THE 1966 PROTOCOL ON THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND THE HOLY SEE FROM A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE

The paper discusses the 1966 Protocol on the Negotiations Between Yugoslavia and the Holy See that has already been subject to several historical analyses focusing primarily on negotiations leading to it rather than the document itself. The initial hypothesis is that the legal profile of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol may indicate its hidden political weight and a deeper historical meaning. In order to discern it, the paper examines the Protocol as an instrument of international law, aiming at explaining the way its form and substance have reflected difficulties and affected changes in relations between a Communist state and the Roman Catholic Church in Tito’s Yugoslavia. Therefore, the paper compares the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol with its Eastern-European equivalents and discusses its impact on further evolution of the Yugoslav constitutional and legal framework.


. Introduction
In 2018, the People's Republic of China and the Holy See signed an agreement concerning the appointment of Roman Catholic bishops serving in China. The agreement provides that, from 2018 on, Chinese Government has the authority to recommend candidates for vacant bishoprics before they get officially appointed by the Pope. This kind of settlement of the so-called 'investiture contest' -the conflict over ability to nominate and install bishops -also known as the concordat arose in medieval Europe, but it is no longer a privileged subject of arrangements between a sovereign state and the Roman Catholic Church. Ever since the end of the Second Vatican Council in 1965, modern concordat agreements normally strong bilateral commitments makes a poor impression of its content too. How did this document then become 'a concordat'? The manifest contradiction between the face value of the Protocol's form and substance, on one hand, and subsequent qualifications of this document, on the other, is the central issue to be discussed in this paper. This is not only the doctrinal question but also an indicator of its political and historical relevance.
The 1966 Yugoslav Protocol has already been the subject of several partial analyses focusing less on the document itself, but rather on negotiations leading to it. Starting from the personal archives and Memoirs of Agostino Casaroli The starting premise of t his paper is that the legal profile of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol may indicate its specific political weight. Therefore, the following lines are an attempt at resolving two interconnected questions: that of the legal nature of the Protocol and, in the context of the latter, its political purpose. In order to achieve this, the further analysis examines the Protocol as an instrument of international law, explaining its form and substance as reflecting the foregoing difficulties and affecting changes in 8 The Holy See, Catholic Church and the Political Power in Tito's Yugoslavia. 9 The State and Religious Communities 1945-1970. 10 Negotiations Between the Holy See and Yugoslavia and Signing the 1966 Protocol. relations between the state and church in Tito's Yugoslavia. Aiming for this goal, the paper emphasizes the international context of the document by pointing to contrasts a nd parallels with its Eastern-European equivalents. Concurrently, it discusses the effects of the Protocol on further evolution of the Yugoslav constitutional and legal framework.  11 It was concluded in a solemn form, with diplomatic pomp and in the presence of foreign reporters and local press on 25 June 1966. The Protocol was signed by Milutin Morača, a member of the Yugoslav Federal Government and the President of the Federal Commission for Religious Affairs, and Agostino Casaroli, the Undersecretary of the Sacred Congregation for Extraordinary Ecclesiastical Affairs. The Protocol was drafted in two authentic versions -in Italian and Serbo-Croatian. 12 Yugoslavia ratified this document with a decree of the Federal Government signed by its President Petar Stambolić on 13 July 1966. Alongside the Protocol, this decree as a ratification instrument included two additional documents. One was a brief text entitled simply Proceedings (i.e. the records of the signing ceremony), signed and dated the same as the Protocol. The other are two diplomatic letters framing the arrangement set in section IV of the Protocol and also bearing the date of 25 13 Curiously enough, after the Pope's ratification, the Holy See had never published this document in its official gazette Acta Apostolicae Sedis, "but only in technical study Enchiridion dei Concordati". 14 More than a formal peculiarity, the latter detail seems a key one for substantial understanding of the 1966 Protocol.
. The Protoco l Substance "A concordat agreement designates an international treaty concluded between the Holy See and a particular State in order to regulate mutual relations, the position and the activity of the Catholic Church in the State in question. " 15 As any other, the given definition is no more than an ideal-type one 16  Catholic moral and social teaching in State legislation". 17 Modern Catholic teaching considers the State rather an entity without any religious creed, but with a duty to respect and protect both individual religious liberty, as well as the corporate freedom of the Church. This doctrinal turnover changed the logic of concordat negotiations and stipulations rapidly. The main topic of concordats before the 1960s were mutual concessions resulting in establishment of a confessional state, where privileges granted to the Church by the state had been recompensed by its influence on the appointments of bishops, the ecclesial servants' civil oath and administrative control over their activities. Contrary to the practice of the time, the present-day concordat agreements generally postulate the self-proclaimed exclusion of state authority in religious matters which in turn provide the church with exclusive competence over nomination and installation of clergymen. 18 Ironically, such an evolution was least perceptible in the resolutely secular people's democracies behind the Iron Curtain. As totalitarian systems, these regimes, per definition, were hostile towards any other concurrent ideology, especially Roman Catholicism, which was regularly targeted as a reactionary pillar of an ancient regime. Such hostilities were mutual and strong. During the long reign of Pius XII (1939)(1940)(1941)(1942)(1943)(1944)(1945)(1946)(1947)(1948)(1949)(1950)(1951)(1952)(1953)(1954)(1955)(1956)(1957)(1958), the Pope's official policy of zero-tolerance, far from isolating the Communist regimes, played into their hand. 19 "Instead of buttressing the self-confidence of local churches, he left them dangerously exposed raising the stakes in a confrontation they could not hope to win". 20 The new Pope John XXIII and the Second Vatican Council he initiated hinted at a new, proactive stance known as the Vatican Ostpolitik 21 aiming to ease the strained relations and turn them from confrontation and crisis towards 17  détente and coexistence. 22 During the next three decades, Agostino Casaroli, the leading protagonist of this diplomatic campaign, was challenging the government influence in church affairs throughout the Central and Eastern Europe. With varying success, he was seeking either for a modus vivendi as a practical compromise that bypassed difficulties, or a modus non moriendi offering the Church at least a chance of survival. 23 In a comparative perspective, his achievements in Tito's Yugoslavia were unquestionable. In order to discern the scope of this success, it is necessary to distinguish the signed and ratified main text of the Protocol from a series of documented, yet unofficial verbal statements which were, as succeeding events would confirm, no less important part of the entire arrangement.

THE MAIN TEXT: YUGOSLAVIA AS AN EXCEPTION OR A MODEL?
The main body of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol is a relatively short text composed of an introductory paragraph tracing the course of the official talks and four brief sections marked by Roman numerals from I to IV. The first two sections describe the official positions of both negotiating parties and express their readiness (i.e. willingness, not duty) to take into consideration any controversial issue that any of the partners would deem worrying and, thus, necessary to be brought to the attention of the other. The section III expresses mutual readiness of both sides to consult each other concerning all issues of interests in their relations. Finally, section IV reestablishes diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See that have been interrupted for fourteen years.
The opening lines of the section I easily explain the scarcity of the Protocol. The official stance of the Yugoslav Government was that the legal position of religious communities was regulated by the Constitution and national legislation grounded on principles such as freedom of religion, separation of the state and the church, equality before the law, etc. 24 In other words, as Casaroli's Memoirs keep pointing out, the Yugoslav government did not allow for even a theoretical possibility of a particular international treaty with the Holy See to have the legal status of the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia for its subject-matter. 25 In a multiethnic community with a complex federative composition and delicate his- 22 Ibid., p. 118. 23  torical background such as then Yugoslavia, any separate agreement with a particular religious group could have provoked suspicion and disrupted the already fragile interethnic relations. Thus, throughout the official -(as well as unofficial and preparatory) -talks, the Yugoslav delegates were steadily resisting the idea of a concordat agreement as the final outcome of the negotiations. 26 Instead and from 1964 27 on, the Yugoslav side started proposing a modus vivendi (i.e. a memorandum of understanding). 28 Understood as a non-legally binding arrangement free of a particular form, such modus vivendi would have expressed no more than a mutual commitment to the factual situation and willingness to discuss pending issues and seek their practical solutions. 29 Indeed, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol seems more like an agreement to disagree than a real treaty, let alone a concordat. This impression is only amplified once it is compared with the Hungarian Partial Agreement signed two years earlier. The latter stipulates a series of serious compromises and mutual concessions. In order to release the Roman Catholic Church of severe administrative control of the Hungarian Government, 30 26 30 The main concession was the removal of the so-called "ministerial commissaries", popularly known as the "bishops with moustaches" who "[...] did not only restrict the the Holy See accepted the divided competence in appointment of bishops, 31 the state oath for all its ecclesial servants 32 and the state supervision over the Hungarian pontifical institute in Rome. 33 Appointment of bishops was the main and certainly the most difficult topic in negotiations with all communist regimes of the time. It also explains the reason why the local Roman Catholic episcopates were usually reserved towards negotiations initiated by the Holy See. They were generally against the talks from which they were excluded, as they were concerned how these talks could affect their positions and authority. This silent resistance to Rome was the strongest in almighty-cardinal Wyszyński's Poland, where the Church was strong due to its own resources. 34 Such resistance was, though, perceptible throughout the rest of the Communist Europe, except in Tito's Yugoslavia. Such exception implicitly accounts for the absence of any statechurch arrangement on bishops' investiture in main text of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol. There was no agreement because there was no conflict before: despite all tensions culminating in interruption of diplomatic relations after Stepinac was created a Cardinal in 1952, the Roman Catholic bishops' freedom, but when appointing priests they enforced a veritable counter-selection, in as much as they granted their consent only to the appointment of unworthy persons". where the "government showed a willingness to remove the commissioners only in those places where they had succeeded in agreeing with the Church on the filling of the diocese head post", Ibid., p. 198. 31 "According to the process outlined in the first annex to the agreement, the Holy See could appoint bishops from among candidates appearing on the list submitted by the Hungarian Bench of Bishops -agreed upon in advance with the government, whereas in the case of other candidates (as an 'extraordinary procedure' of sorts), it had to ascertain through direct negotiations or through the president of the Bench of Bishops that the Hungarian government had no objection to the candidate", Ibid., p. In fact, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol makes an impression of a joint statement about a relatively satisfying status quo of the church-state affairs. Yet, if it was really so, why did this ascertainment of the existing state necessitate a form of a particular, duly signed and ratified, international agreement?
The part of the answer lies in the last -most certainly not the least -point of this document. Since the stan dards of international law require a mutu al consent for establishment of diplomatic relations, 42 there is no doubt that, regardless of its fairly inappropriate title, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol is an international agreement, moreover a concordat strictissimo sensu. Namely, according to the definition mentioned above, "A concordat agreement designates an international treaty concluded between the Holy See and a particular State in order to regulate mutual relations [...]", including, a fortiori, the diplomatic ones. An emblematic illustration of this doctrinal stance was offered in the post-communist 1990 Hungarian concordat, a brief treaty establishing full diplomatic relations between Budapest and the Holy See. 43 This convincing interpretation, however, was promise anything or confirm anything. Mr. Tardini wrote to Josip Ujčić, the Belgrade Archbishop: 'Not even orally and this Includes the draft or concept of any agreement. This is not only against the Canon Law, but harmful to the Church and to souls. '" According to Luxmoore relativized by the fact that diplomatic relations in the particular Yugoslav case, resumed after 14 years of interruption, were not qualified as "full", but only "unofficial". More precisely, the Yugoslav Government expressed "its readiness to allow the residence to an Apostolic Delegate [the Pope's emissary to the Roman Catholic Church in particular state -author's remark] who will, at the same time, be the envoy to the aforementioned Government". 44 Within the same section IV, the Holy See expressed its reciprocal willingness to receive an envoy representing the Yugoslav Government. Yet, in the diplomatic letter attached to the 1966 Protocol, Cardinal Cicognani, the Pope's State Secretary, underlined that "these envoys will act in a capacity of unofficial representatives". However, the same letter, the content of which was approved in the response letter of the Yugoslav Foreign Secretary Nikezić, specified that these envoys would be appointed, acting and recalled in accordance with the norms of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and, consequently, provided with "all personal and real privileges and immunities applied on diplomatic representatives in accordance with the norms of international law and the above-mentioned Convention". 45 In other words, although "unofficial", the reestablished relations were undoubtedly diplomatic. The fact that they would be elevated to the ambassadorial level without further formalities only four years later affirms the quality of the Protocol as a de facto international agreement by virtue of its real impact on diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See. 46 Strengthened by the joint statement in which both sides express mutual readiness to consult each other about all issues of interests for their bilateral relations whenever deemed necessary, 47 this reestablishment of diplomatic contact was generally considered the biggest breakthrough of Vatican Ostpolitik ever. Actually, with the single Cuban exception, Yugoslavia became the first -and the last -Communist state with a diplomatic mission to the Holy See. In other words, Tito's regime did not only grant papal jurisdiction over the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia with this Protocol. By signing and ratifying it, Yugoslavia recognized the international legal personality of the Holy See de jure, a concept the mainstream Soviet legal doctrine continuously denied. Only the 1974 Polish Protocol came any closer to this point by virtue of establishing regular working contacts and teams with diplomatic capacities. 48 Unthinkable in the USSR and its satellite states, this Yugoslav step forward, however, had its logic and explicitly settled compensation. As a matter of fact, the cornerstone of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol is embedded in the section II that expresses the official position of the Holy See during the talks i.e. its principle stance that "activities of Catholic priests in exercising their priestly duties must remain within the religious and ecclesial limits, so they could not misuse their religious and ecclesial functions for political purposes". 49 Furthermore, "the Holy See -in accordance with the Catholic moral -disapproves and condemns every act of political terrorism or similar criminal violence whoever its perpetrator may be". 50 Expressing general attitudes of the Roman Catholic Church, these stipulations were not controversial as such. Two complementary commitments listed below were far more delicate, though. These two provisions clearly expressed the readiness of the Holy See to consider the Yugoslav Government allegations concerning particular Catholic priests' involvement in the above-mentioned criminal activities and subject them to prospective canonical proceedings and measures. 51 Such stipulations had a crucial meaning for the Yugoslav government, to which the influence of Vatican on the anti-Yugoslav emigration and its terrorist activities was the main topic throughout the negotiations. Torn for a long time between this unrelenting Government demand and a discrete, yet steady resistance of the Yugoslav Bishops' Conference, the Holy See finally yielded before the ultimatum of the Government which, at one point, threatened to withdraw from the nearly-finished agreement. 52

THE VERBAL NOTES: A YUGOSLAV OR A CROATIAN CASE?
The strongest opposition to the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol, namely to its section II, came from the Yugoslav Episcopate dominated by Croatian prelates. At the very finish of negotiations, the majority of bishops lead by Cardinal Franjo Šeper, the Archbishop of Zagreb, 53 were actively working against the Protocol, convinced that signing it would easily "create an impression of it as a successful attempt of the Federal Government to mislead the Holy See in an anti-Croatian direction". 54 Cardinal Šeper initially tried to postpone the conclusion of the arrangement and get some time for its reassessment. 55 Once he finally obeyed the will of Pope Paul VI, he asked the supreme church authority not to publish the document, or, at least, to allow Yugoslav bishops to publicly express their personal reserves to it. 56  During the whole post-war period, the Yugoslav Intelligence Service (UDBA) was struggling against the Ustashe terrorists actively and morally supported by a certain number of Catholic priests of Croatian origin living and working in emigration. Thus, from the very first unofficial meeting in May 1963, Yugoslav negotiators made it clear to their Vatican counterparts that "the emigration issue" would be high on their agenda. In fact, in the early phase of the negotiations, when each side was probing the readiness and expectations of the other, Yugoslav representatives were foremost testing the willingness of Vatican to restrain anti-Yugoslav activities of the Catholic emigration. The main trial in this respect was President Tito's tour in South America scheduled for the late September and early October 1963. The Yugoslav Government expected visits to these states, otherwise home to many anti-Yugoslav emigrants from Croatia, not to be followed by anti-communist rallies. Only once the Holy See had met these expectations 64 did the Yugoslav Government accept to start the official talks aiming at the conclusion of a modus vivendi and revival of diplomatic relations. 65  As it has already been pointed out in the text, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol was no more than a modus vivendi or a memorandum of understanding. It was a non-legally binding document, yet still an arrangement based on strong, trustworthy promises on both sides. This was an acceptable contracting form insomuch as the partners attested their bona fides in the course of the previous unofficial and preparatory talks. Although brief and simple in style and structure, this modus vivendi was a result of a long and exhausting bargain. However, not all of its achievements have been incorporated in it. For tactical reasons, some of the arrangements have been recorded only as informal verbal notes (i.e. separate statements given in writing and initialed by the heads of negotiating teams). 67 Defined in the Protocol Proceedings as references to the statements the negotiators had verbally exchanged during the talks, 68 they have not been considered the official part of the Protocol, published neither in Official Gazette nor in the press, but an attached series of moral obligations. 69 The most relevant among them was surely the one concerning the way of functioning of the St Jerome Illyric College. The status of this pastoral school associated with the ratlines and close to Ustashe emigration after the WWII was one of the main topics during the talks. 70 The way the two reciprocal verbal notes on this specific issue have been expressed leads to the conclusion that this arrangement must have been settled and implemented even before 1966. More precisely, the Yugoslav note claims that "the current situation shall not be changed [...] as long as the College would serve its purpose, a.k.a. as long as the students' education in the College would respect the Constitution and the social-political system of SFRY". 71 As it follows from the symmetrical note of the Holy See, the "current situation" im- plied the restrictive College admission policy limited only to students of Yugoslav nationality "as long as the inflow of youth from SFRY bishoprics would be sufficient in number". 72 This seemed to be a sustainable compromise meaning there would be no place for emigrant elements in the College as long as Yugoslav authorities would be ready to issue passports to student priests-to-be coming from Yugoslavia. 73 Similarly, another verbal note of the Yugoslav Government offered guarantees concerning the Roman Catholic Church real property basis on Yugoslav national law (i.e. the right to buy, reconstruct or built new estates). 74 On the other hand, in one of its verbal notes, the Holy See confirmed its readiness to act in order to prevent the Catholic emigration activities that might be unfavorable to further development of relations between the Roman Catholic Church and the Yugoslav state. 75 Alongside verbal notes expressing these gentlemen's agreements not suitable for publication for political reasons, there were two more referring to pending issues for further discussion (concerning the status of priests' associations autonomous fr o m bishops' authority 76 and the government competencies in appointment of new bishops 77 ), as well as other two expressing insurmountable differences in attitudes regarding religious instruction in public schools 78  limits" of priestly activities as a disclaimer of Kanzelparagraf in the section II of the Protocol. 79 Taken as a whole (i.e. including all verbal notes), the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol between Tito's regime and the Holy See leaves an impression of an unbalanced political deal. In order to resume (only unofficial) diplomatic relations and get something that it practically already had (a full jurisdiction over the Roman Catholic Church in Yugoslavia), the Holy See agreed to serious concessions. In return for getting no religious instruction in public schools, it promised to continue seeking for a compromise in matters that seriously jeopardized its authority (i.e. the status of autonomous priests' associations and government competencies in bishops' nomination). Moreover, it risked losing the trust of a faithful church in Croatia by agreeing to the Government demands regarding the worrying actions of the Croatian Catholic emigration. The scope of 1966 Yugoslav Protocol became clear enough to explain its accompanying political controversies only after this in-depth analysis, especially as related to why and how Cardinal Šeper's attitude "had to take into account the Croatian patriotism of the Yugoslav catholic majority for whom a dialogue with Belgrade appeared to be a yielding to the centralist Serbian State". 80 Nevertheless, was it really that bad? Despite all regrets and criticism coming from the Catholic and nationalist ranks in Croatia, 81 it does not seem so. Ironically -or highly symbolically? -the 1966 Protocol between Yugoslavia and the Holy See had been signed only five days before the Brioni Plenum took place. The theatric fall of Aleksandar Ranković, the mighty head of UDBA intelligence service and the personification of "the centralist Serbian concept of the Yugoslav State", at this Communist party Plenum was a milestone in devolution of Tito's Yugoslavia. After Ranković's destitution and all through the late 1960's and the early 1970's, the country was passing 79 The Holy See perceived the teaching of Catholic moral and doctrine to be within these limits. The Yugoslav Government did not acknowledge these limits as a disclaimer. through serious constitutional reforms tended to transform it from a federation into confederation. As a result of this process, culminating in 1974 Yugoslav Constitution, the legislative competencies in the matter of legal status of religious communities had been transferred from the federal state to federated entities. Instead of a single federal statute, there were eight parallel legislations now. Similar in form and structure, they were not identical, though. Their comparative analysis leads to a surprising, hence certain and safe conclusion: the northwestern federated entities with a Catholic majority (i.e. Slovenia and Croatia) or a significant Catholic minority (i.e. Vojvodina) loosened their regional legislation by granting churches and religious communities extended rights, removing restrictions or attenuating penalties. The evolution of religious instruction, a major topic during the negotiations with the Holy See ten years earlier, was a striking example. According to the 1953 Federal Statute, religious instruction (catechism) was free, but restricted to religious facilities, allowed only after the regular school teaching had ended and conditioned by a previous consent of both parents and the child itself. While Montenegrin, Bosnian and Macedonian legislation from mid-1970s extended an earlier federal restriction by allowing religious instruction only in the time after regular teaching and the "extra-curricular activities", the Slovenian Statute did not mention any of these schedule limitations. Similarly, the Croatian Statute extended religious instruction to any other space that was legally allowed. On the other hand, while Serbian, Montenegrin, Bosnian and Macedonian legislation still explicitly demanded the consent of both parents, Slovenian, Vojvodinian and Croatian legislation used word play by asking for "saglasnost roditelja", a phrase in Serbo-Croatian which, due to its semantics, may refer to both parents or only to one of them. 82  thest. For instance, the highly controversial state administrative control over religious schools (followed by the 1961 restrictive interior regulation of the Croatian autonomous government) had been replaced by the 1978 Croatian Statute and its convincingly most lax rules in this matter in comparisons with the legislation of the seven other Yugoslav federated republics and provinces. 85 Hardly a coincidence, these digressions may hint at a more ambitious conclusion: more than reestablishment of diplomatic relations and Tito's official visit to Vatican in 1971, 86 such differentiated evolution of Yugoslav legal framework was by far the most intriguing consequence of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol as the highest point in Vatican Ostpolitik ever. 87

. Conclusion
In 1801, the French revolutionary state and the Roman Catholic Church signed an agreeme nt ending a more than a decade long anticlerical phase of the French Revolution. This so-called, "Napoleon's concordat" announced the end of the Revolution by renouncing its firm laical legacy.
In tions of the contracting parties inferred from the terms of the document and the circumstances of its conclusion, the 1966 Protocol was less of an international treaty and more of a memorandum of understanding or -to employ the term that contracting parties themselves preferred to use -a modus vivendi as an only morally obliging gentlemen's agreement. Furthermore, for confidentiality reasons, some of the arrangements reached had been registered only as verbal confidential notes attached to the act and not as its official part. The soft form of the settlement was a Yugoslav request. As a multiethnic community with a complex federative composition and delicate historical background, Yugoslavia risked to disrupt fragile interethnic equilibrium by concluding an exceptional international treaty with the Roman Catholic Church. Hence, throughout the talks, the Yugoslav Government steadily resisted the idea of signing a concordat as the final outcome of the negotiations. Nevertheless, the very form of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol -a signed and ratified legal instrument -denies the strong attitude of the Government and gives right to Vatican officials to classify it as a concordat agreement. This settlement, namely, served as a legal basis for revival of diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and the Holy See interrupted fourteen years before. Since the norms of modern international law require a mutual consent for establishment of diplomatic relations, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol cannot be qualified but as an international agreement (i.e. a concordat). Though 'unofficial' , the reestablished relations were undoubtedly diplomatic. The fact that only four years later they would be elevated to the ambassadorial level without further formalities proves positively the international agreement quality of the Protocol.
The hybrid nature of the 1966 Protocol reveals its political purpose in effect. Non-legally binding, the provisions of this 1966 Yugoslav Protocol had a remarkable political weight manifested in a dialectic play of its form and substance. The soft legal form of the Protocol hides its hard-political core: a bitter deal between an atheist regime that agreed to tolerate an unruly church in return for its proactive stand and silent obedience. Perceived in a broader historical perspective, this compromise looks less like an armistice and more like a setup for a long-lasting cohabitation. A detailed analysis of eight parallel Yugoslav regional legislations enacted in the subsequent years validates this conclusion. Unlike Yugoslav southeastern federated entities with a majority Orthodox or Muslim population, the Yugoslav northwestern federated entities with a Catholic majority or an important Catholic minority markedly relaxed their legislations by granting religious communities with extended rights, removing restrictions or attenuating penalties. Even if this contrasted evolution became possible only after the devolution of Tito's Yugoslavia by its last 1974 Constitution, it is less likely that it would have taken this direction without the 1966 compromise. This gives rise to a new perception of the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol. Commonly understood as a mere modus vivendi that was supposed to keep a status quo in order to maintain a fragile inter-ethnic balance, this agreement in effect announced a reverse process. As such, the 1966 Yugoslav Protocol was perhaps not a proper concordat de jure, but surely its de facto surrogate of Tito's doing. Marko Božić REZIME U pokušaju da popravi položaj katolika iza Gvozdene zavese, Sveta stolica je šezdesetih i sedamdesetih godina prošlog veka sklopila sporazume sa nekoliko istočnoevropskih komunističkih režima od kojih je, međutim, samo onaj zaključen sa Jugoslavijom 1966. smatran konkordatom. Polazeći od namere ugovornih strana utvrđenih na osnovu teksta sporazuma, ali i okolnosti pod kojima je on zaključen, u radu se dolazi do zaključka da je Protokol o razgovorima između predstavnika jugoslovenske vlade i Svete stolice manje bio međunarodni ugovor, a više memorandum o razumevanju, odnosno, rečima samih ugovornih strana, jedan modus vivendi u smislu tek moralno obavezujućeg sporazuma. Ovaj zaključak potkrepljuje i činjenica da su iz političkih razloga neki od dogovora postignutih tokom pregovora bili registrovani samo kao usmene izjave koje su pratile sporazum, a da zvanično nisu bile njegov deo. Meka forma sporazuma bila je uslov jugoslovenske strane. Kao multietnička zajednica sa složenim federativnim uređenjem i osetljivom istorijskom pozadinom, Jugoslavija bi potpisivanjem posebnog međunarodnog sporazuma sa Svetom stolicom rizikovala da ugrozi svoju krhku unutrašnju nacionalnu ravnotežu.