BANKING IN THE CONDITIONS OF DEREGULATION VS. REREGULATION

Ovaj rad obrađuje savremena kretanja komercijalnog bankarstva sučeljavajući faze deregulacije i globalnom hipotekarnom krizom pokrenute reregulacije te djelatnosti. U deregulatornim uslovima je došlo do zaoštravanja konkurentske pozicije banaka, na što su one reagovale povišenom: marketizacijom, odnosno globalizacijom, koncentracijom, sekjuritizacijom i konglomeratizacijom, te profitno orjentisanim menadžmentom rizika svoje aktivnosti. Kontrakcija njihove kamatne margine je tako bila neutralizovana redukcijom operativnih troškova i rezervi za gubitke, te povećanjem nekamatnog prihoda održavajući bankarsku profitabilnost. Recentna kriza je ukazala na potrebu čvršće regulacije ili reregulacije bankarskog sektora, sa svrhom umanjenja njegovog sistemskog rizika u čemu se ističe značaj strožijih međunarodnih standarda bankarskog kapitala i likvidnosti, te potreba adekvatnog tretmana sistemski značajnih banaka. Reregulacija treba da ojača kapitaliziranost i likvidnost, ublaži obim, koncentraciju, internacionaliziranost i poslovnu razuđenost, te poboljša nadzor bankarskog sektora implicirajući njegovu nižu, ali stabilniju rentabilnost. Na takvo dejstvo donesenog dijela ciljanih regulatornih mjera upućuje viša likvidnost, niža globalizacija, usporenija koncentracija i sekjuritizacija, te stabilizaciono orjentisana aktivnost menadžmenta rizikom današnjih banaka. Njihov rast i profitabilnost su oboreni.


Introduction
The global mortgage crisis, just like the previous economic ones, either of international or narrower scope, (re-)opened the issue -which therefore seems to be the eternal (unsolved) issue -of the optimal level of economic activity regulation, i.e. the necessary composition of market and administrative factors enabling its functioning. In the period up to the huge global economic crisis ("Great (Economic) Depression") it was believed in the sufficiency of autochthonous or spontaneous economic mechanisms to provide the desirable economic performance. The given crisis, however, granted the primacy to the state against the market when it came to channeling economic activity. Subsequently, enforcing the regulation of the economic process, implying, through its stagflation, the incompetence and inefficiency of the state as the mass entrepreneur and investor, led to the its management-related engagement being pushed towards the economy. Nevertheless, the launched era of economic deregulation starting in 1980s, and particularly in 1990s, first through the currency crisis at the end of the 20 th century, and then particularly through the global mortgage crisis ("Great Recession") in late 2000s, indicated that the newly-established, excessive liberalization of the economic process in the field of its financing, i.e. in the financial sector, and within it the commercial banking sector, was counterproductive, and that additional regulatory measures must be involved to achieve its higher stability and wider beneficial performance.
Thereby, although it generally does not considerably deviate from the trends manifested by all other sectors of (global) economy, commercial banking singled out as the field of (evident) primary manifestation, but also as the (assessed) fundamental cause of the recent crisis, attracting particular attention of all relevant stakeholders in economic life.
In analytical terms, it should determine the specific or critical weaknesses of the observed banking deregulation model, which, generally, by finding in its (internal and external) competitiveness the major potential contribution of that banking to the economic (and social) life through (consequential) narrowing of banks' interest margin, has (necessarily) led not only to the expansion of the scope and scale of their operations (in order to reduce the non-interest expenditures and increase the non-interest revenues, thereby maintaining the existing profitability), but also to riskier (securitiesbased) transactions, thereby getting them further away from their original role. Based on the (established) neuralgic weaknesses of the banking deregulation approach, there should arise a different, repeated regulation, i.e. reregulation of commercial banking, which evidently must take the opposing course (in relation to deregulation), focusing on stability (vs. competitiveness), thereby reducing the size, business scope and risk of the banking sector, bringing it back to its main purpose of (deep) financial intermediation. In this process (given that reregulation in itself is not sufficient to eliminate, let alone prevent economic and financial crises), it must be coordinated with the regulation reform of the remaining part of the financial sector, in the function of its higher transparency, along with other sector, primarily the monetary one, i.e. monetary policy, which, in addition to the stability of prices, should facilitate the stability of the entire financial sector (for the purpose of its higher stabilization efficiency).
This paper focuses on the (above mentioned) general need for a stabilization-based organization of commercial banks, by opposing the stages of its deregulation and reregulation. These stages are examined dominantly from the aspect of their manifestations and fundamental operational effects.
in synergy with the former. Deregulation in banking made the most powerful impact in the countries which (previously) had prominent regulation, the most important of which were the USA and Japan. In these countries, atypical or in other developed countries non-existent (banking) regulations in the first place reflected in a strict division of commercial (loans and deposits) and investment (securities operations) banking, and in the USA in certain limitations as to the expansion of banks' branch network, and maximization of their deposit interest rates. Deregulation abolished these limits, granting full freedom to banks in the developed world in terms of securities operations, physical dispersion of organizational units, and determination of interest rates on deposits. What remained included regulations in respect of obligatory insurance of (small) bank deposits, and limitation of volume of large bank loans.
Moreover, this led to the harmonization, at the international level, of norms concerning minimal capitalization of banks, supervision of their operations, and market transparency of these institutions, in respect of (though seemingly reregulation based) the main purpose of banks' deregulation, reflected in the strengthening of healthy mutual market competition of the concerned institutions, but without substantially jeopardizing the safety of their operations, thereby generating wider beneficial economic and social effects. These prudential norms of banking operations were prepared by the distinguished Basel Committee on Banking Supervision -BCBS, from the ranks of the Bank for International Settlement -BIS, defining them, initially, in a relatively rigid manner, through capital requirements for the identified credit risk (the so-called Basel I of 1988), and then for market risk as well (Appendix to Basel I in 1996). It was in the upgraded version (the so-called Basel II, see: BIS-BCBS, 2006), whose implementation (since 2007-2008), though not its creation (2006), was outside the deregulation period, ending with the occurrence of the global mortgage crisis (hereafter to be referred to simply as: crisis) in 2007 (the crisis which manifested itself until mid-2009, causing a reregulation of banking), that the BCBS defined a more flexible norms, taking into account the specificities of individual banks, i.e. allowing them to implement their own models of evaluation and relativization of risks (credit, market and operational), provided that they have been confirmed by the national regulatory institutions and transparently disclosed to the public.
Deregulation of banking was supported and encouraged (in addition to being triggered by it, as already stated) by another factor in the form of substantial changes in this field in the relevant pre-crisis period -i.e. the implementation of IT, and the electronization of business, both directly and indirectly, (in the latter case) affecting the complete financial and economic (and also social) structure, and through that (additionally) the banking itself. The implementation of IT (which, viewed individually, started several decades before the launching of banking deregulation) in banking recorded its most direct impacts in the occurrence of new products and/or distribution channels, in the form of: debit, credit and e(lectronic)-cash cards (whose development dates back to the 1950s), automated teller machines -ATMs, since 1967, electronic funds transfer points of sale -EFTPOS, since the 1970s, telephone banking (since 1983), Intranet and Internet banking (since 1995). It has also resulted in a genesis of sophisticated instruments of business decisionmaking, including risk management in banks, although its greatest effects are in the field of standardized, mostly payment operations and (above listed) instruments.
The basic consequence of the synergetic effect of deregulation and electronization of banking (in developed countries) was manifested in the stiffening of its competitive position. Namely, the given deregulation in itself makes it easier to conduct banking business, encouraging the appearance of new players and increasing the competition among them. Information technologies have the same impact, congealing the (required) material resources for performing banking activities (thereby, in the extreme forms of such impacts, making them acquire a virtual character). Moreover, by standardizing financial services and making them, in this sense, generally and specifically less banklike, they loosen the ties between banks and their clients, at the same time developing the motivation and potentials of non-banking financial institutions for providing such services. Also, by enabling a quick and quality evaluation of creditworthiness, they contribute to a direct connection between investors and large non-financial companies seeking resources at the financial market, thereby suppressing both banking and, in general, financial intermediation (the "disintermediation" effect).
To the stiffening of their competitive position the banks responded by means of the following: a) marketization and its special aspect -globalization of their activities; b) consolidation, i.e. concentration of the banking sector; c) expansion of off-balance sheet services as a considerable aspect of the restructuring of their business offer; d) securitization or intensified performance of securities-related operations as another way to redirect their business activities; e) conglomeration of the production of financial services, in combination with business alliances with appropriate non-financial companies; and f) generally speaking, implementation of (more efficient) profit-oriented risk management methods. These measures also contribute to the elimination of detrimental impact exerted by recessionary factors of a general (i.e. global) scope or a specific scope (at the level of individual countries) that banks occasionally (cyclically) get exposed to.
As an indicator of globalization of banking, i.e. the prominent accumulation of its international (and multinational) transactions (see: Pilbeam, 2006;Melvin, 2004;and Smith, Walter, 2003), we may use the quicker dynamics of growth of international and foreign assets and liabilities of banks worldwide, compared to total assets/liabilities of banks (domiciled) in representative developed countries: the USA, Japan and Germany. Thus, in the observed period, the international, i.e. foreign assets and liabilities of banks at the global level expanded at the rate of about 12% (Table 2), exceeding in their total value the (practically) stagnant growth in the Japanese banks, and by about 1/2, and by 1/3 of that value the growth rate of assets/liabilities in the German and American banks (6.57% and 8.07%), respectively.  The increased concentration of banking (see : Walter, 2004;Ćirović, 2007;and Rose, 2002) may be expressed by increasing the share of the five largest units of the banks' sector in its assets, and decreasing the (total) number of units of that sector within the selected developed countries. Thus, in the observed period the share of the top five in the assets of (all) banks in Germany, Japan and the USA was increased by 24, 17, and 10 percentage points (to 63%, 52%, and 31%), respectively (Table 3). Moreover, the (total) number of German and American banks dropped by about 1/5, and the number of Japanese banks by about 1/10 in the given period.
The expansion of off-balance sheet activities of banks (see: Kidwell et al, 2006;Heffernan, 2005;Koch, Macdonald, 2003;and Rose, 2002 The Japanese banks, however, did not follow suit in this ( d y n a m i c ) sense, because their respective participation dropped (by 6 percentage points) in the observed period, although its size, even at the end of the period (amounting to 32%), was rather impressive, and higher than the size recorded in the first-mentioned banks (Source of these data: Independent calculations of the author based on -Bank of Japan (BoJ), 2013).
The intensified securities-related operations (see: Ćirović, 2007;Matthews, Thompson, 2005;and Koch, Macdonald, 2003) are adequately represented by banks in Japan, where the share of these transactions in their assets is substantially increased (by 13 percentage points) in the observed period, reached at its end the highest value within the banks in the benchmark group of countries (34% - Table  6). In the American and German banks, the concerned participation was (almost) stable in the analogous period, with considerable sized recorded at its end (28% and 20%, respectively - Table 6).  2 Osim za Japan, gdje pokazuje stanje krajem marta naredne u odnosu na naznačenu godinu. 3 Podaci za Japan se odnose na 1999. g. 4 Podaci za Japan se odnose na 2011. g. In the aggravated conditions of their development and sustainability, banks did not seek solutions for advancing their position just within themselves, in terms of externalization, accumulation and restructuring of their original business activities, but also turned to nonbanking financial services and institutions, i.e. re-oriented to the production of a total package of financial services (classic banking, insurance, pension schemes, portfolio management, etc.), thereby generating financial conglomerates, or, at the retail level, financial supermarkets. Striving to fully exploit the economies of scale and scope, which is fundamental for the motivation of the given (and all other) business integrations, they started to establish business alliances with non-financial companies, serving clients on a mass scale, such as software, telecommunication and retail firms (see: Ćirović, 2007;Heffernan, 2005;and Rose, 2002). 1 Except for Germany, which indicates the share of the so-called "big banks" -there used to be five (5) of them according to the then valid classification (in that country) in 2006 and 2008, but three (3) in 1997 and four (4) in 2012. 2 Except for Japan, which indicates the position at the end of March the following year compared to the current year. 3 The data for Japan refer to 1999. 4 The data for Japan refer to 2011. Pogoršanje konkurentske pozicije banaka u RZ i njihove opisane reaktivne mjere, pored već iznesenog ovih potonjih na kontrakciju rezervi za gubitke (prema aktivi) i djelomičnu eskalaciju nekamatnog prihoda (u ukupnom prihodu) tih institucija su uticale i na ostale bitne kategorije njihovog bilansa uspjeha (iskazane prema aktivi), u smislu redukcije (neto-)kamatne margine ili razlike kamatnog prihoda i rashoda (što se odnosi na kompetitivni položaj banaka) i djelomično operativnih troškova (kao posljedicu datih mjera), rezultirajući održanjem bankarske profitabilnosti (što je njihov krajnji cilj. Vidjeti: BIS Annual Report, 2001-07). Tako su u promatranom periodu, (u odnosu na aktivu) sniženi kod banaka u RZ: (neto-)kamatna margina, od čega u najvećem (relativnom) obimu u Njemačkoj i; operativni troškovi, takođe, u datom obimu najistaknutije kod njemačkih, uz izuzetak n j i h o v o g p o v e ć a n j a u japanskih b a n a k a , i m p l i c i r a j u ć i uz ostale ( p r e t h o d n o specificirane) e f e k t e ( n a z n a č e n i h mjera) na bilans uspjeha p r o m a t r a n i h ustanova (skoro) nenarušavanje b a n k a r s k e profitabilnosti u obuhvaćenim zemljama.
The deteriorated competitive position of banks in developed countries and their above described reactive measures, in addition to the already stated impact of the latter on the contraction of loss provisions (in relation to assets) and a partial escalation of non-interest revenues (in total revenues) in the concerned institutions, also impacted other significant categories of their profit and loss statement (expressed in relation to assets), in terms of a reduction of (net-)interest margin or a difference between the interest revenues and expenditures (referring to the competitive position of banks), and, in part, operational costs (as a consequence of the given measures), resulting in the maintenance of banking profitability (which was their ultimate goal) (see: BIS Annual Report, [2001][2002][2003][2004][2005][2006][2007]. Thus, in the observed period, banks in developed c o u n t r i e s recorded (in relation to assets) the reduction of: (net-)interest margin, the biggest (relative) scope in this respect having been recorded in Germany; and operational costs, also, in the given scope most prominent in the German banks, with the exception of their increase in the Japanese banks, implying, along with the other (previously specified) effects (of the indicated measures) on the observed institutions' profit and loss statements, an (almost) uninterrupted banking profitability in the examined countries.
In the given time framework, in the representative developed countries, with the exception of Japan, there has been a substantial growth of all basic banking aggregates (Table 5): total assets/liabilities (in the USA and Germany: 8.07% and 6.57%, respectively), loans (8.07% and 6.35%, respectively), and bank deposits (7.81% and 7.69%, respectively), which was even quicker than the one characteristic for the corresponding nominal gross domestic product -nGDP (5.4% and 3.35%, respectively). At the same time, loans increased (somewhat) faster than deposits in the macro-systems with prominent economic expansion (represented by the US system), and slower in those with less intensive expansion (represented by the German system). The exception in terms of dynamics of basic banking aggregates (as underlined) is Japan, where total assets/liabilities and bank deposits (practically) stagnated, and bank loans recorded a slight decline (-1.87%), with the stable nGDP of this country reflecting its (overall) recession in early 1990s, and the crisis of its banking sector (caused not only by that recession, but also by certain autochthonous factors) in the late 1990s. The crisis of the banking sector, thus, arose not only from the (preceding) severe recession of the Japanese economy (whose inevitable consequences were reflected in the escalation of non-performing loans and losses in the stock portfolio of this sector's units), but also from its rooted structural problems, aggravated due to the competition of state-sponsored financial institution, and the general absence of risk sensitivity in Japanese banks when it comes to determining prices of loans they extend (see: JBA, 2006). The fundamental structure of banks' transactions in the relevant developed countries in the observed period ranged from an (almost) unchanged one, characteristic for the USA and (to a somewhat less extent) Germany, to the substantially modified one, characteristic for Japan (Tables 6 and 7). Thus, the American banks (practically) maintained the shares of deposits, credit sources and other obligations (on the liabilities side), moderately increasing capital by 2 percentage points (to 10%), also stabilizing the proportion of loans and securities (on the assets side), slightly lowering the share of liquid assets, and increasing other assets by 3 and 4 percentage points (to 4% and 9%), respectively. The German banks (like the US ones), recorded slight changes in their assets, in terms of the (essential) perpetuation of the share of loans, securities and liquid assets, and the growth of other assets by 2 percentage points (to 5%), with somewhat bigger changes (compared to those in the USA) on the liabilities side, in terms of increasing the share of deposits by 5 percentage points (to 46%), and decreasing credit sources and other obligations (both these resources) by (only) 2 percentage points (to 42% and 7%, respectively, thereby actually not changing the proportion of capital at all. Such an adjustment of assets in the German banks was dictated by the economic cycle downswing in that country in the observed period. (For more about the business trends of these banks see: Association of German Banks, 2006.) On the other hand, Japanese banks significantly restructured both their assets, through the (already mentioned) growth of the share of securities by 13 percentage points (to 34%), at the expense of decreasing loans, other and liquid assets by: 8, 3, and 2 percentage points (to 55%, 8%, and 3%), respectively, and liabilities by increasing the share of deposits by 9 percentage points (to 70%), reducing credit sources and other obligations by 5 and 4 percentage points (to 19% and 7%), respectively, thereby preserving the existing share of capital. These huge balance sheet adjustments resulted from the (mentioned) general trend of banking securitization (accumulation of securities), and the critical position of the Japanese economy and banks (orientation towards deposits as conservative banking resources).
The sector's structure of bank loans in the concerned developed countries, in the given period, underwent certain changes in accordance with the level of overall business activity in those countries, hence in the USA (characterized by a satisfactorily high economic expansion of 3.23% (Source of data: independent calculations of the author based on the IMF, 2013)) the changes were mild, allowing for an increase in the share of low creditworthiness clients such as retail clients, by 3 percentage points (to 48%), at the expense of corporate clients, financial institutions and other sectors, whereas in Germany, whose economic growth was slow (1.46% (Source of data: independent calculations of the author based on the IMF, 2013), i.e. by more than 1/2 lower than in the US), the changes were substantial, in favor of high creditworthiness clients like financial institutions and "others", primarily the public sector, whose share increased by 18 and 5 percentage points (to 42% and 16%), respectively, at the expense of retail, and especially corporate clients, whose shares decreased by 2 and 21 percentage points (to 20% and 22%), respectively (Table 8).
Pomenuta, nova regulacija treba da umanji sistemski rizik, odnosno vjerovatnoću skupnog bankrota banaka (zemlje) na osnovu: 1) njihove izloženosti istovrsnom riziku; 2) snažnih međubankarskih veza i 3) procikličnosti djelovanja datih institucija. Reformske mjere snižavanja bankarske izloženosti istovrsnom riziku ili one usmjerene na redukciju rizika nesolventnosti pojedinačnih (takvih) ustanova imaju za predmet: a) veličinu, strukturu i rizičnost bankarskih bilansa (kvantitet i kvalitet kapitala, ostale moduse relativizacije rizika, limite zaduženosti i likvidnosne zahtjeve); b) upravljanje i poticaje (standarde regulacije i nadzora, s posebnim usmjerenjem na (prudentniji) bankarski menadžment rizika, pravila isplate dividendi, te nagrađivanje menadžera i zaposlenika) i c) tržišnu disciplinu (povećanje transparentnosti, posebno u pogledu OTC derivativa i sekjuritizovanih produkata, te međunarodne harmonizacije računovodstvenih standarda, uz veći nadzor nad agencijama za kreditni rating) . Mjere smanjivanja štetnih efekata intrabankarskih veza su fokusirane na sistemski (ili nacionalno) i globalno značajne (bankarske) institucije u težnji da ih učine sigurnijim (kroz ograničavanje obima i opsega njihovih aktivnosti, te nametanje dodatnih kapitalnih i likvidnosnih holdinga), manje uticajnim na druge institucije (putem prekograničnog nadzora, prekograničnog kriznog menadžmenta i pokrića troškova njihovog bankrota od strane neosiguranih kreditora), te podložnim istovrsnom tipu regulacije. Mjere redukcije procikličnosti When it comes to maturity structure of bank deposits in the major developed countries, in the observed period, there were huge, sometimes even divergent, oscillations, especially in Japan, (Table 10). Thus, in the American banks there was a reduced share of transaction and time deposits by 11 and 6 percentage points (to 11% and 28%), respectively, in favor of the increase of savings and foreign deposits by 14 and 3 percentage points (to 43% and 18%), respectively. The drop in the share of transaction deposits in the USA can be explained by the accelerated circulation of money (due to the usage of sophisticated -electronic payment instruments), and the substitute (monetary) power of savings (interest) deposits, characteristic of time deposits (in favor of savings deposits), in line with the expectations of the (relevant) investors concerning the future dynamics of (long-term) interest rates and economic cycle overall. As opposed to the American banks, the Japanese and German banks were characterized by an escalated share of transactions deposits by 28 and 8 percentage points (to 51% and 56%), respectively. In case of the former, this was primarily at the expense of the time deposits (making the situation additionally different from the one in the US), and, to a somewhat smaller degree, at the expense of foreign deposits, by 23 and 4 percentage points (to 44% and 3%), respectively, with a relatively stable share of savings deposits, whereas in the case of the latter, the given escalation was achieved at the expense of, first of all, savings and then time deposits, by 6 and 2 percentage points (to 10% and 34%), respectively. The given restructuring of bank deposits in Japan came as the result of the (preceding) severe recession of its economy, whose signs of recovery did not yet impact the motivational structure and shares of its investors, whereas in Germany the reason lay in a relatively non-stimulating business environment and prudential behavior of depositors in that country.
The mentioned new regulations should mitigate the systemic risk, i.e. the probability of mass bankruptcy of banks (the country) based on: 1) their exposure to the risk of the same kind; 2) strong inter-bank ties; and 3) procyclical actions of the given institutions. The reforms aimed at reducing the banks' exposure to the same risk or those aimed at reducing the risk of insolvency of individual institutions concern the following: a) size, structure and riskiness of banks' balance sheets (quantity and quality of capital, other modes of risks relativization, indebtedness limits and liquidity requirements); b) management and incentives (standards in terms of regulation and supervision, with particular focus on the (more prudential) banking risk management, dividend disbursement rules, and bonuses for managers and employees); and c) market discipline (increasing transparency, especially in terms of OTC derivatives and securitized products, along with international harmonization of accounting standards, with intensified supervision over credit rating agencies). The measures aimed at reducing adverse effects of intra-bank relationships are focused on systemically (or nationally) and globally important (banking) institutions, with the objective of making them safer (by limiting the scale and scope of their activities, and imposing additional capital and liquidity holdings), lowering their impact on other institutions (through cross-border supervision, cross-border crisis management and coverage of costs of their bankruptcy by uninsured creditors), and making them susceptible to the same kind of regulation. The measures aimed at reducing procyclicality of the banking sector tend to provide anticyclical movements of capital rates, proportion of trade margins, loan to collateral ratio, and disparities (active and passive) of equivalent currency positions. When it comes to the stipulated (total) reform of the regulation of banking organizations, the biggest challenge remains to be the adequate treatment of those systemically important, i.e. internationally active ones.
In their synthetized effect, the given regulatory measures, otherwise articulated through the mitigated electronization of banking operations (whose intensification was identified as the second significant pre-crisis factor), by means of a stricter treatment of liquidity and capitalization of these operations inevitably lower their profitability (and, thereby, their attractiveness), whereas by means of an identical direction: marketization, i.e. globalization, consolidation, securitization, conglomeration and profit-oriented risk management activities in banking, they bring its riskiness within the frames of a "typical" . On this basis, they imply a slower and restructured growth of banking activity (in relation to its pre-crisis practice based on a liberal banking regulation model), manifested in the following: a) lowered volume and concentration (or systemic sensitivity) of (centralized) international operations and (risky) originally non-banking operations, hence (consequently) the non-interest income (expressed, as in the case of other categories in the banking balance sheet, in relation to assets); b) increased capitalization (along with the (current) loss provisions), liquidity (including the stability of sources of finance), (net-)interest margin (in the latter case, based on the lower (internal and external) competitiveness), and operational costs (for the reasons referred to in a)), along with: c) higher quality supervision and regulation (excluding the usage of public funds in emergency circumstances) of the banking sector, ultimately resulting in the improvement of its profitability versus risks, in terms of a nominally lower, yet more stable planirano da se postigne do konca 2012. g., ali je ostvareno (samo) kod najznačajnijih zemalja iz te grupacije, no uz znatan pravni i operativni napredak te vrste kod većine ostalih (Vidjeti: BIS Annual Report, 2013). Na (već uočljivo) efektivno djelovanje djelomične primjene date politike reregulacije bankarstva upućuje njegova recentna manje intenzivna elektronizacija i u sprezi sa tim: viša likvidnost (mada još ne i kapitaliziranost), te niža globalizacija, usporenija koncentracija i sekjuritizacija, kao i pokrenuta stabilizacijski (vs. ranije vladajuće profitno) orjentisana aktivnost menadžmenta rizikom te djelatnosti. Njen rast je (postao) niži, no (još) uglavnom neprekomponiran na reregulatorski preferiran način. No, profitabilnost banaka je oborena, saglasno reregulatornoj koncepciji pravca (premda još ne i neposredne osnove) dinamike te veličine.
Banke u referentnim RZ su najvećim dijelom ojačale svoju likvidnosnu poziciju u (post) kriznom nasuprot pretkriznom okruženju. profitability (see: Study group report, 2011). Among the adopted preferred reforms, the most significant are the recent international standards of banking capital, and (for the first time so far, the same standards of banking) liquidity -Basel III, established by the BCBS in late 2010, with the obligation of their embedding into national legislations by 2013, and (full) implementation by 2019. The established capital standards raise its required rate and quality (primarily the share of common stocks within it), expand the calculation (risk-)basis for capital allocation (predominantly for banking activities related to securities), and determine its additional holdings with a n t i -c y c l i c a l purpose (see: BIS -BCBS, 2010 and 2013).
In addition to Basel III, among the adopted (international) reforms and measures, in the form of principles and recommendations, worth mentioning are the guidelines for a more efficient banking regulation and supervision, systemically important, i.e. internationally active banks (see: FSB, 2011). Moreover, in the observed field, there was a prominent activity of the G-20 countries, aimed at the centralization of clearing and trading in standardized OTC derivatives at (that group's) member countries level, which was planned to be achieved by late 2012, but was (only) accomplished in the most significant countries from that group, although with a substantial legal and operational progress in that respect having been recorded in most other countries (see: BIS Annual Report, 2013).
What has been indicating the (already noticeable) effective impact of the partial implementation of the given banking reregulation policies is its recent less intensive electronization, and in relation to it: higher liquidity (though not yet capitalization), lower globalization, slower consolidation and securitization, and the launched risk management activity in this field which has been stabilization-oriented (as opposed to the previous profit-orientation). Its growth has lowered, yet it has still not been completely readjusted according to the preferred reregulation policies. Nevertheless, the banks' profitability has dropped, pursuant to the reregulation dynamics (which has not yet become the direct basis) when it comes to this aspect.
The banks in observed developed countries mostly strengthened their liquidity positions in the (post)crisis environment, in relation to the positions before the crisis. Thus, the share of primary liquidity reserves (in total assets) after the (mentioned) pre-crisis decline in the US and (actual) stagnation in the German banks (Table  6), increased by 6 and 2 percentage points, respectively, within the entire crisis period (following which the positions in Germany decreased by 2 percentage points, whereas in the USA is continued to increase), and the postcrisis period (up to 10% and 9%, respectively, at the end of the period). The Japanese banks, after the (indicated) pre-crisis reduction, (almost) maintained the stated share in the (post-)crisis years (4%).
As opposed to their liquidity, the capitalization of banks in major developed countries did not substantially change in the (post-)crisis period in relation to the period before the crisis. Banks in the USA, Japan and Germany, out of which (as already mentioned) only those in the USA in the pre-crisis environment recorded a negligibly changed proportion of capital in their total liabilities, (almost) maintained that proportion (of 11%, 5% and 4%, respectively), in the period after the crisis (Table 7).
Banke referentnih RZ u (post)kriznom periodu dominantno nisu proširile, već su nastavile sa pretkriznim sužavanjem svoje (neto-)kamatne margine (prema aktivi). To je zapravo odlikovalo američke i japanske banke (gdje je vrijednost promatrane veličine dosegla naposljetku 2,3% i 0,8%, respektivno), Tabela 10 -Ročna struktura depozita (kod) komercijalnih banaka reprezentativnih razvijenih zemalja -iznos za: SAD u mlrd. USD; Japan, u bil. JPY i; Njemačku, u mlrd. EUR Stanje u zemlji krajem godine provisions in (total) bank assets, thus, after the pre-crisis period during which it was (as indicated) substantially reduced (Table 4), ultimately remained unchanged (0.1%, to be precise, with its occasional doubling in the crisis years) in the Japanese and German banks. Unlike them, the banks in the USA doubled the given participation after it followed the equivalent (pre-)crisis pattern as the other banks (except that during the crisis it increased 5.5 times), to reach 0.4% towards the end of the post-crisis period, in relation to the period before the crisis. Internationalization of banking business was reduced in the post-crisis period compared to the period preceding the crisis. After the precrisis period, during which (as indicated) the given internationalization (expressed through the volume of expansion of international and foreign assets and liabilities of banks worldwide, on the one hand, and the total assets of banks in selected developed countries, on the other hand) increased (Table 2), during the crisis it (practically) stagnated when it comes to the US and German banks, whereas (though still escalatory) it weakens when it comes to the Japanese banks, only to decrease in the post-crisis environment (in all these banks), in the form of growth of (total) assets of banks in the observed countries (2.13%, 2.09% and 7.02%, respectively), as opposed to the decline of international banking transactions at the global level (1-3%).
The banking sectors of the selected developed countries are mostly characterized by a suppression, in terms of slowing down or stagnation, even reduction of concentration in these sectors in the (post-)crisis period compared to the times preceding the crisis. Measured as the share of the largest five in (total) assets of all banks (country), the given concentration (Table 3), after the (mentioned) pre-crisis increase, remained (almost) frozen in Germany and Japan (although, to tell the truth, there was a transitory emergency decrease in Germany by 3 percentage points). The increase of the observed concentration in the USA from the indicated 10 before the crisis to 6 percentage points in the following period (resulting in 37%), indicates that there was a deceleration of this process in this country. Expressed by means of the dynamics in the number of banks, this process was in Germany even reversed in the (post-)crisis environment (when their number increased by 7%), in relation to the pre-crisis environment (when, as indicated, it was decreased), whereas in Japan this process slowed down (given that the number of banks in that country was reduced by 9% in the precrisis years as opposed to 4% in the subsequent observed years (almost equal in number)), and in the USA this process kept its pace (the number of banks in that country being reduced every year by 2%).
Similarly to concentration, the banks in major developed countries are dominantly characterized by disfavoring, in the form of diminishing or decelerating their (further) securitization in the (post-)crisis environment, against the pre-crisis years. Thus, the German banks, following the indicated pre-crisis stability, lowered the share of securities in their assets (Table 6) by 7 percentage points in the subsequent period (to 13%). The Japanese banks, the most prominent ones (as stated) among the observed banks according to securitization in the pre-crisis environment, slowed down this process, given the increase of the observed share by 8 percentage points (to 40%) during the crisis (when it dropped by 2 percentage points) and the post-crisis years, compared to the increase by 13 percentage points before the crisis. The US banks, following the (mentioned) pre-crisis relative stagnation, increased the level of their securitization, i.e. the mentioned share by just 2 percentage points during the subsequent period (to 30%).
The banks in the representative developed countries mostly increased the intensity of their off-balance sheet activities in the postcrisis period, as compared to the period before the crisis. In this respect the Japanese banks particularly excelled, reversing the course of this trend (expressed through the proportion of non-interest in total bank income), from the (indicated) pre-crisis decline to its growth by 4 percentage points (to 36%) (source of data: independent calculations of the author based on JBA, 2013). The banks in Germany continued the (indicated) pre-crisis increase of this category, at an even stronger pace during the entire crises (when it was transitory reduced by 2 percentage points), and the post-crisis period, by 7 percentage points (to 23% at the pri čemu su one njemačke (u tom pogledu) bile blagi izuzetak, pošto je kod njih ova veličina naposljetku (nakon kriznog smanjenja, minorno) nadvisila (0,8%) svoju finalnu pretkriznu vrijednost (Tabela 04.).
The above described dynamics of banking activities in the representative developed countries in the (post-)crisis environment was accompanied by the overall continuation of the pre-crisis reduction of their operational costs (in relation to assets). The reduction of these costs at the end of the crisis versus the reduction recorded in the years before the crisis was actually to a substantial degree manifested only in Japan (Table 4), where these costs were (almost) halved (to 0.8%), as opposed to the precrisis environment (in that country) when they increased (as already mentioned, substantially). Following their (indicated) contraction in the US and Germany before the crisis, in the former their level was perpetuated at the end of the post-crisis period, compared to the level as before the crisis (3.1%, with a transitory emergency increase), whereas in the latter there was a (slight) increase (to 1.3%, after a stagnation during the crisis).
The banks in the observed developed countries in the (post-)crisis period predominantly did not expand, but continued to narrow their pre-crisis (net-)interest margins (in relation to assets). This is what actually characterized the American and Japanese banks (where the value of the observed category ultimately reached 2.3% and 0.8%, respectively), with the German banks (in this respect) being somewhat of an exception, given that this category finally (after the minor decline during the crisis) exceeded (0.8%) its final pre-crisis value ( Table 4).
The indicated n a r r o w i n g of the (net-) interest margin and operational costs, along with the accumulation of non-interest income and loss provisions of banks in major developed countries, generally led to the reduction of their profitability in the (post-) crisis years versus the years before the crisis. In the American, Japanese and German banks (in relation to their assets) this reduction at the end of the analyzed period, compared to the period before the crisis, amounted to: about 1/2, 1/3 and 4/5 (resulting in the value of: 1%, 0.6%, and 0.1%), respectively ( Table 4).
The presented dynamics of the basic banking aggregates in the representative developed countries resulted in a general reduction of the loan participation, and, overall, an increase of deposits in (total) assets/liabilities of banks in those countries. Thus, the US, Japanese and German banks, following the (indicated) precrisis stability of the share of loans in their assets, except in the case of the Japanese banks, where it dropped, lowered this share by the end of the observed period (Table 6) by: 7, 6 and 20 percentage points (to 52%, 49% and 48%), respectively (maintaining this trend even after the crisis, except in the Japanese banks, where the given share remained unchanged). On the other hand, the banks in the USA after its (practical) (pre-)crisis stagnation, increased the share of deposits in their liabilities (Table 7) by 8 percentage points (to 75%), whereas the banks in Japan, after its (indicated) pre-crisis increase, stabilized it (70%), and the banks in Germany, after its (indicated) pre-crisis decline, decreased it by another 4 percentage points (along with the increase by 2 percentage points during the crisis) by the end of the post-crisis period (to 44%).
The structure of bank loans per sectors in the major developed countries, as before the crisis, in the subsequent time period followed the current economic cycle in the concerned countries, so that its considerable reduction after the pre-crisis period in the USA (by 2.53 percentage points, at the rate of real economic growth of 0.8% from 2007 to 2012. Source of data: Independent calculations of the author based on the IMF, 2013), stopped the (previously indicated) increase in the share of less creditworthy clients, such as retail and corporate ones (at the total level of 90%), otherwise at the expense of financial institutions and other sectors in their banks' loans (Table 8), whereas in Germany, where economic activity slowed down at an 8 times more moderate pace (by 0.32 percentage points, at the production growth rate of 1.14% from 2007 to 2012 (Source of data: Independent calculations of the author based on the IMF, 2013), yet at only a slightly higher level than in the USA), the indicated share was perpetuated in the (post-)crisis years compared to the years before the crisis (in the total volume of 43%).
The maturity structure of bank loans in the major developed countries, as well as the structure by sectors, recorded certain changes in line with the business environment of banks, so that the German banks, after the (mentioned) pre-crisis increase in the share of short-term loans, and reduction of long-term ones, in the forthcoming period (characterized by a relatively higher economic expansion in that country in relation to other selected developed countries) reduced the former, and increased the latter category by 8 percentage points (to 43% and 57%, respectively), which happened i 44%, respektivno). Naznačeno zamrzavanje ročne strukture depozita (kod) japanskih banaka nasuprot istaknutom jačanju njihove transakcione komponente u razdoblju ranije istaknute recesione krize tamošnje privrede nagovještava oporavak i pokretanje daljeg ekonomskog razvoja te zemlje.
When it comes to the maturity structure of deposits in banks in the observed developed countries, in the years after the crisis there was mostly a growth in the share of transaction deposits, with the changes in other types of deposits being (versus the former) either opposing or neutral in character (Table 10). Thus, after the (indicated) pre-crisis reduction in the US banks, and the increase in the German banks, the proportion of transaction deposits in total deposits (held by them) ultimately escalated (following the emergency stagnation in the former country, and a drop by 4 percentage points in the latter), by 4 and 7 percentage points (to 15% and 63%), respectively, at the end of the post-crisis period, in relation to the period before the crisis. As opposed to the precrisis environment, when (as mentioned) the shift in transaction deposits in the indicated banks was mostly at the expense of the savings deposits, in the post-crisis period in the USA it was completely counterbalanced by a variation -reduction in foreign deposits (given that the fluctuations of savings deposits (expansion) and time deposits (contraction) in the banks in that country were mutually annulled), whereas in Germany it was at the expense of time deposits (given that the savings deposits in the German banks (essentially) stagnated). The described changes in the maturity structure of deposits in the US and German banks follow the (long-term) expectations of the (relevant) investors in terms of the future growth of the (long-term) interest rates and economic cycle, generally speaking, in the concerned countries. After the (indicated) pre-crisis growth of the share of transaction deposits (held by them), predominantly at the expense of the time deposits, the Japanese banks actually froze the established final precrisis maturity composition of the concerned deposits (at the level of their key types, at 52% and 44%, respectively). The indicated freezing of the maturity structure of deposits held by the Japanese banks, against the prominent strengthening of their transaction component, during the previously mentioned recession in their economy, suggests a recovery and a boost in that country's further economic development.

Conclusion
Starting from the 1980s, and especially in the 1990s, commercial banking (hereafter to be referred to as: banking) has been developing predominantly under the influence of (mutually intertwining) factors of deregulation and information technologies (IT). Deregulation of banking abolished the (previously existing) limits in banks' operations with securities (in the developed countries), introduced the physical dispersion of organizational units, and determination of interest rates on deposits. What remained included regulations in respect of obligatory insurance of (small) bank deposits, and limitation of volume of large bank loans. Moreover, this led to the harmonization, at the international level, of norms concerning minimal capitalization of banks, supervision of their operations, and market transparency of these institutions, in respect of (though seemingly reregulation based) the main purpose of banks' deregulation, reflected in the strengthening of healthy mutual market competition of the concerned institutions, but without substantially jeopardizing the safety of their operations.
non-banking financial institutions for providing such services. Also, by enabling a quick and quality evaluation of creditworthiness, they contribute to a direct connection between investors and large non-financial companies seeking resources at the financial market, thereby suppressing both banking and, in general, financial intermediation.
To the stiffening of their competitive position the banks responded by means of the following: a) marketization and its special aspect -globalization of their activities; b) consolidation, i.e. concentration of the banking sector; c) expansion of off-balance sheet services as a considerable aspect of the restructuring of their business offer; d) securitization or intensified performance of securities-related operations as another way to redirect their business activities; e) conglomeration of the production of financial services, in combination with business alliances with appropriate nonfinancial companies; and f) generally speaking, implementation of (more efficient) profitoriented risk management methods. Although in a deteriorated competitive position, implying the contraction of their (net-)interest margin, the banks in developed countries used the above described reactive measures to reduce their operational costs and loss provisions, and to increase their non-interest income, thereby (almost) maintaining their (previously achieved) profitability.
In addition to its adverse effects and arising indications for other major sectors of the global economy, the global mortgage crisis, having caused the turbulences in the banking sector's profit positions, has pinpointed the necessity of firmer regulation or reregulation of the banking sector. This new regulations should mitigate the systemic risk, i.e. the probability of mass bankruptcy of banks (the country) based on: their exposure to the risk of the same kind; strong inter-bank ties; and procyclical actions of the given institutions. Articulated through the mitigated electronization of banking operations, by means of a stricter treatment of liquidity and capitalization of these operations inevitably lower their profitability (and, thereby, their attractiveness), whereas by means of an identical direction: marketization, i.e. globalization, consolidation, securitization, conglomeration and profit-oriented risk management activities in banking, they bring its riskiness within the frames of a "typical" financial intermediation. On this basis, they imply a slower and restructured growth of banking activity (in relation to its pre-crisis practice based on a liberal banking regulation model), manifested in the following: a) lowered volume and concentration (or systemic sensitivity) of (centralized) international operations and (risky) originally non-banking operations, hence (consequently) the noninterest income (expressed, as in the case of other categories in the banking balance sheet, in relation to assets); b) increased capitalization (along with the (current) loss provisions), liquidity (including the stability of sources of finance), (net-)interest margin (in the latter case, based on the lower (internal and external) competitiveness), and operational costs (for the reasons referred to in a)), along with: c) higher quality supervision and regulation (excluding the usage of public funds in emergency circumstances) of the banking sector, ultimately resulting in the improvement of its profitability versus risks, in terms of a nominally lower, yet more stable profitability. Among the adopted preferred reforms, the most significant are the recent international standards of banking capital, and (for the first time so far, the same standards of banking) liquidity -Basel III, the biggest challenge remains to be the adequate treatment of those systemically important, i.e. internationally active ones.
What has been indicating the (already noticeable) effective impact of the partial implementation of the given banking reregulation policies is its recent less intensive electronization, and in relation to it: higher liquidity (though not yet capitalization), lower globalization, slower consolidation and securitization, and the launched risk management activity in this field which has been stabilization-oriented (as opposed to the previous profit-orientation). Its growth has lowered, yet it has still not been completely readjusted according to the preferred reregulation policies. Nevertheless, the banks' profitability has dropped, pursuant to the reregulation dynamics (which has not yet become the direct basis) when it comes to this aspect.