes's and Bentham's concept of liberty is based on a simplified moral psychology (Taylor 1979, 176).

Negative theories of liberty, which assume the existence of exclusively external limitations on liberty, according to Taylor, were formed under the influence of materialist and anti-metaphysical thought, that is, thought oriented towards the natural sciences, as well as a fear of totalitarian dangers. The advantage of the concept of liberty as the absence of external obstacles certainly lies in its simplicity: liberty is defined as the possibility of doing what we want, without questioning whether we might be mistaken about our own desires.

However, according to Taylor's view, we can be mistaken when it comes to our emotions and desires. To support this position, Taylor first considers the feeling of pain. Namely, if during a particular medical procedure we do not feel pain, then pain does not really exist; therefore, a mistaken perception is not possible when it comes to this type of feeling (Taylor 1979, 187). This, however, is not the case when it comes to our fundamental desires; unlike the sensation of pain, we can misperceive a certain goal as fundamental. Our fears, for example, can be irrational, as can our feelings of shame, in contrast to the sensation of pain, which cannot be.

According to Taylor's understanding, human beings can therefore be prone to self-deception and a lack of self-control; that is to say, they can be mistaken about their goals and purposes, and thus any concept of liberty that does not include the existence of internal limitations on liberty is not sustainable. In this sense, as Taylor states, we cannot say that someone is free if, for example, they are not aware of their potential; liberty, therefore, among other things, also implies a certain degree of self-understanding (Taylor 1979, 177).

Therefore, if people can be mistaken in their choice of basic goals, or if the individual is not the ultimate arbiter when it comes to their own liberty, an important question arises: Does this mean that people can be forced into liberty by those wiser than themselves? In other words, if this conception of liberty is carried over to the collective level, does it open the door to totalitarianism? Taylor's answer to this question is negative; a positive conception of liberty, which implies the existence of internal obstacles, i.e., the possibility of error, does not

necessarily imply the imposition of a specific official doctrine by the state (Taylor 1979, 180). Individuals differ in their form of self-realisation, and so we cannot speak of a specific mode of self-creation that would apply to all people.

Taylor's conception of liberty as the active overcoming of internal obstacles is based on the so-called 'fact of strong valuation' (Taylor 1979, 184). This refers to the existence of first- and second-order desires; that is to say, we can have desires (of the first order) that are different, and even contradictory. In that case, we are compelled to evaluate our essential goals and desires and, consequently, to make a choice between them by retaining certain desires and rejecting others. Second-order desires are desires about desires, that is to say, they refer to first-order desires (Frankfurt 1971, 6). This way of thinking about liberty originates with the philosopher Harry Frankfurt, who, in his examination of liberty, sought to explain the concept of the person.

According to Frankfurt, understanding what we essentially are constitutes a central philosophical question. The distinctive feature of human beings in relation to other creatures lies precisely in our structure of will (Frankfurt 1971, 6). Indeed, animals can also have motives and desires and can make decisions, which makes them subjects of first-order desires. What constitutes the essential characteristic of human beings is the ability of self-reflection, or self-evaluation. What, therefore, distinguishes humans from other creatures is precisely our ability to desire to be different with regard to our ends and preferences, that is, to desire to have or not have certain desires and motives (Frankfurt 1971, 7). Consequently, humans are subjects of both first-order and second-order desires.

A second-order desire is when we want one of our desires (a first-order desire) to become our will. As an example, Frankfurt cites a person who has a desire to take drugs, but who, on the other hand, wants to stop the addiction (Frankfurt 1971, 12). These two first-order desires are evidently in conflict with each other. If the aforementioned person prefers one of these desires, that is, if they want, for example, the desire to quit their drug addiction to be effective and constitute their will, we can speak of the existence of a second-order desire. It is shown, therefore, that a second-order desire exists when, for a given person, first-order desires are not equally acceptable, or when one of the conflicting desires constitutes a part of their identity.

What is important to note regarding Frankfurt's position is that second-order desires do not necessarily manifest a moral stance, and that first-order desires are not evaluated exclusively from a moral perspective. Furthermore, a person who possesses a desire about

desires can be irresponsible or capricious, which shows that second-order desires are in fact preferences, regardless of what they are based on (Frankfurt 1971, 13).

Taylor therefore shares Frankfurt's understanding of the structure of the will, or his view on the existence of first- and second-order desires. His phrase, 'the fact of strong valuation' implies that we experience our purposes, motives, and desires as qualitatively different, that is, as relevant or trivial, higher or lower, noble or not (Taylor 1979, 184). If, for example, we are guided by defiance, we consider such a motive to be bad in itself, regardless of its intensity. We may be overwhelmed by a certain desire at a given moment, and yet consider it bad, which shows that our criteria for choosing our first-order motives and desires are not quantitative, but qualitative.

To illustrate this stance, Taylor cites the case of a person whose malicious and spiteful reactions, which they can barely control, jeopardise a relationship with another person whom they care deeply about (Taylor 1979, 185). The motives of such a person are, therefore, in conflict with one another; what makes the essential difference between them is that in the event the aforementioned person chooses to give up their destructive behaviour, they do not lose any satisfaction, true good, or pleasure. In other words, they do not lose a part of their identity. Furthermore, such behaviour constrains the person, so, according to Taylor's understanding, they would be less free if they were guided by such behaviour (Taylor 1979, 192). The existence of internal limitations on liberty, even when there are no external obstacles, therefore implies the existence of a degree of liberty.⁵

What is essential to emphasise when it comes to conflicts between our first-order goals and desires is that, according to Taylor, there are two types of this kind of conflict. To illustrate this point, Taylor gives the example of a person who is torn between their marriage and their career. Namely, if she wants to devote herself to a fulfilling job, the person in question is forced to be away from home frequently, which jeopardises her relationship with her spouse, to whom she is very attached. These two desires are, therefore, mutually exclusive. However, unlike the previous example of a person prone to destructive behaviour, here we are dealing with two desires that represent an expression of the personality, or rather, a part of the person's identity. The person prone to malicious behaviour is constrained by this motive, and wishes to be rid of

⁵ Taylor's view that, in addition to external, there are also internal limits to liberty is shared by the contemporary authors Adam Swift and John Gray. This understanding implies a positive definition of liberty, that is, a definition of liberty as autonomy, which involves the active overcoming of internal obstacles. According to Gray, liberty as the mere absence of external constraints does not represent an end in itself. Liberty understood as autonomy, which involves rational deliberation and reflection, represents an end in itself (see Gray 1980). Swift also equates liberty with autonomy, which consists in rational self-direction (see Swift 2008). Both authors therefore emphasise the importance of our rational capacities.

it. Although such feelings undeniably belong to that person, they represent an obstacle to their fundamental purposes and, consequently, to their liberty. In contrast, we cannot say that a person who wishes to dedicate themselves to a career would be freer if they were to renounce that desire, because they can identify with it, just as with the desire to preserve a marriage (Taylor 1979, 188).

To summarise Taylor's position, we can conclude that there are certain points of contact between Berlin's and Taylor's views. Berlin shares Taylor's criticism of the concept of collective self-realisation, which consists of the state imposing a specific vision of the common good. What Berlin does not agree with, however, is the identification of liberty itself with self-realisation. Berlin, therefore, questions the Enlightenment ideal of rational self-improvement; people can freely and consciously choose another goal, one that is more significant to them. The implication of this understanding is that, contrary to Taylor's position, the individual is the ultimate judge when it comes to their own liberty. This stance constitutes the fundamental assumption of the negative conception of liberty (Stančić 2020, 63).

If we do not reduce liberty to self-realisation, we can still characterise a person who behaves morally wrongly or irrationally as free. This stance is contrary to Taylor's understanding of the necessary connection between an individual's liberty and their ends, motives, and preferences. Someone, therefore, can freely choose 'bad' goals; we can call them stupid or evil on that basis, but not unfree. It follows from this that the advantage of the negative conception of liberty lies in the fact that we are able to discuss whether a particular person is free or not, regardless of the fact that we do not know their motives and goals (Stančić 2020, 67). Questions about the origin and nature of values, desires, and beliefs of a certain person represent an intrusion into the private sphere of an individual, which, according to the tradition of classical liberalism, should be outside the interference and control of other individuals or the state. In this sense, such questions represent, in a certain way, a violation of the integrity and dignity of the individual.

CONCLUSION

The definition of liberty is inherently linked to the understanding of human nature itself; our concept of liberty is founded on our conception of human nature. In this sense, the different, and often contradictory, definitions of liberty are the result of differing understandings of what constitutes the essential characteristics of human beings. Given that the question of liberty is one of the central subjects of philosophical consideration, we can agree with Berlin's observation that the aim of philosophy is to 'help people understand themselves' (Berlin 1980, 11).

In this paper, we have sought to show the advantage of the negative conception of liberty over the positive, that is, the conception of liberty as the absence of external, rather than also internal, obstacles to liberty. The recognition of internal obstacles to liberty is common to all conceptions of autonomy. This understanding implies a rejection of the idea that liberty consists in doing what we want. In other words, one can do what one wants and yet not be free. From this, it follows that there is a necessary connection between an individual's liberty and their preferences.

In contrast to this view, our aim was to show that there is no necessary connection between an individual's liberty and their motives and ends, and that liberty equally implies the right to act irrationally or morally wrongly. Starting from Berlin's premise of an irreducible pluralism of values, it is shown that liberty, defined as the absence of coercion, is an end in itself, regardless of whether it produces some good, that is, whether it contributes to the realisation of some other value, such as morality, happiness, equality, or social justice.

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ДА ЛИ ПОСТОЈЕ УНУТРАШЊА ОГРАНИЧЕЊА СЛОБОДЕ? БЕРЛИНОВО СХВАТАЊЕ НАСУПРОТ СХВАТАЊИМА ГРИНА И ТЕЈЛОРА**

Резиме

Предмет овог рада јесте питање слободе, које заузима централно место у оквиру филозофских и друштвено-политичких расправа. Проблем слободе био је предмет разматрања још од античких времена. Међутим, још увек не можемо говорити о постојању једне дефиниције слободе са којом би се сви сложили. Различите дефиниције слободе резултат су различитих схватања онога што се може сматрати субјектом слободе, као и онога што може представљати ограничење слободе. Овај рад бави се дефиницијом слободе у односу на то како дефинишемо њено ограничење. Полазна премиса овог рада јесте Берлинова дефиниција негативне слободе као одсуства спољашњих препрека, односно принуде. Затим ћемо анализирати критике овог схватања слободе, које се свode на тврдњу да, поред спољашњих, можемо говорити и о унутрашњим препрекама слободи. Оне обухватају нормативну теорију слободе Томаса Хила Грина, као и схватање слободе као аутономије Чарлса Тејлора. Оно што је заједничко овим критикама јесте њихово напуштање идеје да се слобода састоји у праву да чинимо оно што желимо, или схватања да постоји нужна веза између слободе појединца и његових мотива и циљева. Циљ рада јесте да покаже предност негативног схватања слободе у односу на позитивно, односно дефиниције слободе као одсуства спољашњих, а не унутрашњих препрека слободи.

Кључне речи: Исаија Берлин, Чарлс Тејлор, Томас Хил Грин, аутономија, позитивна слобода, негативна слобода

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