

Protiv obrazovne hijerarhije: putuj, pouči, pokori

Aleksandar Ostojić¹

Ekonomski fakultet u Subotici, Univerzitet u Novom Sadu, Srbija

Predrag Krstić

Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Srbija

Iguman Sanja

Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Srbija

Apstrakt

Oslonjeni pre svega na analize i sugestije Ransijera i Levi-Strosa, autori rada nastoje da izlože kritiku hijerarhijski vrednovanih orijentira putovanja i obrazovanja. Prvi deo rada posvećen je zapadnim putnicima i njihovom „civilizatorskom“ odnosu prema drugim, dotad nepoznatim, predelima i narodima. Drugim delom rada ustanovljava se analogni obrazac i kada je reč o odnosu koji se uspostavlja u obrazovnom procesu, u kojem takođe novo i nepoznato valja savladati, osvojiti i pokoriti neupitnim znanjem. U zaključku se sugerše mogućnost dekonstrukcije predefinisnog poretka civilizacije i/ili znanja, ne bi li se najavila mogućnost afirmisanja razlike, bez dominacije i učenja, bez jednoznačnog objašnjenja; mogućnost koja bi možda mogla da se ostvari s odstupanjem od iluzije o univerzalnoj merodavnosti Znanja i njegovog posednika.

Ključne reči: obrazovanje, putovanje, hijerarhija, znanje, objašnjenje.

Uvod

Možda je svako putovanje obrazovno putovanje: u svakom se, hteli – ne hteli, s nečim novim susreće i nešto novo se može naučiti. I možda je svako obrazovanje svojevrsno putovanje: od neznanja do znanja ili „od neznačajke izvesnosti do inteligentne konfuzije“ (Felder & Brent, 2004: 270). Ali mimo ove trivijalne ili metaforičke zamjeničnosti, postoji jedno zajedničko svojstvo – ili bolje, držanje – koje povezuje putovanje i obrazovanje, makar onako kako ga shvata kultura kojoj pripadamo: oba su iskušenja i iskušavanja, oba su ispitivanja (isledivanja) i oba podrazumevaju hijerarhiju. Na njenom vrhu je znanje i onaj koji zna, i utoliko viši ukoliko više zna, a na dnu je ono suprotno, u podjednakoj srazmeri.

U oba slučaja se ide nečim nepoznatom ili još-ne-poznatom koje se upoznaje. I u oba slučaja pristup toj figuri drugosti, na mestu „nestabilnosti“ gde se susreće „periferni“

¹ aleksandar.ostojic@ef.uns.ac.rs

Drugi, po pravilu je konkistadorski: proterivanje ili podvođenje pod stabilno i odveć poznato jezgro uvek istog vlastitog centra (Lotman, 2005). Jednom je to „divljak“, a drugi put „neznalica“ – zapravo saobrazne slike koje legitimišu onaj, po binarnoj opoziciji suprotstavljeni, lik civilizatora-znalca, nosioca nadmoćne racionalnosti koji proniče i p(r)okazuje prvog. S takvim samorazumevanjem (Taylor, 2013) i s takvim misionarskim ovlašćenjem zapadni putnik je putovao ili pohodio, saznavao ili osvajao nove teritorije i nove „duše“.

Kada je o obrazovnoj dimenziji reč, prosvetni pogon odašilje „neznalicu“, ekvivalent, a prečesto i drugo ime za „divljaka“, na put – koji je iskusni učitelj već prešao. Rukovođeni njegovim poznavanjem ciljanog odredišta i „objašnjenjima“ koja privode njemu, oni, od njega drugi, dospeće tamo gde je on, smestiti se unutar poretka u koji je i on smešten i čiji je agent, i konačno postati deo istorije „istog“ (Fuko, 1971: 68). Pritom se podrazumeva da je svaka nepoznanica, svaka različitost za vođu obrazovno-istraživačkog puta samo privremena i da će je potčiniti poredak koji svemu i svima suvereno diktira sliku sveta i smisla obitavanja u njemu.

Pogled putnika

Cvetan Todorov (Tzvetan Todorov) istrajni kritičar zapadne i svake etnocentričke gordosti i svakog hijerarhizovanja kultura, na osnovu empirijske analize književnih svedočanstava ponudio je „portrete tipova putnika“, nepretenciozno priznajući da spisak koji broji čak deset različitih vrsta putnika nije ni iscrpan, ni metodski uzoran, niti takav da jedna vrsta putovanja u jednom trenutku isključuje preduzimanje drugih u drugom (Todorov, 2008). Ali kakav-takav princip deobe koji odgovara njegovim interesovanjima – kapacitet putnika za novo, njegov „odnos prema bliskosti i sapostojanju“ (Todorov, 1994: 328) – inostruktivan je i za temu ovog članka.

Prvi lik u ovoj podeli je „asimilator“: „Asimilator je onaj koji bi hteo da izmeni druge kako bi oni ličili na njega“; on veruje u jedinstvo ljudskog roda, ali tuđe odlike tumači kao nedostatke u odnosu na vlastiti ideal. Asimilator se tako ispostavlja kao zastupnik univerzalnog hijerarhijskog poretka, unutar kojeg se njegova kultura nalazi na vrhu. Njegova, nekada uzorna slika – slika je hrišćanskog misionara „koji hoće druge da preobrati u svoju veru“ (neretko i mačem). Takav konkretan oblik religijskog mesijanizma možda danas i jeste redak, ali Todorov s pravom uočava njegove nove, u savremenosti zastupljenije oblike – na lokalnom nivou kao talas asimilacije onih manje moćnih ili manje zastupljenih, a na svetskom kao novi kolonijalizam koji „izvozi revolucije“ (Todorov, 1994: 328-329).

Sledeći putnik je „asimilovani“. Najčešći njegov vid je imigrant: „onaj koji obavlja putovanje samo u odlasku“. Nasuprot „asimilatoru“ koji ide drugima da bi ih upodobio sebi, asimilovani bi da postane kao drugi kod kojih odlazi: da ih do kraja upozna, živi među njima i da ga prihvate kao svog. On nije gastarbajter koji je negde drugde na određeno vreme, niukoliko se ne odričući svoje kulture, već onaj koji bi da se poistoveti s drugima, da postane „kao oni“, da bude asimilovan – pa i po cenu (ili je to možda već unapred odigrani preduslov) prihvatanja etnocentričkog izopačenja lokalnog stereotipa (Todorov, 1994: 331-332).

U otporu da se plati takva cena nastupa „egzot“. On je „stranac“ koji ne prihvata tuđe navike, tuđe konvencije koje tuđini smatraju prirodnim; on ih uočava ali im se ne potči-

njava; on neprestano poredi postupke drugih zemalja sa normama svoje zemlje; on tako uočava mane drugih kojih oni koji su ih naturalizovali nisu svesni. Njegova nevolja je što, ukoliko bi da ostane takav, neprestano mora da živi u krhkoj ravnoteži i da pomno prati promene na osetljivoj vagi na kojoj obitava: „između iznenađenosti i prisnosti, distanciranja i identifikacije“. Ukoliko ne poznaje dovoljno druge, egzot ih ne razume, a ukoliko ih predobro poznaje, više ih ne vidi onim privilegovanim okom „spolja“ (Todorov, 1994: 332).

„Izgnanik“ je pak sličan egzotu utoliko što izbegava asimilaciju, a imigrantu utoliko što nastanjuje zemlju koja nije njegova. Od egzota ga, opet, razlikuje nezainteresovanost za narod u čijoj sredini živi. Naprotiv: „To je čovek koji svoj život u inostranstvu tumači kao doživljaj nepripadanja sredini i koji tu sredinu upravo zbog toga voli. Izgnanika interesuje njegov život, pa čak i njegov vlastiti narod; ali on je shvatio da je upravo po taj interes bolje da živi u inostranstvu, tamo gde ne ‘pripada’; on više nije privremeno, već definitivno stranac.“ (Todorov, 1994: 332). Dekart (René Descartes) u Holandiji, Volter (Voltaire) u Švajcarskoj, Džojks (James Joyce) i Beket (Samuel Beckett), Garsija Marques (Gabriel García Márquez) i Ginter Gras (Günter Grass) u Parizu, a među njima i drugima možda i sam Cvetan Todorov, svima njima tek stranstvovanje, izabrano, omogućava udobno stvaranje „nacionalnih“ ostvarenja. Oni su srećni zbog života u tuđini – upravo zato što to njihovo hotimično izgnaništvo ne samo da odbija čvršće veze sa drugima među kojima žive, nego se već unapred osujećuje za „otkriće drugih“ (Todorov, 1994: 333).

Poslednji od pet tipova putnika koji se u ovom prilogu izdvajaju, a uz asimilatora možda i najupečatljiviji, jeste „alegorista“, koji na drugi način iskorišćava druge. On govori o stranom narodu, ali s malo ili nimalo brige za njega, već ne bi li oboružan njegovim iskustvom raspravljao o problemima vlastite kulture. Od Monteskejevih (Montesquieu) *Persijskih pisama* i Didroovog (Denis Diderot) *Dodatka Bugenvilovom putovanju*, izmaštanih putopisa koji se i danas čitaju kao pionirske, duhovite i poučne packe umišljanju Evropljana da su norme njihove kulture uopšte opravdane ili poželjne, a naročito da se mogu smatrati merodavnim za druge (Monteskje, 2004; Stanley, 2009), pa sve do opčinjenog projektovanja nade iz sredine dvadesetog veka u Treći svet, ponavlja se figura „primitivističkog alegorizma“: drugi se zapravo ne posmatraju, ili posmatranje ne služi da bi se istinski spoznao Drugi, već da bi slika drugog služila kao iskrivljeno ogledalo, čime se „izokreću“ uočene osobenosti sopstvene zemlje ili društva kome se nedvosmisleno i jedino i dalje pripada (Todorov, 1994: 333-334).

Savest putnika

Drugo i drugi su hronični problem u svim formama kolonijalnog diskursa, kao i diskursa koji bi da odstupa od njega. Kada je o prvom reč, putopisi su odigrali možda presudnu ulogu i, u svakom slučaju, (p)ostali svedočanstvo imperijalizma evrocentričkog znanja i saznavanja. U devetnaestom veku oni su se razvijali uporedo s projektima prirodne istorije, a njihovom formalizacijom „postignuto je stvaranje mreže kolonijalnih i metropolitiskih prostora“ (Gregory, 1998: 82). Nema nikakve sumnje da je posredi bila, fukoovski rečeno, proizvodnja znanja, čije su tvrdnje zavisile od rada „na terenu“.

Sami novootkriveni, novoupoznati ili novoosvojeni prostori su iznova definisani ili redefinisani: „široko otvoreni prostori prirode“ kojima se hodilo u otkrivanju novog sveta

bili su, međutim, neodvojivi od proizvodnje zatvorenih prostora kao što su botaničke bašte, muzeji ili zoološki vrtovi. Kroćenje i pripitomljavanje nepoznatog moralo je da sačeka sistematski određenu, što će reći precizno omeđenu, i sa sigurnošću prezentovanu formu znanja, zaokruženog, bezbednog i pouzdanog znanja. Ono nije neposredno proizlazilo iz iskustva prelaska i upoznavanja terena, već tek iz naknadne perspektive udaljenog posmatrača, kojem je omogućen panoramski pogled na prirodu, na novi, drugačiji ili divlji svet, koji se mogao konstruisati kao zatvoren prostor, rezervat ili egzotični isečak različitog, i postati dostupan za prikazivanje evropskoj javnosti (Outram, 1996).

Ali ni istorija drugačijeg, antikolonijalnog (puto)pisanja nije zanemarljiva. Najkasnije od romantičara (Molnar i Molnar, 2013: 363-364), pa preko Fojerbaha (Fojerbah, 1956), sve do savremenog anarhoprimitivizma (videti, na primer, Zerzan, 2005), nižu se ukazivanja na krivo skretanje zapadne tehnonaučne racionalnosti i njenih političkih produžetaka, na neophodnost drugačijeg mišljenja. Vilijam Vordsvort (Wordsworth, 1974) i Kolridž (Coleridge, 2004) se otiskuju u spekulacije o tome „kako seljaci misle“, otvarajući vek i po ranije savremenu debatu o (ne)mogućnosti „primitivne“ ili „divlje“ misli (Levi-Stros, 1978; Lévy-Bruhl, 1954; Lévy-Bruhl, 1966; McLane, 2000: 46–50; Sahlins, 1995). Na to pitanje Vordsvort, poput kasnije Levi-Strosa (Claude Lévy-Strauss), implicitno odgovara afirmativno (Wordsworth, 1974: 125; uporediti Levi-Stros, 1978: 318; Levi-Stros, 2009: 19–20). Kolridž, baš kao i Sartr (Jean-Paul Sartre) vek i po posle njega (Vattimo, 2012), u najboljem slučaju nudi jedno uslovno „da“: seljaci misle, ali ne kao bolji deo društva – svakako ne kao sveštenici, filozofi i književnici, kojima je suđeno da obezbede „najbolje delove jezika“ za poeziju (Coleridge, 2004).

Posle romantičara, i savremeni kulturni relativizam ustaje protiv prosvetiteljske promocije *hijerarhijski strukturiranog pojma „civilizacije“*, koji je poslužio da se u svesti Zapada sopstveni položaj vidi kao model, vlastite navike kao univerzalne sposobnosti, sopstvene vrednosti kao apsolutni kriterijum suđenja, a zapadnjaci sami kao gazdujući posednici svekolike prirode (Schulze, 2008). S teorijskom pripremom, s epistemološkom logistikom kriptonormativnih, diskriminatornih, „linearno-progresivističkih“ pojmova, mogla je da počne i stvarna kolonizacija svega različitog, svega što odstupa i što se smešta na niži rang razvoja (Lévy-Strauss, 1989: 161, 310–311, 316–317).

Od te spekulativne neukosti, ispostavlja se, leči etnologija, uvidom da ta neukost nije ništa drugo do „slepo odbijanje onoga što nije naše“, da varvarstvo nije opozit civilizaciji, nego je, skupa s civilizacijom, smišljeni konstrukt, kao i da celu konstrukciju valja demontirati informišući one koji druge krste varvarima da je varvarin pre svega čovek koji veruje u varvarstvo (Lévi-Strauss, 1988: 303). Danas je važno, naprotiv, ne uništiti, sačuvati, zaštititi „tužne trope“, i šire: zainteresovati se za „analizu i tumačenje razlika“ među društvima (uporediti Levi-Stros, 1978: 313–315; Lévy-Strauss, 1988: 299–306; Levi-Stros, 1999: 292). Te razlike su danas ugrožene, stara se da ukaže Levi-Stros, a ne jedinstvo vrste koje savremena sredstva saobraćaja i masovni mediji ionako čine gotovo neizbežnim. I on sa zebnjom zamišlja „vreme kad će na planeti postojati samo jedna kultura i civilizacija“ (Levi-Stros, 2009: 23).

Zla savest Okcidenta, dakle, progovorila je u dvadesetom veku različitim glasovima, ali njihova društvena dimenzija ponavljaće staru tezu, samo izričitiije i ubojitije: sva

društva moraju biti tretirana kao podjednako vredna, ali ne i jednaka, već naprotiv, upravo različita i neuporediva. Svaki drugačiji pristup je put u naivnu ali rasprostranjenu besmislicu pretpostavljanja superiornosti jednog od njih, ili u manje naivno zanemarivanje razlika za volju neuverljivog bratstva svih ljudi (Levi-Stros, 1999: 302; Lévy-Strauss, 1988: 302–304).

Delimična podrška nastojanjima Levi-Strosa da ublaži rane zapadne saznanje i geografske konkviste, pridoći će kasnije s (ne)očekivane strane. U predavanju „O humanističkim naukama i filozofskoj disciplini“, podjednako kao nekada Levi-Stros obraćajući se Unesku, Žak Derida (Jacques Derrida) pronalazi implicitnu filozofiju u tekstovima međunarodnih ustanova koje se zasnivaju na idejama ljudskih prava i međunarodnog prava. Čitanje Kantove „Ideje opšte istorije“ (Kant, 1968) je pritom prilika da se detektuje teleološka pretpostavka Evrope kao cilja univerzalne istorije koji prožima modernu do duboko u savremene diskurse. Međunarodne ustanove se suočavaju s istim problemom evrocentrizma, a Deridi je ovde ponajviše stalo do onog kosmopolitiskog „prava na filozofiju“ koje bi sada valjalo misliti mimo njenog „grčko-evropskog porekla i sećanja“, kao i mimo pukog suprotstavljanja njemu (Derrida, 1994: 14).

Filozofija izlazi iz dugoveke i zamorne alternative evrocentrizma i protivevrocentrizma, prema Deridi, a za razliku nadalje od Levi-Strosa, izgleda ne samo da može pronaći nego ga i vlastitim savremenim statusom nudi. Budući da „više nije određena programom, izvornim jezikom ili govorom“, budući da su već i njeni koreni sumnjivi, „bastardni, hibridni, kalemljeni, multiliniarni i poliglotski“, tako shvaćena, ona već (po)stoji s one strane „kolonijalne ili neokolonijalne dijalektike prisvajanja i otuđivanja“ i predstavlja, „ako postoji takva stvar, taj drugi put“ (Derrida, 1994: 15)

Deridin prigovor Levi-Strosu, ali i Rusou (Jean-Jacques Rousseau), Vordsvortu, Kolridžu i čitavoj tradiciji prirodnjačko-primitivističke korekture civilizacije, Todorov bi rekao „alegoristima“, sastoji se u uvidu da takva nastojanja da se spere krivica zapadne kulture moraju da okončaju u nekritičkoj fetišizaciji drugog pola, u umišljanjima nekakve bezazlene prirode Drugog, ispunjene nepatvorenom lepotom i dobrotom. Ako se odmakne od tog krivog ili naopakog ogleдалa zapadnog protivetnocentrizma (Dos, 2019: 47-48), međutim, razotkriće se da je direktno predavanje navodno neobeščaćenoj prirodi podjednako teleološki i eshatološki inficirano kao i osvajačko nahrupljivanje u nju: u oba slučaja sanja se „san o punom i neposrednom prisustvu koje zatvara povijest“ (Derrida, 1976: 154).

Pogled učenog

Učenje uvek uvodi u neki poredak, bilo da je reč o poretku znanja, društva ili „civilizacije“, pri čemu su oni prečesto uvezani. Poredak znanja možda čak uvek prethodi ostalim hijerarhizacijama, objašnjava ih, opravdava i/ili ozakonjuje. Međutim ako poslušamo Ransijera (Jacques Rancière), učenje, kao i objašnjavanje, nije ili ne bi trebalo da bude ništa drugo nego *obećanje razumevanja*, razumevanja koje naknadno dolazi, ali za koje ne postoji nikakav garant da je konačno, a samim tim ni jedino legitimno ili ispravno. Svako razumevanje ili objašnjenje koje sebe uzima za konačno nije ništa drugo nego simulacija:

simulacija poretka. Učenje, da bi uopšte bilo učenje, mora moći da promaši, da *ne ispuni obećanje* – to je rizik koji dopušta učenju da se odvija. U suprotnom, učenje bi se pretvorilo u faktički iskaz, u reprodukciju i repetitivnu jednih istih činjenica, što bi značilo da se ništa *novo* nikada ne bi dogodilo, ništa novo se ne bi nikada (na)učilo. A ukoliko ne bi bilo mogućnosti drugačijeg odgovora, obrazovanje bi prestalo da bude obrazovanje i postalo ekonomija ili – možda pre, rečima Deride – tehnologija:

Kada je putanja jasna i data, kada određeno znanje unapred otvara put, odluka je već doneta, podjednako bi se moglo reći da nema odluke koja bi se tek donela; neodgovorno, a čiste savesti, jednostavno se primenjuje ili implementira program. [...] To od delanja čini jednostavnu primenu znanja ili veština. To od etike i politike čini tehnologiju. (Derrida, 1992: 41, 45)

Obrazovanje koje nije i neizvesno lutanje ne može da izbegne udes da je, iznad svega i pre svih emancipatorskih stremljenja, *kontrola, hijerarhizacija i uspostavljanje* ili *očuvanje* određenog *dominantnog* poretka. Svako obrazovanje koje pretpostavlja određeno nastoji da *potčini*. Ransijer nije sam u ovom zaključku. Fuko (Foucault, 1983) će pre njega detektovati razgranatu mrežu hijerarhija u akademskom pogonu: fakulteti, kao i sve druge institucije, prožeti su odnosima moći, nastojanjima da se – uvek zarad kontrole, zarad pribavljanja autonomije za sebe i potčinjavanja dugih – nametne jedna istina, jedan diskurs, jedno znanje ili jednostavno interes jedne grupe. Ali njih, uvek istovremeno, prožima i reakcija, otpor takvim nastojanjima, neka protiv-moć koja onda upotpunjava nestabilnu kompoziciju visokoškolske ustanove (Foucault, 1983).

Ni na nižim nivoima organizovanog masovnog obrazovanja stvar ne stoji bolje. Ne samo ucene ocena i ispita, nego već sama „organizacija prostora“ u osnovnim školama klasifikuje učenike i „funkcioniše kao mehanizam pogodan za učenje, ali i za nadzor, hijerarhizaciju, nagrađivanje“ (Fuko, 1997: 196). Na tom tragu i usredsređeniji na prenos znanja, i Delez (Gilles Deleuze) će primetiti:

Govor nije načinjen da mu se veruje, već da mu se potčini. Kada učiteljica objašnjava deci neku računsku operaciju, ili kada ih poučava sintaksi, ona im ne daje informacije u pravom smislu reči, već im saopštava zapovesti, prenosi im parole, navodi ih da proizvode tačne iskaze, „prave“ ideje koje su nužno usklađene s dominantnim značenjem. (Delez i Parne, 2009: 34)

Klod Levi-Stros (Claude Lévi-Strauss) putuje u džunglu Amazona, u pleme *Nambikvara*, koje ne poseduje pisani jezik, niti se koristi crtežima, izuzev nekoliko tačaka ili krivulja koje ponekad, retko, iscrtaju štapom na zemlji (Levi-Stros, 1999: 234). Nambikvarama su dati papiri i olovke bez namere da se odmah „poduče“ *veštini* pisanja. Isprva, niko se neće latiti olovaka i papira, ali već nakon par dana, svi u selu pokušavaće da pišu, tačnije da imitiraju pokrete koje su videli da Levi-Stros pravi. Pošto ovim „učenjem po modelu“ Nambikvare ne mogu naučiti zaista da pišu, već samo da „imitiraju pisanje“, Levi-Stros održava prvu pravu lekciju pisanja, svojevrsni nagovor na pisanje, ukazivanjem na važnost pismenosti, s neskrivenom argumentacijom ili motivacijom da od nepismenih domorodaca valja načiniti građane. „Svako se mora osposobiti da čita, tako

da vlast (s pravom) može da kaže: Nepoznavanje zakona nije opravdanje“ (Levi-Stros, 1999: 238).

Ovo učenje-putovanje sa predvidivim završetkom, jedno među mnogima, prekida, međutim, jedan neočekivani *dogadaj*. Poglavica plemena okuplja pleme, traži od Levi-Strosa tablu za pisanje i, nakon što napravi nekoliko krivudavih linija oponašajući pisanje, daje Levi-Strosu tablu da *pročita*. Predstavi ni tu nije kraj: ubrzo zatim poglavica uzima Levi-Strosove spise i počinje da ih *objašnjava* ostatku plemena, „pišući“ nakon toga svoj „odgovor“ (Levi-Stros, 1999: 234-235). Suvišno je reći da je posredi *simulacija razumevanja*: poglavica se pravi da razume šta Levi-Stros piše, isto kao što se *pravi* da njegove krive linije poseduju smisao koji bi Levi-Strosu trebalo da bude transparentan. Da stvar bude upečatljivija, „navodni smisao“ koji poglavica interpretira članovima svog plemena ticao se *robne razmene* između plemena i „belog čoveka“ (Levi-Strosa) – dakle *simulacija razumevanja* i *objašnjavanja* za svoj predmet imala je *ekonomiju*, nesumnjivo zato što će robna razmena biti doživljena kao nešto što će neposredno uticati na život plemena.

Naum ove predstave bio je pre svega da zadivi, da ostatak plemena dodatno podredi poglavici. Ransijerovski formulišući, koristeći *pisani jezik*, simulirajući *razumevanje*, te služeći se *objašnjenjem*, poglavica zapravo koristi *obrazovni diskurs* da potvrdi i opravda svoju hijerarhijsku poziciju. On je neko ko za razliku od drugih „brže uči“ i „bolje razumeva“, pa je stoga i opravdano da mu se drugi potčinjavaju. I tako je prvi susret „nevinog“ plemena Nambikvare sa pisanim jezikom afirmisao njegovu potčinjavalačku funkciju. Levi-Stros to još oštrije eksplicira:

Ako je moja pretpostavka tačna, treba priznati da je osnovna funkcija pisane komunikacije olakšavanje porobljavanja. Upotreba pisma za bezinteresne ciljeve, za postizanje intelektualnih i estetskih zadovoljstava sekundarni je rezultat, čak i ako pretpostavimo da se ona najčešće ne svodi na sredstvo podupiranja, opravdavanja ili prikrivanja njegove osnovne upotrebe... Tako se borba protiv nepismenosti stapa sa većom kontrolom vlasti nad njenim građanima. (Levi-Stros, 1999: 237-238)

Čini se da je ovakav zaključak suprotan opštem uverenju da se treba obrazovati (steći znanje, naučiti čitati i tako dalje) kako bi se izbegla podređenost, manipulacija ili kontrola onih na pozicijama moći. Premda isprva tako može delovati, teško da je reč o suprotnosti. Jednosmerna hijerarhija obrazovanja o kojoj govori Ransijer ili potčinjavalački aspekt pisanja i govora koji simuliraju razumevanje, kako navodi Levi-Stros, poručuju da se legitimacija hijerarhije uvodi istovremeno s dominantnim obrazovnim diskursom. Drugim rečima, unutar diskursa „obrazujte se da ne biste bili kontrolisani“, hijerarhija koja je bazirana na znanju i do koje se dolazi putem obrazovanja već je uvedena – njom su pripadnici zajednice već obuhvaćeni, bez obzira da li su „unutar“ ili „izvan“ dominantnog obrazovnog poretka. Takav poredak je u prisnom saglasju sa fiksnim pozicijama, predodređenim putevima, odgovorima i odredištima unutar obrazovnog procesa. Dominacija obrazovnog, kao i svakog drugog poretka počiva na njegovoj stabilnosti, na zaprečavanju mogućnosti da se on relativizuje. Obrazovanjem se društveni poredak reprodukuje, a obrazovni – samoreprodukuje.

Savest učitelja

Takav obrazovni nastup ili takva p(a)raobrazovna strategija zapravo društvenog potčinjavanja, u tom smislu subjektivacije i kontrole, čini se stabilnom istorijskom i transkulturalnom konstantom koja – utoliko možda i više ukoliko se izdaje za trajnu i nužnu – inspiriše osporavanja i potragu za alternativom. U *Učitelju neznanici* Ransijer (Rancière, 2010) pripoveda o jednoj „intelektualnoj avanturi“ koja će u svoj vrtlog uvući i nadalje voditi prvo profesora Žana Žakotoa i njegove studente, a zatim i mnoge druge. Naime, priča teče tako da je, predajući u Luvenu francuski jezik, a ne govoreći flamanski kojim su se studenti služili, Žakoto studentima (za)dao zadatak da čitaju dvojezično izdanje Fenelonovog (François Fénelon) didaktičkog romana *Avanture Telemaha. Odisejevog sina*, da bi potom, sugerišući da se oslanjaju na prevod, tražio od njih da napišu esej o njemu, ali na francuskom jeziku – koji studenti dakle nisu govorili.

Rezultati ovog „slučajnog“ eksperimenta daleko su prevazišli Žakotoova očekivanja: studenti su uspjeli da u dobroj meri ovladaju francuskim jezikom, a ono što je iznenađujuće i što predstavlja još jednu tačku u kojoj Ransijerova, Žakotoova ili naša avantura počinje jeste da su to uspjeli da urade *sami*, to jest, bez bilo kakvog *objašnjenja* učitelja, koje bi tom procesu učenja prethodilo. Na osnovu ovog *događaja*, proširujući ispitivanje mogućnosti učenja bez objašnjenja, Ransijer izvodi tezu koja predstavlja jednu od glavnih okosnica njegovog dela:

Treba preokrenuti logiku sustava objašnjavanja. Nije nužno objašnjenje da bi se otklonila nesposobnost razumijevanja. Upravo suprotno, ta nesposobnost je fikcija koja strukturira objašnjavalačko poimanje svijeta. Objasnjavatelj treba nesposobnog, a ne obrnuto, i on je taj koji nesposobnost uspostavlja kao takvu. Nekomu nešto objasniti ponajprije znači pokazati da taj netko to ne može sam shvatiti. Prije nego postane pedagoški čin, objašnjenje je pedagoški mit, priča o svijetu podijeljenom na učene i neuke duhove, zrele i nezrele duhove, one koji su sposobni i nesposobni, inteligentni i glupi. Podvala koja obilježuje onoga koji objašnjava sastoji se od dvostruke početne geste. S jedne strane, on proglašava apsolutni početak: tek sada počinje čin učenja. S druge, na sve stvari koje treba naučiti on baca veo neznanja preuzimajući na sebe zadatak da ga skine. (Rancière, 2010: 15)

Objašnjenje je pedagoška pretpostavka, tvrdiće Ransijer. Učitelj (iz priče), istina, traži od učenika da nauče, ali im ništa ne objašnjava, ponavljajući ovaj postupak, te dokazujući da učenici mogu da uče sami. Tim gestom se narušava postojeća hijerarhija znanja. Proces obrazovanja kao putovanja postupnim i sigurnom rukom profesora vođenim saznavanjem do obaveznog *odredišta* nije ni bio moguć, zato što Žakoto nije bio u stanju da prenese to odredište na one koji uče. Kasnije on „podučava“ tako da ni on sam ne zna gde je odredište ka kom put učenja treba da vodi, niti kako tačno doći do njega. Učitelj tako uči – putuje, luta – zajedno sa učenicima. Pošto Ransijer izbegava bilo kakav čvrst poredak znanja, emancipacija polaznika se kod njega javlja isključivo kao *samoemancipacija* – postupak koji, za razliku od Rusoovog (i mnogih drugih) pristupa, ne primorava učenike da budu slobodni, već čini da se oslobode sami (Snir, 2020: 149).

Ali, ako je odredište i u jednom i u drugom slučaju sloboda, ako učitelji uputi ne vode nikud drugde nego do istog onog cilja do kojeg su studenti i sami došli, u tom slučaju, koja je razlika između samooslobođenja i oslobođenja? Nije li daleko smislenije sistemski sprovoditi „oslobađanje“? Zašto bismo navodili učenike da sami dođu do znanja, kada je jednostavnije (i efikasnije) saopštiti ga i od učenika zahtevati da nauče? Žakotoovi učenici možda jesu stekli određeno znanje, ali ko kaže da im to znanje ne bi brže prenela profesorka francuskog koja govori flamanski?

Rekonstrukcija Ransijerove argumentacije u prilog neobjašnjavalačkom pristupu kome daje prednost mogla bi teći na sledeći način: budući da svaki sistem podrazumeva unutrašnju hijerarhiju, a samim tim i određenu vrstu *kontrole*, znanje i/ili sloboda koji treba da proiziđu iz obrazovnog putovanja ne pripadaju nikakvom pretpostavljenom sistemu znanja. *Objašnjenje* je agent sistema: ono nije tu da spase zalutalog putnika, već pre svega da uspostavi sistem kontrole, ne više samo obrazovne, nego i znatno šire, društvene ili političke. Itaj Snir (Itay Snir) s pravom ukazuje da Ransijerova knjiga, iako govori o univerzitetskom profesoru, nipošto nije knjiga samo o obrazovanju, već delo koje, ističući sputavajuće ili zaglupljujuće principe objašnjavalačkog diskursa, rasvetljava logiku na kojoj je zasnovan čitav društveno-politički poredak (Snir, 2020: 150).

Znamo da objašnjenje zapravo nije tek oružje zatupljivanja u rukama pedagoga, nego sama sprega društvenog poretka. A poredak podrazumijeva podjelu položaja. Podjela položaja pretpostavlja objašnjenja, fikciju koja raspodjeljuje i opravdava, fikciju nejednakosti koja nema drugog razloga svog postojanja. (Rancière, 2010: 142)

Zaključak koji otključava

Ketrin Malabu (Catherine Malabou) će iscrtati direktnu vezu Levi-Strosovog i Ransijerovog rada. Priča prvog započinje višestrukim lutanjem. Levi-Stros luta, slučajni eksperiment je lutanje; lutaju i Nambikvare u svom „učenu“. Međutim, lutanje se (pre)usmerava jednim neočekivanim događajem koji objavljuje zaplet: poglavica uspeva da „dode“ do „svrhe“ pisanja – ne naučivši da piše. Ovaj *događaj* omogućuje mu da preokrene kurs: „poglavica obrće svoju situaciju neznanja – on ne zna da piše – da bi iz nje izvukao najveću moguću korist“. Ali ta inverzija, rođena u slučaju, postaje događaj koji potvrđuje naopakost principa: ono što se čini tek mogućom posledicom pisanja (*pozicije znanja*), ispostaviće se njegovom „primarnom funkcijom“ (Malabou & Derrida, 2004: 66).

Priča iz džungle tako nas vraća Ransijeru: funkcija *objašnjenja* prethodi njegovom značenju, ona ga određuje. Drugačije rečeno, svako moguće značenje objašnjenja uslovljeno je njegovom funkcijom. Obrt koji vrši poglavica je nesumnjivo plod iskrivljenja prvobitne namere, zanošenja s planiranog puta, izvođenje iz navođene trajektorije, ali je on, s druge strane gledano, i jedna dosledno „izvedena katastrofa“ (Malabou & Derrida, 2004: 66), jedno transparentno ili transparentnije uvođenje protiv-poretka – plemenskog, recipro, naspram građanskog – u kome takođe više nema lutanja, u kome prestaje putovanje van poznatih predela i na scenu stupa uvek domicilna ekonomija.

Ali, najzad, ukoliko su govor ili pisanje osmišljeni da bi (im) se potčinilo, kako drugačije razumeti i proceniti i pokušaj analize ili govora o tome? Nije li svako objašnjenje – pa i ono koje objašnjava nužni i nužno zločudan afinitet objašnjenja i podjarmljivanja – u racionalizovanu oblandu metakritike uvijeno uspostavljanje iste one hijerarhije između onoga koji zna i onoga koji ne zna? – Delezov odgovor na ta pitanja, koja osudi hijerarhije i standardizacije znanja vraćaju milo za drago, mišljenju obrazovanja preporučuju nešto naizgled manje od statusa kojim je ono sebi laskalo, ali možda ono najteže: odstupanje od metapozicije povlašćenog epistemičkog i pos(r)edničkog subjekta, udaljavanje od preduzetničkog manira takođe (Delez, 2010: 254), skretanje od svakog dominantnog značenja – napuštanje, ukratko, svake „funkcije“ koja određuje kurs i uskraćuje ili redukuje druge mogućnosti.

Ali, i ako se prihvati takva zanosna preorijentacija, pretiče ono manje načelno, konkretnije pitanje: može li se u obrazovanom procesu napraviti jasna razlika između *objašnjavanja* koje nastoji da potkopa hijerarhiju i polaznike izbavi od nje, i *objašnjenja* koje bi da ih uputi u nju i ojača je? – Ako ima istine u Freireovom (Paulo Freire) zapažanju da „oni koji obespravljaju, ugnjetavaju i iskorištavaju jer imaju moć, ne mogu u toj moći naći snagu za oslobođenje ni obespravljenih ni sebe“, pa da ih, skupa sa sobom, moraju osloboditi obespravljeni (Freire, 2002: 28), onda bi protivotrov dominaciji u obrazovanju, po analogiji koja ne pretpostavlja društvenu revoluciju, već nešto možda mnogo više ili svakako dublje, mogao ili morao da se potraži ne kod nosioca ovog ili onog oslobađanja (za novo tlačenje, novi poredak), već u oslobađanju samog „objašnjenja“, u oslobađanju od njega, u preokretu kojim samo obrazovanje prethodi svojoj funkciji, te se tako stalno iznova uspostavlja, u onoj *samoemancipaciji* kojoj ne treba s visine intoniran nalog šta emancipacija obrazovanjem treba da bude i za/zbog čega se sprovi.

Uostalom, takva sugestija i ne mora da se vidi kao naročita novost. Već je Gete (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) znao ono na čemu će mnogo kasnije insistirati čitava *Selbstbiludng* tradicija, tradicija koja je zagovarala da je svako obrazovanje – ukoliko se u njemu zaista obrazuje – samoobrazovanje (Baykan, 2013). Gete naime primećuje da nemački jezik (kao zaista među retkima i srpski) „s pravom koristi reč obrazovanje kako za ono što je nastalo, tako i za proces nastanka“ (uporediti Gadamer, 1986: 16-18; Dobrijević i Krstić 2013; Krstić, 2021: 91). Ta dvoznačnost omogućava pomeranje akcenta s društvenog preduzeća na obrazovanje kao „stvar pojedinca, svesno oblikovanje sopstvenog života i preuzimanje kontrole nad njim“, a „tajni izvor snage unutar čoveka samog“ sada se – osamostaljen – suprotstavlja *svim* spoljnim uticajima (Assmann, 2014: 328). Uho naviklo na diktat kolektivnih ciljeva i ličnih „ostvarenja“ u njegovom ključu, onda kao i sada to može čuti kao skandalozno zastupništvo. Ono to i jeste. Ono naime jedino, a da to jedino uopšte nije malo, hoće da sugeriše kako bi možda bilo uputno glagole povezane s obrazovanjem učiniti trajnim i misliti ih kao trajne radnje: radije ostvarivanje, nego definisano ili ka (s)pokoju definitivnosti kretanje ostvarenja, radije oblikovanje nego oblikovanost i radije obrazovanje nego obrazovanost, nego iluzija uobražene izobraženosti.

Literatura

- Asmann, A. (2014). *The long shadow of the past: Memorial culture and historical politics*. New Literary Overview.
- Baykan, A. (2013). Critique of Education: Educator in the Work of Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe Named Faust I. *Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 70, 1880-1890. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.01.266>.
- Coleridge, S. T. (2004). *Biographia Literaria*. Project Gutenberg. <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/6081/6081-h/6081-h.htm>
- Delez, Ž. i Parne, K. (2009). *Dijalozi*. Fedon.
- Delez, Ž. (2010). *Pregovori (1972-1990)*. Karpos.
- Derrida, J. (1976). *O gramatologiji*. Veselin Masleša.
- Derrida, J. (1992). *The Other Heading. Reflections on Today's Europe*. Indiana University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1994). Of the Humanities and the Philosophical Discipline. The Right to Philosophy from the Cosmopolitical Point of View (the Example of an International Institution. *Surfaces*, 4, 5–21.
- Dobrijević, A., & Krstić, P. (2013). Self-Education and University. *Synthesis Philosophica* 55–56 (1–2), 83–96.
- Dos, F. (2019). *Istorija strukturalizma 2. Napolje sa znakom*. Karpos.
- Felder, M. R., & Brent, R. (2004). The intellectual development of science and engineering students. Part 1. Models and Challenges. *Journal of Engineering Education*, 93(4), 269-277.
- Foerbah, L. (1956). *Principi filozofije budućnosti*. Kultura.
- Foucault, M. (1983). The Subject and Power. In H. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow (Eds.), *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (pp. 208 - 226). University of Chicago Press.
- Fuko, M. (1971). *Riječi i stvari*. Nolit.
- Fuko, M. (1997). *Nadzirati i kažnjavati*. Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića.
- Freire, P. (2002). *Pedagogija obespravljenih*. Odraz.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1986). *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*. Mohr Siebeck.
- Gregory, D. (1998). Power, Knowledge and Geography. The Hettner Lecture in Human Geography. *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 86(2), 70–93.
- Kant, I. (1968 [1784]). *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, Kants gesammelten Schriften, Tom 8. Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Krstić, P. (2021). Rekvijem za Humbolta: Bildung i Zeitgeist. *Theoria*, 64(1), 91-111.
- Levi-Stros, K. (1978). *Divlja misao*. Nolit.
- Levi-Stros, K. (1999). *Tužni tropi*. Zeptr Book World.
- Levi-Stros, K. (2009). *Mit i značenje*. Službeni glasnik.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1954). *Primitivni mentalitet*. Kultura.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1966). *How Natives Think*. Washington Square Press.
- Lévy-Strauss, C. (1988). *Strukturalna antropologija*, tom II. Školska knjiga.
- Lévy-Strauss, C. (1989). *Strukturalna antropologija*. Stvarnost.
- Lotman, Y. M. (2005). On the semiosphere. *Σημειωτική – Sign Systems Studies*, 33(1), 205-229.

- Malabou, C., & Derrida, J. (2004). *Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida*. Stanford University Press.
- McLane, M. (2000). *Romanticism & the Human Sciences: Poetry, Population & the Discourse of the Species*. Cambridge University Press.
- Molnar, J. D. i Molnar, A. (2013). Lutalački etos i duh romantike - razmatranja na tragu sociologije Maksa Vebera. *Sociološki pregled*, 48(3), 355-372. <https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg1303355J>
- Monteskje, Š. (2004). *Persijska pisma*. Utopija.
- Outram, D. (1996). New spaces in natural history. In N. Jardine, J.A. Secord, & E.C. Spary (Eds), *Cultures of natural history* (pp. 249-265). Cambridge University Press.
- Rancière, J. (2010). *Učitelj neznanica. Pet lekcija iz intelektualne emancipacije*. Multimedijalni institut.
- Sahlins, M. (1995). *How „Natives“ Think, About Captain Cook for Example*. University of Chicago Press.
- Snir, I. (2020). *Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière*. Springer.
- Schulze, G. (2008). *Die Sünde. Das schöne Leben und seine Feinde*. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag.
- Stanley, S. A. (2009). Unraveling Natural Utopia: Diderot's Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville. *Political Theory*, 37(2), 266-289. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591708329648>
- Taylor, C. (2013, July 3). Charls Teylor Lecture: Master Narratives of Modernity [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m95ck7A2Ooc>
- Todorov, C. (1994). *Mi i drugi: francuska misao o ljudskoj raznolikosti*. Biblioteka XX vek.
- Todorov, T. (2008). *La peur des barbares. Au-dela du choc des civilisation*. Robert Laffont.
- Vattimo, G. (2012). Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought. In G. Vattimo, & P. A. Rovatti (Eds.), *Weak Thought* (pp. 39-53). Sunny Press.
- Wordsworth, W. (1974 [1799]). Essay on Morals. In W. J. B. Owen, & J. Smyser (Eds.), *The Prose Works of William Wordsworth* (pp. 122 – 129). Clarendon.
- Zerzan, J. (2005). *Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections*. Feral House.

Примљено: 26.04. 2023.

Прихваћено за штампу: 20. 06. 2023.

Against the Educational Hierarchy: Travel, Teach, Subdue

Aleksandar Ostojić¹

Faculty of Economics in Subotica, University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia

Predrag Krstić

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Iguman Sanja

Institute for Philosophy and Social Theory, University of Belgrade, Belgrade, Serbia

Abstract

Relying primarily on the analyses and suggestions by Rancière and Lévi-Strauss, the authors of this paper endeavour to present a critique of the hierarchically valued landmarks of travelling and education. The first part of the paper is dedicated to Western travellers and their 'civilising' treatment of other landscapes and peoples, previously unknown. The second part of the paper identifies an analogous pattern when it comes to relationship established in the educational process, where the new and the unknown also have to be mastered, conquered, and subdued by unquestionable knowledge. The conclusion suggests the possibility of deconstructing the predefined system of civilisation and/or knowledge, with a view to creating the possibility for the affirmation of differences without domination, as well as learning without an unambiguous explanation, a possibility that may perhaps materialise with the abandoning of the illusion about the universal authority of Knowledge and its possessor.

Keywords: education, travelling, hierarchy, knowledge, explanation.

Introduction

Perhaps, every travel is an educational travel: in any one of them, whether wanted or not, one encounters something new, and something new can be learned. And, perhaps, every education is a travel of its own kind: from ignorance to knowledge or "from ignorant certainty to intelligent confusion" (Felder & Brent 2004, p. 270). However, apart from this trivial or metaphorical substitutability, there is a common feature – or better yet: an approach – that associates travelling with learning, at least in the manner the latter has been understood by the culture to which we belong: both of them are temptations, both are examinations (investigations) and both imply a hierarchy. At the top of it is knowledge

¹ aleksandar.ostojic@ef.uns.ac.rs

and the one who knows, all the more so, the greater the knowledge he possesses, while at the bottom is the opposite, in an equal proportion.

In both cases, one proceeds towards something unknown, or something that is still-not-known, and is being studied. In both cases, the approach to that figure of 'otherness', at a place of 'instability' where the encounter with the 'peripheral' Other takes place, is, as a rule, conquistadorial: exiling or subjugation to the stable and already familiar core of the always same own centre (Lotman, 2005). On one occasion, it is a 'savage', and on another, an "ignorant" – in fact, corresponding images that provide legitimacy to the image opposed to them pursuant to binary opposition – that of the civiliser-the knowledgeable, the holder of the supreme rationality, who perceives, points to, and denounces the former one. It is with such self-understanding (see Taylor Center, 2013) and such missionary authority that the Western traveller has travelled or visited, gained knowledge of, or conquered new territories and new "souls".

In reference to the educational dimension, the educational machinery sends an "ignorant person", the equivalent of, and far too often also another name for, "savage", on a trip – that an experienced teacher has already traversed. Guided by his knowledge of the targeted destination and by the "explanations" leading to it, those, who are other in relation to him, will arrive there where he is, settling within the system where he has also been accommodated and where he is acting as its agent, and they will ultimately become part of the history of the "same" (Foucault, 1971, p. 68). In this process, it is implied that each unknown, each diversity, is only temporary for the leader of the education-research travel, and that it will be subordinated by the order that sovereignly dictates its picture of the world for everyone, as well as the meaning of living in it.

The View of the Traveller

Tzvetan Todorov, a relentless critic of Western and any other ethno-centric vanity, and any kind of hierarchisation of culture (Todorov, 2008), has presented "portraits of the different types of travellers", based on an empirical analysis of literary testimony, admitting unpretentiously that the list, comprising as many as ten different kinds of travellers, is neither exhaustive, nor methodologically representative, or such that one kind of travel at one point in time excludes undertaking any other travel at any another time. However, no matter what kind of principle of classification suits his interests – the capacity of the traveller for the new, his "relationship towards closeness and co-existence" (Todorov, 1994, p. 328) – it is also instructive for the topic of this article.

The first character in this cast is the "assimilator": the "assimilator is the one who would like to change others to resemble him": the assimilator believes in the unity of humankind, however, he interprets the features of others as flaws in relation to his own ideal. Thus, the assimilator manifests himself as a representative of the universal hierarchical system, where his culture stands at the top. His, once exemplary, image is also the image of a Christian missionary "who wants to convert others to his creed" (often also by the use of sword). Such a concrete form of religious messianism may be rare nowadays, however, Todorov rightfully perceives its new, contemporary forms – at the local level, as a tide of

assimilation of those who are less powerful or represented, and on the global plane, as new colonialism which “exports revolutions” (Todorov, 1994, pp. 328-239).

The next traveller is “the assimilated one”. His most frequent form is the immigrant: ‘the one who completes his travel by just departing’. As opposed to the “assimilator” who goes to the others in order to make them resemble himself, the assimilated one would like to become like the others he is going to: to get fully acquainted with them, to live among them, and to have them accept him as one of them. The assimilated one is not a *Gastarbeiter* who stays somewhere else for a certain period of time, without repudiating his own culture, but rather, the one who would like to identify with others, to become “like” them, to be assimilated – even at the cost of accepting (this might be a prerequisite accepted in advance?) the ethno-centric distortion of the local stereotype (Todorov, 1994, pp. 331-332).

Resistance to paying such a price creates the “exotic”. The exotic is an “alien” who does not accept the customs of others, or foreign conventions that foreigners consider natural; the exotic takes note of them, however, without subordinating himself to them; he constantly compares the procedures in other countries to the norms in his own; thus, the exotic observes the flaws in others, that those who have naturalised them are not aware of. His trouble is in the fact that if he wants to remain like that, he must constantly live under a frail balance, carefully keeping an eye on the changes on the sensitive scales on which he lives: “between being surprised, having a close relationship, being distanced, or accepting identification”. If he is not sufficiently familiar with others, the exotic does not understand them, and if he knows them too well, he no longer views them with that privileged eye that watches from “the outside” (Todorov, 1994, p. 332).

The “exile”, on the other hand, is similar to the exotic inasmuch as he avoids assimilation, while being similar to the immigrant because he dwells in a country which is not his own. He is distinct from an exotic in his being uninterested in the people among whom he lives. He is quite the opposite: “This is an individual who interprets his life abroad as an experience of not belonging to the given environment, and who likes that environment exactly for that reason. The exile is interested in his own life, and even in his own people; however, he has come to realise that it is exactly for the benefit of this interest that it is better for him to live abroad, there, where he does not “belong”; he is no longer temporarily an alien, but rather, definitely an alien” (Todorov, 1994, p. 332). For René Descartes in the Netherlands, Voltaire in Switzerland, James Joyce and Samuel Beckett, Gabriel García Márquez and Günter Grass in Paris, including, perhaps, also Tzvetan Todorov, himself, among the above named and many others, living as aliens by their own choice, enables them to comfortably create ‘national’ accomplishments. They are happy to live abroad - exactly for the reason that their intentional exile not only rejects any stronger relations with the others among whom they live, but also hinders such relations for the purpose of “discovering others” (Todorov, 1994, p. 333).

The last of the five types of travellers to be singled out in this contribution, one who may be the most impressive apart from the assimilator, is the “allegorist”, who exploits Others in a different manner. He talks about a foreign people, however, with little or no concern about them, his aim being to discuss the problems of his own culture,

while being armed with their experience. Starting with Montesquieu's *Persian Letters* and Denis Diderot's *A Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville*, fictional travelogues that have been read even nowadays as pioneering, witty, and edifying slaps to the presumptuousness of the Europeans to believe that the norms of their culture are justified and even desirable, and particularly that they are to be considered applicable to others (Montesquieu, 2004; Stanley, 2009), on to the mesmerised projecting of hope on the Third World, in the mid-20th century, the figure of "primitivist allegorism" keeps perpetuating itself: others are, actually, not observed, or rather, observation does not serve for really getting to know the Other, but for using the image of the other as a crooked mirror, "perverting" the observed features of one's own country or society to which one unequivocally only and still belongs (Todorov, 1994, pp. 333-334).

The Conscience of the Traveller

Otherness and others are a chronic problem in all the forms of colonial discourse, as well as in the discourse that would like to deflect from it. In reference to the former, travelogues may have played a decisive role, and in any case, they have become and have remained, a testimony to the imperialism of Eurocentric knowledge and learning. In the 19th century, they developed parallel to the projects of natural history, while their formalisation "was achieved through the production of a network of colonial and metropolitan spaces" (Gregory, 1998, p. 82). It was, no doubt, about what Foucauldians would call the production of knowledge, this time acquired through "field work".

The newly discovered, newly perceived, or newly conquered spaces, themselves, were defined or redefined anew: "the wide open spaces of nature" that had been travelled in discovering the new world were, however, inseparable from the production of enclosed spaces, such as botanical gardens, museums, or zoos. The taming and breaking in of the unknown had to wait for a systematically defined, i.e. precisely limited form of knowledge presented with certainty, a knowledge that was to be rounded off, safe, and reliable. That knowledge did not emerge directly from the experience of traversing the field and getting acquainted with it, but rather, from the subsequent perspective of a distant onlooker, who was provided with the possibility of having a panoramic view of nature, of a new, different, or wild world, that lent itself to being designed as an enclosed space, a reserve, or an exotic clip of the different, becoming available for presentation to the European public (Outram, 1996).

However, the history of a different kind, the history of anticolonial (travel) writing, is not negligible either. Starting at the latest with the Romanticist (Jeremić Molnar & Molnar, 2013, pp. 363-364), and extending on to Feuerbach (Foerbah, 1956) and the contemporary anarchoprimitivism (see, e.g., Zerzan, 2005), one can trace numerous instances of pointing to the wrong turn taken by the Western techno-scientific rationality and its political extensions, including highlighting the need for a different thought. William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor Coleridge dealt with speculations about "the thought of peasantry", opening a debate that had been current a century and a half earlier, about the (im)possibility of "primitive" or "savage" thought (Lévy-Bruhl, 1954; Lévy-Bruhl, 1966;

Sahlins, 1995; Lévi-Strauss, 1978; McLane, 2000, pp. 46-50). Wordsworth, just like Claude Lévi-Strauss somewhat later, replies in an implicitly affirmative sense (Wordsworth 1974, p. 125; compare to Lévi-Strauss 1978, p. 318; Lévi-Strauss 2009, pp. 19–20). Coleridge, just like Jean-Paul Sartre, a century and a half after him (Vattimo, 2012), offers, at best, a conditional “yes”: peasants think, but not like the better part of the society – certainly not like priests, philosophers, and men of letters, who are destined to provide “the best parts of the language” for poetry (Coleridge, 2004).

Following the Romanticists, modern cultural relativism was also to rise against the Enlightenment-based promotion of the *hierarchically structured concept of “civilisation”*, which contributed to the Western mind’s perception of its own position as that of a model, with its own customs being universal abilities, and its own values an absolute criterion of judgement, while we, ourselves, are the controlling owners of entire nature (Schulze, 2008). The theoretical preparation, the epistemological logistics of cryptonormative, discriminatory, “linear-progressivist” terms, paved the way for the actual colonisation of everything that was different, of anything that deviated and was attributed a lower development rank (compare Lévi-Strauss, 1989, pp. 161; 310-311; 316-317).

It turns out that such speculative ignorance can be cured by ethnology, by providing the insight that such ignorance is nothing but “blind rejection of what is not ours”, that barbarianism is not the opposite of civilisation but rather, a construct contrived together with civilisation, and that the whole structure should be dismantled, informing the ones who brand others as barbarians, that a barbarian is first the one who believes in barbarianism (Lévi-Strauss, 1988, p. 303). Conversely, today, it is important not to destroy, and to preserve and protect the “sad tropics”, and more broadly: being interested in the “analysis and interpretation of differences” among the societies (compare Lévi-Strauss 1978, pp. 313-315; Lévi-Strauss, 1988, pp. 299-306; Lévi-Strauss, 1999, p. 292). It is such differences that have been jeopardised today, Lévi-Strauss insists on pointing out, rather than the unity of the species, which has become almost inevitable owing to modern communication means and mass media. It is also with misgivings that he contemplates “the time when only one culture and one civilisation will exist on the planet” (Lévi-Strauss, 2009, p. 23).

The evil conscience of the Occident, therefore, was given expression in the 20th century in different voices, however, their social dimension was to reiterate the old thesis, this time, notably, in a more explicit and devastating manner: all societies must be treated as equally valuable, however, not equal, but rather the opposite, different and incomparable. Any other approach is a path to the naive, but widespread, nonsense of presupposing the superiority of one of them, or, to the less naive neglecting of differences for the sake of an unconvincing brotherhood of all the people (Lévi-Strauss, 1988, pp. 302-304; Lévi-Strauss 1999, p. 302).

A partial support for Lévi-Strauss’s endeavours to soothe the wounds of the Western cognitive and geographic *conquistas*, was to come later from an (un)expected side. In his lecture *Of the Humanities and the Philosophical Discipline*, just like formerly Lévi-Strauss in his address to UNESCO, Derrida (Jacques Derrida) finds an implicit philosophy in the texts of international institutions founded on the ideas of human rights and international law.

In reference to this, reading Kant's *Idea for a Universal History with a cosmopolitan purpose* (Kant 1968) is an opportunity for detecting the teleological assumption that Europe is the goal of universal history, which pervades the modernity, reaching right to the depths of contemporary discourses. International institutions are faced with the same problem of Eurocentrism, and what Derrida cares about the most in this context is that cosmopolitan "right to philosophy" which is now to be considered without its "Greco-European origins and memory", as well as without being merely opposed to it (Derrida, 1994, p. 14).

According to Derrida, as opposed to Lévi-Strauss as evidenced further on, apparently, philosophy not only seems to be able find its way out of its long-standing and exhausting alternative between Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism, but it offers it with its own, contemporary status. In view of the fact that it is "no longer determined by a program, an originary language or tongue", considering that its roots have become dubitable, "bastard, hybrid, grafted, multilinear and polyglot", being perceived in this manner, it already stands and exists on the other side of the "colonial or neo-colonial dialectic of appropriation and alienation", representing, "if there is any such thing, the *other way*" (Derrida, 1994, p. 15).

Derrida's objection to Lévi-Strauss, as well as to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Wordsworth, Coleridge and the entire tradition of the naturalist-primitivist correction of civilisation, Todorov would say here, to the "allegorists", consists of his insight that such attempts to wash away the guilt of the Western culture are bound to end in a non-critical fetishisation of the other pole, in fantasising about some kind of benign nature of Otherness, filled with unadulterated beauty and goodness. However, moving away from that awry mirror of Western anti-Eurocentrism (see Dos, 2019, pp. 47-48), reveals that direct surrender to that allegedly undisgraced nature is teleologically and eschatologically infected, as much as the invasive breaking into it: both cases involve "the dream of a full and immediate presence which closes history" (Derrida, 1976, p. 154).

The View of the Learned

Learning always leads to a certain order, whether an order of knowledge, society, or "civilisation", these being intertwined far too often. The order of knowledge may even always precede the other hierarchisations, explaining them, justifying them and/or legitimizes them. However, if we listen to Rancière (Jacques Rancière), learning, just like explaining, is not, and should not be, anything other than a *promise of understanding*, understanding that comes subsequently, however, that has no warranty of being final, and therefore, neither the only legitimate nor correct. The understanding or explanation that considers itself final is nothing but a simulation: a simulation of the system. In order for learning to be learning at all, it must be able to miss, to *fail to fulfil a promise* - this is the risk that allows learning to evolve. Otherwise, learning would be turned into a factual statement, into a reproduction and repetition of the one and the same facts, meaning that nothing *new* would ever take place, nothing new would ever be learned. And if there were no possibilities for a different answer, education would cease to be education, and it would become economy or – rather, as Derrida would put it – technology:

“When the path is clear and given, when a certain knowledge opens up the way in advance, the decision is already made, it might as well be said, there is none to make: irresponsibly, and in good conscience, one simply applies or implements a programme. [...] It makes of action a simple application of know-how. It makes of ethics and politics a technology” (Derrida, 1992, pp. 41, 45).

Education which is not, at the same time, an uncertain blundering, cannot avoid the mishap of being, above all and before any emancipating aspirations, *control, hierarchisation* and *establishing or preservation* of a certain *dominant* order. Education that presupposes a destination strives for *subordinating*. Rancière is not alone in this conclusion. Foucault (Michel Foucault) was to detect the branching network of hierarchies in the academic machinery before him: faculties, just like any other institution, are pervaded by the relations of power and endeavouring – always for the purpose of gaining control, winning autonomy for oneself, and subordinating others – to impose a single truth, a single discourse, a single knowledge, or simply, the interest of one group. However, they are, concurrently, always permeated also by reaction and resistance to such aspirations, by a certain kind of counter-power which then completes the unstable composition of the higher education institution (Foucault, 1983).

Things are no better at the lower levels of organised mass education, either. It is not only the blackmail of marks and examinations, but also the very “organisation of the space” in elementary schools that classifies students and provides for their “functioning like a mechanism conducive for learning, however, also for supervision, hierarchisation, and rewarding” (Foucault, 1997, p. 196). Proceeding along the same lines, but focusing more closely on the conveying of knowledge, Deleuze (Gilles Deleuze) was also to observe:

“Oration is made not to be believed, but to be obeyed. When a teacher explains an arithmetic operation to the children, or when she teaches them syntax, she does not give them information in the proper sense of the word, but rather, gives them orders, conveys slogans to them, prompts them to produce the exact statements, ‘the right’ ideas which are necessarily attuned to the dominant meaning” (Deleuze & Parne, 2009, p. 34).

Claude Lévi-Strauss travelled to the jungles of the Amazon, to the *Nambikwara* tribe, who do not have a written language, nor do they use drawings, except for several dots or curves they occasionally, or very seldom, draw on the ground by means of a stick (Lévi-Strauss, 1999, p. 234). The Nambikwara were given paper and pencils without the intention of immediately “teaching” them writing *skills*. At first, no one would take a piece of paper or a pencil, however, already a few days later, everyone in the village was trying to write, more precisely, to imitate the gestures they saw Lévi-Strauss make. Since this “model learning” could not help the Nambikwara learn how to write for real, but only how to “imitate writing”, Lévi-Strauss delivered the first real writing lesson, a specific attempt to persuade them to learn how to write, by pointing to the importance of literacy, with unconcealed argument or motivation for turning the illiterate natives into citizens.

“Everyone has to learn how to read, so the authorities can [rightly] say: Being ignorant about the law is not an excuse” (Lévi-Strauss, 1999, p. 238).

However, this learning-travel with a foreseeable end, one among many, was interrupted by an unexpected *event*. The chieftain of the tribe assembled the tribe, asking Lévi-Strauss to give him a writing board and, having drawn several meandering lines imitating writing, he asked Lévi-Strauss to *read* from the board. This was not the end of the event: shortly after, the chieftain took Lévi-Strauss’s papers and started *explaining them* to the rest of the tribe, after which he “wrote” his “reply” (Lévi-Strauss, 1999, pp. 234-235). Needless to say that this was a *simulation of understanding*: the chieftain pretended to understand what Lévi-Strauss had written down, as much as he *feigned* that his convoluted lines made sense that should be transparent to Lévi-Strauss. To make matter even more striking, the “alleged sense” interpreted by the chieftain for his tribesmen had to do with *commodity exchange* between the tribe and the “white man” (Lévi-Strauss) – therefore, the subject of the *simulation of understanding* and *explanation* was *economy*, undoubtedly because commodity exchange was to be experienced as something that would have a direct impact on the life of the tribe.

The intent underlying this spectacle was, primarily, to impress and subordinate the rest of the tribe to the chieftain even more. Formulating it in a Rancièrian fashion, one could say that, by using *written language*, as well as *simulating understanding*, and using *explanations*, the chieftain actually uses the *educational discourse* to confirm and justify his hierarchical position. As opposed to others, he is someone who “learns faster” and “understands better”, and therefore, it is justified for others to be subordinated to him. And thus, the first encounter of the “innocent” Nambikwara tribe with written language reaffirmed its subordinating function. Lévi-Strauss expresses this in even more starkly:

“If my assumption is right, it must be recognised that the basic function of written communications is to facilitate conquest. Using writing for purposes not involving interest, for achieving intellectual and aesthetic pleasures, is a secondary result, even if we assume that most often it cannot be reduced down to an instrument of support, justification, or concealing of its basic use [...]. Thus, struggle against illiteracy blends with a greater control of the citizens by the Government” (Lévi-Strauss, 1999, pp. 237-238).

Apparently, such a conclusion is contrary to the general belief about the need to be educated (acquire knowledge, learn how to read, and so on), in order to avoid subordination, manipulation, or control by those who hold positions of power. Even though this may seem to be the case, at first instance, it is hardly a matter of opposites. The unidirectional hierarchy of education discussed by Rancière, or the subduing aspects of writing and speech which simulate understanding, as stated by Lévi-Strauss, indicates that the legitimation of hierarchy is introduced parallel to the dominant educational discourse. In other words, the discourse “educate yourselves so you can avoid being controlled”, already enshrines the hierarchy based on knowledge and attained by education – that hierarchy already encompasses the members of the community, irrespective of whether they are “inside or outside” the dominant educational order. Such order is in close harmony with fixed positions, predetermined paths, answers, and destinations within the educational

process. The domination of the educational order, just like any other order, rests on its stability, on hindering the possibility for its relativisation. It is through education that the social order reproduces, while the educational order – self-reproduces.

The Teacher's Conscience.

Such an educational performance, or such an (para)educational strategy of social subjugation in the sense of subjectivation and control, appears to be a stable historical and transcultural constant which – perhaps even more so if it is presented as permanent and necessary – inspires challenges and the search for an alternative. In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, Rancière recounts the story of an “intellectual adventure” which was to draw into its whirlpool and guide further on, first of all, Professor Joseph Jacotot and his students, and then, many others. Namely, the story goes that Jacotot, who taught the French language in Leuven, without having any knowledge of Flemish, which was the language used by his students, gave the students the assignment to read a bilingual edition of Fénelon's (François Fénelon) didactic novel *The Adventures of Telemachus, Odysseus' son*, after which he asked them to write an essay about the character, suggesting that they rely on the translation, however, to write it in French – which the students did not speak.

The results of this “accidental” experiment greatly exceeded Jacotot's expectations: the students managed to master the French language to a substantial degree. However, what was surprising, as well as being another reason for Rancière's, Jacotot's, as well as our speculations, was that they managed to do that on *their own*, i.e. without any teacher's *explanation* before that process. On the basis of this *event*, extending his research to include the possibilities for learning without explanations, Rancière came up with a thesis that represents one of the major pivots of his work:

“The logic of the explanatory system has to be reversed. Explanation is not indispensable to tackle the inability to understand. Exactly the opposite, that inability is a fiction that structures the explanatory understanding of the world. The explainer needs the unable, not vice versa, and he is the one who establishes inability as such. Explaining something to someone means, above all, to show that he or her cannot understand on their own. Before it becomes a pedagogical act, explanation is a pedagogical myth, a story about the world divided into the learned and the ignorant spirits, the mature and the immature spirits, those who are able and those who are unable, the intelligent or the stupid. Deception which characterises the explainer consists of a twofold initial act. On the one hand, the explainer declares the absolute beginning: the act of learning starts only now. On the other, he pulls down the veil of ignorance on all the things that have to be learned, assuming the task of lifting the veil himself” (Rancière, 2010, p. 15).

Explanation is a pedagogical presumption, argues Rancière. True, the teacher (in the story) asks the students to learn, without giving them any explanation, and after repeating the procedure, he proves that the students can learn on their own. This act disrupts

the existing hierarchy of knowledge. After all, the process of education, as a travel involving gradual learning, guided to the mandatory *destination* by the certain hand of the professor, was not possible, because Jacotot was not able to transfer that destination onto the learners. Later on, he “teaches” in such a manner that he, himself, does not know what is the destination that the learning is supposed to lead to, nor how to reach it exactly. This is how the teacher teaches – travelling, wandering – together with the students. Since Rancière avoids each and every defined system of knowledge, the emancipation of his students evolves exclusively as *self-emancipation* – a procedure which, unlike Rousseau’s approach (and that of many others), does not force students to be free, but rather, makes them liberate themselves on their own (Snir, 2020, p. 149).

However, if the destination in both cases is freedom, if the teacher’s instructions do not lead anywhere other than the goal that the students have reached on their own, in that case, what is the difference between self-liberation and liberation? Is it not far more reasonable to implement “liberation” through a system? Why induce students to acquire knowledge on their own, when it is simpler (and more efficient) to impart knowledge and ask the student to learn it? Jacotot’s students may have acquired a certain knowledge, but, can anyone claim that this knowledge would not be conveyed to them faster by a French teacher who speaks Flemish?

A reconstruction of Rancière’s argumentation in support of the non-explanatory approach to which it gives priority, could run as follows: since every system implies an internal hierarchy, and therefore, also a certain kind of *control*, the knowledge and/or freedom, which are supposed to ensue from the educational journey, do not belong to any presupposed system of knowledge. *Explanation* is an agent of the system: it is not there to rescue the blundering traveller, but rather, to establish a system of control, not only an educational one, but also a much broader, social, or political one. Itay Snir rightly argues that Rancière’s book, even though it speaks about a university professor, is, by no means, a book about education alone, but a work which, highlighting the hindering or dumbing down principles of the explanatory discourse, sheds light on the logic underlying the entire social-political order (Snir, 2020, p. 150).

“We know that explanation is, in fact, not only a weapon for dumbing down in the hands of the pedagogue, but the very nexus of the social order. And the order implies a distribution of positions. Distribution of positions implies explanations, a fiction that distributes and justifies, a fiction of inequality which has no other reason for its existence” (Rancière, 2010, p. 142).

Unconcluding Conclusion

Catherine Malabou was to outline the direct association between Lévi-Strauss’s and Rancière’s work. The story of the former commenced with repeated wandering. Lévi-Strauss wanders, his accidental experiment is in wandering; The Nambikwara also wander in their “learning”. However, the wandering is re-directed by an unexpected event that is about to bring ruin to the established order – *a catastrophe*: “The chief reverses his situation of ignorance – he doesn’t know how to write – in order to extract from it

the best possible advantage. He pretends to know how to write in order to oppress and deceive the other members of the tribe. This *accidental inversion* – by chance, thanks to a concurrence of circumstances or an *event*, the absence of knowledge produces an excess of power – confirms an inversion of principle. What seems to be merely the effect of writing (subjugation) in fact reveals itself as the “primary function of written communication” (Malabou & Derrida, 2004, p. 66).

Thus, the story from the jungle brings us back to Rancière: the function of an *explanation* precedes its meaning, determining it. In other words, any potential meaning of the explanation is conditional upon its function. The turnaround made by the chieftain is, undoubtedly, the result of a distortion of the original intention and swaying from the path planned, an ejection from the guided trajectory, however, on the other hand, it is a consistently “derived catastrophe” (Malabou & Derrida, 2004, p. 66), a transparent, or rather a more transparent, introduction of a (counter-)order – a tribal order, as it were, as opposed to the urban one – where wandering has also ceased, and travelling outside the familiar scenery has come to an end, while the scene has been taken over by the ever domiciled economy.

However, ultimately, if oration or writing have been designed to be obeyed, can an attempt to analyse or discuss this be understood or assessed otherwise? Is not every explanation – and even the one that explains the necessary and the necessarily malicious affinity of explanation with subjugation – the establishment of that very same hierarchy between the one who knows and the ignorant, wrapped in the rationalised gown of metacriticism? – Deleuze’s answer to these questions that retaliate against the condemnation of the hierarchy and standardisation of knowledge, recommends to the reflection of education something apparently lesser than the status it flattered itself with, however something that may be the most difficult to do: withdrawal from the metaposition of a privileged epistemic, mediating, and possessory subject, as well as distancing from the entrepreneurial manner (Deleuze, 2010, p. 254), and deviating from any dominant meaning – briefly, abandoning any “function” that determines the course, denying or reducing other possibilities.

However, even if such a captivating re-orientation is accepted, the less principal and concrete question remains: can a clear distinction be made in the education process between the *explanation* which tends to undermine the hierarchy and redeem the students from it, or the *explanation* which aims to introduce them to it and reinforce it? - If there is any truth in Freire’s (Paulo Freire) observation that “The oppressors, who oppress, exploit, and rape by virtue of their power, cannot find in this power the strength to liberate either the oppressed or themselves”, and that the subjugated are the ones who have to free them together with themselves (Freire, 2005, p. 44), then, the antidote to domination in education, by analogy which does not presuppose a social revolution, but something, perhaps, far more sophisticated, and certainly more profound, could or should be sought not with the holder of this or that liberation (for a new subjugation, a new order), but in the liberation of the “explanation” itself, in the liberation from the very explanation, in a overturn where education itself precedes its function, thus being constantly re-established, in the *self-contained self-emancipation* which does not need

an instruction intoned from above regarding what emancipation by education should be and the reason why it is being implemented.

After all, a suggestion of this kind need not be considered a particular novelty. Already Goethe (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe) knew that every education – if it really educate – is self-education (Baykan, 2013); a view that was to be insisted on later by the entire *Selbstbildung* tradition, a tradition which advocated this position. Namely, Goethe argued that the German language (just like Serbian, among the few), “rightly uses the word education [*Bildung*] to denote both what has been created, and the process of creation” (compare Gadamer, 1986, pp. 16-18; Dobrijević & Krstić, 2013; Krstić, 2021, p. 91). This ambiguity makes it possible to shift the emphasis from the social enterprise to education as “a matter of the individual, the conscious formation of one’s own life and assuming control over it”, while the “secret source of strength within man, himself”, now that it has become independent – faces up to *all* external impacts (Assmann, 2014, p. 328). The ear, accustomed to the dictate of collective goals and personal “accomplishments” keeping them in mind, now just like then, may hear this as scandalous advocacy. This is what it is, after all. Namely, what it would like to suggest, and the suggestion is not minor at all, is that, perhaps, it would be advisable to put the verbs associated with education into their continuous form, perceiving them as continuous actions: therefore, accomplishing, rather than a defined accomplishment, or one that leads to the stillness and finality of definitiveness”; forming, rather than formation, and educating, rather than education, or the illusion of supercilious educatedness.

Literature

- Assman, A. (2014). The long shadow of the past: Memorial culture and historical politics. *New Literary Overview*.
- Baykan, A. (2013). Critique of Education: Educator in the Work of Johann Wolfgang Von Goethe Named Faust I. *Procedia – Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 70, 1880-1890. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2013.01.266>
- Coleridge, S. T. (2004). *Biographia Literaria*. Project Gutenberg. <http://www.gutenberg.org/files/6081/6081-h/6081-h.htm>
- Delez, Ž. & Kler, P. (2009). *Dijalozi*. Fedon.
- Delez, Ž. (2010). *Pregovori (1972-1990)*. Karpos.
- Derrida, J. (1976). *O gramatologiji*. Veselin Masleša.
- Derrida, J. (1992). *The Other Heading. Reflections on Today's Europe*. Indiana University Press.
- Derrida, J. (1994). Of the Humanities and the Philosophical Discipline. The Right to Philosophy from the Cosmopolitical Point of View (the Example of an International Institution). *Surfaces*, 4, 5–21. <https://doi.org/10.7202/1064974ar>
- Dobrijević, A., & Krstić, P. (2013). Self-Education and University. *Synthesis Philosophica*, 28(1-2), 83-96.
- Dos, F. (2019). *Istorija strukturalizma 2. Napolje sa znakom*. Karpos.

- Felder, R. M., & Brent, R. (2004). The intellectual development of science and engineering students. Part 1. Models and Challenges. *Journal of Engineering Education*, 93(4), 269-277. <https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2168-9830.2004.tb00816.x>
- Foerjebah, L. (1956). *Principi filozofije budućnosti*. Kultura.
- Foucault, M. (1983). The Subject and Power. In H. L. Dreyfus, & P. Rabinow (Eds.). *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (pp. 208-226). University of Chicago Press.
- Fuko, M. (1971). *Riječi i stvari*. Nolit.
- Fuko, M. (1997). *Nadzirati i kažnjavati*. Izdavačka knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića.
- Freire, P. (2005). *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Continuum.
- Gadamer, H. G. (1986). *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Vol 1). Mohr Siebeck.
- Gregory, D. (1998). Power, Knowledge and Geography. The Hettner Lecture in Human Geography. *Geographische Zeitschrift*, 86(2), 70-93.
- Kant, I. (1968 [1784]). Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht. *Kants gesammelten Schriften*, tom 8 (pp. 17–31). Walter de Gruyter & Co.
- Krstić, P. (2021). Rekvijem za Humbolta: Bildung i Zeitgeist. *Theoria*, 64(1), 91-111.
- Levi-Stros, K. (1978). *Divlja misao*. Nolit.
- Levi-Stros, K. (1999). *Tužni tropi*. Zepter Book World.
- Levi-Stros, K. (2009). *Mit i značenje*. Službeni glasnik.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1954). *Primitivni mentalitet*. Kultura.
- Lévy-Bruhl, L. (1966). *How Natives Think*. Washington Square Press.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1988). *Strukturalna antropologija*, tom II. Školska knjiga.
- Lévi-Strauss, C. (1989). *Strukturalna antropologija*. Stvarnost.
- Lotman, Y. M. (2005). On the Semiosphere. *Σημειωτική – Sign Systems Studies*, 33(1), 205-229.
- Malabou, C., & Derrida, J. (2004). *Counterpath: Traveling with Jacques Derrida*. Stanford University Press.
- McLane, M. (2000). *Romanticism & The Human Sciences: Poetry, Population & the Discourse of the Species*. Cambridge University Press.
- Jeremić Molnar, D., & Molnar, A. (2013). Lutalački etos i duh romantike – razmatranja na tragu sociologije Maksa Vebera. *Sociološki pregled*, 48(3), 355-372. <https://doi.org/10.5937/socpreg1303355J>
- Monteskje, Š. (2004). *Persijska pisma*. Utopija.
- Outram, D. (1996). New Spaces in Natural History. In N. Jardine, J.A. Secord, & E.C. Spary (Eds.), *Cultures of Natural History* (pp. 249-265). Cambridge University Press.
- Rancière, J. (2010). *Učitelj neznanica. Pet lekcija iz intelektualne emancipacije*. Multimedijalni institut.
- Sahlins, M. (1995). *How "Natives" Think: About Captain Cook for Example*. University of Chicago Press.
- Schulze, G. (2006). *Die Sünde. Das schöne Leben und seine Feinde*. Hanser.
- Snir, I. (2020). *Education and Thinking in Continental Philosophy: Thinking against the Current in Adorno, Arendt, Deleuze, Derrida and Rancière*. Springer.
- Stanley, S. A. (2009). Unraveling Natural Utopia: Diderot's Supplement to the Voyage of Bougainville. *Political Theory*, 37(2), 266-289. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0090591708329648>

- Taylor Center (2013, July 3). *Charles Taylor Lecture: Master Narratives of Modernity* [Video]. YouTube. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m95ck7A2Ooc>
- Todorov, C. (1994). *Mi i drugi: francuska misao o ljudskoj raznolikosti*. Biblioteka XX vek.
- Todorov, T (2008). *La peur des barbares. Au-dela du choc des civilisation*. Robert Laffont.
- Vattimo, G. (2012). Dialectics, Difference, Weak Thought. In G. Vattimo, & P.A. Rovatti (Eds.), *Weak Thought* (pp. 39-52). State University of New York.
- Wordsworth, W. (1974 [1799]). Essay on Morals. In W. J. B. Owen, & J. Smyser (Eds.), *The Prose Works of William Wordsworth*, tom 1 (122-129). Clarendon Press.
- Zerzan, J. (2005). *Against Civilization: Readings and Reflections*. Feral House.

Article submitted: 26. 04. 2023.
Accepted for publishing: 20. 06. 2023.