ABSTRACT Neoliberalism seems to be a ubiquitous concept, both in anthropological scholarship and in the public discourse, as global social inequalities continue to grow. In anthropology, neoliberalism has been particularly popularized in the past decade and a half, but – as is the case with most anthropological concepts – the consensus on its meaning has not been met. Furthermore, it is not rare to see neoliberalism being used in scholarship without an operational definition. Concurrently with its popularity, the concept attracted numerous criticisms. In this review article, I present a short overview of how neoliberalism has originated, then used, and criticized in anthropology and its sister disciplines such as human geography. Additionally, I focus on the transformations in the nature of the state, governance, and subjectivity that occur in late capitalism, as well as how we can approach those transformations ethnographically. The increased unavailability of welfare provision in neoliberalism has been heavily investigated in anthropology of health and care. I thus particularly discuss how the concepts of care and responsibility have been used in anthropology to that end.

Keywords: neoliberalism, state, citizenship, health, care, responsibility

NEOLIBERALISM AND THE STATE IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Theoretical approaches to neoliberalism can be divided in multiple ways (see Clarke 2008; Jessop 2013; Kingfisher and Maskovsky 2008; Springer 2012), but two main theoretical currents are most often identified (Ganti 2014; Wacquant 2012). The first one stems from Marxist thought and political economy and is concerned with the effects of neoliberalism as a structural force that produces policies such as deregulation of the economy, privatizati-
on of enterprises, and reduction of social welfare programs (see Greenhouse 2010; Harvey 2007; Mirowski 2014; Peck 2004). The second approach draws on post-structuralism, particularly Foucault’s (2008) work on governmentality, and looks at neoliberalism as political rationality in which subjectivities are governed and reshaped according to the ideal of \textit{homo oeconomicus} (see Matza 2012; Ong 2006a; Rose 2007; Rose and Miller 1992). Drawing from an intersection of the first two approaches, a third theoretical current can be isolated, which focuses on agents and institutions that put neoliberal ideology to practice (see Elyachar 2005; Schuller 2016; Wacquant 2012).

The origins of neoliberalism as an ideology and set of philosophical ideas are diverse and can be traced to the Freiburg school and the Chicago school (Foucault 2008; Lemke 2001). The Freiburg school – also known as Ordoliberal after the journal \textit{Ordo} – emerged in the mid-1920s in Germany. In reference to the emergence of the Third Reich, Ordoliberals proposed that the drawbacks of capitalist society could be overcome by constructing innovative strategies that would tackle various contingencies in the system itself. Given that the Ordoliberals see Nazism – “an unlimited growth of state power” (Foucault 2008, 111) – as a consequence of the intrinsic defects of the state, rather than of the market, they aim to adopt the free market not just as a method of state limitation, but as an organizing principle of the state. Or, in short, “a state under the supervision of the market rather than a market supervised by the state” (Foucault 2008, 116).

Like Ordoliberals, the Chicago school opposed state interventionism. What Nazism represented for Ordoliberals, the defined “field of adversity” (Foucault 2008) of American neoliberals were Keynesian policies (New Deal), pacts of war (Beveridge report and other interventionist measures), and the growth of federal administration through economic and social programs. Foucault states that, unlike Ordoliberals, the key element in the Chicago school’s version of neoliberalism is their application of economic principles to the social sphere. That is, Ordoliberalism maintains the difference between the social and economic sphere; the Chicago approach does not (Foucault 2008; Lemke 2001). A consequence of that is a construct of an ideal form of subjectivity based on \textit{homo oeconomicus}. Furthermore, not only is the economic conflated with the social, but economic principles of market rationality are to be guiding principles for all human conduct (Brown 2003).
Conflating the economic sphere and other spheres of human conduct also represents a way in which neoliberalism moves away from classical liberalism (Brown 2003). Foucault (2008) identifies this difference as one stemming from the basis of government. Although neoliberalism and classical liberalism share the ideal of *homo oeconomicus*, it does not represent the same figure. Given the naturalizing tendencies of classical liberalism, *homo oeconomicus* is an ideal that stems from human nature and represents an individual in pursuit of their own interest through exchange. In neoliberalism, *homo oeconomicus* is a form of governable subjectivity, who reacts to artificially arranged liberty and embodies entrepreneurialism (Brown 2015; Burchell 1993; Foucault 2008). In neoliberalism, subjects are and should be *homo oeconomicus* in all spheres of life, shaped as human capital seeking to pursue competition rather than exchange. Neoliberal subjects – as investors in their own human capital – can be understood as “the managers of a portfolio of conducts pertaining to all the aspects of their lives” (Feher 2009, 3).

The second difference between neoliberalism and classical liberalism that Foucault identifies is the redefinition of the relationship between the state and the economy (Foucault 2008; Lemke 2001). In classical liberalism, the state’s role was to monitor the market – and intervene when needed in order to protect individual freedoms – but in neoliberalism, it is the market that regulates the state. However, for classical liberals, the market and rational economic behavior represent a naturally existing reality, whose existence is supervised by the state. Neoliberals consider that the market and rational economic behavior must be constructed by the government and can only exist under certain legal and political contexts (Brown 2003; Burchell 1993).

After WW2, the Mont Pelerin Society articulated the neoliberal program, a thought collective led by the Austrian political philosopher Friedrich von Hayek. However, neoliberalism remained on the margins of the economic policy until the 1970s. The economic crisis in the 1970s led to neoliberalism breaking through into mainstream politics and economics. Both the US and the UK experienced stagflation – high inflation, high unemployment, and low growth – which led policymakers to search for alternatives to Keynesianism (Jones 2012). Once neoliberalism emerged from the fringes of economics, it was popularized as a set of policies by Ronald Reagan, Margaret Thatcher, and Deng Xiaoping (Harvey 2007; Mirowski 2014).
Certain authors suggest that there is a distinction between neoliberal theory and practice, or that the practice has significantly departed from the theoretical model of neoliberalism (Harvey 2007; Hilgers 2012; Ferguson 2010). According to neoliberal theory, the state should use its monopoly on violence to uphold the institutional framework that assures individual freedoms. Such institutions are strong individual property rights, the rule of law, free market, and free trade (Harvey 2007). While individual freedoms, that is, market freedoms, are guaranteed in the neoliberal state, individual welfare is a matter of personal responsibility (Cruikshank 1999; Galvin 2002; Rose and Novas 2005; Shamir 2008). Unlike early nineteenth-century liberal theory, which aims to maximize freedom for as many individuals, the neoliberal theory is critical of and destructive to democracy and sees it as a potential threat to individual rights – predominantly market freedoms – and the rule of law (Brown 2003, 2015; Harvey 2007; Springer 2009). Thus, neoliberalism favors the rule of elites and experts, legitimized through the promotion of “trickle down” theory (Harvey 2007). Harvey states that some of the divergences of practice from theory stem from internal contradictions within the neoliberal theory itself – such as how to interpret monopoly power and market failures – as well as political contradictions within neoliberalism. One of them is a contradiction between strong individualism and desire for collective life, which ultimately creates a paradox concerning the neoliberal state: the existence of “intense state interventions and government by elites and ‘experts’ in a world where the state is supposed not to be interventionist” (Harvey 2007, 69).

Daniel Goldstein (2012), alongside Stephen Collier (2012), problematizes the analytical distinction between neoliberal theory and practice. The theory of neoliberalism cannot be found in some founding “Ur text” which could serve as a template for its implementation. Neoliberal theory, just like its implementation, is contradictory, heterogeneous, and “messy,” and hence both theory and practice are social processes positioned in specific times and spaces. Instead of comparing neoliberal theory – whatever that may be – to various cases of neoliberalism on the ground, it is more productive to approach _actually existing neoliberalisms_ not as local varieties of one global, uniform theory, but as “sets of theories and practices about the world that are fundamentally the products of local history and experience – much of it
shaped by colonialism and its aftermath – and impactful of lived daily reality” (Goldstein 2012, 305; also see Collier 2012; Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 2018; Peck and Theodore 2012).

The critique of distinguishing between neoliberal theory and implementation is in line with authors who argue against looking at neoliberalism as a tidal wave (Ong 2006b) or Leviathan (Collier 2012; Latour and Callon 1981) that spreads from one or two centers where it can be found in its “purest” form – usually assuming the US and the UK as the centers in question. Similar to the concepts of modernization (Cooper 2005) and globalization (Cooper 2001; 2005; Tsing 2000), neoliberalism was described as a universal monolith that bulldozes over and transforms local economies (Springer 2013), making it a fundamentally omnipotent, omnipresent, and for its analysis, a theoretically promiscuous concept (Clarke 2008). However, not only does neoliberalism not exist anywhere in its “pure” or “paradigmatic” form – including the US – but neoliberalism itself can be considered an abstraction (Peck 2004; Springer 2013). Discourses on neoliberalism-as-monolith – coming from both the right and the left – obscure the messiness and geographical variations between various political contexts. Thus, Aihwa Ong proposes to approach neoliberalism as “a migratory technology of governing that interacts with situated sets of elements and circumstances” (Ong 2007, 5).

Feminist critique has turned our attention to how Marxist authors – such as Harvey or Wallerstein – tend to produce a discourse of capitalism² as a unified entity (a system rather than a set of practices), singular (a dominant system without its true equivalent), and total phenomenon (everything, even socialist practices, exists within capitalism). Such discourse rests on a conceptualization of the economy as an autonomous social sphere and the reproduction of a monolithic conception of class (Gibson-Graham 1996). Conceptualizing capitalism in such a way carries not only analytical consequences but also political, by impeding our ability to resist capitalism and imagine alternative futures (Gibson-Graham 1996; 2006). Some authors,

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² Late capitalism is a temporal and descriptive term that is used to mark transformations in the nature of capitalism, while neoliberalism refers to an ideological movement and particular political rationality (Ganti 2014; Harvey 1990). However, the terms are sometimes used interchangeably.
primarily political economists from the field of human geography, further this proposal and argue that, rather than speaking of universal neoliberalism, it is more productive to speak of a series of “partial, shifting and thoroughly hybridized” neoliberalizations (Springer 2013, 151; Birch and Siemiatycki 2016; Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010; England and Ward 2007; Peck and Theodore 2012).

Harvey states that neoliberalism is marked by a structural change in the nature of governance, that is, a shift from the government – centrality of state apparatus – to governance, a “broader configuration of the state and key elements in civil society” (Harvey 2007, 76–7). Even though there is no agreed-upon definition of governance among scholars, it can be understood as “governing without Government” (Rhodes 1997), a transformation from hierarchical governing to “networked, integrated, cooperative, partnered, disseminated, and at least partly self-organized” governing (Brown 2015, 123). Governance is not exclusive to neoliberalism, but it has been mobilized as the primary administrative form in neoliberalism and represents the key instrument for economizing life (Brown 2015, 122). Governance is not only reflected in a partnership between governmental, para-governmental, and non-governmental organizations – public-private partnership (Jessop 1997) – but also in the dissolution of the distinction between state, business, nonprofit, and NGO endeavors as each institution conducts itself in alignment with a business model (Brown 2015, 123). This process is particularly visible in the general shift towards the privatization of state practices (Hibou 2004), such as private prisons (Fassin 2016; Wacquant 2009), private military contractors (Starzmann 2015; Woods 2011), and privatization of healthcare and social security (Abadía-Barrero 2016; Adams 2013; Calhoun 2006; Smith-Nonini 1998).

Neoliberalism as political rationality thus reorganizes relationships between the market, state, and individuals (Ganti 2014). Some authors suggest that the state retreats from the market in neoliberalism – evidenced by a diminished public sector – making way for the principle of the free market to organize exchange and competition (Prasad 2006; Haque 2008). This view has been heavily criticized (Brown 2003; Harvey 2007; Wacquant 2012), as has the market/state dichotomy, or the construction of the two as two separate realms (Bockman 2011). The belief in market control as opposed to
that of the state is a trait that neoliberalism shares with classical liberalism (Lemke 2001), but rather than disappearing, the state gets restructured and recalibrated to function as a business, that is, on a for-profit basis (Mirowski 2014; Ong 2006b; Peck and Theodore 2012; Hilgers 2012). Thus, Harvey defines the neoliberal state as “a state apparatus whose fundamental mission is to facilitate conditions for profitable capital accumulation” (2007, 7). Hence, following the authors that argue that ‘the state’ has not disappeared in neoliberalism, anthropological investigation of state practices and imagination is still highly relevant. This is especially the case in contexts where the state acts or is expected to act as the main provider of welfare services (see Brković 2017; Muehlebach 2012; Read 2014). In fact, people may construe ‘the state’ as agentive, thus developing a set of emotions, hopes, fears, desires, and affects about the state (see Linke 2006; Laszczkowski and Reeves 2017; Pinker and Harvey 2015; Stoler 2006).

In his Preface to African Political Systems, Radcliffe-Brown (1940) rejected the notion of the state as an analytical object, arguing that it represents a philosophical fiction as it phenomenologically does not exist. He further states that what does exist is an organization, a collection of individuals integrated into a system of social relations. Philip Abrams (1988) disagrees that the state should not be studied anthropologically and develops some of Radcliffe-Brown’s arguments, namely his point that the state as such does not exist as an entity. Rather, the state itself is a reified construct, “a mask which prevents our seeing political practice as it is” (Abrams 1988, 58), thus following Engels who says that the state represents “the first ideological power over man” that reproduces class relations3 (Engels 1959 cited in Abrams 1988, 64; see also Miliband 1969; Poulantzas 1975). Abrams proposes the abandonment of the state as a material object of study and instead argues for a focus on the idea of the state as an ideological construct, a “social fact – but not a fact in nature” which gets construed out of political agencies and institutions – the state system (Abrams 1988, 75).

3 Male Marxist authors have privileged class relations in social analysis, often leaving the question of gender and racial disparity unaddressed or treating it as a ‘subsection’ of class disparity and/or criticizing feminism as a bourgeois discipline. For that reason, gender and race were often absent from Marxist analyses of the state, as well as in general (see Brown 2006; Hartmann 1979; Mackinnon 1989; Robinson 2000).
The state has re-emerged into the spotlight of anthropology in the 1990s and is characterized by an interest in analyzing both state images and state representations. Authors writing this “new” anthropology of the state followed Abrams in criticizing the assumption of the state as an empirical object of study (Sharma and Gupta 2006a); such a reified conceptualization of the state was representative of statist approaches of the 1960s (see Krasner 1978; Nordlinger 1988; Skocpol 1979). Anthropologists have critiqued the analytical spatial optics of the state as constituting an all-seeing, all-encompassing repository of power that is placed “above society,” even though people and communities might conceptualize it as such (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Li 2005, 383). The proposed goal of the anthropological analysis was to understand “how ‘the state’ comes into being, how ‘it’ is differentiated from other institutional forms, and what effects this construction has on the operation and diffusion of power throughout society” (Sharma and Gupta 2006a, 8). However, this does not imply that the state is institutionally fixed, as it is not bound nor represented by any one institution, as it is “not an apparatus but a set of processes” and relations of power (Trouillot 2001, 127). Such an approach emphasizes the role of culture in state formation (Navaro-Yashin 2002; Sharma and Gupta 2006b; Steinmetz 1999; Yang 2005) and looks at how the state gets imagined and (re) produced on the local level through everyday bureaucratic encounters (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 1995; 2012), practices of customs officers (Chalfin 2010; Kostić 2017), police officers (Cabot 2018; Fassin 2013), development workers (Ferguson 1990; Li 2007), school teachers (Wilson 2001) and ‘ordinary’ citizens (Anjaria and Rao 2014). ‘The state’ can be encountered in mundane practices of circulation of documents (Cons 2016; Hull 2012; Navaro-Yashin 2007; Verdery 2014), newspaper reading (Gupta 1995), using roads and public transportation (Dalakoglou 2016; Simić 2014), or waiting in line (Auyero 2012).

Anthropological approaches to the state have thus turned our attention to the state’s dual nature as a set of representations and a set of practices (Abrams 1988; Mitchell 2006; Sharma and Gupta 2006a). In order to address the connection between state-as-image and state-as-practice, it is necessary to produce ethnographically sound analyses that will focus on the state as a set of relational practices between actors who are embedded in various networks and hierarchies, which often do not overlap with images of a coherent state (Read 2014; Simić 2017; Thelen, Thiemann and Roth 2014; Verdery 1996).
Tatjana Thelen, Larisa Vettes, and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann (2017) propose a relational approach to studying the state, which they term *stategraphy*. The authors develop stategraphy to fill the analytical void between analyzing state images and practices, which they perceive in social studies of the state. Approaching the state as a “social relation” was previously articulated by Nikos Poulantzas (1969) and was later picked up by Bob Jessop (2008) in his “strategic-relational approach.” Thelen, Vettes, and Benda-Beckmann complement these approaches by “maintaining a processual focus in which relational modalities and the influence of embeddedness become palpable in the multitude of recurrent face-to-face encounters” (Thelen, Vettes, and Benda-Beckmann 2017, 7). The approach incorporates three avenues of analysis. Starting with the premise that the state exists between actors with uneven access to resources and who “negotiate over ideas of legitimate power by drawing on existing state images,” the first avenue presents a focus on different relational modalities that draw on “differing normative concepts of what a state should be and how it should act and embody past experiences in structural environments that translate into contingent expectations for the future” (Thelen, Vettes and Benda-Beckmann 2017, 7).

The second avenue of analysis focuses on *boundary work* (Thelen, Vettes, and Benda-Beckmann 2017). Two fields of boundary work are prominent: boundaries between family/kinship and the state (see Borneman 1992; Brown 2006; Herzfeld 1993; MacKinnon 1989; Thelen, Thiemann, and Roth 2014; Yang 2005), and those between state and civil society (see Gramsci 2006; Hann 2005; Kaviraj and Khilnani 2001; Mitchell 1991). The question of how we can locate the boundaries of state power was indirectly posed by Foucault (2008) even though he explicitly refused to deal with the question of the state as such (Lemke 2007). He stated that the boundary between what should and what should not fall under the state’s power, or the boundary between the public and the private, is a matter of governmental tactics (Foucault 2009). Timothy Mitchell (1991) further investigated governmental tactics and insisted that the production of the state/society boundary was not a simple division between two objects, but rather an *effect* that was a result of social and relational practices. Thus, anthropologists should, via ethnographic methods, look at how people enact, extend, or resist that boundary (Mitchell 1991; Thiemann 2016).
The third proposed analytical focus is on *embeddedness*, which emphasizes the “need to observe different sets of actors and their personal embedding within state hierarchies as well as within other networks” (Thelen, Vetters, and Benda-Beckmann 2017, 8; see also Benda-Beckmann and Benda-Beckmann 1998). Relations between embedded actors are characterized by power differentials and differences in access to resources, and as such, reproduce boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Thelen, Vetters and Benda-Beckmann 2017).

**SELF AND CITIZENSHIP IN NEOLIBERALISM**

According to Foucault, government, or “the conduct of conduct” (Gordon 1991, 2), can be defined as an “attempt to shape human conduct by calculated means” (Li 2007b, 275). Unlike sovereignty, the government is concerned with populations rather than individuals or specific groups. Its purpose is “to improve the condition of the population, to increase its wealth, its longevity, and its health” (Foucault 2009, 105). Securing the wellbeing of populations requires the exercise of a particular form of rationality, which Foucault termed government rationality or *governmentality* (Foucault 2009). Governmentality is concerned with the question of the nature of government and ways in which it can be properly exercised – envisioned as a practice rather than one institution or ideology (Gordon 1991). For Foucault, governmentality represents an ensemble of institutions, calculations, techniques, and tactics aimed at regulating populations; a historical tendency in the western world in which “government” emerged as the predominant – but not exclusive – form of power (over sovereignty and discipline); and a process through which the state of justice of the Middle ages, which transformed into the administrative state in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually became “governmentalized” (Foucault 2009, 108-9).

From the governmentality perspective, government represents a continuum between the government of others and the government of self. In attempting to sketch out a history of the human organization of knowledge

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4 For quite some time, studies of governmentality mostly ignored non-western (Lemke 2007; but see O’Malley 1996a) and non-liberal contexts (see Brotherton 2012).
about themselves, Foucault referred to specific techniques that people use to understand themselves. He called them *technologies*, or “[matrices] of practical reason” (Foucault 1988, 18), and identified four of them: technologies of production, technologies of sign systems, technologies of power, and technologies of the self. In his work, he predominantly focused on the latter two but insisted all four technologies are interconnected. Governing the self refers to forms of self-regulation and philosophical practices which guide that self-regulation through focusing the body and mind in pursuit of “the good life” (Burchell 1993; Lemke 2001; Rose 1999). Those are the practices Foucault terms *technologies of the self* (Foucault 1988). Technologies of the self represent ethnographically visible socially embedded practices, “which promise to show the universe in a grain of sand” as they enact particular political rationalities (Brodwin 2017, 78). As such, they still present a useful analytical concept for anthropologists.

Earlier authors tended to link freedom as a site of resistance to the government (Rose, O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 90), but Nikolas Rose (1999; 1992) argued that a key strategy for “governing the soul” was the creation of freedom. As Graham Burchell explains, liberalism – in all its versions – construes the relationship between government and the governed that lies upon the assumption that “individuals are required to assume the status of being the subjects of their lives, upon the ways in which they fashion themselves as certain kinds of subjects, upon the ways in which they practise their freedom” (Burchell 1993, 276). Barbara Cruikshank makes a similar point by arguing that democratic government “depends upon the ability of citizens to recognize, isolate and act upon their own subjectivity, to be governors of their selves” (Cruikshank 1997, 235). She insists that our relationship to ourselves construed through self-governing is directly related to citizenship as “[t]he constitution of the citizen-subject requires technologies of subjectivity, technologies aimed at producing happy, active and participatory democratic citizens” and argues that democracy is “entirely dependent upon technologies of citizenship” (Cruikshank 1997, 247).

Aihwa Ong (1996) uses a Foucauldian approach to subjectivity to address the question of citizenship. Ong uses the concept of *cultural citizenship* understood as “a cultural process of ‘subject-ification’ in the Foucauldian sense of “self-making and being-made by power relations that produce con-
sent through schemes of surveillance, discipline, control, and administra-
tion” (Ong 1996, 737). While Renato Rosaldo’s (1994) concept of cultural
citizenship focuses on the demands of disadvantaged subjects for full par-
ticipation in the democratic processes, Ong (1996) employs the concept to
refer to a dialectical process of making-up citizenship by the state as well
as the citizens. Making up citizenship is thus a dual-sided process that gets
negotiated between subjects and the state, as well as civil society and social
groups. As such, cultural citizenship as an analytical concept investigates
both top-down and bottom-up practices and does not restrict the investiga-
tion of the former to state-led practices like some authors do (Corrigan and
Sayer 1985; Scott 1998) and recognizes the role that agents beyond the state
have in governing different categories of subjects (Ong 1996; also see Dean
1999; Ferguson 1990; Li 2005; Mitchell 1991; Rose 1999; Rose and Miller
1992; Trouillot 2001). Such an approach allows anthropologists to showcase
citizens’ agency, which is ethnographically visible through observation of
claims-making practices and expectations put forward to the state. Since
citizenship status is never static, simultaneous analysis of the expectations
that the state itself presents to its citizens allows anthropologists to get a
fuller picture of the subject-making process (see Cabot 2014; Dagnino 2005;
James 2013; Molé 2012; Nuijten 2013; Petryna 2002).

A premise that citizenship represents more than a bundle of rights and
responsibilities tied to a particular national community is widely accepted
among anthropologists (Lazar and Nuijten 2013). Anthropologists have ar-
gued that citizenship is never simply defined through formal and legal fra-
meworks of a sovereign state and that it “sets uneasily within those frames”
(Petryna and Follis 2015, 403). Citizenship is processual, contingent, and
contested and heterogeneous groups may claim rights and benefits associat-
ed with citizenship (Ong 2006a; Lazar 2013; Ticktin 2011), and citizens-
ship – as is the case with liberal democracy – does not represent a category
towards which all people universally aspire (Hindess 2004; Petryna and
Follis 2015; Scott 1996).

Liberal rule, and in particular rule in “advanced liberal democracies,” seeks
to govern through “regulated choices of individual citizens, now construed as
subjects of choices and aspirations to self-actualization and self-fulfillment”
(Rose 2006, 147). Government of social, personal, and economic conduct and
their alignment with political objectives is made possible not only through macro-political schema but also through ‘indirect’ mechanisms which make them governable “at a distance”: calculative and computational techniques, procedures of auditing, creation of vocabularies, architectural forms, statistical methods, et cetera (Miller and Rose 1990, 8; see also Hacking 1975; 1991; Shore 2008; Shore and Wright 2015; Strathern 2000). These action mechanisms at a distance (Latour 1987) heavily rely on expertise – social authority granted to specific agents based on their claims to specialized knowledge and truths (Li 2007a; Matza 2012; Miller and Rose 1990; Mitchell 2002; Rose 1999). Subjects of advanced liberal government are envisioned as individuals actively working to “enterprise” and fulfill themselves within their own “micro-moral domains” or communities (Rose 2006, 158). Governing at a distance involves increased emphasis on individual responsibility – related to the state’s retreat from the provision of welfare services – and the employment of calculative, prudential, and risk-managing practices (Burchell 1993; Cruikshank 1999; O’Malley 1992; 1996b; Rose 2007).

Responsibility and responsibilization are commonly named among the main elements in the production of neoliberal subjectivities (see Burchell 1993; Miller and Rose 1990; Rose 2006; 2007; Shamir 2008; Zigon 2010). Drawing on Foucault’s work on technologies of the self, responsibilization is commonly defined as the redelegation of responsibility from the state onto the individuals to govern themselves, and understood in that way, is coupled with the process of irresponsibilization of the state (Cradock 2007). This process is particularly visible in the example of social services and health-care provision. Citizens of “advanced liberal democracies” become self-governing individuals who are supposed to make responsible choices about their own health in a way that would minimize the burden on the state and maximize their own wellbeing (Miller and Rose 2008).

In many places facing neoliberal transformation, citizenship is understood in ethical terms. Ethical citizenship is a category that refers to a new kind of relationship between the state and citizens, and between citizens themselves, that frames them as moral subjects of responsible communities (Brković 2017; Muehlebach 2012; Petryna 2002). In that framework, the state should support citizens and communities – such as voluntary associations – to take on their share of responsibility for collective welfare.
Voluntary labor has gained attention in scholarship dealing with neoliberalism, and authors studying volunteerism argue that in neoliberal governance, volunteer labor is repositioned as states shift the responsibility for social security onto citizens. As such, volunteer labor is situated in the expansion of affective economy, where compassionate labor is being utilized as a mobilizing strategy to provide care (see Adams 2013; Brown and Prince 2015; Muehlebach 2012). A particular form of subjectivity and belonging – ethical citizenship – is produced through practices of mobilizing unpaid volunteer labor, as calls for responsibility to provide care are distributed.

However, the idea that a singular neoliberal model of the self – the responsibilized citizen – is universally adopted and unresisted is analytically problematic (Dunn 2005; Ho 2009; Yanagisako 2002). People react to calls for responsibility in a multitude of ways, and in everyday practice, responsibility is defined in a range of meanings. The idealized neoliberal self-governing individuals are, in fact, embedded in a variety of social relations and interdependencies: to the family, community, state, or workplace (Rose 2006). In relation to different kinds of socialities, responsibility and accountability gain different meanings and are practiced in numerous, sometimes contradictory, ways. Trnka and Trundle (2017) address this issue by introducing the analytical concept of competing responsibilities. Even though responsibilization as a concept refers to the delegation of responsibility from the state onto the individuals to govern their own access to care (Maslovsky 2000), responsibility gets defined in numerous ways – for example, as a non-reciprocal relationship in caregiving practices, or a reciprocal one in ideologies of the social contract – and is not characteristic of one form of governance (Hage and Eckersley 2012; Rose 2006; Trnka and Trundle 2017).

The processes of making claims about responsibility can be enacted in ways not exclusively specific to the neoliberal ideal of the self-managing individual, but as enmeshed in a variety of relationships of care and cooperation, and which can ultimately serve as a strategy of resisting neoliberalism (see Chudakova 2017; Hage and Eckersley 2012; Rose 2006; Trnka and Trundle 2017). Such an approach reveals the intricacies of everyday life since it allows us to look at how people use opposing notions of responsibility simultaneously without feeling conflicted, depending on the context and power relations at play (Kleinman 2006; Zigon 2010).
An open approach to responsibility is a productive way to think about neoliberalism as a mobile technology or about how neoliberalism as governing rationality travels and gets selectively appropriated and re-appropriated in various contexts (Ong 2007). For example, Jessica Robbins-Ruszkowski (2017) shows how, in postsocialist Poland, neoliberal reanimation of the civil society sector resulted in the constitution of new relations of intimacy and mutuality between older Polish citizens. In her book *One Blue Child*, Susanna Trnkka (2017) investigates how the introduction of global and national health policies that emphasize self-managed care is being used to promote and enact more patient-focused and personalized approaches to healing. Anthropological efforts to decouple responsibility from neoliberalism resulted in discussions of how care is sometimes more connected to feelings of responsibility than love (Gilligan 1982; Held 2005), and implications that this link has for negotiating levels of dependence, obligation, or mutual obligation (Hage 2003; Mol 2008). By approaching responsibility as a heterogeneous mode of ethical and social engagement, anthropologists can additionally inoculate themselves against the view of neoliberalism as a tidal wave and investigate the ways in which – even in the same social field – various actors can react and strategically engage the implementation of neoliberal measures in different ways, depending on the situation.

**CARE AND HEALTH IN NEOLIBERALISM**

The question of deservingness of care is inseparable from the production of citizenship, and in the context of places undergoing a neoliberal restructuring of the state, from neoliberal notions of personhood. A number of ethnographic studies in various context have investigated the production of such ethical citizenship, but also showed that neoliberalism, in fact, produces an extraordinary multiplicity of subjectivities (see Cabot 2016; Lazzarato 2014; Matza 2009; 2012; Molé 2012; Muehlebach 2012; Rozakou 2016). In the context of (health)care, ethical citizenship relates to strategic practices of enacting patienthood and “managing” illness (see Carr 2011; Ecks 2010; Galvin 2002; Mol 2008; Sunder Rajan 2017).

As the state’s involvement in welfare provision diminishes in neoliberalism, the involvement of the private sector and civil society rises (Brković
2016; Horton et al. 2014; Lamphere 2005; Rylko-Bauer and Farmer 2002). Such institutional shifts have consequences on multiple levels, such as the changes in the quality of services offered, as well as availability and affordability of those services. Given that uneven structural development is “the hallmark of geography of capitalism” (Smith 2008, 4), quality, availability, and affordability of care is also unevenly distributed, thus producing specific bio-inequalities (Fassin 2009; see also Coburn 2000; Nguyen and Peschard 2003). Even though universal healthcare is a (sometimes constitutionally guaranteed) ideal in many countries and is promoted by the WHO (2013), resources to distribute that right equally lack in most places, especially in the so-called ‘developing world’ (Pfeiffer and Chapman 2010; Smith-Nonini 2006). Policies of ‘structural adjustment’ – first and foremost privatization and user fees – required by trans-governmental agencies such as the IMF or the World Bank have increased global health inequalities.

The neoliberal healthcare reform – in which market logic becomes the dominant ideology in healthcare – and the struggles around it reflect a transformation of moral values around human life (Abadía-Barrero 2016; Mulligan 2010). The management of for-profit healthcare systems goes hand in hand with the implementation of population control mechanisms, among which is the shaping of personhood according to market principles (Abadía-Barrero 2016). The promotion of the ideal of a responsibilized individual represents one such mechanism, which can then be used to allocate and limit access to welfare services. Sarah Horton (2004) explores how the US public healthcare system “resolves” the problem of limited resources by establishing categories of ‘deservingness’ of citizenship benefits – such as Medicare – through which Mexican immigrants are cast as irresponsible and undeserving of benefits and ‘hard working’ Cuban refugees are labeled as deserving of welfare. Access to healthcare thus reflects power relations between a public-private partnership that follows the neoliberal logic of competition and individual choice and citizens attempting to use healthcare services (Abadía-Barrero 2016; Mol 2008).

Thus, in neoliberalism, health is construed through the “logic of choice” as a matter that should be managed on an individual level, rather than be addressed institutionally (Mayr 2008; Mol 2008). Instead of the state being solely responsible for covering healthcare provision after the fact, the indi-
viduals, families, and communities take on the responsibility of limiting the demand for healthcare through healthy lifestyles. The responsibilities of local actors such as NGOs, local-level service providers, and associations are also renegotiated. Processes of neoliberalization of healthcare brought to the deinstitutionalization and migration of medical services to the private and informal sector (Birungi 1998; Streefland 2005), tensions between healthcare providers and local communities (Bassett et al. 1997; Foster 2005), uneven access to healthcare services (Farmer 2004; 2008; Foley 2009; Kes- havjee 2004; Mulligan and Castañeda 2017) which directly impacts health outcomes in poor communities (Comaroff 2007; Farmer 2001; Singer 1998).

Some authors argue that a new form of citizenship is emerging in the age of new biomedical technologies and genomics, termed biological citizenship (Petryna 2002; Rose and Novas 2005). Rose and Novas (2005) say that contemporary political and economic forces are considering the political and national form of citizenship projects that emerged after the XVIII century civil rights policies. By citizenship projects they refer to ways in which the designated authorities are recognizing certain individuals as citizens and acting upon them. The interrogations of the citizenship project happened because, on the one hand, the nation cannot be seen anymore as a single bounded unity, and on the other, specific biological ideas have underlined many citizenship projects in a way that is somewhat different from their earlier eugenics-informed racialized and nationalized forms. The analysis of such forms of citizenship must incorporate both strategies for making up citizens “from above,” but more importantly, focus on how the notion of citizenship has shaped the ways in which individuals understand themselves in terms of knowledge of their somatic individuality. Such “regimes of the self” create a self-governing prudent and enterprising individual that takes control over their own life through making informed choices. The responsibility for the self is now comprised of both corporeal and genetic responsibility – for one’s own body and health, as well as genome (see also Franklin 2000; Heath et al. 2007; Kerr 2003; Rapp 2000).

In the absence of state-supported welfare, citizens often turn to voluntary associations and NGOs to gain access to care. As people turn to the civic sector to seek care, certain authors argue that a new form of sociality emerges concerning biological citizenship termed biosociality (Rabinow 1996; Rose
and Novas 2005; Gibbon and Novas 2008; Guell 2011). The concept refers to collectivities that form around a notion of shared biology, such as patient rights groups and organizations. The key to the functioning of this biological citizenship is a “political economy of hope,” where biology is no longer seen as destiny, but rather as a manageable and manipulable implicated fate (Rose and Novas 2005; Novas 2006). This moral economy presumes that “life itself” becomes imbued with social meanings and connected to the capital, and in that way, the vitality of every individual becomes a potential source of biovalue (Novas 2006).

Bio-concepts have also attracted various types of criticism. Kean Birch (2017) turns our attention to the fact that ways in which bio-concepts have been used lack empirical support for generic conclusions that are drawn from their use. That is not to say that bio-concepts need to be discarded, but their use needs to be dissociated from the same generic conclusions.

Some authors have observed an odd absence of the investigation of inequality in Foucauldian inquiries of biopolitics (Fassin 2009; Marsland and Prince 2012). Marsland and Prince (2012) pose the following question: to what extent are “biological identities” important to persons on the margins, where poverty is the most significant factor in the proliferation of illness? The realm of biomedical technologies of which Rose and Rabinow speak (genetic testing, new reproductive technologies) are available to a very limited number of people, of upper-class positions. As ethnographic data shows, there is a pronounced disjuncture between biomedical experiences in impoverished regions and “the emerging politics of life” that authors such as Rose and Rabinow discuss (Marsland and Prince 2012; see also Davis 2012; Guell 2012; Marsland 2012).

Plows and Boddington (2006) critique the concept of biocitizenship and say that it tends to obscure relations of inequality and promote normative ways of engaging in biosocial relations. The authors argue that patient organizations do not actually always organize around biologically understood shared identity. Thus, the authors argue that we should look into how patients’ communal identity is being articulated and how their social practices relate to already established kinship, friendship, and professional relations.

Rebecca Marsland (2012) offers a good path to rethink biosociality – by taking note of the “social” aspect as equally as we look into the “bio” part.
Marsland says that by observing the sociopolitical circumstances in which biosociality takes shape, we can see the existence of a tension between ideal prescribed citizenship practices and structurally constrained possibilities of leading a good life (see also Marsland and Prince 2012). These circumstances affect how personhood gets shaped and which goals do people try and achieve through health activism. This point is also made in Cornelia Guell’s (2012) article on Turkish migrants in Germany who struggle with diabetes management. By paying close attention to their particular positions in society – as precarious and marginal members of the community – she concluded that the practices of self-care that they were doing were not merely about abiding by the principles of ideal citizenship but rather about addressing their precarious positions through interventions in their bodies and community organizing.

Andrea Muehlebach (2012) looks at the case of the Italian state mobilizing precarious citizens to volunteer their labor in acts of simultaneous care for the self and others. Yet rather than merely concluding that the state exploits unpaid labor of the unemployed and pensioners, Muehlebach questions the premise that neoliberalism is irreconcilable with relations of care and solidarity. According to the author, neoliberalism produces “a highly moralized kind of citizenship” (Muehlebach 2012, 6), where volunteers driven by altruism become ethical citizens. Of course, the creation of the category of ethical citizens goes in hand with exclusion of another group – volunteers discursively reproduce the distinction between themselves and female immigrant domestic workers who are perceived as being driven by money, not altruism, hence raising the value of their own morality. Thus, not only does neoliberalism produce more than one type of responsibilized self, and not only are neoliberal subjects always enmeshed in a variety of social relationships but care – generally understood as a positive activity – is a morally laden concept and is interlocked with the production of citizenship and shaping of subjectivities (see also Brotherton 2012; Keshavjee 2014; Koch 2013).

Tatjana Thelen (2015) argues that the concept of care has been academically discussed, for one, in fragmented ways, as a practice or relationship that emerges from already existing relations, such as kinship, friendship, and patronage (see also Drotbohm 2009). Additionally, care has tended to
be tied to the reproduction of particular binaries, such as private-public, good-bad, traditional-modern. For example, ‘warm’ relations of care that happen in intimate, private settings of a household are contrasted with ‘cold’ institutional care (Hochschild 1995; cf. Mol, Moser, and Pols 2010; Pols and Moser 2009; Thelen 2015). Therefore, narratives of intimate paid care or unpaid emotional care provided by non-family members have tended to be dismissed as inauthentic (Thelen 2015, 499).

Furthermore, care is not necessarily defined as a reciprocal or symmetrical relationship – examples are the relationship between the state and citizens or between a parent and child – it can involve various levels of dependencies and obligations, is constantly (re)negotiated both on an individual and societal level (Robbins Ruszkowski 2017; Trnka and Trundle 2017), and does not necessarily produce a positive effect, but can also cause harm (Stevenson 2014; Ticktin 2011). Thus, defining what care is, who is responsible for providing it, who deserves to receive it, and what constitutes responsible care is far from straightforward (see also Davis 2012; Hemment 2012).

To overcome these theoretical inadequacies, Thelen (2015) argues that care needs to be put at the forefront of analysis. This would include: a recognition that both caregivers and care-receivers equally participate in the construction of need and responsibility; situating care practices in the context of broader institutionalized frameworks; disentangling care from the private sphere to include experiences beyond family and kin; and leaving behind the normative framework which construes care as a necessarily positive activity and instead of looking at it as an open-ended process (Thelen 2015, 508). Care can thus be a starting position to investigate the production of social differences through unequal power relations, but also as the entry point for the analysis of new forms of relationships and institutions that enhance solidarity and mutuality (Lawson et al. 2007). To do so, the investigation of care needs to be coupled with the exploration of the economy and the position of care in the global reorganization of labor (Green and Lawson 2011).

Anthropological investigation of health and care goes hand in hand with analyzing economic and political transformation. Thus, to effectively address care as an open-ended relational process, neoliberalism and the state need to be conceptualized as contingent, contested, and relational. This includes challenging the hegemonic status of neoliberalism, questioning the univer-
sality of the neoliberal construction of subjectivity, decoupling responsibility and similar technologies of the self from neoliberalism, and paying attention to our interlocutors’ agency in the shaping of socio-political systems.

WHAT’S NEOLIBERALISM GOT TO DO WITH IT?

The concept of neoliberalism, even though heavily criticized, is still commonly used in anthropology. However, rather than treating the concept as self-evident, we can find productive ways to utilize and operationalize neoliberalism. A proposed way of avoiding the treatment of neoliberalism as an omnipresent and omnipotent Leviathan (Clarke 2008; Collier 2012) is to focus on neoliberalism as a mobile technology of governing (Ong 2007) that selectively gets (re)appropriated in particular contexts. Analyzing actually existing neoliberalisms (Peck, Brenner, and Theodore 2018) or processes of neoliberalization (Springer 2013) as products of local circumstances, not as local versions of a unified global neoliberal theory, is a productive way to not only contextualize our case studies but a good way to highlight the agency of all actors and analyze the ways in which political practices are constituted from “below” and from “above.”

Authors following Foucault (2008) have described ways in which processes of neoliberalization reshape subjectivities towards the ideal of market-driven, self-governing and calculating individuals. Shaping of subjectivities through self-governing is interconnected with citizenship-making processes (Cruikshank 1997; Ong 1996). In neoliberalism, this process becomes apparent in the construction of ethical citizenship or the framing of citizens as moral subjects of responsible communities (Brković 2017; Muehlebach 2012). As the state partially redelegates its responsibility for welfare provisioning to private and voluntary associations, ethical citizenship can be produced through the mobilization of unpaid caregiving labor. Thus, delegation of responsibility plays a key role in the citizenship-making process.

Responsibilization is often named a dominant technology of the self in the production of neoliberal subjectivities (Burchell 1993). The process of responsibilization includes shifting the responsibility from the state to individuals to govern themselves. However, responsibility is not specific to neoliberalism, and even in neoliberalism, it gets understood and enacted
in a multitude of ways depending on the context and social relationships in question (Trnka and Trundle 2017).

Claims-making practices based on citizenship, as well as providing and receiving care, are morally laden activities. Everyday moral “balancing acts” that happen in the face of social and economic transformation are indeed practices through which a moralized kind of subjectivity and citizenship is constituted and (re)shaped, and thus provide a good place to observe those processes. But in order to avoid the trap of using neoliberalism as a universal explanation, I argue we should follow authors who put responsibility and care as the starting points of analysis (Thelen 2015; Trnka and Trundle 2017). Such an approach requires leaving behind assumptions of what responsibility and care mean in a particular setting, especially leaving behind the assumption that they are automatically reproducing or resisting neoliberalism.

LITERATURE


A. Jugović Spajić: Approaching Actually Existing Neoliberalisms


Navaro-Yashin, Yael. 2007. “Make-Believe Papers, Legal Forms and the Counterfeit: Affective Interactions between Documents and People


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Teorijski pristupi realno postojećim neoliberalizmima: građanstvo, odgovornost i zdravstvena briga u antropologiji

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Odeljenje za antropologiju

Sažetak: Neoliberalizam kao koncept je stekao popularnost, kako u antropologiji, tako i u javnom diskursu, kao aparat i uzrok za objašnjenje rasta globalnih nejednakosti. U antropologiji, neoliberalizam je posebno postao popularan kao analitički koncept u poslednjih 15 godina, ali ne postoji slaganje oko njegovog značenja, a neretko se koristi bez operativne definicije. Istovremeno sa rastom popularnosti termina neoliberalizam, u antropologiji su takede proizvedene brojne kritike koncepta i dovedena je u pitanje njegova upotreba i analitička vrednost. U ovom preglednom članku, nastojim da predstavim kratku istoriju nastanka neoliberalne teorije, a zatim i kako se neoliberalizam kao analitički koncept koristio i kritikovao u antropologiji i srodnim disciplinama. Naročito se fokusiram na transformacije u „prirodi“ države, vladanja i subjektiviteta do kojih dolazi u poznom kapitalizmu, i kako im se može prići etnografski. Sve veća nedostupnost socijalnih programa u neoliberalizmu se intenzivno istražuje u antropologiji zdravlja i brige. Samim tim, posebnu pažnju posvećujem diskusiji upotrebe koncepata brige i odgovornosti u antropologiji u svrhu razumevanja globalnih neoliberalnih transformacija.

Ključne reči: neoliberalizam, država, građanstvo, briga, zdravlje, odgovornost