

Hybrid Warfare Management of the United Kingdom

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Abstract: The United Kingdom achieves national security by acting in accordance with the Fusion Doctrine, as a new approach to national security that should ensure the integration of all resources of national power. The Fusion Doctrine was officially accepted in 2021 within the new national security strategy. The new strategy integrated defence, security and foreign policies into a single act which reflects the Fusion Doctrine in the best manner. The new approach to security led to organizational changes of the entire state administration system, as well as within individual departments. Special emphasis was placed on the efficient coordination of the complex state apparatus.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, fusion doctrine, security management.

Graphical abstract



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INTRODUCTION

The understanding of hybrid warfare has evolved over time from Walker's thesis (Walker, 1998) about an efficient way of warfare by specially trained and prepared units, to the state's actions which are carried out through a network of state bodies and non-state actors (Hoffman, 2007; Miller, 2015). The last phase of the evolution began in 2014 with the events in eastern Ukraine and Crimea (Hoffman, 2018). The change in understanding arose as a result of Western countries' concerns about the strengthening of Russia and its resistance to the expansion of NATO towards the Russian borders. This is visible in the strategic security acts of the leading NATO countries. The United Kingdom is no exception in that sense (HM Government, 2015), because it recognizes the danger of hybrid warfare, links it to Russia's actions in Ukraine and emphasizes the need for internal reforms and cooperation at the NATO level in order to successfully oppose this threat.

A key characteristic of hybrid warfare is merging activities from all domains of society into a single activity, managing it from one centre and its direction towards a single goal (Mirković, 2021). Which activities will be merged in a particular case depends on circumstances. Countering hybrid warfare puts the request upon the government to "bring all relevant actors together into a comprehensive system of resilience building" (Wigell et al., 2021), so society as a whole would be resilient and prepared to counter any form of hybrid threat. Comparative analysis showed strong consensus that this, the whole-of-government or whole-of-society approach, is adequate to counter hybrid warfare. There are differences in which way and to which extent the whole-of-government approach is developed and implemented. Elizabeth G. Troeder (2019) from the US Army War College advocates "the establishment of a standing National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee (NSC/PCC) for grey zone solutions, with sub-NSC/PCCs for each of the United States' most active adversaries, so that subject matter experts from the Department of Defence, Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and the national intelligence community can be quickly assembled in times of crisis". Lasoen (2022) analysed EU's counter hybrid warfare strategy. According to him "the EU's strategic response to the full range of these threats is to design a Hybrid Toolbox which indexes all available countermeasures and facilitates the development of new ones, in order to surpass the different levels and departments across which these measures are sourced, in an integrated and coordinated framework".

The Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats (Hybrid CoE) worked out the Comprehensive Resilience Ecosystem (CORE). The basic idea is to develop resilience of a society through interconnection between 13 domains (military, diplomacy, intelligence, economy, cyber, etc.) in which actors use tools against hybrid activities in order to protect seven foundations of democratic society. CORE "can promote cross-sectoral, whole-of-society effort by taking stock of the crucial interlinkages between issues often addressed separately within different spaces. It provides a methodology to achieve a better understanding of the behavior between complex systems, institutions and societal factors and improves the assessment of the cascading effects of hybrid threats and effects of policy interventions. Building on the 13



domains of the conceptual model, the comprehensive resilience ecosystem will facilitate the development of an effective hybrid toolbox” (Jungwirth et al., 2023).

Comparative analysis revealed that whole-of- government approach should be national endeavour regardless of whether the state is a member of regional or global organization or not (Lasoen, 2022); it is aimed to develop resilience of the society as a prerequisite to counter hybrid warfare (Jungwirth et al., 2023); it is strategic approach which encompasses all society (Elonheimo, 2021), whereby government has legal authority and ability to integrate all resource of national power into a single structure.

The Fusion Doctrine is name for the UK’s whole-of-government approach to hybrid warfare and thus to national security. It was formulated in 2018 with the intention to develop a “culture of general interest” in all executive departments. The basic idea is the organizational and functional fusion of all resources of national power, starting from economy, through the military resources to diplomacy and cultural influence (HM Government, 2018a). With the Fusion Doctrine the Government “recognised fully that industry is a core and integral component of the UK’s national security approach” and that private sector will be a mainstream actor (Rosemont, 2021). Reforms at all levels of the UK’s national security system have been carried out in accordance with the Fusion Doctrine in order to counter the security threats in a synchronized and integral manner and, at the same time, to conduct its own hybrid warfare.

The introduction of the Fusion Doctrine is an informal confirmation that the UK is in a state of permanent war which is waged using hybrid warfare against competing states (especially Russia and China) and an unspecified number of non-state actors who, through terrorism, extremism or abuse of information technology, continuously seek to threaten the interests of the UK, home and abroad. The implementation of the Fusion Doctrine and later its efficiency depends on the ability of security management to integrate all resources of national power. For this reason, research problems are defined by the following questions:

- 1) Does the current structure of the UK’s Government reflect the idea of the Fusion Doctrine?
- 2) What constitutes the UK security management and does it meet the requirements to be the carrier of hybrid warfare?
- 3) What are the basic elements and levels of the UK security management in conducting hybrid warfare?

The general hypothesis is that the UK Government reflects the idea of the Fusion Doctrine and therefore its security management is the carrier of hybrid warfare. At the organizational level, there is such a scheme of vertical and horizontal relations between subjects of different status, function, level and authority, which in a particular situation creates the conditions for the integration of numerous actions into a single activity in order to achieve a certain goal. The organization and functioning of this structure are made possible by the existence of relevant legal and political acts at all levels of management. This structure is managed from the highest political and security levels, whereby the integration, coordination and control, depending on the specificity of the tasks, are ensured by the action of lower levels of management (Mirković, 2022).



In order to provide the answers, the UK security management was classified into levels, the holders and jobs at each level were identified and the relations between subjects of the same and different levels were determined. For the purposes of the work, the ministries responsible for foreign affairs, defence and internal affairs were particularly analysed, as three ministries whose policies are integrated (“fused”) into the UK’s single national security strategy.

HYBRID WARFARE MANAGEMENT OF THE UNITED KINGDOM

Top-Level Hybrid Warfare Management of the United Kingdom

The executive power in the UK is nominally divided between the government and the monarch, whereby the monarch is “the dignified part of the British constitution, as opposed to the government, which is the efficient part of the constitution” (Marković, 1980). This is the reason why the Prime Minister, as the head of government, has the highest executive power. The government consists of ministers who are divided into three circles. The first circle is the Ministerial Council, which includes all the ministers, the second circle includes the ministers who are the members of the Cabinet and the so-called inner circle, as an informal group of several ministers who are the closest associates of the Prime Minister. The Cabinet members are also the officials who do not govern any department, but enjoy a high political reputation that makes them necessary and valuable in strategic planning and the UK policy management.

The central forum for discussing, formulating and evaluating national security policy is the National Security Council (hereinafter: the Council). The Council as a Cabinet committee is chaired by the Prime Minister and its membership always reflects the current perception of national security. It traditionally consists of the Lord Chancellor and the Secretary of State for Justice, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, and the Attorney General. Council sessions are attended by the National Security Adviser and, if necessary, by the Chief of the Armed Forces, heads of intelligence services and others whose presence may be useful in the work of the Council (Gov. UK, National Security Council).

Council is a place where the national security strategy is formulated. The Strategy, as a document which contains the most important security policy determinations, is presented to Parliament by the Prime Minister. The current Strategy (Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy – hereinafter: Integrated Review or IR) by name and content shows that at the top-level management there exists an awareness of the need for an integral approach to national security. The process of achieving goals from the IR is under the constant supervision of the Council, which, if necessary, initiates the preparation of the National Security Capability Review (NSCR). The NSCR contains an overview of the capabilities and capacities of the national security system and a proposal for the best model of organization and action. The Fusion Doctrine was introduced by the NSCR in 2018 and later it was accepted in the IR in 2021 as a principle of essential importance for “deep interdepartmental integration”



(Cabinet Office, 2021). This “was a major event in the history of joined-up government. It diagnosed changes to the national security arena, principally the distributed nature of non-traditional threats and their responses, offering a way to promote best practice in strategy-making and implementation – all while placing a spotlight on cross-functional teams, accountability and annual review” (Fossey, 2020).

The Council has subcommittees in charge of certain issues and it is assisted by a network of entities which consists of the National Security Secretariat (NSS), the Joint Intelligence Organization (JIO) and the National Security Advisor (NSA). The NSA is the highest advisor to the Prime Minister and the Cabinet on national security issues, and in addition, he is the secretary of the Council and manages the NSS. As the secretary of the Council, he is responsible for drafting the NSCR. The NSS prepares the Council principles and priorities of strategic importance related to security and intelligence affairs, develops security procedures, etc. (UK Parliament, 2021a; Devanny & Harris, 2014). The JIO consolidates the results of the work of the security services and prepares intelligence assessments for the highest authorities. The Cabinet has the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), which through interdepartmental coordination provides ministers and other high-ranking officials with intelligence assessments related to security, defence and foreign policy. The chairman of JIC is the Professional Head of Intelligence Analysis and, at the same time, he is the Head of the JIO (UK Parliament, 2021a). He is responsible to the Prime Minister.

At the end of this brief summary about the UK's top-level management, a conclusion was drawn that it reflects the idea of the Fusion Doctrine.

Middle-Level Hybrid Warfare Management of the United Kingdom

The core function of subjects at this level is coordination of the subjects which achieve the goals set by the IR. Although solutions at this level change often, research has shown that there are entities that exclusively perform interdepartmental coordination tasks. Their task is to include all interested entities in the process of planning, decision-making and implementation of decisions. The Cabinet integrates the results of work at this level into the Planning and Performance Framework that determines the financial and other aspects of the executive power's activities (Cabinet Office and HM Treasury, 2017). The starting point of the Framework is a plan for the distribution of funds for each department, whereby the ministers prepare a one-year Outcome Delivery Plan. Outcome Delivery Plan evaluates previously achieved results and sets goals for the following year.

In order to carry out coordination tasks, the National Security Strategy and Implementation Groups (NSSIG) were formed (UK Parliament, 2021a; UK Parliament, 2019a). The NSSIGs were established with the aim to make proposals related to national security to the Council and to coordinate other elements of government for collective decision-making. The function of NSSIG should be taken over by Senior Responsible Owners – SRO as individual subjects (UK Parliament, 2021b). The SRO will manage the implementation of strategies that will be developed separately for each goal of national security and submit reports to the Cabinet. The Council monitors and evaluates the entire process.



The SRO and NSSIG are almost identical to the “coordinating ministers” (Hennessy & Welsh, 1998) which existed in the period 1951–1953. Coordinating ministers did not have executive powers and their tasks were to coordinate other ministers. This idea was contested at that time for the reason that such a model of organization was suitable for war-time conditions, which is why it was quickly abolished. In a situation when security environment is characterized by geopolitical changes, the growing power of competing states and non-state entities, dynamic technological changes and transnational forms of threat (Cabinet Office, 2021), the introduction of SRO and NSSIG represents an informal confirmation that the UK is in a specific type of war, which is why the fusion of all resources of national power is necessary.

“The introduction of Fusion Doctrine in 2018 has the potential to facilitate coordination of all this activity more effectively towards singular national security priorities [...] but to date views on its efficacy to do so are mixed” (Davies, 2022). Likewise, determining the middle-level management in the UK is not straightforward given that organizational changes have been made recently and it takes time for the model to be demonstrated in practice. In Supplementary written evidence submitted by Sir Stephen Lovegrove (UK Parliament, 2021b), Watson & Pedersen (2019) and Government Response to the Committee’s Fourth Report of Session 2017–2019 (UK Parliament, 2019b), it can be found that SROs are personally accountable to the Council. On the other hand, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster is the minister who oversees the implementation of all government policies (including national security policy), so the question can rightly be raised whether SROs answer to him as well. They are certainly accountable to the Council and the Cabinet and we can assume their accountability to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. In any case, the activity of the SRO, whether directly or indirectly, is supervised by the Council and that is the reason why it can be said that the idea of fusion has been realized at this level.

Hybrid Warfare Management of the FCDO

Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) is responsible for foreign policy (Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office [FCDO], 2021). In the organizational sense, the FCDO is an example of a fusion, because it was created in September 2020 by merging the office responsible for foreign affairs and the Commonwealth and the office for international development. The structure of the FCDO is complex and consists of an executive part and collective bodies (boards and committees) which perform advisory or supervisory function or determine the general guidelines and principles of the FCDO’s operation. The Secretary of State (SoS) is responsible for the work of the FCDO, the implementation of the IR in foreign policy domain and he determines the International Development Strategy. The SoS and the Ministerial Team are the top-level management of the FCDO.

The Permanent Under-Secretary (PUS) is the most important middle-level figure. He manages the administrative part of the FCDO and at the same time serves as a support to ministers, independently or through membership in numerous committees and boards. PUS, as the Head of the Diplomatic Service – DS, is responsible for official and public diplomacy, as well as intelligence abroad, which is an essential part of FCDO activities. He



is assisted in his work by a Senior Management Structure, which is also the middle level of management. Ambassadors and high commissioners, as heads of diplomatic missions abroad, are the lower level of FCDO management. "Heads of Mission are now accountable for the delivery of cross – HM Government country plans that have been agreed by Ministers and set out the strategic priorities for the UK's international efforts in each country" (FCDO, 2021).

Public diplomacy is conducted through several bodies which are mostly not part of the FCDO. Wilton Park is part of FCDO and represents a forum for global strategic discussion, which gathers leading world and/or regional scientists, business people, representatives of the media, the non-governmental sector, etc. The fundamental aim of Wilton Park is the creation of a desirable public discourse at international level which subsequently should be transferred to individual countries through the media and non-governmental organizations. The desired product of public diplomacy is the creation of the international elite that promotes the UK's interests and serves as a kind of filter in public discourse.

The British Council is an independent body that develops and strengthens cultural ties with other countries and is recognized in the world through the spread of language competencies, which are confirmed by the Council's certificate. The Great Britain-China Centre develops relations between the political officials of both countries on the basis of a strategy that is consistent with the national policy towards China. The UK also provides scholarships to young and successful students from abroad and invests in strengthening ties with the private sector, non-governmental organizations, foreign governments and international organizations. Public diplomacy is complementary with the BBC, which acts in accordance with the UK's strategic goals and priorities. FCDO achieves additional influence through cooperation and assistance to the Global Media Defence Fund (GMDF), which works under the auspices of UNESCO to protect those whose freedom of reporting is threatened.

MI 6 (Secret Intelligence Service) and the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) carry out intelligence activities for the needs of the FCDO. MI6 operates abroad in order to collect information relevant to the prevention of terrorism, the detection and suppression of hostile actions by states and achieving cyber security. It cooperates with MI5, GCHQ, the armed forces, the police and international partners. MI 6 is managed by the Chief (so-called "C"), who is appointed by the SoS and to whom he reports. The GCHQ uses cutting-edge technology to monitor and collect electronic communications in order to suppress cybercrime, terrorism and other forms of serious and organized crime. This agency is headed by a director who is accountable to the SoS. The work of both services is regulated by the Intelligence Services Act (1994).

The global operation and complex structure of FCDO requires constant alignment, coordination, supervision and determination of strategic principles. Numerous committees and bodies at all levels of management serve this purpose. At the top level, there is a Supervisory Board chaired by the SoS. The Supervisory Board meets twice a year in order to determine the strategic direction of the FCDO. At the middle level there is the Management Board which "ensures that the organisation delivers departmental priorities and objectives set by Ministers. It makes strategic choices for long-term departmental management where a cross-departmental view, impact or action is required" (FCDO, 2022). Once a month, the Management Board considers reports on the state of finances and the implementation of plans of organizational units and submits a report to the Supervisory Board.



The Management Board oversees a network of boards and committees, of which the Executive Committee, the Transformation Board and the Strategy Committee should be mentioned. The Executive Committee makes decisions daily in accordance with established strategic positions and principles to solve urgent issues, etc. The Transformation Board is a temporary structure that aims to establish a new organizational model of the FCDO. Finally, the Strategy Committee considers the key strategic issues on which the success of the FCDO depends, proposes changes in the strategic operation and assesses the coherence of the strategies.

Hybrid Warfare Management of the Department of Defence

The Ministry of Defence (Ministry of Defence – MoD) has a complex structure. It consists of two parts - the first with executive powers and the second without executive powers, whose basic function is to ensure harmonized, unified and efficient management and leadership in the MoD. “The Defence Operating Model (DOM) explains how MOD works as a whole, how its constituent parts work, how it integrates with the rest of government, and how it works with other organisations” (UK Ministry of Defence [MoD], 2020). The Secretary of Defence – SoD is at the top level of the MoD management and he is assisted in his work by a Ministerial team. SoD participates in the development of the defence strategy (Defence in a Competitive Age), which is an integral part of the IR. IR serves as a basis for SoD to determine the defence tasks in a document called Defence Strategic Direction from which one-year MoD plans are derived. Based on one-year plans, military and civilian departments create their work plans (Command/Corporate Plans).

Head Office is the middle level of management which supports SoD and his team by providing strategic leadership and management of the MoD. Some of the most important strategic decisions, priorities and directions of the MoD are determined at this level. The Head Office performs four of the seven basic activities of the MoD: determining the defence policy (policy), formulating the defence strategy (strategy), planning activities (planning) and management (governance) of the MoD. The Head Office ensures strategic direction and cohesion within the MoD by preparing strategic decisions for the top management, while at the same time determining the courses of action of lower management. Acting as the middle level of management, the Head Office ensures the fusion of all elements of the MoD (MoD, 2020).

Military and civilian affairs are carried out at Head Office. The Permanent Secretary, as the first political advisor to the SoD and the person responsible for the efficient and economical use of the armed forces, is responsible for civil affairs. The Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), as the first advisor to the SoD, is responsible for military affairs. They are assisted in their work by a network of military and civilian departments. From the point of view of the subject of the work, it is important to mention that the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff is responsible for military strategy and operations (DCDSfMSO) who, on behalf of the CDS, directs the execution of operations at the strategic level, supervises and directs engagement and training of special forces and chairs the Defence Crisis Management Organization (DCMO).



Military affairs are carried out through five military commands: the Defence Nuclear Organisation, the Royal Navy, the Army and the Royal Air Force which have tasks to form, train and equip military units (generate - as one of the activities of the MoD) which the Strategic Command, as the only operational command (operate - the use of armed forces on the ground) used in military operations (MoD, 2020). The Strategic Command unites all resources in military operations on land, in the air, at sea, in space and cyberspace. From the perspective of the research, it is important to mention the Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) headed by the Chief of Joint Operations (CJO). PJHQ is operationally the most important organizational unit because it brings together all resources of MoD for the purpose of carrying out specific combat tasks. Combined combat groups that are formed for the purpose of realizing a certain combat mission under the authority of the CDS are managed by the CJO (MoD, 2014), who can delegate some or all of the powers to a subordinate officer. Thus, a chain of command begins with the Prime Minister as the holder of the entire executive power and then continues with the SoD and CDS as the head of the armed forces, who directly or through the DCDSfMSO commands the joint battle groups. Bodies such as councils, boards and committees, which do not have executive powers, contribute to the coordination of the complex defence system (governance - as the fourth activity of the MoD). The Defence Council is the highest body and consists of the SoD, Ministerial team, Permanent Secretary, CDS, chiefs of all branches of the military, as well as heads of civilian departments in the Ministry of Defence. The Council has three subcommittees that are in charge of individual types of the army (MoD, 2020). The next committee is the Defence Board, which consists of the SoD, the Ministerial Team, the Permanent Secretary, the CDS, the deputy CDS, the Director General Finance and a maximum of four officials who do not have executive powers. The Defence Committee brings together the top level of MoD management and as such its main task is to determine strategies and plans for building military capacities. The Executive Committee consists of the Permanent Secretary, the CDS and his deputy and the most important heads of civil and military departments within the Head Office. Implementation of strategic decisions, goals and priorities determined by the Defence Board depends on the Executive Committee's work.

Hybrid Warfare Management of the Home Office

The Home Office (hereinafter: HO) organizational structure has undergone major changes in the last ten years. At the top of the hierarchy is the Home Secretary - HS which is assisted by the Ministerial Team. The Ministerial Team consists of ministers responsible for the three basic missions of the HO (national security, public safety and migration and border control). The HS and Ministerial Team are top level management of the HO. At the middle level, there is a team of civil servants with executive and non-executive powers, led by the Permanent Secretary. Officials with executive powers are responsible for the basic missions of the HO, while those with non-executive powers are responsible for creating conditions for successful and efficient work (technical-communication means, human resources, cooperation with the private sector, etc.).

Organizational changes were characterized by grouping jobs into three groups according to the HO's basic missions and assigning those groups (missions) to holders. At the mid-



dle level, there are also organizational units that determine the mission guidelines in accordance with higher strategic documents. The public safety mission is carried out by the Public Safety Group (PSG) as an organizational unit within the HO. PSG is managed by the Director General who is responsible for the development, coordination and implementation of the government's strategy, policy and legislation on crime, policing and fire.

Policing is performed in accordance with the Strategic Policing Requirement – SPR) which is adopted and periodically updated by the HS. The SPR is a strategic document that identifies the national threats and “appropriate national policing capabilities to counter those national threats” (Police Act 1996, Sec. 37A). Policing is performed by police forces formed for 43 police areas on the territory of England and Wales. The Metropolitan Police, as a special police unit, is responsible for combating general and organized crime in the Greater London (Metropolitan Police, 2021). Police and Crime Commissioners (PCC) are elected in every police area in order to make sure that local police meet the needs of the community. PCC in annual plans determine strategic direction and goals for the local police forces. Furthermore, they take care of police efficiency, determine the budget funds, and have responsibility for the appointment and dismissal of local police chiefs and for spending funds. In Greater London, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, mayors formally hold the responsibilities of a PCC, but they appoint policing deputies who act as PCC (Home Office, 2011). Police coordination in England and Wales is carried out through the National Police Chiefs’ Council – NPCC, which was established by an agreement concluded between 102 police bodies (National police collaboration agreement in relation to the coordinating body known as the National Police Chiefs’ Council, 2017). This agreement foresees coordination with the police forces of Scotland and Northern Ireland, which are not part of the agreement.

Policing in Scotland is the responsibility of the Scottish Police Authority (SPA), while the Police Scotland (PS) exercises police powers. Scottish Ministers set the Strategic Police Priorities (SPP) and the SPA is responsible for producing a strategic police plan (Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012) while Chief Constable presents annual police plan. The work of the PS is managed by the Chief Constable, who is responsible to the SPA. Policing in Northern Ireland is carried out in police districts by the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Strategic goals are set by the Ministry of Justice and the Board as the highest body of the PSNI that controls and supervises the police. Board determines the annual policing plan. In addition to the Board, the Police Ombudsman also supervises the police. The PSNI is under the direction and control of the Chief Constable, who is accountable to the Board (Police (Northern Ireland) Act 2000).

The supervision of the police in England and Wales can be carried out directly by the HS in accordance with the Police Act 1996 or by the Police Inspectorate. HS has a right to issue direct orders to local police when he believes that there could be harmful consequences due to wrong actions or inaction by the police. Inspectors are appointed by the monarch and their number is determined by the HS with the approval of the Minister of Finance. The inspectors submit a report to the HS on the results of the controls which they undertake (Police Act 1996, Sec. 54).



In 2013, in the fight against organized and serious crime the National Crime Agency (NCA) was established as an intelligence-police agency which “leads the UK’s fight to cut serious and organised crime, protecting the public by targeting and pursuing those criminals who pose the greatest risk to the UK” (NCA, 2021). Furthermore, the HS brings a special strategy for fighting organized and serious crime (HM Government, 2018b). The NCA is an independent body of executive power and is not part of the HO’s organizational structure. However, the Director General is responsible to the HS. The NCA determines the Work Plan (Annual Plan) based on the strategic priorities determined by the HS and publishes the National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime (NSASOC) as a document which “provides a single picture of the threat to the UK from serious and organised crime. It informs both the national response (what the priorities are and what action will be taken) and the expected results (how success will be measured)” (NCA, 2018). The NCA has original jurisdiction in the territory of England and Wales. In the territory of Scotland and Northern Ireland, the NCA officers are performing tasks on the basis of an agreement of understanding with the devolutionary authorities. The Director General appoints officers for Scotland and Northern Ireland and they have powers equal to local police officers (NCA, 2022).

The Homeland Security Group (HSG), as an organizational unit of the HO, “sits at the heart of the UK’s national security system, setting strategic direction and playing a crucial enabling role in national security and law enforcement operations”. It performs its tasks by coordinating activities aimed at suppressing internal threats, creating a legal and political framework for the application of policing powers and creating prerequisites for the use of modern technology. It is managed by the Director General. In addition to the HSG, the national security mission is carried out by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and MI5. NaCTSO achieves goals which are determined in the counter-terrorism strategy (Home Office, 2018c) that is brought by HS and plays a central role in fighting against terrorism. It is a police organization which is a member of the NPCC and serves as a support network of Counter-Terrorism Advisers who assist in the work of police agencies. NaCTSO is headed by the Director.

MI5 is not part of the HO’s organizational structure. It is managed by the Director General who is responsible to the HS who appoints him (Security Service Act 1989, Sec 1) and to the Prime Minister. The main function of MI5 is the protection of national security, especially against espionage, terrorism, sabotage, political coups, harmful action of foreign agents and activities that threaten economic security conducted by external actors. The law stipulates that MI5, in accordance with its possibilities and capacities, assists the NCA and the police forces in order to suppress serious crime. Members of MI5 have no executive power, which is why they are directed to work with the police, customs, immigration authorities and other law enforcement agencies (Cabinet Office and National Security Intelligence, 2010).

The mission of border protection and delivering the immigration policy is carried out by several bodies that are part of the organizational structure of the HO. They perform activities based on the annual plans of the HO and the plans for migration determined by the HS. At the heart of the mission is the Migration and Borders Group, which sets policy in this domain. Within this mission, the tasks are performed by Immigration Enforcement, the Border Force, the Passport Office and UK Visas and Immigration. The Border Force



controls the land border and all ports and airports in the UK. UK Visas and Immigration carries out visa-related work “with a firm emphasis on national security”. The Passport Office issues passports and has seven regional centres across the UK. Immigration Enforcement “is responsible for preventing abuse, tracking immigration offenders and increasing compliance with immigration law”. Border protection and the application of immigration regulations is supervised and controlled by the Independent Chief Inspector for Borders and Migration (ICIBI). ICIBI is an independent monitoring body that is accountable to the parliament and that makes recommendations and proposals for improving the efficiency of the HO.

CONCLUSION

The IR represents a single act which fused defence, foreign and security policies in accordance with the new approach to national security formulated in 2018 in the NSCR. With this, the Prime Minister and the Council at the top level of management laid the political foundations for the fusion of the entire executive branch. Successful fusion further depends on the effective coordination of all elements of the executive power in order to include interested subjects in the processes of planning and execution of national security affairs. The task of coordinating the work of a great number of executive authorities was first given to the NSSIG, and then to the SRO, while the entire coordination process is monitored and supervised by the Council. At the same time, membership in the Council allows the ministers of the most important departments to directly implement the policy that was determined at the top level.

Successful fusion also requires organizational changes within the department. These changes are aimed at creating the necessary conditions for the effective performance of missions that achieve national security goals. For this reason, the Office for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and the Office for International Development were integrated. Thus, official diplomacy, public diplomacy, international development and intelligence work abroad were fused and became the responsibility of the SoS. Coordination of numerous and heterogeneous tasks within FCDO as well as of FCDO with the entire state administration system is the responsibility of the bodies at all levels of FCDO management. In the MoD structure, there are collective bodies that establish general principles of action, organizational units that develop military capacities and prepare the armed forces for use and finally the Strategic Command that uses military forces in military operations.

The HO adapted its organizational structure to the missions. Policing is separately performed in England and Wales, and Scotland and Northern Ireland which have independent police authorities. However, coordination and cooperation in the field of general crime is achieved through the NPCC and in the field of serious and organized crime on the basis of a memorandum of understanding with the governments of Scotland and Northern Ireland. National security tasks are carried out by MI5 as an independent agency responsible to the HS and the National Security Group, which is an organizational part of the HO. The migration policy is carried out through a network of entities. The centre of the network is the Migration and Border Group, which determines the general principles of action.



UK security management is characterized by several things. First of all, at the top level, there is an awareness of the need for an integral approach to national security. This awareness can be recognized through organizational changes and strategic acts at lower levels of management. Then, at all levels of management there are collective bodies whose aim is to establish general principles and guidelines for coordinated management in an individual department and within other elements of the security system. Furthermore, the dynamism and openness of the system is visible because the recommendations that arise as a result of the control and supervision process become an integral part of new strategic acts. In the end the following conclusions were drawn: 1) the organizational structure of the UK government reflects the idea of the Fusion Doctrine; 2) the security management of the UK represents the carrier of hybrid warfare; 3) the basic elements and levels of the UK security management in conducting hybrid warfare were determined, and 4) bearing in mind that organizational changes happened relatively recently the efficiency of the Fusion Doctrine is yet to be seen.

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