What’s African? Identifying Traits of African Security Governance

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Abstract: African and external approaches to security governance and reform have come to stress the importance of local, national and regional ownership, embodied at the national level by the concept of “local ownership” of Security Sector Reform and in the recourse to regional and sub-regional security mechanisms as “African solutions to African problems”. While a normative consensus on this idea seems to have emerged in the policy sphere, we ask what traits can be discerned in the national and regional discourses and practices of security governance that might be plausibly considered specifically African. This article thus explores the discourses and practices of attempts to link aspects of security governance to specific times and places at the national and regional levels in Africa. Tracing the discursive recourse to identity across four eras of modern African history, we argue that specifically African traits of security governance at national and regional levels can be discerned in institutional legacies of repression and poor security governance, as well as the discursive commitment to norms of human security at the regional level, as embodied in the African Peace and Security Architecture.

Keywords: African Union, Organization of African Unity, African Peace and Security Architecture, Security Sector Reform, pan-Africanism

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Introduction: Shared Traits of African Security Governance at National and Regional Levels

In the decades after the end of the Cold War, interstate conflict decreased, while the share of sub-state conflicts fought between non-state actors in domestic contexts, increased from 5 percent during the 1980s to 25 percent during the 1990s. In the dominant policy discourse, these so-called ‘new wars’ were attributed to the phenomenon of ‘failed’ or ‘failing states’ – that is, regime types that were unable to provide the basic state functions to their populations, including welfare, representation and, crucially, security. In contrast to conventional wars, as Kaldor argues, these ‘new wars’ were mostly triggered by so-called ‘identity-conflicts’ and a blurring of economic and political violence.

A first response to the perceived problem of the ‘new wars’ came in the form of peace- and state-building operations, which entailed large-scale international interventions to create durable and legitimate state structures that would guarantee basic security and enable legitimate democratic governance. Arguments for the need to establish functional governance capacity through institutional reform moved quickly to the centre of the peace- and state-building agenda in the wake of failures to stabilise a number of countries during the 1990s. As part of this new focus on the nature governance and the need to reform institutions, an agenda for ‘Security Sector Reform’ (SSR) became a key ingredient in Western donor discourses and practices in post-war interventions. Defined as the effort to create effective and efficient security services within a framework of democratic control, rule of law and respect for human rights, the SSR agenda was quickly formalised into official policy by both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies. SSR was ultimately enshrined as a pillar of international interventions in post-war settings through the United Nations’ Secretary-General’s Reports on SSR in 2008 and 2013 as well as a UN Security Council resolution on SSR in 2014.

Yet both the theoretical construct and the practical elements of SSR quickly attracted widespread criticism, especially by both external and local actors who perceived the concept as a technocratic attempt to export the institutions of the liberal state outside the West. Furthermore, from a pragmatic perspective, externally sponsored efforts are widely held to have failed in their attempt to transform security governance in conflict-

2 Chojnacki 2009, 186.
3 Kaldor 2006; Münkler 2002.
5 Kaldor 2013, 2.
7 Ball and Hendrickson 2009; Brzoska 2003; Chappuis and Hänggi 2013; Hänggi and Scherrer 2008; Jackson 2011; Smith 2001.
affected states, and external interventions have been criticised for a lack of coordination, coherence, and long-term perspectives in their programmes. Critical scholars have portrayed SSR as a naive attempt to impose external models of security governance, described as “laudable” but “ahistorical and overambitious”. Attempts to integrate local ownership into SSR have been qualified as “more akin to a rhetorical device than a guide for implementers.”

One element of the critique of the underlying logic of SSR has focused specifically on the assumption that state security structures can and should be rebuilt on the basis of concepts and experiences derived from elsewhere, and in particular European patterns of security governance. According to this critique, SSR is inspired by an external ignorance of local security conditions, norms and practices, and for this reason cannot transform domestic security governance. Thus critics have portrayed SSR as part of futile attempts to create Western-style models of governance that by their nature lack legitimacy and are incompatible with local power structures; attempts that have at best generated “mixed” and “uneven results” and at worst ended up “doing more harm than good.”

In response to this conceptual challenge, the idea that reform must be inspired by and adapted to local security contexts has achieved universal support at all levels of intervention, ranging from international and regional to national and local actors. This consensus has in practice created a much greater role for regional actors to promote post-conflict reconstruction of security structures and for South-South cooperation in sharing models and experiences of security governance. Regional and South-South cooperation is thought to stand better chances in reconstructing security structures, as these actors are perceived to be more familiar with prevailing local norms and challenges related to resource restrictions, and as a result can better facilitate reforms tailored to the local context. This emerging discourse on security governance takes distinct forms at the national and regional levels: in national reform contexts it is embodied in the call for greater local ownership in externally supported SSR, and at the regional and sub-regional levels concerned with collective security, it is implicit in the call for ‘African solutions to

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10 Scheye and Peake 2005.
11 Duffield 2001; Larrinaga and Doucet 2010.
12 Egnell and Haldén 2009.
13 Scheye and Peake 2005, 308.
14 Hills 2009.
15 See further Hills 2014; Schlichte 2008. A variation of this critique is also discernable in the growing interest in co-called hybrid security governance configurations resulting from external interventions: for example Jarstad and Belloni 2012; Mac Ginty 2011; Richmond and Mitchell 2012. For alternative perspectives relevant to the security field and SSR: Bonacker, Daxner, Free and Zürcher 2010; Denney 2014; Schroeder, Chappuis and Kocak 2013.
16 Berg 2014.
17 Schroeder 2010.
18 Cooper, Hughes and De Lombaerde 2007.
African problems’. It is this discursive assertion of distinctiveness that lies at the heart of our research interest.

This article asks what is discernibly “African” in the models and discourses that have shaped security governance in different reform contexts and at the regional and sub-regional levels. The question of security governance reforms as an instance of policy transfers raises sensitive questions of endogeneity in itself, but it also comes at a crucial moment in ongoing international discussions of peacebuilding and international interventions. South-South cooperation in conflict-affected states is on the rise and has been for some time: It is actively encouraged in multi-lateral forums, including the United Nations.19 The African Union also formalised its own approach to SSR placing the principle of “African ownership” at local, national and regional levels at the centre of the approach.20 Other sub-regional bodies, and countries that have experienced their own reform processes, now seek to export their experience through an increased role in international interventions: South Africa is the most prominent example in sub-Saharan Africa but other countries including Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and even Rwanda are increasingly appropriating this role. At the sub-regional level, the Economic Community of West African States is preparing its own policy framework on security sector reform. Across national reform contexts, the idea of local ownership of SSR as a source of distinctively African modes of security governance has become central to both donor and national discourse.

These developments come at a time when national and local visions of reform have been made central to external assistance. On the global stage, this process has been encouraged by The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), which clearly established national leadership of reform efforts and sensitivity to local context as essential framing conditions for any international assistance to conflict affected states. This emphasis on country-led reforms was carried forward in the Busan Agreement of 2012, which introduces the “New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States”, underlining the importance of security governance reforms in state- and peacebuilding. In this context, clarifying the nature of regional, sub-regional, national and local visions of security governance – and how these have evolved over time – is essential in order to provide a better understanding of what it is reform-minded actors seek to achieve and how in international interventions.

This article approaches the question of models of security governance from the perspective of their discursive construction. The aim is to build a narrative that describes the “typical” features—if any—international and African actors share in their imagining of specifically African traits of security governance and reform. With this goal in mind, we trace shared traits of African security governance through specific eras of modern history. Instead of attempting to present a coherent chronological narrative of continent-wide African security governance—a task far beyond our modest ambitions—we seek to highlight

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20 See further African Union 2013; Esmenjaud and Franke 2009.
some of the contradictory empirical evidence from different modern eras that makes it so difficult to specify the particularly “African” traits of security governance: thus the first section looks at the legacy of colonial governance; the second section focuses on the fragmentation of national security apparatuses during the post-colonial Cold War era; a third section considers the influence of pan-Africanism and regional security discourse during the Cold War; and the fourth section traces these precedents into the post-Cold War era. With an overview of these influences, we conclude by presenting some observations on the common traits African solutions have presented to African security governance problems.

Our empirical illustrations will be taken from West Africa as this region encapsulates many dynamics that can apply to the whole of Africa, including the problem of regime stability and legitimacy, the legacy of colonial security governance, and intra-regional rivalries. Western African states have also been at the forefront in introducing forms of sub-regional security institutions, which exposed many of the underlying discursive ambiguities linked to the concept of “African security” that lie at the core of our argument.

**Colonial Models of Security Governance as Foundational Experience**

The way the national security actors in post-colonial countries conducted their tasks relied heavily on the models of security governance introduced by respective former colonial administrations: The very administrative and organisational structures of the colonial past directly influenced work practices and ideas of security provision. Although exceptions to the rule apply, security actors and institutions were often maintained by the post-colonial administrations due to political exigencies or simply a lack of organisational alternatives. Similarly, European security doctrines continued to shape the then-independent African states.\(^21\) It must be noted, however, that while the post-colonial governments adopted the security governance models of the former colonial administrations, the political institutions necessary to effectively monitor and direct the agents of security provision had either never been created or were neglected to the point of dysfunction. The top-down policing practices inherited from this era reflected a state- rather than people-centric approach to security that treated the population as a threat to the established regime, and could therefore be classified as a part of colonial heritage kept alive by autocratic post-colonial regimes.\(^22\) The persistence of colonial security practices in post-colonial African countries can be comprehended best by the example of colonial policing.

Colonial policing in West Africa for instance aimed primarily at upholding internal security and maintaining law and order by preventive patrolling in the settlements. Although French and British modes of colonial governance differed in form, Bagayoko\(^23\) identified

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21 Sebba 1999, 71.


23 Bagayoko 2012.
several points of convergence between the French and British styles of policing. In the case of the British Empire, strategic planners sought to implement models of security governance that had worked best in British-occupied Ireland, though with adaptations to guarantee their effectiveness in the respective local conditions in African and Asian colonies.24 In particular, the model of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC)25 served as a policing tool to control the British Empire. This gendarmerie-type police force was, in contrast to the British Metropolitan Police model, militarily trained, barracked, and heavily armed in order to conduct policing in volatile colonial settings, both rural and urban. A focal point in police training was robust policing and crowd control, including an RIC training centre in Dublin that prepared British police forces to serve in the colonies.

Due to rising internal tensions in response to calls for independence in the West African colonies after World War II, more robust police practises and special mobile units were created. Also due to perceptions of hostility among colonial administrations, policing practices did not evolve into more service-oriented civilianized policing modes but instead remained militarized and repressive. Although, as Sinclair26 points out, these robust police tactics contradicted the policing standards of the British metropolitan police on non-violent engagement with the population, the contextual circumstances of increased political turmoil led to regulated strategies of crowd control and violent counter insurgency tactics. Manuals on crowd control by the police forces, effective in the whole British Empire, specified the applicable stages of controlled violence the security forces could use against protesters and rioters, ranging from non-lethal violence to the use of firearms, and lethal force. While the constabulary forces were primarily responsible for combating internal security threats, the police also collaborated with the colonial military regiments in times of war.27 For example: the British colonial regiments, which were mainly tasked with border defence, were also deployed internally in a number of countries to conduct joint operations with the colonial police forces, particularly after the end of World War 2 when more organised insurgency movements emerged.28

24 Clayton and Killingray 1989, 4f.
25 The RIC was renamed the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in 1922.
26 Sinclair 2006, 152f.
The Consequences of the Limited State-Building Process in the Post-Colonial Cold War Era: The Fragmentation of the Security Apparatus

In contrast to the European state- and nation-building processes, which took four to five hundred years, most of the contemporary developing countries had less than half a decade to establish a viable nation-state during the decolonisation process of the 1950s and 1960s. Although post-colonial states commonly tried to emulate the nation-state model, the majority of these countries could not resort to generic formal political systems or institutions to effectively and accountably manage national security forces. Despite the formal retreat of the colonial powers, one of their lasting legacies persisted: the relative absence of stable and legitimate government institutions in which political, economic and military decision-making was clearly separated. Although many independence movements officially called for the mobilisation of the population through the establishment of mass party organizations, “independence frequently left a small, modernized, intellectual elite confronting a large, amorphous, unmobilized, still highly traditional society. […] In Africa the less stratified character of society and [compared to other world regions] the difference in historical timing produced radical praetorianism.”

As a result of the lack of institutionalised means of access to political power, those excluded from the political system often turned to violence in order to force their entry into the ranks of the political elites. This led in turn to the extensive politicisation of the security forces and also fostered autocratic political structures. Simply put, because of their relative organizational efficiency and their access to modern weapons, the state security forces provided an efficient way to use violence as an instrument for changing internal power distribution. Consequently, in the period from the beginning of decolonisation until the end of the Cold War, 72 percent of African leaders lost their office in a violent coup, while only one leader left office as the result of an electoral outcome. Political leaders reacted to the fact that their own security apparatus posed by far the most dangerous threat to their office with strategies of personalisation: Senior military leaders were appointed for personal loyalty, alternative security services were created to compete with the established ones, and resources were diverted away from the formal institutions and into personal networks. As William Reno argues, “security for the ruler, therefore, has come to embody the opposition of the monopolization of coercion that Weber identifies as a cardinal feature of state-building.” Moreover, existing frictions within the military leadership over revenue-spending and distribution of power destabilized increasingly fragmented political systems even more, and led to frequent coups and counter coups.

29 See Ayoob 2007.
30 Huntington 1996 (1968), 200.
31 Edmunds 2006, 1063.
32 Reno 2003, 324.
33 Ibid., 325.
34 Decalo 1990.
motivated use of the armed forces to quell resistance, produced unpredictable and fragile civil-military relations with pragmatic coalitions between politicians and military factions dominating the national political arena. In many countries, networks of public and private actors of violence divided between competing elites thus became commonplace features of politics. Since, as Hannah Arendt observed, violence can in the long term only undermine power, understood as a community’s capacity of common action, this tendency undermined the legitimacy of the political system and alienated the population from political elites.

While the fragmentation of security institutions can therefore be seen as a consequence of divide and rule strategies employed by power-holders such as Joseph Mobutu, Paul Biya or Omar Bongo, this was enhanced by a number of external factors. Membership in the UN contributed to the phenomenon of so-called “negative sovereignty” a by-product of internationally recognized and guaranteed borders, which released many African state administrations from the immediate imperative of actively maintaining their own border security and establishing border regimes with neighbouring countries. Apart from several proxy wars between African states during the Cold War era, the existing security forces, particularly the national armed forces, were not tasked to defend the borders against neighbouring rivals but were deployed to uphold internal (regime) security. Moreover, the Cold War influx of external military equipment and expertise in the form of security assistance from the United States and the USSR respectively, did not foster democratic security governance structures, but only increased the bargaining capital of political elites, who could channel external funding to their personal networks.

As long as the confrontation between the two superpowers lasted, African regimes were able to generate external revenues that allowed them to sustain public services and redistribution policies and thus to generate a minimum of internal legitimacy, which reduced popular incentives to use violence in pursuit of political participation and access to economic resources. The end of the Cold War and the apparent ideological triumph of liberal capitalist ideologies brought this system to its demise as it led to the sudden end of external funding for strategic support. So-called ‘entrepreneurs of conflict’ turned to ethnic and/or religious identities in order to mobilize support for internal recognition and equal access to political and economic resources through the use of violence. Thus, while internal discord and struggles between ethnic groups were rendered invisible during

35 Edmunds 2006, 1072.
37 Jackson 1990.
38 Herbst 2000.
the Cold War period, as Ayoob\textsuperscript{41} has argued, the decade of the nineties was shaped by numerous, brutal intra-state conflicts.

In sum, we have seen that in practical terms, during the Cold War era “security” in African states was associated, above all, with the personal and regime security of the ruler at hand. Security institutions had an ambiguous function: On the one hand, they were tasked to defend the ruler against the political ambitions of competing elites who could rely only on violence to gain access to the political system. On the other hand, security institutions were themselves often used as leverage in building the required resources of violence to challenge the political elites in place. The resulting manipulation and fragmentation of the state security apparatus further weakened the already limited legitimacy of the political systems of many African states.

**Pan-African Security Norms During the Cold War: Between Anti-Colonial Rhetoric and Regional Competition**

We have seen in the previous section that the newly created African states and their respective leaders looked for external assistance and the strengthening of the security apparatus to compensate for the lack of internal state-building during the colonial period. At the same time, African leaders were eager to find other means to bolster regime security and reduce the risk of internal uprisings, while reducing the influence of non-African actors—especially the superpowers—on their policy choices. Thus, they looked for ways to create a trans-African political project that would re-affirm a specifically African political identity without challenging the colonial legacy of Westphalian quasi-statehood.\textsuperscript{42}

One result of this goal was the Organization of African Unity (OAU), officially created in 1963. At the inauguration conference, Emperor Selassie of Ethiopia stated the OAU’s ambitions in the famous speech, “Towards African Unity”:

\begin{quote}
We need an organisation which will facilitate acceptable solutions to disputes among Africans and promote the study and adoption of measures for common defence and programmes for co-operation in the economic and social fields. Let us, at this Conference, create a single institution to which we will all belong, based on principles to which we all subscribe, confident that in its councils our voices will carry their proper weight, secure in the knowledge that the decisions there will be dictated by Africans and only by Africans and that they will take full account of all vital African considerations.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

Rhetorically, the OAU sought to institutionalise the intellectual movement of Pan-Africanism that had developed as a movement of cultural resistance against colonial
domination as early as 1900.\(^\text{44}\) However, while the main intellectual protagonists of the Pan-African movement sought to promote independence through a political and military centralisation and unification of the continent, the political leaders participating in the creation of the OAU disagreed on the ways such unity could be achieved.\(^\text{45}\) At that time, African governments were associated into three regional “blocs”, known as Brazzaville, Casablanca and Monrovia, differed by their geopolitical as well as ideological affiliation. Although at that time the quasi-unanimity of leaders rhetorically adhered to the idea of African Unity, even within the blocs the leaders did not agree on how to translate this idea into institutional reality. These divisions that led to the adoption of the intergovernmental model of a “United Nations of Africa”, supported for example by the Liberian President William Tubman, as opposed to the integrated model of a “United States of Africa” (as promoted, for example, by the Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah\(^\text{46}\)). In defence of the legitimacy of existing regimes, African leaders argued that “whatever the size, shape, population, and resources of these jurisdictions, they have a right to exist because they are the embodiment of the African political revolution. […] By this process, the successor states were made legitimate – not one, or several, or many individually, but all equally.”\(^\text{47}\) The ambition of enhancing stability by securing existing borders and regimes was reflected in the founding principles covered in Article 3 of the OAU charter:

(1) The sovereign equality of all Member States; (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states; (3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence; (4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration; (5) Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other state; (6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories which are still dependent; and (7) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs.

These principles were thus shaped by an apparent paradox: On the one hand, the OAU was designed to protect African politics from outside interference and, in that sense, to allow for genuine “African” political development. On the other hand, the OAU’s pan-African claims were intentionally limited to the “acceptance of the inherited colonial jurisdiction and the international legitimacy of all of the existing African states.”\(^\text{48}\) As a result, the OAU was centred on security norms that heavily favoured sovereign equality among African states, the promotion of consensual modes of dispute settlement, and non-intervention in internal affairs, whether to foster subversion, promote norms of democratic governance,

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44 This year was marked by the first “Pan-African Conference”, convened in London and resulting in the creation of the “Pan-African Association”. However, the intellectual genesis can be traced back to the late 18th century when members of the African diaspora began to formulate ideas about common “African” cultural characteristics. See Makalahni 2011; Williams 2007, 262.
45 Esmenjaud and Franke 2009, 6–8.
46 Williams 2007, 264.
47 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 17–18
or even prevent armed conflict. “Consequently, OAU members made a conscious decision not to involve the organization in peacekeeping operations. Rather optimistically, they hoped that a focus on preventive diplomacy would dramatically reduce the need for subsequent peace operations on the continent.”

Despite the fact that the OAU principles appeared to privilege the principles of non-interference and sovereignty over the principle of peaceful settlement of political conflict, scholars have attributed to the OAU a relatively good performance in terms of conflict resolution. Yet although the OAU did enable informal mediation and reconciliation procedures between concerned heads of states and the OAU chairpersons during the Cold War, the OAU’s mediation efforts were mostly limited to inter-state conflicts. Whereas “almost all international disputes between members have been brought before the organization at some time, a number of intense internal disputes have never been subjects of formal discussion or action.” This demonstrates the primacy of the OAU’s norm of non-interference over the norm of peaceful conflict settlement.

However, it would be misleading to consider the OAU as being the sole or even dominant source of African security norms after decolonisation. Throughout the Cold War, a number of competing sub-regional organizations, shaped along existing African geographic, cultural, and/or linguistic boundaries, were established. West Africa, for example, saw the emergence of three major regional initiatives the Communauté Économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO), the Union Monétaire Ouest Africaine (UMOA), and the OAU’s constituent regional body, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). These organizations differed also in terms of normative ideas about how international security was to be maintained and organized. “The most fundamental point of disagreement concerned the questions of why unity should be sought in the first place, which objectives and interests inter-African cooperation should serve, and how it should be institutionalised. [...] Given the already thick walls between the Francophone, Anglophone, Lusophone, and Arabic blocs of states, these differences in political outlook did not exactly help the continent on its march to unity.”

A prominent example of competing regional organizations was the West-African rivalry between Francophone CEAO and Anglophone ECOWAS. While ECOWAS constituted as early as 1981 the legal foundation for a regional military force (which would result in the creation of ECOMOG in 1990), CEAO was widely seen as an instrument for six francophone countries of the region to maintain close ties with France in economic and security matters as a counter-balance to Nigeria’s leadership role in ECOWAS. As African leaders were pursuing competing agendas of regional influence and external

49 Williams 2008, 313.
50 Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 19.
51 Meyers 1974, 362.
52 Franke 2007, 34.
support, “existent [regional] institutions expanded and new ones sprung up in all parts of the continent and in the most varied specialisations.” As a result, by 1990, there were more than 40 regional organizations in West Africa alone, many of them created as a result of the diverging agendas of Anglophone and Francophone countries and their outside sponsors. ECOWAS, however, was the only organization to develop an effective intervention instrument (in the form of the ECOMOG force established in 1990) and thereby marking a departure from the OAU’s interpretation of security through non-interference and negotiation between sovereign states.

At the close of the Cold War, the regional fragmentation of African security mechanisms did not necessarily mean that the very idea of (consensual) “African” security norms had been discredited. Although the rhetorical linkage between Pan-Africanism and the sovereignty of the post-colonial states hampered the development of a normative consensus and therewith effective, pan-African security institutions, this linkage did provide a discursive background of resonance that could be used to challenge the regime-centric conception of security, which was both a result and a cause of the incomplete state formation processes that followed decolonization. As a result, “ethical and normative questions about what it means to be ‘African’ play an important role in defining what count as legitimate security challenges and the appropriate form of response.” The swift reinterpretation of the contents of the “African security model” after the end of the Cold War illustrates this discursive openness, as the following section will show.

The previous sections detailed some of the ideas and practices that developed in Africa related to the theme of security and stability after decolonisation. We have seen that it would be misleading to assume that one coherent understanding of “African security” had emerged by the end of the Cold War. However, the idea of a specifically African understanding of security opened a discursive field of reference, which cleared the way to develop and test a variety of conflict settlement institutions that went beyond purely bilateral approaches, both on the continental and the regional level.

**African Solutions to National, Sub-Regional and Regional Problems: the African Union and Human Security**

With the end of the Cold War, the security situation in many African states again changed dramatically: as external support for domestic regimes of questionable legitimacy decreased, domestic political tensions surfaced, often in the form of violence and civil war. In the wake of failed international responses and disengagement from the region following the end of the Cold War, a marked demand for “African solutions to African problems” in response to deteriorating security coalesced. The nationalist and regionalist sentiment
that had characterised the 1980s became the basis for impetus as the moribund OAU was
outpaced by developments at the sub-regional level.\textsuperscript{57} The deployment of a peacekeeping
mission by ECOWAS as a response to the crisis and violence in Liberia in 1990 marked
a watershed moment in this regard, because the regional economic body was forced to
exceed its original mandate by assuming the responsibility for peacekeeping that the OAU
had been accused of neglecting: in this light, OAU support for the ECOWAS mission, in
the words of one scholar, constituted “a recognition of its own weakness.”\textsuperscript{58}

It was the threat of regional contagion from Liberia’s brutal civil war that initially caused
Ghana, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Nigeria to push for the intervention that led ultimately
to the deployment of ECOWAS’ first peacekeeping mission – the ECOWAS Monitoring
Group (ECOMOG). Yet reflecting the fact that events were propelling intervention
forward at a rate that outstripped institutional preparedness, ECOMOG was deployed
on the basis of an ad-hoc legal bricolage made from existing ECOWAS protocols of 1976,
1978, and 1981.\textsuperscript{59} In West Africa, this momentum led to the creation of a new peace
and security framework in 1993, and ultimately the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, and Security in 1999. The dire consequences of civil
wars, their trans-border security implications also echoed on a regional scale, and together
with the sudden international disengagement in African affairs illustrated in Somalia, and
later Rwanda, became instrumental in convincing African states of the need for united,
continent-wide security responses. At a hopeful juncture in international politics, which
South African president Thabo Mbeki famously predicted as the “African renaissance”,\textsuperscript{60}
the recourse to African identity and partnership also held powerful discursive appeal.

Yet despite the discursive appeal of unity and shared identity, crises in Somalia, Rwanda,
the DRC and others made plain continuing barriers to pragmatic cooperation: more
particularly, these crises showed up the institutional and legal weaknesses of the OAU. It
was in this context that in the late 1990s Muamar Gaddafi launched a call for the rebirth of
the OAU as the African Union (AU). Winning the support of Nigeria and South Africa,\textsuperscript{61}
the AU was agreed in 2000, established in 2001 and launched in 2002 as the institutional
embodiment of a political willingness to take back responsibility for the continent’s
security challenges from the international community.

Whatever its rhetorical purpose, the AU was from its inception moulded in the image of
European political and security institutions. At the heart of the AU project was the earlier
concept of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa
(CSSDCA); a Nigerian project formed on the basis of the “Kampala document”, agreed

\textsuperscript{57} For a more general account of the weaknesses of the OAU and its reinvention as the AU, please
see Adejo 2001.
\textsuperscript{58} Adebajo 2002.
\textsuperscript{59} Aning 2004.
\textsuperscript{60} Esmenjaud and Franke 2009, 15.
\textsuperscript{61} Though arguably for distinct reasons, see further: Møller 2009.
in 1991 and envisioned as a counterpart to the OSCE. However, where institutions may resemble European precedents, the norms that this organisation aimed to influence were particular to the African continental context: specifically in that the agreement set out to modify the status of sovereignty as an inviolable principle in favour of a concept of security based on human security, good governance and a responsibility to protect human rights. This focus on non-conventional security and the principle of human rights before sovereignty came before the UNDP report of 1994 had popularised the concept of human security at the international level, and also anticipated the findings of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty that would endorse the idea of an international “responsibility to protect” almost a decade later. However, the CSSDCA project was stillborn, and it was not until almost a decade later that Nigeria resuscitated it as the foundation for the new AU, endorsed at the first AU summit in Durban 2002. In articles 4h and 4j of the African Union’s 2000 Constitutive Act, the AU thus claimed the right to intervene in a member state in grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.

The movement towards a more human-centred concept of security and multilateralism based on partnership notwithstanding, the 1990s did little to change the reality of domestic security conditions in most African states: where undemocratic governments used the security sector for repressive regime maintenance. Specifically African traits became more visible in the general characteristics of the security situation than in any organised response to them: Aning, for example, summarises these trends as situations of increasingly fragmented political authority; mounting influence of armed non-state actors; divided loyalties within discredited state security agencies; and the growing prevalence of self-organised security forces within society as a response to the state incapacity to provide for security. South Africa’s radical transformation of security sector governance in the context of the 1994 transition to democracy became the exception to this continental trend, and a global example of the potential for SSR as transformative reform agenda.

If democratisation of security at the national levels remained sluggish overall, the situation at the regional and sub-regional levels changed faster. A further expression of the influence of human security enshrined in multilateral cooperation was the endorsement of democracy promotion and good governance as a basis for conflict prevention and post-conflict peacebuilding. This normative shift became visible in the

62 See further: Møller 2009, 7–9.
63 Møller 2009, 9.
66 For a discussion of the formative influence of South Africa’s transition experience on global approaches to SSR, see further Bryden and Olonisakin 2010; Cawthra and Luckham 2003.
development of legal instruments endorsing principles of democratic governance and free and fair elections, and the exclusion and isolation of leaders who come to power unconstitutionally: a regional example being the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance signed in 2007. These trends were consolidated at the regional level with AU-wide policy positions on principles of domestic democratic governance and in particular of the security sector.⁶⁷ Møller⁶⁸ has pointed to the relevance of pan-African rhetoric in cementing political support for these normative innovations; a fact which is to some extent paradoxical considering that the same rhetoric of pan-Africanism served in earlier eras to reinforce principles of non-interference, and sovereign supremacy.

At the regional level, the change from the OAU to the AU was also pitched as an African solution to African problems. Among the most important features of the new institutional architecture was the AU Peace and Security Council: one of five pillars of the APSA, it was created in 2002 with a mandate to oversee conflict-prevention, peace-making and support operations, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building. The institutional form of the PSC recalled the UN Security Council, although there were no permanent members and no veto rights, and the election of members for staggered terms gave the structure a more democratic character.⁶⁹ Moreover, the union-based approach to peace and security seemed to owe some inspiration to the European Union: for example, the PSC is charged with drafting a common defence and security policy for Africa, which it has used as a platform to endorse a non-traditional concept of security, that includes not only conventional military and strategic considerations, but also political, social, economic and cultural aspects of security (again reflecting very much the precedents set by the EU in the conception of security and defence contained in the “Petersberg Tasks”).⁷⁰

Similarly, the PSC was to be supported by another pillar of the APSA, the African Standby Force: a rapid reaction force that was meant to provide a means for the AU to intervene in crisis situations without having to engage with the long and difficult processes involved in securing UN support. The AU failed to establish the African Standby Force by 2010 as it had initially set out to do, a failure variously attributed to a lack of capacity and political will:⁷¹ As a result, preparations seemed to have stalled at a point where national readiness for deployment was low and the provision of forces remained at the discretion of member states.⁷²

Yet if the AU’s institutional framework appeared as some kind of UN–EU hybrid, it was also innovative in several ways. Even if the reality of the African Standby Force failed to

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⁶⁷ See for example the African Union Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform.
⁶⁸ Møller 2009, 10.
⁶⁹ Ibid. 10–15.
⁷⁰ Ibid. 13.
⁷¹ Bachmann 2011.
⁷² The authors wish to thank an anonymous reviewer for insight on this point.
live up to the ideal, the principle of a multilateral organization having troops at its disposal linked to a continent wide early-warning and monitoring system remained a significant commitment to African independence in resolving conflict on the continent. A further unique institutional feature of the APSA was the Panel of the Wise: an appointed panel of “highly respected” African statesmen tasked to advise the PSC and act as envoys on its behalf often in crisis negotiations. This commitment to mediated conflict resolution harks back to the precedent embodied by the OAU’s longstanding commitment to mediation, but carries it forward into a new institutional reality by reserving the legal and operational option of direct intervention.

An obvious factor restricting a greater role in security for the AU, as well as sub-regional and national actors, is the fact that the lack of resources can constrain capacity development and may compel “African solutions” into the sphere of influence of non-African actors who chose to support them on a case-by-case basis. In the absence of sufficient resources, decisions about when and how African solutions are applied continue to be heavily conditioned by Western, rather than African, actors. Indeed, significantly greater numbers of African troops are deployed in UN missions compared to AU missions, not in small part due to the higher level of compensation associated with UN deployments; a structural factor upon which some militaries depend for their own capacity development. More cynically, critics accuse external actors of appropriating the slogan of “African solutions to African problems” in order to avoid more direct engagement in conflicts that do not affect their own national interests.

If these are important external constraints, an internal constraint is the limited political commitment that African states themselves evince for shared security responsibilities. Thus, for example, it is not clear why the rhetoric of pan-Africanism, and African solutions has retained such discursive force in the context of AU peace operations, when the viability of security interventions lay plainly with the relatively small number of “lead nations” that tended to provide the lion’s share of support in these contexts in the past: the greatest contributions to early missions in terms of troops and financial support thus came routinely from the same states, namely Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda, Rwanda, Ethiopia, Kenya and Ghana. At the same time, there is evidence that this trend is evolving with Uganda, Burundi, Angola, Congo Republic significantly involved in AU-mandated missions deploying a record total number of troops under AU auspices in 2013. It is thus quite clear that even if not all African states can, or do, assume equal responsibility for intervening in situations of crisis on the continent, the idea of intervention, as a shared African responsibility, remains powerful.

73 Esmenjaud and Franke 2009.
74 Boutellis and Williams 2013, 2.
75 Esmenjaud and Franke 2009.
76 Lotze 2013, 1.
Conclusion

The preceding article has retraced some of the formative influences of modern history on the discourse and practice of security governance at the national and regional levels in Africa. But if there are specifically African traits to national or regional patterns of security governance, what are they? If there is a common notion that might plausibly encompass the great variety and diversity of African contexts in such a way as to merit the description of “African”, what is it and what might it contain? In this article we have asked what common traits have been identified on the basis of historical African experience, and several points of convergence can be drawn from the discussion.

Looking first to the experience of colonial models of security governance, it was argued that certain common institutional features and habits of national security practices were forged in the crucible of colonial repression, and that these experiences also shared certain commonalities based either on region or coloniser. It is certainly not our intention to suggest that the experience of modern security governance in any African context can be deduced directly from these historical facts. Instead we seek to understand the relevance of this formative experience in shaping subsequent experiences of security governance: insofar as repressive colonial-era security institutions became the tools of post-independence autocrats in the context of externally enforced quasi-statehood, it seems that this shared colonial legacy was an important factor in shaping the specifically African traits of national and regional security governance which subsequently emerged.

It is plausible to argue that the common experiences of co-opted democracy, repressive security governance, civil war and regionalised conflict dynamics contributed to the growing effectiveness of discursive references to good governance, human rights, human security and collective security – value which came to express themselves in African initiatives to improve security governance both at national levels, through SSR, and at regional levels, through the institutionalisation of the AU and the introduction of the APSA.

The continuing influence of a claim to African identity provides a resource for the political and security institutions that tap into these discursive historical precedents. For example, the modern institutional architecture and values of the AU framework for conflict and security hark back in a number of ways to early facets of pan-Africanism, for example in the liberal idealism expressed in the idea of multilateral governance; in the emphasis on individual equality and freedom as expressed in the centrality of human rights; and also in the importance given to social and economic aspects of security as expressed in the commitment to human security.77 Even the idea of the African Standby Force evokes a long precedent of calls for a pan-African military force; an idea promoted widely by

77 In this regard, Esmenjaud and Franke 2009, 6, note the influence of Wilsonian idealism on pan-Africanism.
Nkrumah including at the founding of the OAU when he proposed the creation of a Defence Command for Africa.\textsuperscript{78}

Yet the tensions within African security cooperation also continue to reflect precedents in pan-Africanist politics, especially in so far as the forces of nationalism continue to pull against the impulse to multilateral action, in much the same way as Nkrumah argued with Tubman over the progress and extent of a future continental unity. The structural precedents that the AU and the OAU faced were also similar in that both organisations were forced into peacekeeping missions by circumstance early in the first years of their existence. Thus barely a year after the first AU summit agreed to establish the PSC, the AU had assumed responsibility for overseeing the peace process in Burundi (AMIB launched in 2003). That mission was followed by major missions to Sudan and Somalia creating a precedent for future engagements. Moreover, concurrent to these deployments, the institutional architecture of the AU itself was still being developed, and its complex relationship with sub-regional organizations and multilateral bodies, such as the UN, still being negotiated. In a similar way, the OAU was quickly diverted from its seminal functions of fostering continental unity into the task of conflict mediation, as a spate of border disputes divided post-independence states and caused civil wars. As with the later-AU, internal divisions hampered agreement on the principle of collective security missions: thus the first all-African peacekeeping deployment - the Inter-African Force – came into being without OAU endorsement when African troops from Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Morocco, Senegal, and Togo deployed with French and US support to the former Zaire in 1978. The historical continuity continued, however, insofar as the OAU eventually did endorse the principle of collective security in the form of an ill-fated mission to Chad in 1981.\textsuperscript{79}

While these parallels provide only a preliminary answer to our research question of what is specifically African about regional and national patterns of security governance, it seems clear that there are indeed continuities in “African solutions” to the questions of African security governance. Our evidence suggests that specifically African traits include references to pan-African ideals that have remained influential at least on the rhetorical level, as well as to human-security driven approaches to regional and sub-regional security governance: Both points constitute a constant founded on African historical experience.

\textsuperscript{78} Franke 2006.

\textsuperscript{79} See further, Naldi 1985; Schatzberg 1989.

References


