This article summarizes relevant literature in critical border studies and explores how contemporary changes in border policing and management affect the nature of the contemporary state and sovereignty. It asks: If it is not clear where exactly borders are, how does this impact our understanding of state sovereignty? How is the deterritorialization of borders challenging our understanding of territorial sovereignty? How is outsourcing “legitimate means of violence” to non-state actors on borders reshaping the state’s authority? In dominant political and public discourse, borders are seen as a common and defining feature of modern statehood. The modern nation-state political theology has invested the monopoly of governance over borders exclusively to the state. However, contemporary border practices challenge such an idea. Ethnographic studies show that while borders are bound to the nation-state sovereign power, they are also sites where multiple actors come into play and are increasingly disentangled from the geopolitical lines on a map. Ethnographic focus provides insights into everyday workings of sovereign power, a topic often overloaded with abstraction and relegated to the realm of theory. However, while ethnographic studies about border control and management question the prevailing ideas about state and borders, these studies often remain trapped in statist logic and spatial assumptions of the modern territorial state. Considering the historical perspective and incorporating the analysis of economic processes on the state and border could help mitigate the shortcomings mentioned above.

**Keywords:** borders, border control, state, sovereignty, territoriality, non-state actors

**INTRODUCTION**

This article explores how contemporary changes in border policing and management affect the nature of the contemporary state and sovereignty. It asks: If borders are elsewhere than they officially are, how does this impact...
our understanding of state sovereignty? How is the deterritorialization of borders challenging our understanding of territorial sovereignty? How is outsourcing “legitimate means of violence” to non-state actors on borders reshaping the state’s authority? To answer these questions, I will explore the literature on the proliferation of border and border actors. By following the premise that borders are consequential condensation points where broader changes in state-making are worked on the ground, this article will explore the proliferation of borders and border actors and consequences of these changes for nature, uses, limits, and effects of sovereign state power.

What we understand as a modern border became widely established in the eighteenth century (Walters 2011; Mezzandra and Nielson 2013). The fact that it became a common and defining feature of statehood and modern territoriability might be attributed to the inception of the Westphalian system of international relations (Del Sarto 2010; Mezzandra and Nielson 2013; Walters 2011). More concretely, the frontier was only able to emerge once states began to acquire particular forms of knowledge and administrative capacity, which allowed them to survey, map, and mark their borders (Winichakul 1994). A nation map presupposes the existence of boundary lines; however, maps do not record and refer to pre-existing reality – they are prime technology for creating the reality of a nation-state and its borders (Anderson 1983; Green 2012, 576; Winichakul 1994, 54). The mapping process was concomitant with the “monopolization of the legitimate means of movement” (Torpey 2000)², which refers to the process by which states expropriated rights to authorize and regulate control of movement from individuals. Individuals whose legitimate means of the movement have been expropriated by their home country became citizens. Individuals whose cross-border movement has not been authorized by a nation-state became “a disquieting element, […] because by breaking up the identity between man and citizen, nativity and nationality, they throw into crisis the original fiction of sovereignty” (Agamben 1995; see also Glick Schiller and Wimmer

² Following the imagery of “expropriation” used by Marx to describe the process of capitalist development and by Weber to characterize states’ monopolization of the legitimate use of violence, Torpey argues that modern states have also “expropriated the legitimate means of movement” and monopolized the authority to determine who may circulate within and cross their borders.
2002). As Arendt (1958) and Agamben (1998) both argued, exclusion of non-citizens has always been central to sovereign power exercise.

In order to make effective the abstract notions of nation-state and borders, states are in dire need of material articulations (Keshavarz 2016). The contemporary passport is a prime example of the nation-state’s classificatory logic and material technique of border control (Caplan 2001; Torpey 2000; Keshavarz 2019). Radhika Mongia argues that the passport emerged as a state document that purports to assign a national identity rather than a racial identity – “a mechanism that would conceal race and the racist motivations for controlling mobility in the guise of a reciprocal arrangement between states described as national” (Mongia 2018, 137; see also Besteman 2018, S000).

This classificatory logic of “national order of things” (Malkki 1992; 1995), at least on the official level, replaced earlier ideas about borders and territory. The Westphalian logic generates the idea of borders as neatly defined edges that delineate an ideally homogeneous state (Green 2012, 577). The earlier idea of borders is based on peripheries and centers, without a clear-cut edge, and boundary that was identified by “river, mountains, three piles of stones, teak forest” (Winichakul 1994, 75) or as “marches,” swathes of land (Ben Silmame 2010, 39). Fatma Ben Slimane (2010) and Thongchai Winichakul (1994) show how in the cases of the Maghreb region and Siam respectively, colonial governments imposed their particular understanding of borders, that is, “the conception of borders as barriers, and the instruments of spatial enclosure and distinction between people” (Ben Slimane 2010, 53). The displacement of indigenous geographical knowledge was never a gradual adjustment process – it was always more or less violent (Winichakul 1994, 61). Although, as previous examples show, “borders and their meanings are historically contingent” (Del Sarto 2010, 151), it is also the case that once they are constructed, they are reified both in practices and peoples’ imaginations (Green 2012, 580). Constituting borders through geographical barriers or in terms of other taken-for-granted physical referents presents them as “primordial, timeless, as part of nature” (Khosravi 2010, 1), thereby concealing their histories and their contested character. Such a traditional image of borders is inscribed onto maps in which discrete sovereign territories are separated by lines and marked by different colors (Malkki 1992, 26).
Early critiques of the idea of borders as clear-cut edges were based on studies of the US-Mexico border in the 1980s and early 1990s. By focusing attention to movements across, and transgressions of the US-Mexico border, rather than on what the border contained and separated, a new understanding of border emerged. This literature theorized the US-Mexico border zone as a paradigm of hybrids, intercultural exchange, resistance, circulation, and low intensity militarized conflict. Some researchers used the border as an image or as a metonym for the juxtaposition of two cultural and political experiences that are often in conflict due to differential political and economic power relations and looked at how borders are reenacted in everyday relations within the territory of a nation-state and between nation-states (Rouse 1991; Kearney 1991). Other researchers, particularly those in American and cultural studies, took the critique of the naturalness of the border to unsettle the notion of naturalness of raced, gendered and sexual identities (e.g., Saldivar 1997). They also pointed out the productivity of borderlands in creating hybrids, fluid identities, and mixtures within experiences of violence and inequality (e.g., Anzaldua 1987). However, as Sarah Green indicates, these studies’ focus was primarily on the people’s identity, not the identity of the borders (2018, 72–73).

Following these initial debates regarding borders and their relationship with identities, the focus switched to the conceptual and material character of borders. These studies critiqued the idea of borders as a territorially fixed, static line and argued that borders should be understood as a series of practices (Parker and Vaughan-Williams et al. 2009; Green 2010). Instead of regarding borders as objects (whether symbolic or material), most often understood as mental or physical barriers or bridges, the borders-as-process approach argues that borders are, in effect, a technique entailing the process of classifying and ordering space and relations between here and elsewhere in the world (Green 2013, 348). Informed by these debates, researchers began to pay attention to materialities and the actual architecture of border practices.

3 Josiah Heyman criticized such approach to the study of border because “when a border is condensed to image, and when this image symbolizes a wide-ranging political and theoretical stances, understanding of the border becomes reductive and delocalized” (1994, 44).
According to these researchers, border security functions have migrated away from the territorial limits of states to dispersed and heterogeneous sites located beyond geopolitical borderlines, as well as inside the societies they are meant to secure (Agier 2016; Coutin 2003; Mountz 2011; Cabot 2014; Côté-Boucher et al. 2014). Furthermore, emerging actors and sectors play different roles in border management, while the state’s functions at borders are molded in new ways with new justification (Amoore 2013; Chalfin 2010; De Leon 2015). Because borders represent sites where sovereign power occurs, they represent privileged vantage point from which we can rethink sovereignty and state. Therefore, borders represent a productive setting for exploring how the state’s sovereignty is reenacted, transformed, or abated (Amoore 2013; Albahari 2015; Brown 2010; Vaughan-Williams 2009).

In the first section, I will examine work done in critical border studies concerning the spatial proliferation of borders. This section explores how policing of borders in virtual spaces and practices of “off-shoring” of border management cause deterritorialization and expansion of borders. This will provide a venue for critically interrogating the concept of territorial sovereignty. In the second section, I will explore the role of various non-state actors, including international organizations, the EU, and state-subjects, to manage borders. This will provide insights into how the power of putatively sovereign states has been restricted through negotiations with both external and internal actors.

**SPATIAL PROLIFERATION OF BORDERS AND STATE TERRITORIALITY/SOVEREIGNTY**

In much of the scholarly work on border control and border management, there is an emphasis on the disentanglement of border work and the geopolitical borderline. Scholars who write within the framework of critical border studies repeatedly underscore that the border should not be understood as a solid, static line (Côté-Boucher 2008; Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Bialasiewicz 2012; Mezzandra and Nielson 2013; Green 2012; Frowd 2014). They argue that we should examine how border controls have proliferated and diffused. Analyzing spatial proliferation of borders can challenge the inside/outside binary of national territoriality and assumptions about territorial state sovereignty.
Many studies about current changes in border regimes focus on the extension of border control into virtual spaces. The world of technologies, databases, biometrics, and predictive software offers a new image of border and border management. Bigo argues that in the digital space, “borders are constructed via a multitude of points that are linked together through networks of computerized databases constantly exchanging information” (Bigo 2014, 217). Such so-called “smart borders” were developed after 9/11 due to the perceived need for better technological systems of border management and control (Salter 2004). Borders produced in databases and software are endowed with a new role, that of “social filter” (Amoore and de Goede 2005; Amoore 2006; Côté-Boucher 2008; Aas 2011; Bigo 2014) that distinguishes different types of mobilities. The movements that are designed as threatening (e.g., refugees, undocumented migrants) are contained and inhibited, while other types of mobilities are facilitated (e.g., business travelers) (Côté-Boucher 2008; Aas 2011). Nonetheless, this does not mean that the surveillant gaze is directed only toward the movements of “high-risk groups”; it is also directed toward socially privileged populations. However, rather than being distinguished by the amount of data collected about them, surveillance of these groups is driven by different sets of objectives and consequences (Aas 2011, 337).

Aiwa Ong calls this a system of “graduated sovereignty,” whereby “citizens in zones that are differently articulated to the global production and financial circuits are subjected to different kinds of surveillance and in practice enjoy different sets of civil, political, and economic rights” (2003, 41). While for Ong (2006) such forms of sovereignty represent an exception under the neoliberal regime, Bonilla warns that to cast these political forms as exceptions “problematically reinscribes the classical sovereignty as [...] an actually existing measurable quality of states rather than viewing it as discursive figure produced through colonial encounter” (Bonilla 2017,

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4 For instance, Aas writes about FLUX, the US-Dutch frequent traveler program whose proclaimed objective is to make travel a “seamless experience” and whose customers are so called low-risk passengers “with no criminal record, no customs and immigration convictions who are willing to pay 374 Euros, plus additional 150 Euro yearly fee for the privilege of skipping queues and time consuming border checks” (Aas 2011, 336).
331; see also Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2002). Concepts like sovereignty and citizenship could be seen as a part of the category of “North Atlantic universals,” that is, concepts that “project transhistorical relevance while hiding the particularities of their marks and origins” (Trouillout 2003, 26). The colonial origins and legacies produced race as a sociopolitical category of distinction that still deeply shapes the border regimes and understanding sovereignty and citizenship (De Genova 2017; Besteman 2019a). Consequently, it is vital to “do the critical work of reconfirming the racial specificity of what is so commonly and casually euphemized as ‘migrant”’ (De Genova 2017, 4; emphasis in original). However, while border enforcement practices are deeply racialized (and classed), focus on them turn attention far away from racialized and classed borders within the citizenship (Anderson and Huges 2015, 2). Thus, policing of borders and producing of (social) boundaries are tightly related in “a process in which immigrants are racialized, and ethnic minorities are reminded of their foreign origin” (Fassin 2011, 214).

One of the prime technologies aimed to control and manage these “suspicious” and mobile populations in the name of public security is biometrics. Maguire argues that “biometrics offer not merely a way of enhancing the verification of identity but rather a technology that enables the development of deterritorialized e-borders” (2009, 14). By connecting identity inextricably to the human body, biometrics, “the border and the body merge” (Muller 2010, 86). The body becomes a passport (Aas 2006; Lyon 2007). Aas argues that by creating the docile body, “biometrics tends to be seen as an exemplary bio-political technique connecting the individual both to their identity and to the external system of governance” (Aas 2011, 341). It seems that the presumption of infallibility tempts authorities with a promise of

5 Glick Schiller and Wimmer argue that “the placing of African-American alongside immigrants within the race relations cycle portrayed them as outside the nation” (2002, 317). For instance, Volpp writes about the case of African American and poor relief in late eighteenth century Massachusetts, whereby immigrant origins are invented to evade to justify refusing their claims upon community (Volpp 2012).

6 This is especially evident in numerous policies and scholarship focused on the ‘second-generation migrants’ (e.g. Portes and Zhou 1993; Crul and Doomernik 2003; Collet and Petrovic 2014).

7 Luise Amoore and Marieke de Goede (2005) challenge the representation of biometric technologies as infallible and unchangeable verifiers of the
security and solution to the problem of suspect identities (Cole 2001). Côté-Boucher argues that the (in)effectiveness of border control in digital space comes from “its capacity to relate to a set of technological mechanisms of control constantly reinscribing the space of border, bringing it into existence when and where security agencies suppose it is necessary” (2008, 146).

Furthermore, “the shared information acquires legitimacy by means of self-referentiality” in digital spaces by being exchanged, repeated, and circulated (Côté-Boucher 2008, 149). The absence of transparency, which goes along with self-referentiality, is one of the central features of the digital space of border control. The information shared between security agencies and the processes of dataveillance, for the most part, remain unknown to the general public (Côté-Boucher 2008, 150). While the integral element of institutionalized power such as state is to withhold information and dictate terms of knowledge (Abrams 1988, 62), digital technologies heighten state inscrutability by masking a databases’ logic of operation (Gusterson 2019). Bowker and Star consider modern technology as a form of ‘frozen organizational discourse’ because the “arguments, discussions, uncertainties and processual nature of decision making are hidden away in a piece of technology […] values, opinions and rhetoric are frozen” (Bowker and Star 1999, 135; see also Besteman 2019b, 168). Thus, humans’ situational logic and discretionary power are “displaced by and subordinated to the logic of automation and bureaucracy” (Gusterson 2019, 2). However, although data-surveillance has great power over the assessment of individuals as

truth about a person. For them, biometric technology is not a scientific, neutral and “smart” solution to the problem of establishing identity but it represents “informatization of the body,” part of a process in which technologies themselves are incorporated in bodily experience. Thus, it is important to “challenge and destabilize the apparent security of biometrics-body link, to point to fallibility of technologies, as well as to the agency that is enacted as ‘technology tends to take life on their own’” (Amoore and de Goede 2005, 165).

8 Thus, while these technologies appear to be novel and “innovative,” they resemble their paper counterparts in some respects. Ilana Feldman in her study about bureaucracy in Gaza argues that the authority and legitimacy of documents also depends on self-referentiality. She suggests that the self-referential characteristics which produced legitimacy and authority in Gaza “are features that often lead to bureaucracies being criticized as obscure, opaque, and anti-democratic” (Feldman 2008, 16).
threatening or legitimate, these border control mechanisms should not be taken as totalizing (Côté-Boucher 2008, 146).

The practices of border policing in virtual and digital spaces prompt us to ask where the state's borders are and remind us that border making/policing practices “run within the political and social territory rather than outside of it” (Das and Poole 2004, 17). Although border policing in these spaces does not occur at the state’s territorial edge, it still remains largely defined by political and social imaginaries of the nation-state. However, these virtual spaces and settings could destabilize the inherently territorial language of containment and sovereignty that seems to bind the nation to the state (ibid.). Furthermore, border policing in digital spaces complicates typical imaginaries of state spatialization, which involves encompassment and verticality (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). The encompassment of the data becomes an alternative to territorial encompassment. By displacing border policing to virtual spaces, the state’s actual capacities at the border are dispersed. For Tsianos and Karakayli, the extraterritorial logic of control embodied in virtual data collection denaturalizes border controls and sovereignty (Tsianos and Karakayli 2010, 374). This claim echoes Weber's ideal-type conception of the state. In his classical definition, Weber describes the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” However, as Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014, 13) warn, Weber's ideal type of modern rational-state is an analytical category which, in his understanding, is clearly not a real object, but a yard-stick with which to “profile” real objects. However, the problem arises when the ideal-type drawn from European experience is used to measure non-European states, thus creating “a hierarchy in which those farthest from the ideal-type are lowest on the hierarchy” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 11). Sometimes, the rationale for border control interventions and “improvements” across the global South is framed precisely as state-building instances through the developmentalization of border security (Frowd 2014, 238).

For Frowd, funding of the EU and international organizations is tied to the developmentalization of security because it plays a dual role as a development and security tool (ibid.). International organizations and national governments in the global ‘North’ increasingly invest in border
management software programs in the “developing” world, thus aligning border management in the global “South” with “the tendency toward government through identification and data capture seen in countries of the global ‘North’” (ibid., 236). However, other authors point out a more sinister role of “development” in the security of EU external borders. According to these authors, the EU makes development aid conditional on the cooperation on border control (Walters 2004; Bialasiewicz 2012). The EU pressures neighboring countries to implement security-driven border controls that “encourage” them to close down clandestine entry routes and improve their detection and surveillance procedures in exchange for development aid or future membership. Thus, increasingly, some African and Eastern European countries are policing borders on behalf of the EU (Andersson 2014; Albahari 2015). Authors observe that the EU’s rhetoric has shifted from that of collaboration and friendly “exchange” to an explicitly security led agenda (Walters 2004; Bialasiewicz 2012).

One example that illustrates the relationship between financial aid packages and security through the framework of the gift economy has been put forward by Ruben Andersson. By using this framework, Andersson seeks to highlight the central features of the “externalization” of borders in African borderlands. He argues that personalized incentives created social bonds between African and European colleagues, “as well as an ‘obligation to reciprocate’ for receivers” (Andersson 2014, 126–127). “The gifts” created a hierarchy of interest because they “nullified the supposed collegiality between Europeans and Africans” (ibid., 127). However, African subcontractors sought to maintain this gifted bond: “to them, the gift remained the donor’s perennial responsibility and so did, by implication, the task of policing migration itself” (ibid., 129). Andersson concludes that this gift economy perpetuates a vicious cycle – the more gifts and funding, the stronger pressure is to find “illegal” migrants, which again increases demands for more funding (ibid., 145). Therefore, development aid and “gifts” have compelled Africans to boost the numbers of people detained as “illegal” migrants. This sets in motion the “illegality industry,” which produces what it seeks to eliminate – more migrant illegality (Andersson 2014).

Some authors argue that in the case of the EU and its neighboring countries, the visible “off-shoring” of border controls has also been
accompanied by the “outsourcing” of migration management (Bialasiewicz 2012, 848; also Walters 2004). For Bialasiewicz, the “outsourcing” of migration management refers to a number of agreements between the EU and its neighboring countries regarding the return and readmission of “nationals illegally present in EU territory” (2012, 849). Walters and Andrijasevic argue that the EU’s role needs to be understood in a broader geopolitical context of an attempt on behalf of the EU to involve itself in the efforts of state-making of its neighboring countries (2010, 75). Therefore, the externalization of border controls can be seen as a part of strategies of “governance and state-making at a distance” (Bialasiewicz 2012, 852).

Writing about a similar process in the case of Australia, Alison Mountz (2011) argues that although spaces of externalization of border control might appear ad hoc – a circumstantial matter of convenience, physical geography, and proximity – they are deeply shaped by economic dependency and post/colonial histories. However, states not only extend their sovereignty through off-shoring of border and migration management, but they also shrink their sovereign territory. For example, following the Tampa affair10, the Australian Parliament retroactively declared parts of its sovereign territory no longer to be included in Australia for the purposes of migration (Mountz 2011; Volpp 2012). Similarly, after the interception of four boats near the coast of British Columbia in 1999, migrants are treated as if they were walking through the “long tunnel” of international airports. Although the migrants were located on Canadian sovereign territory for the duration of their legal processing, legally, they were not yet in Canada (Mountz 2010). Thus, legality is spatialized in the sense that those who do not exist legally are imagined to be “outside” or “not there” (Coutin 2003; Volpp 2012; Kahn 2017). Ghassan Hage stresses that “an image of national space is a

9 However, Rutvica Andrijasevic warns that not all practices of migration management should be understood as ‘externalization.’ She notes that in the case of asylum determination processes (which are increasingly under management of the countries of origin and transit) we are witnessing the “retraction of asylum rights, not its externalization” – externalization presupposes that asylum seekers will have access to asylum determination process which is not always the case (Andrijasevic 2010, 19).

10 For more on Tampa affair see report of National Museum of Australia (2020).
prerequisite for the nationalist capacity to classify others as undesirable” (Hage 2000, 42). However, the assessment of migrants’ desirability can operate as a multiscalar technique of space management. Moffette argues that this strategy “can be considered a form of municipal borderwork aimed to filter who can and cannot live in community based on local and largely discretionary assessments” (Moffette 2014, 268). Thus, in accordance with the literature on the “delocalization of border” (Bigo 2002; Salter 2004), we could say that extensive borderwork also occurs inside the territory of the state on the local and municipal level through the evaluation of migrants’ files when they apply for regularization, the constant policing of migrants in the streets, and the threat of deportation (Coutin 2003; Cabot 2014; Mountz et al. 2002; De Genova 2002; Moffette 2014).

In her insightful analysis, Anne McNevin critically examines the prevailing territorialist logic in studies of border control. McNevin astutely asserts that the off-shore/onshore distinction is a territorial one that “misrepresents the spatially disaggregating techniques of governance” (McNevin 2014, 302). She argues that instead of uncritically employing these categories, we should look at administrative technologies, governing agents, and scholarly habits that tend to reproduce them in technical rather than political terms (ibid., 305; see also Malkki 1992; 1995). She suggests that there is nothing self-evident in territorial categories. McNevin proposes a reflexive strategy of thinking with and beyond territoriality – we should recognize the resonance of territoriality categories and be aware of their conceptual limitations (McNevin 2014, 297). The conceptual limitations of categories of territoriality lie in the fact that they are often mapped onto arborescent and sedentarist logic of the nation-state and culture (Malkki 1992).11 The conceptual and analytical language of the modern territorial state cannot fully capture the spatial complexities of border controls – otherwise, we could use it to explain the apparent paradox of

11 This logics is perpetuated in scholarship on mobile populations. Heath Cabot suggests that “approaches that position transnationally mobile populations alongside citizens and other sedentary groups are particularly promising in de-exceptioinalizing cross-border displacement” (Cabot 2019, 271). Such studies show that although experienced differently, precarity and displacement affects both citizens and border crossers (e.g. Ramsey 2018; Shabazz 2015).
“border transgressions sometimes interpreted as a source of crises (as in the securitization of migration) and sometimes hailed as crisis-combating measures of a sovereign state (as in off-shoring technologies)” (McNevin 2014, 307).

In these constellations of border control and migration management, it is not immediately clear where sovereignty lies in territorial terms. Scholarly analysis often falls in the “territorialist trap” (Agnew 1994) and “methodological nationalism” (Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2002) that has conceptualized states as containers of people, military power, and cultural practices, and natural social and political form of the modern world. However, the contemporary border enforcement practices defy the presumptions of traditionally mapped sovereign territory. States extend their operations beyond sovereign territory borders, where the legality of actions becomes ambiguous (Mountz 2011; Mann 2016). As the studies discussed in this section show, studied ethnographically, borders are not a reflection or manifestation of territorial sovereignty that is fully formed and determined. These studies also highlight that sovereignty is not necessarily state-based and territorial. In other words, as Agnew claims, “effective sovereignty is not necessarily based on and defined by strict and fixed territorial boundaries of individual states” (Agnew 2005, 438; emphasis in original). Thus, rather than looking at state and sovereignty as absolute territorial organizations of political authority, we should look at socially constructed political authority practices, which are not restricted to states and exclusively territorial. Political authority can be seen as a legitimate exercise of power (ibid., 441). However, it is important to note that political authority is never fully complete – there are always competing sources of such authority (Feldman 2019; Kasfir 2015; Bierschenk and Olivier De Sardan 2014).

Therefore, as Madeleine Reeves suggests, the geography of state regulation is more helpfully thought of as a field of competing claims to sovereignty than assuming that it is a priori given and territorial (Reeves 2014, 145). She also suggests that investigations of the dynamics of border work should be approached by exploring state territory as a process (ibid., 9). This presumes shifts from asking what the state “does” at borders to exploring how, where, and in which situated practices the state and borders are invoked
and ignored, done and undone (ibid.). Furthermore, this approach to state, borders, and territory calls us to think about space and place as “lively,” which is not as fixed coordinates but rather how they emerge through active material practices (Massey 2005, 12; see also Basso 1996).

PROLIFERATION OF ACTORS IN BORDER MANAGEMENT AND STATE TERRITORIALITY/SOVEREIGNTY

In addition to the claim that borders should not be understood as territorially fixed lines, one of the central inferences of contemporary border studies is that states are no longer only stakeholders and actors involved in the control of borders. Authors argue that borders are increasingly confronted with an elusive and expansive environment of governance (Foucault 2009), within which a multiplicity of stakeholders and actors play important roles (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Mezzadra and Nielson 2013; Frowd 2014). Thus, border controls no longer (if they ever, I would add) reflect just the aggregate of each state’s national policy whose goal is the protection of national territory.

Various agencies, internal organizations, and non-governmental organizations, which specialize in advising, assisting, and consulting national governments in diverse aspects of border management, can be seen as such new actors involved in border management. The pursuit of simultaneous economic openness and border security witnessed awards of multibillion-dollar contracts to technology and management consultants, IT specialists, risk analysts, and biometric corporations (Amoore 2006; 2013; Salter 2004). Didier Bigo suggests that the sense of crisis and “unease” and the promise of managing them are driven by bureaucratic professionalization and the creation of a transnational field of professionals in the management of unease (2002, 64). These managers of unease are implicated not only in “designing the exceptional circumstances […] but also in declaring and supplying the technologies that come to be a necessary response to emergency” (Amoore 2013, 20; emphasis in original). Border security and management are undoubtedly a lucrative “industry” (Andersson 2014) that protects “global

12 For instance, Accenture made border management a commodified service. They advertise their services (see Accenture 2020).
apartheid” (Besteman 2019a; Heyman 2017). Yet it is not the case that these new forms of an alliance between the state and security/economic expertise represent the privatization of state practices (cf. Hibou 2004). Amoore argues that the contemporary moment witnesses “a complex and iterative form of sovereignty, one that breaches the comfortable delineations of the public from private, political from economic, security from the economy” (Amoore 2013, 2).

One of the organizations that breach these distinctions in border management is the International Organization for Migration (IOM). The IOM is an entrepreneurial and project-based international organization (Frowd 2014, 228). The organization is invested in the promotion of standards and regulation of migration and border control. Andrijasevic and Walters (2010) and Frowd (2014) are interested in how the IOM makes borders into spaces of expertise and international policy. They argue that one of the IOM’s main goals is to align the migration policies in non-Western countries with the migration control norms and aspirations of the West. According to Frowd, in Mauritania, the IOM attempted to achieve this goal through investments in physical and technological infrastructure and training and workshops. These investments shape both the material and discursive environment of border control. Thus, infrastructure-building and equipment investments are not only concrete material provisions; they also embody knowledge about how border control should function (Frowd 2014, 233). Material investments could also be seen as a form of pedagogy – for instance, investments in the IT system, which are widely used for border control in the West, privilege a turn toward data analysis (ibid.). “Pedagogy” of border control is even more explicitly evident in training and workshops organized by the IOM. According to Andrijasevic and Walters, and Frowd, training, and workshops inculcate technical norms, a culture of professionalization and bureaucratic rationalization, and a managerial approach to border control. By doing so,

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13 Josiah Heyman uses the concept “global apartheid” to point out to how borders perpetuate socioeconomic inequality by preventing the legal entry of low-waged workers and to indicate how this is driven by racist logic (Heyman 2017, 47). Catherine Besteman adds to this analysis by pointing out that such system of “militarized global apartheid” is takes the form of militarized border technologies and “feeds a new global security-industrial complex” (Besteman 2019a, S27).
the IOM plays a constructive and constitutive role in border management; it makes “interventions which actually shape and define how states, through their national experts, policymakers, border guards, etc., understand the ‘problem’ of borders” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 985).

The IOM’s methods and norms are legitimated not by direct coercion but through active “elicitation of state agency and deployment of state capacity” (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 980; see also Frowd 2014). Thus, the IOM is not seeking to manage border controls directly. According to Andrijasevic and Walters, its mode of border management is based on the construction of the states as subjects who could enhance their capacity for border control by making informed and strategic choices (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010, 980). Such an approach to the governance of border reformulates borders as sites of expertise and technical norms and standards. Furthermore, Andrijasevic and Walters, and Frowd too, argue that the work of international organizations such as the IOM is not oriented to the dismantling of state power; instead, it is geared toward establishing certain forms of statehood. The IOM operates as “consultant” and “partner,” assisting states to improve their border management. Andrijasevic and Walters argue that such a form of interaction between states and international organizations could be seen as a governing model that results in “overlapping” state sovereignty (ibid., 993; see also Ong 2006). This form of sovereignty is contingent upon a framework where security is redefined as a development problem, which requires assistance from the non-state actors such as the IOM (Andrijasevic and Walters 2010; Frowd 2014).

Gregory Feldman writes how the framing of security and migration policies through development discourse is shared among EU agencies too (Feldman 2011, 66, 67). One such agency is the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). Although no specific master plan exists to coordinate Frontex’s activities, various strategies are drawn to guide cooperative ventures with the relevant government, agency, or organization in operations of border control (Feldman 2011, 84). While Frontex officials accept that their mission is military in form, they also stress the commitment to the liberal virtues of humanitarianism (Feldman 2011; Albahari 2015; Pallister-Wilkins 2015). Ticktin suggests that humanitarianism and policing are “intimately linked, with policing often accompanied by a
gesture toward the humane, and toward the ethical, where force is justified in the name of peace and right” (Ticktin 2005, 359; see also Agier 2011, 4–5). Humanitarianism does not usurp or replace existing trends in security practices; instead, the mobilization of “humanitarian reason” has become a powerful force in shaping contemporary political life, feeding hegemonic discourses, and legitimizing practices, especially in relations related to those who are disadvantaged (Fassin 2012).

Writing about Frontex’s border policing in Evros, Greece, Polly Pallister-Wilkins argues that “the paradox in border policing is between the individual subject of humanitarianism and/or policing, the migrant, and the object of border control, the territorially bounded state or regional unit” (2015, 54). Because EU member states are reluctant to let go of control over their borders (Andersson 2014, 75; Neal 2009, 340), we are witnessing disjointed practices of border control between various EU institutions and individual member states. The EU’s border practices “work as overlapping spheres regimes of governance” (Pallister-Wilkins 2015, 63; see also Ong 2006). Thus, we could see how claims of verticality (claims of superior spatial scope and supremacy in hierarchy of power) that have historically been monopolized by the state are being challenged by non-state actors (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 996). However, this does not mean that “institutions of global governance are replicating on a bigger scale the functions and tasks of the nation-state” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 996). What we are witnessing are new modalities of governance that “occupies and reproduces old spaces of the state as a cover for new initiatives within the state and outside of it, and where each thrives on the borrowed authority of the other” (Chalfin 2010, 187). As a result, territoriality and sovereignty are “intertwined but not necessarily coterminous” (ibid., 239).

The new forms of mobility and border controls operate in the liminal spaces between the public, the state, and supranational organizations. According to Tsianos and Karakayali, these liminal spaces are regulated by institutions that attempt to close off possibilities for public management of mobilities (2010, 374). Crucially, these liminal spaces open up possibilities for new forms of sovereignty, which extends beyond national borders. Many critical researchers agree that international organizations’ participation in border management engenders “deterriorialization” of state sovereignty
(Tsianos and Karakayali 2010; Walters 2011). Although such organizations are state-like in some respects, they cannot be located neatly within the analytical scheme of vertical encompassment (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 994). Nonetheless, Ferguson and Gupta assert that it is necessary to examine state and non-state governmentality within a common frame because it will illustrate that verticality and encompassment should not be “a taken-for-granted fact, but as a precarious achievement” (ibid.).

Furthermore, the role of international organizations and other non-state actors in border controls points out that the boundary between the public and the private realm that supposedly separates the state from other non-state actors is also precarious. In the idealized Weberian model of the state, the hallmark of the modern, bureaucratized state is the separation of public and private. However, the practices of the state and other non-state actors in border management challenge this boundary. The delegation of state power to intermediaries and the growth of private security arrangements shows that it is difficult to say where the line between the state and society actually runs (Migdal and Schlicte 2005, 31). Therefore, the participation of multiscalar organizations in border management shows once more that the elusiveness of the boundary between the state and society should not be taken as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon (Mitchell 1991, 77). Migdal and Schlichte note that “the constant movement of the line and uncertainty that is connected with it can themselves constitute a mode of the rule” (Migdal and Schlichte 2005, 31).

It has been suggested that the mode of rule and governing in neoliberalism takes the form of responsibilization (Lemke 2001; Burchell 1993). Following Foucault, Lemke suggests that neoliberalism is “political rationality that tries to render the social domain economic and link the reduction in state services and security systems to the increasing call for ‘personal responsibility’” (Lemke 2001, 203). Thus, citizens are increasingly delegated with the task of migration and border policing (Anderson 2015, 46; Amoore 2006, 345). For instance, Daniel Goldstein and Carolina Alonso-Bejarano focus on a web-based biometric technology called E-Verify, which allows employers to determine their applicants’ and current workers’ eligibility to work in the US (Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano 2017, 2). This technology introduces the threat of deportation by promising to reveal undocumented workers’ presence
to the state. Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano note that E-Verify “deputize private-sector employers as immigration officers, empowering them to determine who is and who is not eligible to work and whether or not to expose the ineligible to the gaze of the state” (ibid., 2–3). It grants employers new disciplinary power to control and pacify workers (De Genova 2002).

According to Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano, the E-Verify reinforces the biometric border that refers to the development of “digital technologies data integration and managerial expertise in the politics of border management, as well as the exercise of biopower such that the immigrant body itself is inscribed with and demarcates a continual crossing of multiple encoded borders – social, legal, gendered, racialized” (Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano 2017, 4). The biometric border, as a technology of regulation, shapes the everyday lives of immigrants. It produces “shadow populations” – “communities of undocumented living in a separate world made invisible by immigration law” (ibid., 1). At the same time, Goldstein and Alonso-Bejarano argue it conveys to the citizens the appearance that the government is ‘serious’ about immigration enforcement (ibid., 2).

However, sometimes, government actions convey quite a different message to citizens. Mareike Shomerus and Lotje de Vries argue that in South Sudan, the central government downgraded security concerns regarding the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in the western part of the border with the Democratic Republic of Congo. They argue that the government’s strategic neglect of security concerns is due to its limited economic resources, political interest, and its tenuous relationship with the population in the area (Shomerus and de Vries 2014, 288). According to Shomerus and de Vries, for affected citizens, the neglect was “part of a larger plan to abdicate responsibility for citizens the government did not care about” (ibid., 289). Such a situation resulted in the mobilization of residents into militia ‘arrow boys’. In some areas, tax is collected to pay them or buy provisions. Shomerus and de Vries argue that by taking security into their own hands, “arrow boys” effectively became authorities (ibid., 290). They conclude that in the end, this situation redefined how people interpret what government does and how it relates to its citizens – “it led them to dissolve the strict division between ‘government’ and ‘people’ since those affected by insecurity had to be able to protect themselves” (ibid.).
The impact of state power is always felt differently at various national community levels, thus sometimes creating profound ambivalence and discourse of abandonment. In these cases, Aretxaga argues, the imagined national state, which is supposed to provide for its citizens, “seems remote and careless, not fulfilling its obligations and generating a discourse of deficit, an insufficient state which abandoned its citizens” (Aretxaga 2003, 396). However, this does not preclude longing for the paternalistic state. Writing about changes in policing and its consequences for state sovereignty, Jean and John Comaroff suggest that “the fantasy remains that if it did have the will, the state could recapture its monopoly over the legitimate coercion and its patrimonial role in the protection of its citizens” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2016, 37; emphasis in original). They argue that increasing anxiety over-policing of crime is a result of metamorphosis of the state form. According to them, one aspect of this transformation is that the states are increasingly outsourcing responsibility for law and order to its subjects (ibid., 167). The forms of care and social management once provided by the government (such as border policing) are deinstitutionalized and “returned” to “the community” (ibid., 185). According to Comaroff and Comaroff, the outsourcing of many government functions, including some of those related to the legitimate means of violence, is “decentering and decentralizing their sovereignty and the jurisdiction/s of the law” (ibid., x). The new policies of outsourcing everyday policing of borders and mobilities can be seen less as a sign of the state’s weakness than incorporating segments and zones where state sovereignty was never effective (Blom Hansen and Steputtat 2006, 308). However, the stress on the responsibilization of the state subjects in the management of borders urges to ask who or what might serve as the sovereign guarantor of safety and security (Comaroff and Comaroff 2016, 37).

CONCLUSION

The work presented in this literature review shows us that we need to think beyond borders as territorial lines and states as only actors in the management of borders. In doing so, it represents a great springboard for further research. However, a glance over this body of work reveals that its accomplishments are somewhat uneven. Two things stand out – the
first concerns the temporal scope of many of these investigations. It is overwhelmingly the case that studies presented in this paper focus on the immediate present. Most of the authors do not historically situate their studies. This influences their conceptual framing – practices, technologies, and spaces of the border seem to proliferate and relocate; actors involved in border management and control are interpreted as new. While it is definitely the case that we are witnessing changes in border control and management, before we identify them as complete novelties, it would be useful to take into account the historical perspective. For instance, Kal Raustiala notes that although the conventional narrative would tell us that disjuncture between territorial space and governance is new, there have always been specific exceptions to the Westphalian system (Raustiala 2005).

Furthermore, most of the studies rely on the analytical grind in which state occupies one of the central positions. Borders are not places where sovereign power exercises its absolute authority but contested spaces where state and sovereignty are reworked. Studies in this literature review show that we need to abandon sovereignty as “an ontological ground of power and order, expressed in law or enduring ideas of legitimate rule in favor of a view of sovereignty as a tentative” (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2006, 295). In conventional political discourse, sovereignty is seen as the central authority that operates within the state’s territory. However, scholars point out that such a “common sense” topography does not match border realities. Ethnographic focus on practices of border policing complicates the prevailing state idea of all-encompassing territoriality. Studied ethnographically, borders are less a reflection or manifestation of territorial sovereignty that is fully formed and determined, but rather a site from which to “reflect on the project of territorial sovereignty” (Chalfin 2010, 58). The deterritorialization of the border (moving of borders into digital spaces and from geopolitical boundaries) and outsourcing of border controls (to international organizations and state’s subjects) brings into the question “the taken-for-granted spatial and scalar frames of sovereign states” (Ferguson and Gupta 2002, 990). What studies presented in this literature review highlight is that sovereignty should be approached as a lived experience, rather than theoretical abstraction because such approach unveils how different kinds of sovereignties compete, combine, and overlap (Blom Hansen and Stepputat 2006).
Pertinent to the two shortcomings in the literature that I pointed out, Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 44) write that “history is always written from the sedentary point of view and in the name of a unitary State apparatus, at least a possible one” (see also Glick Schiller and Wimmer 2002). It is important for them to continually reflect on history as it is produced and defined by capitalism. This history reveals the relationship between the state and capitalism through moments of territorialization – transnational capital as a locus of high-speed deterritorialization and various forms of the state as loci of reterritorialization (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 475–477).

In late modern capitalism, according to Foucault, “the art of government is essentially concerned with answering the question of how to introduce economy […] into the management of the state” (Foucault 1991, 90). Thanks to the economy, sovereign power oscillate in and out of strictly juridical modes of authority, coalescing the population’s governing with the management of the state (ibid., 99). Thus, in order to understand contemporary sovereignty and territorialization of border policing, it is necessary to pay attention to not only their historical trajectories and different actors that take part in them (including the state), but also to the role of economy and capitalism.

In the contemporary world, borders and border security are constituted as a sort of meta-issue, capable of condensing a whole complex of political and economic concerns, including concerns regarding transformations of state and sovereignty. They should not be treated as mere metaphors, thereby ignoring the very real relations of power that animate and sustain them (Reeves 2014, 52). Politics is immanent to the border regimes and not something that comes from the outside (Walters 2011, 154). Borders are not just an epiphenomenon of state politics. Looking into how borders are managed and controlled illuminates spatial, governmental, and sovereign imaginaries and practices, thus providing insights into contemporary politics.

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Sažetak: Rad sumira relevantnu literaturu iz studija granica i ispituje kako promene u kontroli i upravljanju granicama utiču na konfiguraciju države i njenog suvereniteta. Pitanja kojim se bavi jesu kako prostorna proliferacija i deterijalizacija granica utiču na razumevanje teritorijalnog suvereniteta i kako delegiranje „legitimne upotrebe nasilja“ nedržavnim akterima rekonfiguriše autoritet države. U konvencionalnom političkom i javnom diskursu granice i teritorijalni suverenitet figuriraju kao jedno od glavnih obelježja državnosti. Politička teologija moderne nacionalne države je pripisala monopol nad upravljanjem granicama isključivo državi, te je granice izjednačila sa stabilnim i fiksnim obodima nacionalne teritorije. Savremene prakse kontrole i pravljenja granica dovode u pitanje i komplikuju ove dominantne predstave o granicama, državi i njenom teritorijalnom suverenitetu. Stoga, ovaj rad ukazuje da je umesto metafizičkog razumevanja granica, suvereniteta i države, potrebno da se ispituju svakodnevne prakse u kojima se oni (re)konstituišu. Rad takođe ukazuje da iako etnografske studije o kontrolama granica dovode u pitanje preovlađujuće ideje o državi i granicama, često i same ostaju zaborljene u konceptualnom diskursu države, što može biti rezultat neuzimanja u obzir istorijske perspektive, kao i odsustva analize uticaja kapitalističkih procesa na državu i kontrolu granica.

Ključne reči: granice, granična kontrola, država, suverenitet, teritorijalnost, nedržavni akteri