THE ENACTMENT OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE ITALIAN CONSTITUTION: BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

: Starting from the recent invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army, this essay reflects on the meaning, scope, and application of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution. In particular, the paper analyzes, from a diachronic perspective, the rejection of war by examining its practical implications and focusing on the interrelationships between constitutional law and international law in defining the concept of war and collective self-defense.


. Introduction
Article 11 of the Italian Constitution (hereinafter: Article 11) has always been at the core of an extensive and multifaceted doctrinal debate.This discussion has evolved alongside a range of interpretive proposals put forward by both the political system and civil society, spanning the different historical phases since the establishment of the Italian Republic in 1948.
The ongoing analysis surrounding Article 11 reflects its significance as a fundamental constitutional provision.This norm encompasses key principles related to Italy's role in the international community and its commitment to promoting peace and justice among Nations. 1 Since the end of the Cold War, Italy has increasingly engaged in several military operations, often carried out under the aegis of international institutions.However, such participation has cyclically raised doubts from the standpoint of consistency with Article 11. 2 More recently, the "special military operation" conducted by the Russian army on Ukrainian territory prompted reflections on Italy's position in the international arena, in light of the constitutional parameter of Article 11.In this dramatic situation, the Italian Government's decision to support the Ukrainian resistance by providing defensive weaponry has faced strong criticism from some commentators, who argue that this decision may be unconstitutional. 3o adequately address this issue, it is useful to revisit the steps that led to the adoption of Article 11, accurately reconstructing the practical regulatory scope of this provision and its normative limits.From a methodological standpoint, this topic will be tackled by simultaneously examining both the regulatory aspect and the application of Article 11 itself.
Starting with a doctrinal interpretation, the essay will explore the original intent of this provision, by analyzing the work of the constituent assembly.The paper will then focus on the practical implementation of the constitutional precept, in light of the various wartime events involving the Italian Republic since 1948.
This set of paradigmatic cases will be examined from a primarily domestic perspective, assessing case-by-case the compatibility of those military interventions with the content of the provision under discussion.Such an approach will be intended to illustrate the developments and gradual adaptations of Article 11 throughout the history of the Italian Republic, aiming to gauge the changes that the pacifist principle has undergone in practice and under the influence of international law.This will provide an understanding of the relationships between the Italian Constitution and other legal systems, marked by the aim of constantly opening the Italian legal order to the notions and categories of international law.

. Article  and the Constituent Assembly
In order to investigate the content of Article 11, it is essential to acknowledge an unquestionable historical fact: the Italian Constitution was adopted only two years after the end of the Second World War and the establishment of the United Nations.For the "Constituent Fathers", war represented an immediate historical reference, firmly ingrained in the collective memory of the men and women responsible for drafting the Italian fundamental Charter.The brutality of that conflict had underscored the need for a stable and enduring peace as an essential condition -almost mandatory -for the future development of the Italian legal order and the restoration of peaceful and productive international relations. 4ore than the mere confrontation between opposing ideologies, the Italian Constitution was forged by a universal spirit in which the collective experience of war served as a crucial element in establishing political consensus.This marked a profound departure from the past and a decisive rejection of totalitarianism, which relied on violence and the glorification of force. 5As stated by Togliatti, the Constitution should expressly reject war as an instrument of offensive and conquest policy for two reasons: firstly, from an internal perspective, to stigmatize a conflict that had ravaged the Nation; secondly, from an external perspective, to clarify the position of the Italian Republic in relation to the global political movement striving to outlaw war altogether. 6

4
See Carlassare, L., Costituzione italiana e partecipazione a operazioni militari, in: Article 11 is a provision that, more than any other, places the Italian Constitution in a context of shared values and pushes for the adoption of a broader perspective going beyond national borders and historical events linked to anti-fascism. 7The violence and devastations caused by the second world conflict had generated common reactions and aspirations among Western States, all yearning for a new world order.In the words of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, these States sought not only to reaffirm traditional rights, but also freedom from fear and from misery. 8he memory of war events was still too fresh in the collective consciousness, superseding partisan conceptions and pushing newly reborn political parties to find a common agreement that transcended narrow interests or strategies. 9uch was the consensus that, during the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly, only two Deputies opposed the current wording of Article 11, and not for substantial reasons.The arguments presented by Francesco Saverio Nitti and Guido Russo-Perez, indeed, primarily centered around the difficulty of distinguishing sic et simpliciter between "just wars" and "unjust wars".Moreover, they considered it redundant to include a similar assertion in the Constitution of a country now disarmed and under the guidance of the Allies. 10owever, all the Constituents converged on the need to build a shared system of values firmly opposed to the warlike concepts of the authoritarian State and designed to avert future wars, in accordance with the provisions of the Atlantic Charter.Within this cultural context, the rejection of the use of force represented a prerequisite for creating a new global order based on the principles of collective security and self-determination. 11ence, all the constitutional provisions relating to war embraced a collective pacifist stand as a "supreme principle" endowed with a strong normative value. 12As Bobbio acutely observed, the Constitution embodies a system of values in which the concept of "peace" is so closely intertwined to that of "war"; the two terms must therefore be understood as antithetical.The Italian Constituent employs this sematic dyad in an axiological-prescriptive and not merely descriptive or classificatory manner, with the clear intent of promoting peace and condemning the use of war. 13n this regard, the binding nature of the constitutional precept is apparent.Political forces with different orientations and backgrounds agreed, almost unanimously, to introduce and uphold the fundamental "pacifist principle", articulating it in the clearest way possible. 14The wording of article 11 leaves no room for ambiguity of any kind: "Italy r ejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes.Italy agrees, on conditions of equality with other States, to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations.Italy promotes and encourages international organisations furthering such ends." 15 The principle of catholic universalism, rooted in Christian-democratic traditions, was flanked by the internationalist goals of communists and socialists; these shared values found correspondence in the federalist ideals espoused by the republican and actionist parties. 16The Syst ematic Interpretation of Article  and Its Preceptive Scope On exegetic grounds, Article 11 is an organic provision characterized by logical unity and internal coherence.Its formal construction, with precise punctuation, requires a unitary and systematic interpretation and not partial or separate readings of each single proposition. 17ence, Article 11 must be read in light of its ratio and the significance attributed to the unequivocal rejection of war within the framework of the 1948 Constitution.Since these are strictly functional requirements, each individual part of Article 11 must be understood both as intimately linked to and as an indispensable precondition for the others.Each part thus mutually complements and reinforces the normative significant of the provision. 18

THE "REJECTION" OF WAR
From this standpoint, the absolute rejection of war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes represents the inspiring principle of the entire provision.This principle reflects a shared political project, which serves as a guide in the interpretation of Article 11.
The first line of Article 11 establishes a preceptive scope.Primary, it prohibits the use of military force with the exclusive or prevalent aim of violating the freedom of other peoples (the so-called "war of aggression"). 19Secondly, it unequivocally condemns any attempt to resolve international disputes through anything other than peaceful economic or diplomatic means. 20The regulatory scope of Article 11 also prevents the Italian legal system from adopting attitudes that, while not military in nature, threaten the independence of other States.This includes the supplying of weapons or the harboring in ports and airports of the armed forces of a State engaged in a war of aggression. 21et, the repudiation of war is not expressed in absolute terms. 22ince its first drafting, the Constitution acknowledges that any dispute -however severe and harsh -may always be resolved through peaceful means.At the same time, the Constitution allows the use of armed force in order to safeguard the territorial integrity of a State suffering "unjust aggression". 23Hence, the constitutional rejection of war prevents any type In its text, Japan outlaws war as a means to settle international disputes involving the state and formally renounces the sovereign right of belligerency and aims at an international peace based on justice and order.According to this provision: "1) Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained.The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized." 23 Portinaro, P. P., Introduzione.Diritto internazionale, guerra giusta e nemico ingiusto, in: Eberl, O., Niesen, P., (eds.), 2014, Nessuna pace col "nemico ingiusto"?Se sia lecito of oppression, but it is not entirely pacifist, in the sense that it recognizes the right and duty to defend the independence of one's territory, freedom, and Constitution. 24n this sense, the content of Article 11 is strictly linked to Articles 52, 78 and 87, para 9, of the Italian Constitution.Article 78 indeed provides that "Parliament has the authority to declare a state of war and vest the necessary powers into the Government." Similarly, Article 87, para 9, establishes that the President of the Republic "shall make declarations of war as have been agreed by Parliament." These two provisions are qualified by Article 52, according to which the military defense of the Country is "a sacred duty for every citizen." Therefore, it is to be presumed that the "state of war" deliberated by Parliament and formally declared by the President of the Republic must have eminently defensive characteristics. 25he only constitutionally permitted war is the one aiming to protect the fundamental rights of citizens and safeguarding the integrity of the democratic institutions through the controlled and measured use of military force, in compliance with the principle of self-defense enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the inalienable right of each State to defend its political community from any external aggression. 26From this perspective, Article 11 clarifies the regulatory meaning of all remaining provisions of the Constitution that, in various ways, mention war.
During the discussions in the Constituent Assembly, a cautious approach prevailed, aiming to maintain an efficient military apparatus to be used solely in response to unjustified armed aggression against the imporgli la democrazia dopo averlo sconfitto, Turin, Edizioni Trauben, p. 7; Allegretti, U., 2001, La pace e il suo statuto, Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali, 6, p. 1. 24  independence and territorial integrity of the State.War remained the last resort, to be used only after all the necessary attempts at a peaceful resolution of the dispute were exhausted. 27The use of military force was justified only when a "just cause" existed, arising from a real "state of necessity".In this case, the attacked State -and potentially other States willing to assist it in pursuant of mutual agreements for international cooperation -would respond proportionately to the aggression suffered.The armed response would be consequently limited to "strict defensive needs". 28n compliance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Italian Constitution excludes, however, that the threat against the territorial integrity of a State by a potential enemy (for example through progressive rearmament or with movements of troops on the border) can justify preventive defense actions.In such circumstances, at most, only non-coercive measures such as embargoes, the freezing of economic resources or a block of funding, would be allowed. 29The defensive intervention -individual or collective -must therefore be limited to restoring the violated right by rejecting the aggression.The total destruction of the enemy or the replacement of the Government responsible for the armed attack fall outside the scope of the provision.These would indeed turn a legitimate war into an unlawful action of retaliation, contrary to the intentions of the Constituent Fathers. 30ccording to Article 11, therefore, security means protection from external invasions, such as armed attacks coming from third States, international organizations, or terrorist groups.In this respect, the notion of security must guarantee protection from aggressions, including predominantly armed actions, and may imply the defense of territorial integrity through intelligence and military activities. 31The Italian Constitutional Court has clearly endorsed the lawfulness and the dutifulness of this interpretation.In a number of cases, by providing a combined interpretation of Article 11 and Article 52 of the Constitution, the Italian Court has established that the security of the Country is presumed to axiologically prevail over other values. 32

THE "OPENI NG" CLAUSE AND THE ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY
Having firmly abandoned fascist nationalism and imperialism, and embracing a predominantly irenic perspective, the Republican Constitution recognizes transnational solidarity as an essential precondition for establishing a new coexistence between peoples, based on positive friendships and not on bloody oppositions. 33With this renewed approach, the Italian Constitution identifies a set of fundamental values that take priority over State sovereignty.It also accepts, on conditions of equality with other States, all the limitations of sovereignty, to ensure peace and justice among the Nations.Accordingly, it promotes and encourages international organizations furthering such ends. 34he text of the Constitution neither mentions the European Union nor refers to the United Nations.Nonetheless, references to the aspiration to take part in the UN and to comply with the provisions of its Charter were implicit in the Constituent Assembly.Similarly, the Constituent Fathers also took into account the European perspective, and the fact that the text of the provision does not explicitly mention it is because, especially after the war events, the link of solidarity between European States was taken to be widely accepted and considered implicit in the drafting of Article 11.It is no coincidence that the Italian Constitutional Court, with the decision No. 14 of 1964 and with the decision No. 183 of 1973 has grounded the legitimacy of Italy's accession to the EU on Article 11. 35 To the extent that peace and justice between Nations are priority values, State sovereignty must be self-limited in order to guarantee such values.As emphasized by Guiseppe Dossetti's speech in the Constituent Assembly at the end of the session of 3 December 1946, the ruins caused by war were largely the result of States arrogantly asserting their sovereignty in absolute and unlimited ways. 36In order to ensure a long and lasting period of peace among peoples, modern States must instead be willing to submit to international rules.This would be the only way to build modern Constitutions, breaking the cycle of pride and nationalism, accepting limitations in the interest of peace, and recognizing a higher authority to resolve disputes. 37s the Constitutional Court underlined in its judgment No. 170 of 1984, not all Treaties justify a limitation of sovereignty.Self-limitation of sovereignty is essential only to ensure the rejection of war and to contribute to the creation of a system of solidarity among peoples.As a result, international Treaties promoting peace and justice among Nations justify limitations of State sovereignty.Conversely, Treaties that do not pursue the objectives enshrined in Article 11 may not be enforced in the domestic legal system.The issue of statehood also comes as a direct corollary of the repudiation of war. 38ccordingly, sovereignty undergoes a genetic transformation; it is no longer invoked as a justification for absolute power but as a limit to the ar- bitrary exercise of political authority. 39The idea is that these values reflect the identity, legal culture, and self-understanding of society, thus preserving them he very identity of the polis, rooted in the historical experience of a people as articulated in the Constitution. 40t is within this legal framework that the relationship between the domestic legal order and the international legal system is established.International legal institutions complement and uphold constitutional stability.Indeed, the Italian Constitution clearly limits State sovereignty through the creation of a transnational order that mutually protects such principles.Furthermore, the "opening" that the Italian fundamental Charter accords to the rules of international law goes beyond the institutional dimension and is content-related.Such opening allows for the understanding of the very scope of the clauses contained in the Constitution.
.The Internationalist Principle as a "Supreme Principle" The Constitution does not provide a definition of the term "war", leaving room for international law to clarify its notion and understanding.This highlights the dynamic interaction between the domestic legal order and the international legal framework.The constitutional reference to war acquires a distinct semantic value since the notion of "war" under international law shapes the interpretation of the Italian Constitution. 41reaties, the ca se-law of international courts, and State practices have indeed gradually changed the classical meaning of "war", replacing it with the notion of "armed conflict", which presents different nuances and intensities.Especially in the last three decades, the concept of "war", understood essentially as an interstate conflict aimed at the debellatio of another State, has often proved insufficient to describe a diversified range of 39  conflicts.Against this background, war, in its traditional meaning, is only an option and not even the most frequent one. 42n sum, the concepts and terms of Article 11 must not be considered fixed at the time that the Constituent Fathers adopted them.They are undergoing continuous adjustments in light of evolving legal and political relationships established at the international level. 43Institutional, parliamentary and governmental practices have adapted domestic regulation to the concepts established in international law, integrating them into the interpretation of constitutional provisions.In other words, the Italian Constitution no longer embraces the merely defensive logic that emerged immediately after the end of the Second World War and was aimed at preventing possible aggressions (at that time expected mostly from the so-called "communist bloc"), but it is open to the developments of international conflicts.Hence, the Constitution provides only indirect legal protection to the currently most used method of employing armed force, such as military missions operating outside the national territory under international authority. 44n conclusion, even the constitutional provision establishing the repudiation of war must be consistently re-interpreted in an evolutionary manner, by considering the role played by international Treaties and Institutions.Article 11 indeed provides that "Italy agrees [...] to the limitations of sovereignty that may be necessary to a world order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations." 45 The interpretation of this provision should therefore balance two fundamental principles, the repudiation of war and the participation in international organizations that guarantee peace and security.As mentioned above, the Constituents wished to prevent Italy from venturing into future wars, while at the same time guaranteeing its inclusion in international organizations responsible for collective security, mainly the United Nations.46 The decision not to include the principle of neutrality in the Constitution was largely perceived by the majority of the Italian legal scholars as an attempt to avoid isolation at the international level after the Second World War.47 If the repudiation of war had a truly absolute meaning, it would have been inconsistent to include in the Italian Constitution a statement that was both ideologically strong yet lacking in normative significance.To definitively prevent Italy from being involved in military conflicts, the most suitable option would have been the inclusion of a permanent neutrality clause.Such neutrality would have ensured that the Italian Republic would not participate in any wars except those of a purely defensive nature.This way, the Constitution could have more directly advanced the ideal of promoting peace.
If this did not happen, it is precisely because the Constituents were determined to place Italy among the active participants of international politics.The Constituents left room for involvement in armed conflict situations with the view of enforcing the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. 48This means that a derogation from the manda- Second, the circumstance where the domestic legal system must conform to a decision made by UN, NATO, or EU allowing for the use of force in accordance with the terms and conditions provided by the Charter or the Treaties establishing the European Union, i.e., in a solidaristic perspective.
In any case, the admissibility of possible armed interventions will be assessed against all the clauses that compose Article 11.Therefore, it is entirely possible that a conflict may arise between the rejection of war, included in the first part of the provision, and a decision of a military interventions of international bodies or allied States, which may not be inspired by clear defensive needs or be in line with the values protected by the UN Charter or the Italian Constitution. 49

. Article  in Action:
A Brief Interpretative Overview The pacifist foundation of the Italian constitutional framework is therefore built upon two fundamental principles outlined in Article 11.Firstly, the Constitution rejects war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes.Secondly, it calls for the establishment of an international legal order ensuring peace and justice among the Nations, on conditions of equality with other States. 50owever, the idealistic attempt made by the Constituent Assembly to keep war at a distance from the republican experience faced an immediate challenge due to the geopolitical landscape emerging after the Second World War.The conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union, the delicate institutional balances of the Cold War, and the nuclear tensions between the blocs, soon tested the resilience of the pacifist principle.Within this context, the domestic legal provisions and even the UN Charter proved insufficient in securing the goals expressed in the Constitution. 51

THE ACCESSIO N TO NATO AND THE TENSIONS OF THE COLD WAR
As early as 1949, some Western governments considered it necessary to create a new and more impactful defense mechanism to solidify the hard-won balances achieved through pacification. 52The Italian government's decision to join the North Atlantic Pact was thus motivated by the aspiration to pursue the political objectives outlined in Article 11 effectively.This entailed endorsing the shared values upheld by Western liberal democracies and employing exclusively defensive military strategies. 53et, the practical organization and functioning of NATO soon revealed structural anomalies from the United States' hegemonic position and the implementation of common directives, which actually entrusted defense political decisions to military leaders. 54In order to reconcile the contradictions between the accession to the North Atlantic Treaty and the provisions of Article 11, a new interpretive approach was adopted in the mid-1970s.This allowed for justifiable disparities in treatment among NATO member States, as long as such disparities were deemed essential to ensuring peace and justice among Nations. 55onsequently, a pragmatic attitude towards the Constitution emerged in order to assess the legitimacy of military operations involving Italy against the principles outlined in Article 11.This hermeneutic approach considered the specific circumstances surrounding each military operation and aimed to balance geopolitical stability -including defensive military actions -and the constitutional commitment to pacifism. 56rom this standpoint, during the 1980s, a significant doctrinal debate revolved around installing long-range Euromissiles (Cruise and Pershing II) on Italian territory.Several commentators criticized the Italian government's decision to deploy these "first-strike" missiles, which went beyond purely defensive measures, this way contradicting the objectives stated in Article 11. 57 In the same period, there were extensive discussions regarding Italy's active involvement in various peacekeeping missions abroad.These military expeditions in the Red Sea, Sinai, and Lebanon were coordinated with other NATO countries, even though they lacked specific mandates from the UN. 58egrettably, the involvement of Parliament was often secondary, and irregular procedures were employed, which did not adequately consider accountability measures.In some instances, Treaties were provisionally executed before ratification, openly contravening the combined provisions of Articles 11 and 80 of the Constitution. 59

THE WAR OF THE GULF: COLLECTIVE SELFDEFENSE AND THE UN
In the early 1990s, the overall stability of the system established by Article 11 was again tested against Italy's participation in the first Gulf War. 60 This conflict was peculiar as it no longer fell under the category of "humanitarian intervention" or an "international policing operation", but took on the nature of a military action aimed at "collective self-defense" triggered by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. 61uring that period, the United Nations Security Council, following Article 41 of the Charter, authorized member States to use "all necessary means" to compel the aggressor Country to comply with previous UN resolutions. 62In practice, this measure was interpreted by individual States as an implicit authorization to intervene militarily against Iraq, which had fraudulently occupied Kuwait's territories. 63owever, Article 51 of the Charter -stating that "Nothing i n the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security" -does not appear to provide any justification for the use of force by national entities, especially after the Security Council has already taken the necessary measures to maintain peace. 64he defensive action taken by the international community was therefore based on an overly broad interpretation of State powers, which relied on an additional Security Council resolution bypassing in practice the Charter's normative limits. 65In this regard, several Italian constitutional scholars criticized such an application of the "right to use force", highlighting the clear violations of international norms and the principle of pacifism.They attributed responsibility to the allied forces and Parliament, the Government, and the national Army. 66ore specifically, the Italian intervention in the Persian Gulf was unequivocally deemed to contravene with the provisions of Article 11.This was because, once the initial phase of Kuwait's sudden occupation had ended, the subsequent defense orchestrated by the UN not only lacked sufficient justification but also appeared disproportionate to the actual attack carried out by Iraq.This was an international dispute that the Italian Constitution explicitly prohibited from being settled by resorting to war. 67

THE "UNJUST" KOSOVO WAR
A few years later, in March 1999, the debate surrounding the application of Article 11 was reignited with Italy's involvement in the NATO intervention in Kosovo and Serbia.The doctrinal debate primarily focused on the concept of "just war" and the consequential evolution of the Atlantic Alliance from a purely defensive organization to an entity with substantially different tasks, beyond collective self-defense. 68he military operation was conducted without a specific UN resolution legitimizing the use of force by NATO militaries.Its geopolitical justification was based on the alleged systematic violation of human rights by Serbian forces against the Kosovan minorities. 69his approach faced strong criticism from Italian scholars, who argued that the intervention took the North Atlantic Pact beyond its original purpose, surpassing the limits set by the UN Charter. 70Furthermore, Italy's participation in such action would blatantly violate the principles explicitly enshrined in Articles 11 and 78 of the Constitution. 71any scholars emphasized that rejecting war as an instrument of aggression against the freedom of other peoples and as a means for the settlement of international disputes is a fundamental principle, not be derogated even by an alleged international customary law allowing armed interventions in defense of human rights. 72Thus, there was an attempt to correct the practical application of Article 11, by excluding the pacifist principle from the internationalist openings made by the Constitution and reinterpreting the provision in a purely domestic sense. 73ccording to this approach, some commentators criticized the lack of factual and legal elements that would support the formation of a new customary rule, which would legitimize the individual State's recourse to the use of force in response to serious violations of international law in the absence of a UN Security Council action. 74Moreover, some scholars argued that the situation in Kosovo had unprecedented characteristics.They contended that it was inappropriate to refer to an established customary rule, suggesting that -at most -there may have been a customary rule in the process of formation, or even just mere practice. 75Furthermore, the previous peacekeeping actions to address similar humanitarian needs in Kurdistan or Chechnya could not be considered precedents.In those cases, despite the UN's inaction, neither the involved States nor the regional organizations actually resorted to armed intervention. 76he opposition to any attempt to legally justify armed humanitarian actions was primarily based on substantial reasons.Critics argued that such attempts contradicted the combined provisions of Articles 10 and 11 of the Constitution, which created a significant obstacle to automatically adapting Italian law to new alleged international law rules that contradicted the pacifist principle. 77

THE ATTACK ON THE TWIN TOWERS AND TH E WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
From the very outset, the US government explicitly identified the tragedy of the Twin Towers as a direct attack on the integrity of its Nation. 78In this context, the events of 11 September 2001 were promptly classified as "armed acts" against a NATO Country, leading the North Atlantic Council to invoke -for the first time in its history -the clause outlined in Article 5 of the Treaty. 79he unique aspect of this new war scenario was primarily rooted in the hidden nature of the enemies and the uncertainty surrounding their geographical location.Thus, the war was waged against transnational terrorist groups with tangible support from certain national governments. 80ollowing the US government's identification of the States responsible for harboring or defending "the enemy", the decision was made to unilaterally undertake military operations in Afghanistan.Initially, troops were deployed in neighboring areas, eventually leading to the military occupation of Kabul.This action was framed as a "combat mission" rather than 77   79 The North Atlantic Treaty, Article 5: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council.Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." a "peacekeeping operation".Taliban members and militants captured were promptly deported to the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and ultimately subjected to the US criminal system.The UN Security Council swiftly intervened to support the American administration once Al-Qaeda's direct involvement was confirmed.It condemned the New York attacks as violations of human rights, reiterating the right to self-defense and calling for full cooperation against terrorism from all member States. 81Once the external origin of the attack was established, it became incumbent upon NATO member States to provide solidarity and assistance to the USA through any means necessary, including the use of force. 82Such solidarity consisted of deploying their armed forces, offering military bases, or sending armed contingents to the war zones.Italy's commitments under Operation Enduring Freedom involved supporting actions, including military intervention of the United States and the international community against terrorism, and deploying troops to Afghanistan under US command. 83talian legal doctrine promptly highlighted the apparent contradiction between Italy's participation in war operations and the provisions of Article 11.The criticism was rooted in the absence of explicit aggression by another state or the direct involvement of Italy in a severe international crisis. 84Some commentators openly criticized the flexible interpretation of Article 11 -which had become routine -denouncing the idea that Italy's commitments to international Treaties automatically required its armed forces to intervene in military operations involving allies, with no parliamentary debate and insufficient regard for the peaceful principles enshrined in the Constitution. 85ccording to this approach, Italian military intervention would be deemed acceptable for the protection of fundamental rights -as long as it received authorization from an international organization.However, this automatic approval process does not seem consistent with the pacifist principle, which, instead, calls for a thorough parliamentary debate to assess the objectives and specific methods of any action involving Italian armed forces, on a case-by-case basis. 86he example of the conflict in Afghanistan demonstrates that the crucial issue concerning the application of Article 11 essentially shifted from the total rejection of war to the pursuit of concrete proportionality between the aggression suffered and the defensive response.This interpretation, however, effectively endorses the legitimacy of war at the international level, sparked by humanitarian reasons or aimed at combating terrorism. 87

THE SECOND IRAQI CRISIS: THE DECEPTIVE TE NSION BETWEEN PACIFISM AND THE INTERNATIONALIST PRINCIPLE
The ideological-argumentative framework, which progressively enriched the interpretation and enactment of Article 11 on globalization wars, was also extensively used in the second Iraq conflict, especially by invoking the military intervention as a "just war". 88talian constitutional doctrine identified a renewed tendency to reinterpret the pacifist principle based on internal criteria and the categories of international law.This involved expanding existing classifications and devising specific instruments to support the use of legitimate defense and armed interventions within the UN legal system. 89According to some influential commentators, the primary -if not exclusive -justification for war should be found in the position taken by the United Nations Security Council.This endorsement would make irrelevant any debate about the limits imposed by the UN Charter or Article 11; the use of force becomes indeed permissible when aimed to defend the integrity of a people and implement the procedures of international law. 90Accordingly, a conviction is emerging that, due to the openness brought by the internationalist principle, the Italian legal system should consider admissible defensive wars and armed conflicts authorized by the UN Security Council. 91n this case, the Security Council, through Resolution 1441, implemented inspection and sanction measures against Iraq. 92Nevertheless, the US decision to undertake a unilateral war, despite the opposition from some member States, directly contradicted the domestically and internationally outlined pacifist principle. 93Consequently, the decision to attack Iraq without pursuing UN deliberations would render the war constitutionally illegitimate.Even when considering an interpretative adaptation of a defensive war and Article 11 in light of evolving technological-geopolitical scenarios that have altered international relations, the constitutional rejection of war still maintains its normative strength by imposing constraints on content and procedure. 94his approach has faced substantial criticism from another part of the doctrine, which argues that the interpretative adaptation of Article 11, to reflect ongoing transformations in international relations, would inevitably undermine the normative scope of the constitutional provision.Ultimately, such an adaptation would endorse choices incompatible with the 90  principles of peaceful resolution. 95In line with this trend, the conflict in Iraq should be deemed illegitimate for two fundamental reasons.Firstly, in a system where preemptive war has repeatedly been declared unlawful, there was no clear and immediate threat to peace from the Iraqi side, while the US forces systematically violated the prohibition on the use of force.Secondly, there was a deliberate use of disproportionate force, resorting to an uncontrolled armed intervention. 96

THE CASE OF LIBYA AND THE REDUCTIONIST APPROACH
Within this same interpretative framework, the justifications advanced in support of Italy's participation in the NATO military mission in Libya, undertaken since March 2011, also fall into place. 97According to the prevailing reductionist approach at the institutional and doctrinal levels, the use of military force by the Italian Army in Libya cannot be considered a war, contrary to the first proposition of Article 11. 98 The Italian military intervention is justified by its integration into a broader operation authorized by the UN Security Council, aimed at restoring peace in that area.This kind of action does not fall under the classical notion of "war" as semantically understood by the Constituent Assembly in 1948. 99War, being a multifaceted and heterogeneous concept, is subject to different interpretations.Thus, the constitutional framework leaves room for an indeterminate scope that must be given meaning based on the evolving international law. 100 This approach seeks to establish a perfect concordance between domestic and international law.It contends that determining what constitutes "war" should refer to external categories beyond the boundaries of the Constitution. 101In this way, the pacifist and internationalist principles mutually influence and limit each other, defining the legitimacy of armed actions, particularly under resolutions passed by the United Nations. 102herefore, the arguments put forward to justify Italy's military intervention in Libya follow a derogatory logic. 103It suggests that active support for peacekeeping missions, as mandated by the United Nations, falls within the constitutional framework established under the second proposition of Article 11, by asserting that the approval of Resolution 1973/2011 serves as the sole and necessary authorization required by the Constitution for military action. 104owever, in this particular case, the text of the resolution proves elusive, lacking sufficient precision to determine constitutionally permissible conduct.The provisions for a no-fly zone and the authority to protect civilian populations or intervene in threatened areas appear surprisingly broad and grant States discretion to evaluate the legitimacy and proportionality of international military interventions. 105his approach is rooted in a hyperrealist argument that seeks to relativize the rejection of war to justify using military force.It derives from Italy's undeniable participation in numerous military missions outside its national borders and the progressive paradigm shift in how war is conceptualized within the legal framework. 106Given these circumstances, it is now evident that Italy's involvement extends beyond peacekeeping missions, increasingly entangling the Country in conflict situations that necessitate the use of armed force.Such actions are primarily driven by political decisions and directions that surpass internal considerations.This reality calls for a reevaluation of the pacifist principle, accepting Italian participation not only in defensive wars. 107evertheless, while this relativization of the first part Article 11 proves useful in understanding the historical stance of Italian institutions towards military interventions, it lacks persuasive force on an interpretative level.Such relativization undermines the normative value of the pacifist principle, which can only serve its purpose if it becomes the benchmark for assessing the legitimacy of military interventions, even those justifiable under international law. 108The Specificities of the Ukrainian Case Since war is repudiated as an "instrument of aggression" and as "a means for the settlement of international disputes", a problem may arise when war is invoked in defense of others States.To this end, Article 11 suggests a case-by-case approach inspired by the principles of solidarity and international cooperation.
First of all, the "special military operation" undertaken by the Russian Federation against Ukraine has been considered a genuine "war of aggression".The term "war" in its classical meaning is entirely appropriate, because from the very beginning of the conflict the intention of the invading army to achieve the debellatio of the invaded country has been clear. 109ccording to the plans of the Russian High Command, the military intervention in Ukraine is aimed at conquering the predominantly Russian-speaking territories of Donbass -with the consequent destruction of population and economy -and denazifying Ukraine, with related regime change in Kiev.In this context, the legal institution of "war" is not affected in its essence, while the objective circumstances in which it is placed and the motivations at the core of the conflict appear largely changed. 110econdly, the invasion of Ukraine, which began on 24 February 2022, not only was a case of clear non-compliance with customary international law on the use of force and self-defense, but also openly violated the Russian Federations Treaty obligations; in particular, the violation of Article 2 of the UN Charter is evident.Correlatively, the victim State, Ukraine, is legitimately entitled to armed self-defense under Article 51, which reaffirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, " at least until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. 111n this sense, the reading of Article 11 of the Italian Constitution must be linked to the Charter of the United Nations.The interpretative categories of international law allow us to understand more clearly what is meant by the term "defensive war", since the ius consuetudinis recognizes the right to "collective self-defense", thus justifying armed intervention by third States in aid of an attacked country. 112Therefore, generally recognized principles of international law legitimize such aid.These principles hold a constitutional rank, according to the automatic modifier mentioned in Article 10, para 1, of the Italian Constitution.A combined reading of Article 2, para 2, which states that "the Republic expects that the fundamental duties of political, economic and social solidarity be fulfilled, " and Article 11 indicates that military intervention for assisting an attacked State reacting to a foreign invasion is permissible. 113 fortiori, insofar as the military support limited to sending weapons to the attacked State is seen as a legitimate act of collective self-defense under international law, it should not be considered contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.In other words, sending weapons or providing 111  logistical support to a regular army, which operates exclusively within its territory, would not qualify as an unlawful use of force.It should be construed as an effective support for the legitimate exercise of individual self-defense by the attacked State.Thus, constitutional law matches with international law.In the case of Ukrainian, the UN General Assembly has confirmed that an unlawful aggression from the point of view of international law is underway, therefore Ukraine is reacting in self-defense. 114astly, Article 11 includes a general directive to the Italian political and institutional bodies in their international relations, requiring them to actively pursue a pacifist policy and absolutely prohibiting any involvement in wars of an offensive nature or as means for the settlement of international disputes. 115Yet, this does not exclude participation in wars waged to defend the homeland and the territory of another State.The Constitution does not explicitly clarify whether or not it is allowed to participate in wars for defending other States, thus opening up the space for the identification of an implicit authorization through international law. 116n the silence of the Constitution, the concept of "defensive warfare" should be defined in the light of the international rules governing the use of force and those provisions regulating the exercise of individual or collective self-defense.The "opening" of the Constitution to international law in fact allows for an integrative interpretation of its provisions, like the recognition of the "natural right" to self-defense or defensive support in certain circumstances. 117What is more, in the present geopolitical situation, defense of the Homeland, referred in Article 52 of the Constitution as a sacred duty for every citizen, cannot but include defensive alliances between States, with all the related consequences in terms of mutual assistance in the event of an invasion by a third country. 118

. Some Concluding Remarks
The way in which the debate about Article 11 unfolded during the Constituent Assembly offers important insights for understanding its normative meaning.By examining the historical context and the discussions leading to the adoption of Article 11, we can reach a more nuanced and complete understanding of its implications.Rather than interpreting this provision in a limited or narrow way, a thorough analysis of its origins suggests a comprehensive approach that takes into account three key principles: the principle of peaceful coexistence, the principle of internationalism, and the principle of solidarity.
When it comes to applying this provision, it is important to carefully balance all of its different components in each specific case and assess the constitutionality of any military intervention directly or indirectly involving Italy.This means that none of the different principles outlined in Article 11 can simply and unequivocally override the others, and that the norm must be applied on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the specific circumstances of each individual conflict.By doing so, we can ensure that the constitutional legitimacy of any military intervention is evaluated in a context-specific way.
Within this context, the categories of constitutional law and international law intersect and complement each other, enriching the Italian domestic legal system with the requirements of geopolitical cooperation brought about by Italy's involvement in supranational organizations promoting peace and justice among Nations.