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FROM THE SENSATION TO THE CONCEPT AND BACK: PHILO-AESTHETIC ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN PIERRE BOULEZ AND GILLES DELEUZE

Abstract: It is known that Deleuze and Guattari took the famous concepts of the smooth (*lisse*) and striated (*strié*) from the last chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* from Boulez, who used them to describe the morphology of sound spaces, while Deleuze and Guattari used those concepts in an ontopolitical way – in order to invent an ontology abstract enough to describe the constitution of space and time within the conditions of the capitalist axiomatic and find the corresponding lines of flight. Another important point in the encounter between Boulez and Deleuze is the concept of difference. In Deleuze, difference is the key ontological concept, which (un)grounds the image of thought based on representation and leads to becoming the basic form of thinking the world. According to Campbell, in Boulez, difference appears in a number of ways – from heterophony as a virtual line, through an accumulative development to athematism as a virtual form. It should be mentioned that virtual (*virtuel*) is another important concept of Deleuze's philosophy, (un)grounded precisely through difference. Furthermore, there is a certain similarity between Boulez's concept of diagonal and Deleuze's and Guattari's concepts of deterritorialization and transversality in the sense that all three of these designate the creation of the new in movement between the already known coordinates. In the end, Deleuze translates Boulez's concepts of *temps pulsée* and *temps non pulsée* into the concepts of Chronos and Aion, where Aion designates the qualitative time of becoming, while Chronos the quantitative time of representative thought. The goal of this paper is to research these complex philosophical-aesthetic encounters between Boulez and Deleuze in order to shed light on the ways in which philosophical concepts are created based on art practices, and art practices on the basis of philosophy.

Keywords: Boulez, Deleuze, time, difference, virtual, becoming, striated, smooth

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In a lecture dedicated to the question of the relation between the image and the sound, Gilles Deleuze said that philosophers have nothing to say to the artists (or mathematicians) nor do they need philosophy as such. To be precise

philosophy is not made to think about anything. Treating philosophy as the power to 'think about' seems to be giving it a great deal, but it in fact takes everything away from it. No one needs philosophy to think. The only people capable of thinking effectively about cinema are the filmmakers and film critics or those who love cinema. Those people don't need philosophy to think about film. The idea that mathematicians need philosophy to think about mathematics is comical. If philosophy had to be used to think about something, it would have no reason to exist. If philosophy exists, it is because it has its own content.¹

In this way, Deleuze clearly takes a stand against earlier (systemic) philosophers who, while creating their philosophies, were prescribing rules in regard to what art is and is not, and what artists should do in order to create art, as well as what observers and listeners should look and listen to for the purpose of proper reception.² However, as with every philosophy and theory things are not that simple. In the book *What Is Philosophy?* which Deleuze co-wrote with Félix Guattari,³ these two philosophers gather together their decades long reflections by separating the whole of human activity into three domains – science, philosophy, and art. Science through its apparatus produces functions, philosophy creates concepts, while art as a *differentia specifica* in relation to these two activities possesses sensation.⁴ Even though each of them retains its specificities, they en-

¹ Gilles Deleuze, "What is the Creative Act?", in: Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, New York, Semiotext(e), 2006, 313.

² Immanuel Kant and his Critique of the Power of Judgement could serve here as the best example. For Kant, artwork is artwork only if it is perceived with disinterest, that is, if that which is perceived has no use, practical value, but it serves only for the subject to show itself its freedom in relation to nature and embodiedness marked as domains of necessity compared to the subject which gives itself the law of conduct and hence autonomous in relation to the necessity of natural laws. Cf. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000.

³ Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *What Is Philosophy?*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1994.

⁴ If the claim that philosophers have nothing to say to artists was directed at Kant at least partially, then this division in the form of science, philosophy and art while all three of them keeping their own specificities even though there is communication between them is partially directed toward Hegel. In Hegel, all human activities are to be found on some kind of ladder in movement toward the Absolute Spirit or absolute knowledge in the form of conceptual knowledge, that is, philosophy. In other words, science, art, religion, politics, economics, etc. flow into the concept (or Concept) becoming, in the end, obsolete, while there remains only the self-thinking of the Absolute in the medium of concept. Cf. G. W. F. Hegel, *Science of Logic*, London, Allen & Unwin, 1969.

ter into relations and have something in common. What they have in common is creation, that is, the act of creation.⁵

In this text I will reconsider relations between art and philosophy – concept and sensation – in an encounter between Pierre Boulez and Gilles Deleuze. Deleuze has written and talked about Boulez and his artistic practice on a number of occasions, and he has actively borrowed concepts from him such as concepts of striated (*strié*) and smooth (*lisse*), which Boulez used for describing the morphology of sound space. Deleuze and Guattari used these two concepts in *A Thousand Plateaus* in what I call an ontopolitical way – for the purpose of inventing an ontology abstract enough to describe the constitution of space and time in conditions of the capitalist axiomatic and finding the proper lines of flight. In another place, Deleuze develops the concepts of Chronos (quantitative and sequenced time) and Aion (qualitative and continual time), and makes parallels with Boulez’s concepts of *temps pulsée* and *temps non pulsée* (at the same time considering the typology of time in Marcel Proust). There are two more concepts that tell the similarity. They are difference and diagonal. In Deleuze, difference is the key ontological concept, while in Boulez it appears as heterophony as the virtual line, accumulative development and athematism as the virtual form. Boulez’s concept of diagonal is similar to Deleuze’s and Guattari’s concepts of deterritorialization and transversality in the sense that all three of them signify the creation of the new in movement between the already known coordinates. My aim is to show the rich and complex relations that exist between concepts and sensations, that is, between art practice and thinking, and the ways in which these two interrelate and mutually influence the creation of both.

Difference and the virtual

Difference is, as I have already mentioned, the key concept of Deleuze’s ontology. The concept of difference is developed by Deleuze most consistently in the book *Difference and Repetition*, and in such a way that difference assumes characteristics of the very foundation of thinking the being and beings. Actually, the being itself is defined as difference:

In accordance with Heidegger’s ontological intuition, difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed. There must be

⁵ Gilles Deleuze, “What is the Creative Act?”, op. cit., 315.

differentiation of difference, an in-itself which is like a differentiator, a *Sich-unterscheidende*, by virtue of which the different is gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance, identity, analogy or opposition.⁶

Difference as an ontological foundation has to be difference by itself, difference that is differentiated through difference from other types of difference, such as conceptual difference which is representational, and difference between opposites. Difference by itself is one that enables a conceptual difference and the difference between opposites, that is, a representation as such which is based on the identity of concepts, the opposition of predicates, the analogy of judgment and similarity of sensation. Exactly what the problem is with representation one can glean from the following quotation:

Analogy is itself the analogue of identity within judgment. Analogy is the essence of judgment, but the analogy within judgment is the analogy of the identity of concepts. That is why we cannot expect that generic or categorial difference, any more than specific difference, will supply us with a proper concept of difference. While specific difference is content to inscribe difference in the identity of an indeterminate concept in general, generic (distributive and hierarchical) difference is content in turn to inscribe difference in the quasi-identity of the most general determinable concepts; that is, in the analogy within judgment itself.⁷

In order to develop a proper concept of difference one should show that the difference which produces particular beings precedes specious and individual differences. In other words, difference must be a transcendental principle, which then means that difference is defined for every modality even though these modalities are not the same nor do they possess the same sense while the sense is one (since being is one of difference). With this a categorial turn occurs as well – being is defined as becoming, identity as difference, and one as many.

Deleuze introduces difference as a transcendental principle through the concepts of the actual and the virtual. He needed the virtual dimension in order to retain the continuity of qualitative becomings since the actual is the domain of quantified beings. In order to keep the continuity of becoming – diachrony – and prevent turning the wholeness of time into discrete moments – synchrony – Deleuze's ontology requires the difference between the intensive (virtual) and the extensive (actual). Compared to extensive magnitudes which can be partitioned without a change in nature, intensities cannot be partitioned without a change in their nature. They are then inconsummate, and each of them is difference by itself. Put in the context of two sides of Deleuze's ontology, one can

⁶ Gilles Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, London, Continuum, 2001, 117.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 33–34.

say that intensities play the role of catalysts of actualization of the virtual, producers of extensive space, linear successive time as well as the bodies and their qualities.

In Boulez, difference as an important concept appears in the 1950s and 1960s, even before *Difference and Repetition* appeared in print (1968), although Deleuze wrote about difference in Bergson in the middle of the 1950s.⁸ Many ascribe that fact to the general climate in France at the time. It has, of course, to do with the development of structuralism and poststructuralism.⁹ What is interesting about the relation between Boulez and Deleuze, however, is that they both insist on *difference* and the *virtual*, as opposed to the structuralists who focused on *structures*, however they may be comprehended. In other words, it is not identity that is important, but variation/becoming. For Boulez, the problem of difference/the virtual is a compositional problem, which appears in the form of a virtual theme, virtual form and virtual line, as heterophony. The concept of the virtual theme is based on athematism and on

rejecting an absolute form of a theme, in order to end up with a notion of a virtual theme, (1) where the elements are not fixed at the beginning in a totally defined form, (2) where priority is not given above all to the intervals as the source of musical development, but where the other elements, duration in particular, can play a more important role to which the pitches are subordinated.¹⁰

Considering that the theme does not exist as such anymore, it becomes “a developmental function in the articulation of form”,¹¹ and a virtual form at that. Boulez’s virtual form is usually understood on the basis of Umberto Eco’s concept of the open work of art and the problematization of the relation between the author and the work by Roland Barthes through the conception of the death of the author. But, if we follow Boulez’s intention to explore “an evolving form which rebels against its own repetition; in short, a relative formal virtuality”,¹²

⁸ Boulez directly references *Difference and Repetition* in his lecture at the Collège de France in 1980. Campbell claims that it “may have helped Boulez in choosing the theme for the courses in 1983–1985, which exclusively deal with questions of thematism, athematism, identity and variation”, Edward Campbell, *Boulez, Music and Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, 142.

⁹ For insight in relation between Boulez and Lévi-Strauss cf. Jonathan Goldman, “Structuralist contra Serialists? Claude Lévi-Strauss and Pierre Boulez on Avant-Garde Music”, *Intersections: Canadian Journal of Music*, 30(1), 2010, 77–94.

¹⁰ Pierre Boulez, “Leçons de musique (Points de repère III)”, quoted in: Edward Campbell, *Music after Deleuze*, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, 15.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *Ibid.*, 17.

then we arrive at a somewhat different view. Namely, the point of conceptions such as the open work of art or the death of the author is the foundation of a sort of *intertextuality*, that is, the impossibility of definitive *meaning* which is closed upon itself but always already founded in relation to other *discourses* and *texts*.

However, if difference takes precedence over repetition, we arrive at the fact that it regards the relation between different elements which enter into the multiplicity of relations some of which are actualized while some remain virtual but important in the sense that they offer a “transcendental principle”, that is, an ontological frame for what can be. In other words, it does not regard the production of (impossible) meaning, but the creation of specific assemblages of “blocs of duration” for the exploration of musical space and time, as well as space and time in general, and therein lies the closeness of Boulez’s and Deleuze’s concept of difference/virtuality. Furthermore, virtuality as that which is not present in the actual but which nevertheless defines it is important for understanding heterophony as the virtual line in Boulez’s work. Boulez defines heterophony as “the superposition on a primary structure of a modified *aspect* of the same structure”,¹³ and according to Edward Campbell “Boulez’s heterophonies, in which simultaneous manifestations of a melodic line appear in superposition, are equally different manifestations of a virtual melodic line. This virtual line cannot be simplistically reduced to any one favored version of the line and will certainly not be found in the score, since all of the drawn melodic lines are particular manifestations of the virtual line”.¹⁴

Time and space

According to Campbell, Boulez “goes beyond the traditional rhythmic vocabulary in setting out the temporal possibilities for contemporary music as existing between the poles of what he calls pulsed and unpulsed time”.¹⁵ Pulsed time (*temps pulsée*) can be at the same time compared to striated space (*espace strié*) in which “regular durations are associated with chronometric time as signposts”.¹⁶ On the other hand, unpulsed time (*temps non pulsée*) relates to smooth space (*espace lisse*) because “in amorphous, unpulsed or smooth time there are no regular pulsations or signposts”.¹⁷ Pulsed/unpulsed time and smooth/striated

¹³ Ibid., 20.

¹⁴ Ibid., 21.

¹⁵ Edward Campbell, *Music after Deleuze*, op. cit., 99–100.

¹⁶ Ibid., 117.

¹⁷ Ibid. Boulez says: “Le temps amorphe est comparable à la surface lisse, le temps pulsé à la surface striée; c’est pourquoi, par analogie, j’appellerai les deux catégories ainsi définies

space constitute two sides of homogenous space, while on the other side there lies nonhomogenous space, which is created in the encounter between smooth and striated space. In the book *Penser la musique aujourd'hui* Boulez gives a detailed classification of space/time and their inner differentiation. What immediately becomes obvious is that nonhomogenous space remains nondifferentiated because it does not have any measure (which is a motive Deleuze will take up later), that is, smooth and striated spaces can only be alternated and superposed. Homogenous space, on the other hand, consists of smooth and striated space. Within striated space “straight” and “curved” spaces are produced (*espaces droits* and *espaces courbes*), as well as “regular” and “irregular” spaces (*espaces réguliers* and *espaces irréguliers*) due to the defined partition (*coupure*) and module (*modulo*), while smooth spaces do not contain any of that (undefined partitions, absence of module) but are formed depending on the “statistic spread of frequencies”, which can be equal or unequal (*egale* and *inégle*).¹⁸ Generally speaking, striated spaces and smooth spaces as well as types of time belonging to them do not exist by themselves, but always in interaction, in the encounter with each other.¹⁹

The point of this complex classification of space and time lies in the practical exploration of the pitch or spatiality of the sound. Striated and smooth space are the main forms in the morphology of sound space, all the while smooth space does not offer any signposts or directions for the orientation of the listener. Sound space, on the other hand, can be striated in multiple ways of which “Western music, including serialism, has mostly retained the traditional 12 semitonal striations of tempered space”.²⁰ Boulez’s intention was to create the possibility of differently striated sound spaces, which he did by conceptualizing curved, regular and irregular spaces, but, as Campbell notices, “while he theorizes the possibility of such variably striated spaces, it is not known whether these ideas have ever been actualized in compositional terms, and it may be that they have remained within the realm of speculative theory”.²¹ Campbell also notices that Boulez’s mostly explored traditional striation of sound space, coming closest to the smooth sound space in the composition *Répons* in which he electronically changed the pitch because “beyond the studio, however, there simply were no instruments at that time capable of transferring ideas of smooth space and var-

du nom de temps lisse et temps strié”, Pierre Boulez, *Penser la musique aujourd'hui*, Paris, Gonthier, 1981, 100.

¹⁸ Ibid., 99.

¹⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, 98.

²⁰ Edward Campbell, *Music after Deleuze*, op. cit., 72.

²¹ Ibid., 73.

ious types of striations (pitch divisions) from the realm of theory to that of live performance practice”.²²

The issues that troubled Boulez and his attempts to answer them in the form of the complex apparatus he created in his theoretical and artistic practice, had their second life in the writings of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. In the text “Making Inaudible Forces Audible”,²³ which Deleuze presented at the conference at IRCAM in 1978 dedicated to “Time”, Deleuze reconsiders the question of musical time in Boulez. In another text titled “Occupy Without Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time”,²⁴ which he wrote for the anthology in honor of Boulez’s sixtieth birthday, he writes about the problem of time in Boulez and Proust while at the same time developing his own conception of time based on the difference between Chronos and Aion. Furthermore, in *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari develop concepts of smooth and striated space, which they took from Boulez for the purpose of inventing an ontology abstract sufficient to describe the constitution of space and time in the conditions of the axiomatic of capitalism and to find corresponding lines of flight.

Reconsidering Boulez’s selection of five works,²⁵ Deleuze in the text from 1978 writes about “a kind of *non-pulsed* time emerging from a *pulsed* time, even though this non-pulsed time could become a new form of *pulsation*”.²⁶ Ligeti’s composition is the one that reveals the way in which unpulsed time appears from pulsation, while the next three depict various forms of unpulsed time, and Carter’s composition shows the way in which “a new form of original pulsation, a very particular, very new pulsation”²⁷ appears from unpulsed time. The basic characteristic of this unpulsed time is the duration which “puts us first and foremost in the presence of a multiplicity of heterochronous, qualitative, non-coincident, non-communicating durations”.²⁸ These forms of duration are produced by what Deleuze’s calls “sound molecules”, which are opposite to pure tones

²² Ibid.

²³ Gilles Deleuze, “Making Inaudible Forces Audible”, in: Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, New York, Semiotext(e), 2006, 156–160.

²⁴ Gilles Deleuze, “Occupy Without Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time”, in: Gilles Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness: Texts and Interviews 1975–1995*, New York, Semiotext(e), 2006, 292–299. Originally published in: Claude Samuel (ed.), *Éclats/Boulez*, Paris, Centre Georges Pompidou, 1986, 98–100.

²⁵ The selection includes Ligeti’s composition *Chamber Concerto*, Messiaen’s *Mode de valeurs et d’intensités*, Boulez *Éclats*, Stockhausen’s *Zeitmasse* and Carter’s *A Mirror on which to Dwell*.

²⁶ Gilles Deleuze, “Making Inaudible Forces Audible”, op. cit., 157.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

and which when joined together “are capable of passing through totally heterogeneous layers of rhythm and layers of duration”.²⁹ The second characteristic of unpulsed time is specific individuations in the form of sound landscapes, audible colors and rhythmic characters. It is such a creation of sound, its intensity and content which does not yield to the conceptualization within the frame of matter and form, but matter and force through the “coupling between this very elaborate sound material and forces which by themselves are not sound, but that become sound or become audible by the material that makes them substantial”.³⁰ Those forces which become audible through sound matter are the time, duration and intensity. In other words, music is “all the non-sound forces that the sound material elaborated by the composer will make perceptible, in such a way that we can even perceive the differences between these forces, the entire differential play of these forces”.³¹

This differential play is carried out through the relation between the striated and the smooth as Deleuze shows in the text “Occupy Without Counting”. The metric and chronometric relations are lost in the smooth space-time in such a way that “numbers do not disappear, but they become independent of metric and chronometric relationships; they become numerals, numbering numbers, nomad or Mallarméan numbers, musical Nomos and no longer measure. And instead of dividing a closed space-time *according to* the elements that form a block, they distribute the elements contained in a bubble of open space-time”.³² Deleuze calls that the Order of Time, in opposition to the Series of Time, which is characteristic of striated space-time in which everything functions through tonal language and which sets up a certain identity between the matter and the form. In the Order of Time there are individuations without the identity which “make the variations perceptible in a striated setting and the distributions in a smooth setting”, that is “it allows the identification of difference as such”.³³ This tension between the striated and the smooth, Series and Order, Deleuze clearly articulates through the concepts of Chronos and Aion. In *Logic of Sense* Deleuze introduced this important difference for the purpose of developing his own philosophy of time. Chronos is the time that is tied to the bodies, qualities of those bodies as well as their activities, the time of the actual state of things which is entangled in a causal net. Aion, however, is that time which is “the locus of incorporeal events, and of attributes which are distinct from qualities... populated

²⁹ Ibid., 158.

³⁰ Ibid., 159.

³¹ Ibid., 160.

³² Gilles Deleuze, “Occupy Without Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time”, op. cit., 294–295.

³³ Ibid., 297.

by effects which haunt it without ever filling it up... unlimited, the way that the future and past are unlimited, and finite like the instant... Aion stretches out in a straight line, limitless in either direction... the eternal truth of time: the *pure empty form of time*".³⁴ Aion is the time of becoming.

Aion as the time of *becoming* is connected to the smooth space, while Chronos as the time of *become* is connected to striated space, even though the relations between the two are more complex than these opposites show. In the last chapter of *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari develop this pair of Boulez's concepts to the ontopolitical level in the form of several models – technological, musical (where they explicitly analyze Boulez's theoretical and artistic work), maritime, mathematical, physical, aesthetic – for the purpose of describing the actual state of things which they call world integrated capitalism. They equate the smooth space with nomad space and war machine, while striated space is sedentary space shaped by the state apparatus.³⁵ Smooth space is "an amorphous collection of juxtaposed pieces that can be joined together in an infinite number of ways",³⁶ in other words it is a patchwork of Riemannian non-Euclidian mathematical spaces that contain multiplicities that are qualitative, non-metric, acentric, rhizomatic, flat, directional etc.³⁷ It is directional in the sense that "the stop follows from the trajectory... the interval takes all, the interval is substance (forming the basis for rhythmic values)",³⁸ which is an insight that will be important for the concepts of diagonal, deterritorialization and transversality. In other words, smooth space is constituted by lines as vectors of movement and "is filled by events and haecceities, far more than by formed and perceived things. It is a space of affects, more than one of properties. It is *haptic* rather than optical perception... Intense *Spatium* instead of *Extensio*. A Body without Organs instead of an organism and organization".³⁹

Striated space is the space of the state apparatus. It should be mentioned that the concept of the state apparatus is not related only to the administrative-bureaucratic creation, but to all the forms of thinking that are based on the "tree" (traditional ontology, science, art etc.), while in opposition to them there are rhizomatic forms which are not vertically-hierarchically shaped but exclusively, horizontally-anarchically (smooth space). The state apparatus in the strict

³⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Logic of Sense*, London, Continuum, 2010, 165.

³⁵ Cf. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, London, Continuum, 2004, 524.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 526.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 534.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 528.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

sense, however, is defined by the capitalist axiomatic, one of whose functions is the translation of the abstract axiomatic to the level of concrete bodies, that is, in the quantification of those bodies for the purpose of producing surplus value through machinic enslavement and social subjection. This is where the complexity of relations between the smooth and striated appears. On the one hand, the state as a model of actualization of the axiomatic produces striated space, while on the other, integrated world capitalism (axiomatic) produces “a new smooth space in which capital reaches its ‘absolute’ speed, based on machinic components rather than the human component of labor... The present-day accelerated forms of the circulation of capital are making distinctions between constant and variable capital, and even fixed and circulating capital, increasingly relative; the essential thing instead is the distinction between *striated* and *smooth capital*, and the way in which the former gives rise to the latter through complexes that cut across territories and States, and even different types of States”.⁴⁰ In other words, smooth by itself is no guarantee in the creation of lines of flight, that is the liberation from all that striated space entails. As Deleuze and Guattari write: “Smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles, invents new spaces, switches adversaries. Never believe that a smooth space will suffice to save us”.⁴¹

Diagonal, deterritorialization, transversality

Considering that the smooth space, whether the one of becoming or the one of capital, is defined by lines, vectors and movement in general, there is a question of how that movement is performed. Boulez, writing about his own technique of composition, called that movement a diagonal, and Deleuze writes that “the independent, non-preexisting dimension that is traced along with the block’s variations is called *diagonal* to indicate that it cannot be reduced to either the harmonic vertical or the melodic horizontal as preexisting coordinates. The epitome of the musical act for Boulez consists in the diagonal, each time under different conditions, from polyphonic combinations, through the resolutions of Beethoven, the fusions of harmony and melody in Wagner up to Webern abolishing the frontier between vertical and horizontal, producing sound blocks in a series, moving them along a diagonal as a temporal function distributing the entire work. Each time, the diagonal is like a vector-block of harmony and melody, a function of temporalization”.⁴² This diagonal movement between the preexisting

⁴⁰ Ibid., 543.

⁴¹ Ibid., 551.

⁴² Gilles Deleuze, “Occupy Without Counting: Boulez, Proust and Time”, op. cit., 293.

coordinates in Boulez's case is the movement between the striated spaces of the harmonic vertical and the melodic horizontal, while in Deleuze's and Guattari's it becomes the movement between the striated space of the state apparatus and the smooth space of the body without organs, which they call deterritorialization or transversal movement.

Transversality "assembles heterogeneous components under a unifying viewpoint, which is far from totalizing",⁴³ which corresponds to the movement through a space such as the smooth space, considering that it contains qualitative, intensive multiplicities. Deterritorialization, on the other hand, names the process of decoding fluxes, while fluxes should be understood as all that is, which is in the process of becoming, if said in a Deleuzian way. That process of decoding is played out on already coded fluxes and on those that have been coded through blood and marriage relations (in primitive territorial machines if we speak about human societies). Fluxes coded in such a way are later recoded within the frame of the despotic state which itself is recoded with the appearance of capitalism. Capitalism, as it is, is "the only social machine that is constructed on the basis of decoded flows, substituting for intrinsic codes, an axiomatic of abstract quantities in the form of money. Capitalism therefore liberates the flows of desire, but under the social conditions that define its limit and the possibility of its own dissolution, so that it is constantly opposing with all its exasperated strength the movement that drives it toward this limit. At capitalism's limit the deterritorialized socius gives way to the body without organs, and the decoded flows throw themselves into desiring-production".⁴⁴ As can be seen from this quotation, deterritorialization names the processes of decoding fluxes, and the specificity of capitalism lies in the fact that it is the only social form that relies exactly on the processes of deterritorialization, that is, on the movement toward absolute smooth space. It should be mentioned that the concept of deterritorialization somewhat changed meaning in the course of time. That is, registers of its application changed from the psychological register in which deterritorialization signifies the liberation of the libido from previous investments, through the social register where it signifies the liberation of the work force, to the complete erasure of anthropocentrism in the deterritorializing movements of sediments in the geological sense, the constitution of proteins and symbiotic relationships between the species.⁴⁵

⁴³ Adam Bryx and Gary Genosko, "Transversality", in: Adrian Parr (Ed.), *The Deleuze Dictionary*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, 286.

⁴⁴ Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *Anti-Oedipus*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 2003, 139–140.

⁴⁵ Eugene Holland, "Deterritorializing 'Deterritorialization': From the 'Anti-Oedipus' to 'A Thousand Plateaus'", *Substance* 20(3), 1991, 55–65.

Conclusion: Deterritorializations of concepts and sensations

As I have already indicated in the introduction, Deleuze and Guattari, in their last book they wrote together *What Is Philosophy?*, define science, philosophy and art as separate fields of activity, science producing functions, philosophy concepts, and art sensations. But, as we could see with the example of art and philosophy, these fields communicate between and influence each other, and in such a way that they do not simply take over functions, concepts and sensations. Moreover, as Deleuze himself says, artists and scientists do not need philosophers in order for those artists and scientists to reflect on their own activities and creations. However, encounters happen between them and, as I have shown in the encounter between Boulez and Deleuze, in those encounters certain movements of sensations and concepts occur. I would call those movements, in accordance with what I have already described as specific movement within the axiomatic, the deterritorialization of concepts and sensations. If we take a look at the “direction” of this movement, we will see that it went from the creation of sensations (Boulez’s compositions), to concepts which explain the manner of the creation of sensations (Boulez’s theoretical writings), to the relocation of these concepts to the plane of philosophy together with the broadening of their scope (Deleuze’s appropriation of Boulez’s concepts). In the last two steps there occurs what Deleuze and Guattari call decoding of previously coded fluxes and their de/coding anew, that is, the deterritorialization and de/re/territorialization of concepts and sensations occur in different media located on the plane of immanence. It is exactly the non-hierarchically structured plane of immanence that enables this movement and exchange of material between the concepts and sensations that play out in a rhizomatic way. In other words, there is no relation of predominance between art and philosophy, but both domains together with science lie on the same plane and encounter each other, producing the events of the creation of concepts, sensations and functions.

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