Level of Analysis Problem in the Post-Cold War Deterrence: The Need for Regional Perspectives

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Abstract: The end of the Cold War has had profound effect on deterrence theory and practice. Contrary to the perceived belief that deterrence was a dead concept after the demise of the Cold War rivalries, it lives, even grabs more attentions with recent developments in international relations. During the entire Cold War period, deterrence had been studied within a systemic context in which nuclear superpowers operated in a bipolar world. In the post-Cold War era, with a renewing interest in deterrence theory and practice, deterrence at regional level appears to be more pertinent to new security environment. However, current literature on the concept does not pay adequate attention to deterrence at this level. In this sense, Regional Security Complex Theory(RSCT) has an important explanatory power for resolving regional dynamics in which deterrence practice is generally shaped. This article aims to bridge the gap between deterrence studies and regions, as a level of analysis, by integrating RSCT within the wider deterrence discussion.

Keywords: deterrence, deterrence theory, post-cold war, regional security complex theory (RSCT), management of deterrence in the regional contexts

Introduction

Deterrence is one of the coercive techniques that states use to translate their power into tangible foreign policy outcomes by getting the other to comply by threats of punishment.[1] Even though a theory of deterrence until the early 20th century had never been systematically articulated, it was one of the conventional wisdom and practice of social affairs, since the essentials of deterrence are as old as social life itself and have been known for centuries.[2] In other words, "deterrence is almost as familiar in everyday life as dust on your shoes."[3] The Secretary of Defense, James Schlesinger, made a similar statement

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1   Coercive diplomacy on the other hand is used generally as an umbrella concept that covers all kind of threats politics from intimidation to actual use of force to coerce adversaries. See:George 1991.

2   George 1991.

3   Morgan 2006.

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by saying "Nuclear weapons are used every day" to sustain peace through deterrence.[4] Robert Jervis voices that deterrence is probably the most influential school of thought in the American study of international relations.[5] Indeed, deterrence has been applied to a number of issues from daily state politics to strategic interstate relations as one of the cornerstone concept of American foreign policy. In this sense, deterrence comes to operate at different levels, as it has been perceived, alternatively, as a condition, a strategy, a doctrine, a goal, or a policy.[6] Deterrence theory suggests a connection between conflict avoidance and the use of power, and in this sense it has central theoretical importance in the international relations in addition to it is relevance in strategic policy analysis.[7]

Nonetheless, current theory and practice of deterrence is both the product of 20th century. Patrick M. Morgan correctly pointed out that the start of the Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union on a global scale produced immense interest in deterrence.[8] The atomic bombs that ended the World War II and the bipolar world that emerged out of it set the stage for the emergence of contemporary deterrence theory. The former made stable deterrence necessary, and the later made it possible.[9] Thus, deterrence became one of the backbone strategies of entire superpower politics during the Cold War. By the middle and late 1970s, a great diversification in theories and models had appeared within the study of deterrence. By applying both empirical analysis and psychology such as variations in the aggressors' risk-taking propensity, utility of rewards in addition to threats, and influence of domestic politics on decision makers the deterrence theory expanded.[10] Within this third wave,[11] many scholars challenged deterrence theory on cognitive and psychological basis for the first time.[12] Following this trend, with the end of the Cold War, many argue that deterrence is a dead concept that could offer nothing for the new age.[13] However, since the early 2010s, there has been a renewed academic interest in the theory and practice of deterrence.[14] This time the study of deterrence replaces its past focus on the challenge of deterrence against a global superpower armed with massive nuclear forces with the focus on the challenge of deterrence against a host of potential adversaries including regional powers, "rouge states" and numbers of non-state actors

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4   Kirkpatrick 2009.

5   Jervis 1979.

6   Kegley and Schwab 1991, 12.

7   Weede 1989. For an excellent review of the early roots of the concept see also Quester 1966.

8   Morgan 2003, 1.

9   George and Smoke 1974, 20.

10   Jervis 1979; Sagan 1993; Lebow and Stein 1989.

11   Robert Jervis explains the development of deterrence theory during the Cold War within three subsequent waves. See, Jervis 1979.

12   George and Smoke 1974; Jervis and Stein 1989; Dror 1980; Huth and Russett 1988; Allison and Zelikow 1999.

13   Ullman 1985.

14   Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz 2009.

in many different domains and contexts.[15] Today's revival in the literature is primarily a response to real-world developments issues and, therefore, is more concerned with developing deterrence strategy rather than deterrence theory.[16] According to Lupovici, within this emerging literature, scholars isolated theoretical and empirical questions from each other contrary to the previous waves of scholarship, within which these were studied together.[17]

At the policy level, the most important aspects of the emerging deterrence practices are that, due to the rise of regions and regional actors, regional dimensions have started dominating new emerging security relations in the post-Cold War era. The relevance of regional level has been increased even before the end of the Cold War, as global regions came to enjoy more autonomy and involvement, but with the demise of Cold War bipolarity regions and regional actors turn to be "the ground" in security issues. Many, if not almost all, contemporary conflicts have raised regional concerns and efforts to cope with these conflicts in order to sustain peace, order and security primarily through regional arrangements and actions at the regional level rather than international actions at a global level.[18] Today, with an exception of nuclear proliferation, which receives a distinct global attention, most of the security problems have first and foremost regional character. International relations theory has responded to these developments with a greater interest in regions, and with the "new regionalist arrival in the discipline."[19]

If we think about what units compose and structure international system in the post-Cold War era, regions have became one of the major level of analysis in security studies indeed.[20] Nonetheless, a review of the vast literature on the topic discloses that regional management of deterrence has not been adequately studied, especially on the theoretical front, even though the practice of deterrence requires it, as the post-Cold War security architecture compels more complex and a case-specific-tailored deterrence strategies at the regional level. In this sense, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) offers an accurate departure point for a framework for study of deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Buzan and Weaver point out that "one of the purposes of inventing the concept of regional security complexes was to advocate the regional level as the appropriate one for a large swath of practical security analysis."[21] Therefore, by using the definition of region and regional security in RSCT, this paper aims two things: first to draw attention on the

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15   Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf 2013; See also Long 2008; Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz 2009.

16   Knopf 2010.

17   Lupovici 2010.

18   Lake and Morgan (eds) 1997.

19   Here I am mostly interested in scholars who look at regions as a security related phenomena rather than as integration or focusing on economics and trade. See: Fawcett and Hurrell 1996; Edward and Milner 1999; Hettne, Inotai, and Sunkel 1999; Rosecrance 1991; Ethier 1998; Lawrence 1996.

20   Taking regions as a level of study in the security studies is a contemporary and important phenomenon. See: Buzan and Weaver 2004; Katzenstein 2005; Lake and Morgan 1997, Lemke 2002.

21   Buzan and Wæver, 2003, 43.

problem of the level of analysis within the deterrence study, and second, to suggest that regional level is more appropriate level of analysis for the study of deterrence in the post-Cold War era by integrating RSCT with wider deterrence discussion.

The Problem of the Level of Analysis within the Study of Deterrence

According to Morgan "Deterrence is shaped by the systemic context in which it operates. [In this systemic context] the scale and intensity of the conflicts determine its salience, functions, utility, and mode of operation."[22] Throughout the entire Cold War, deterrence capacity of nuclear destruction as a result of "Mutually Assured Destruction" (MAD) helped to deter both side from a devastating nuclear confrontation.[23] Thus, with help of MAD, and bipolar world order at the system level, the study of deterrence became "theoretically most developed, and practically best applied", since it benefited from "the most rapid development both in theory and in practice."[24] Thus, many think about deterrence as if there is no other level of analysis by and large. However, there have been other levels of analysis, albeit they were marginalized and left ad-hoc for a long time. Smoke and George detect, at least, three other levels of analyses to study deterrence: i) deterrence between superpowers, ii) deterrence of limited war or conventional war, and iii) deterrence in sub-limited conflicts.[25] Deterrence between superpowers is basically the study of deterrence and, as it is already mentioned above, it had received by far the greatest attention, particularly from the mid-1950s onwards. As George and Smoke pointed out by the early 1960s, studies of deterrence at the level of superpower competition "had become almost a separate discipline in itself, enjoying a rich literature, panoply of specialized concepts, and its own technical vocabulary."[26] Deterrence of limited war or conventional war has received significantly less attention and conceptually and analytically has lagged behind the study of deterrence at the system level. Thus, deterrence theories at this level remained somewhat underdeveloped and deterrence practice policies remained somewhat ad-hoc. On the other hand, especially from the Cuban Missile Crisis up to present, there has been a growing interest in deterrence at the level of sub-limited conflicts.[27] However, both theory and practice at this level of analysis is still highly unsystematic and underdeveloped, lacking of any kind of regular methodology for analysis and it even lacks a consensus on the terminology and definition of the problem.[28] There are other investigations that offer perspective from different levels of analysis in the study of deterrence. For instance, in a more recent work explaining why current deterrence theory and practice is so complex,

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22   Morgan 2003, 242.

23   Black 2011.

24   George and Smoke 1974.

25   *Ibid.*, 47–51.

26   *Ibid.*, 39.

27   Sub-limited conflicts are the conflicts such as counterinsurgencies, and guerrilla warfare, espionage, etc.

28   George and Smoke 1974, 44.

Paul *et al.* propose five levels of analysis: i) deterrence among great powers, ii) deterrence among new nuclear states, iii) deterrence and extended deterrence involving nuclear great powers and regional powers armed with chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, iv) deterrence between nuclear states and non-state actors, and v) deterrence by collective actors.[29] Patrick Morgan, the one who offered first the distinction between global and regional deterrence without further elaborating on this, outlines similar levels in his vast works on the subject.[30] Every theory has a "level of analysis" to conceptualize the fundamental or foundational level at which phenomena in the field of study occurs. For instance economists often use firms or households as their level of analysis. International relations scholars use generally international system or states as their level of studies. [31] As David Singer, the first scholar who drew attention to the problem of level of analysis in international relations, pointed out the choice of appropriate level of analysis often turns out to be quite difficult, and may well become a central issue that determines the research focus.[32] Indeed, understanding levels in security studies is the key for understanding the whole security structures. With an exception of system-level studies, analysis of deterrence issues are generally characterized by actor specific focus, drawing form the discussion of rational actor assumption in deterrence theory. All things considered, it is a fair claim that none of these levels adequately reflects on the regions and regional dynamics, which are the most important security drivers of today's security architecture.

Regions are important levels for studying deterrence due to their two traits. First, regional dynamics are one of the overwhelming realities for the study of security related issues. Buzan and Weaver point out that today's risks and threats travel over near distances leaving neighboring countries' security bound to each other.[33] In this sense, not only the pattern of rivalry and conflict or alliances among states, but also, the decision about what weapons systems are to be procured or what sorts of military posture would be sustained, stem basically from the factors indigenous to regional structures. Therefore, assuming that the regional dynamics are playing initial role in deterrence calculations and, thus, should be studied as an independent level of analysis is critical for strategize about deterrence practice. Moreover, as there is only one superpower that although declining can project power globally, regional countries are bound to be the most important players for shaping the deterrence at regional level. For instance, one of the well-known conflicts in which deterrence in play huge role is the conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Historically, the Korean War, as a proxy war, was a result of the conflict between superpowers. In this sense, deterrence requirements in the Korean Peninsula during the entire Cold War were a function of superpower balancing in which the capacity of the regional states or the regional order played very little if it did at all. With the end of the Cold War, the deterrence situation evolved greatly on the peninsula. Now the most important traits

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29   Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz 2009, 9.

30   Morgan 2003.

31   Valerie Hudson uses "ground" instead of level of analysis. See: Hudson 2005.

32   Singer 1961.

33   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 12.

of the deterrence on the Korean Peninsula is not something penetrating from global level but something that evolved from East Asia, as a particular security complex where there is a complex set of relations between superpower(s), great powers and regional powers. The United States, as the only superpower, involves in the regional order as an outsider, whereas China and Japan are great powers of the region itself. To think about the deterrence situation between India and Pakistan, in which regional factors define, securitise, desecuritise, or organize the conflict. Furthermore, when we consider other current situations in which deterrence or extended deterrence takes place, we can easily detect regional dynamics rather than global concerns in deterrence calculations.[34]

Second, but in a very limited way, regions can be perceived as the independent actors of deterrence relations. Today's world is truly regional. World has witnessed a regionalization booms in many international domains, going from culture to economics and from environment to security. We are living the age of regions and regional intuitions. In this sense, for instance, the phenomenon of European security and European deterrence, or Nordic security and Nordic deterrence, or Gulf security and Gulf deterrence, or ASEAN security and ASEAN deterrence, could be utilized in a broader sense. Unfortunate, this approach of studying deterrence by taking regions as a unit of analysis is still elusive. However, new approaches, which take regional dynamics and regions both as level of analysis and as the unit of analysis for the study and practice of deterrence, are urgently needed.

RSCT and the Regional Level of Analysis

Regions as a distinct level of analysis, situated between the state and the globe, is not a new phenomenon even though barely sufficient attention has been given to regional dynamics in the international relations literature.[35] When it comes to take regions both as unit of analysis or as level of analysis, the most obvious problem is defining a region and regional borders. Indeed, one of the major puzzles that scholars have tried to address is how to define regions, and regional borders. Lake and Morgan confirm this fact by stating the following: "How does one define a "region"? Judging by the literature, this cannot be resolved to everyone's satisfaction. Extensive consideration of the question years ago resulted in variety of overlapping definitions. A review some years ago identified eight different labels for region and twenty-one different attributes of it in use."[36] In this sense, Regional Security Complex Theory is one of the most important attempts. The RSCT is,

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34   This is especially true for the study of extended deterrence. See: Tanter and Hayes 2011; Hopper and Brooks 2013; O'Neil, 2013.

35   See a perfect review of the discussion in Kelly 2007.

36   Lake and Morgan 1997, 25.

indeed, a 'magnum opus' in the regionalism literature.[37] The regional security complex is a set of states with a significant and distinctive network of security relations that ensure that the members have a high level of interdependencies on security that these groups of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national security cannot realistically be considered apart from one another.[38] In this sense, the RSCT defines regions through the lens of security. Drawing from the same regionalist functionalism, Lake and Morgan, for instance, define regions on security externalities. In this way, they can escape from the question of which country belongs to which region, yet they fail to establish region as a level of analysis, since in Morgan's theory of regional security regions are just sub-global issue networks.[39] As Kelly points out "Lake does not argue for a regional level of analysis. He imports neorealism on the regions but then jettisons any regional characteristics."[40] Lemke says that regions are "parallel smaller international systems."[41] By accepting the regional level of analysis, instead of subsystems or regional security complexes, Lemke, as a power transition theorist, speaks of "local hierarchies." He unearths twenty-three separate mini-hierarchies under the larger global one, contemporary American primacy. Eight of Lemke's mini-hierarchies are as small as dyads. By contrast, Lake's strictly rationalist regional security complexes do not require this level of intense interaction, meaning any threat can kick up a complex.[42] This makes theory vague in analytical terms. In Katzenstein's model of hegemonic regionalism, regions are not determining levels of analysis as the United States use regions as platforms to project power globally.[43]

Buzan and Weaver suggest that rather than simply seeing the world affairs as a global balance of power game, instead each region can be carved up, explained and conflicts understood within the regional framework. They underscore securitization through regional amity and enmity patterns. In this sense, regions appear as appropriate level of analysis for the study of security. Suggesting that "a regional approach gives both a much clearer empirical picture and theoretically more coherent understanding of international security dynamics."[44]

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37   In summary, the RSCT was first sketched by Buzan in the first edition of 'People, States and Fear' in 1983. The theory was applied to South Asia and the Middle East (Buzan 1983), then elaborated and applied in depth to the case of south Asia, and later applied to Southeast Asia. Väyrynen, Wriggins and Ayoob have applied versions of the theory to several regional cases. Buzan and Wæver used it to study the post-Cold-War transformation in Europe. Later on Buzan and Wæver expanded the applicability of the theory and applied the latest version of the theory to other regions in their book *Regions and Powers* in 2003.

38   Buzan and Wæver, 1997, 190.

39   Lake and Morgan 1997, 7.

40   Kelly 2007.

41   Lemke 2002, 52.

42   Kelly 2007.

43   Katzenstein 2005.

44   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 30.

Their RSCT is, indeed, more compatible with the neorealist reading of security despite the fact that it reflects to constructivist impulses through the concept of "securitization." Its usage of the concepts such as swing powers, overlay, penetration, territoriality, distribution of power, regions as mini-anarchies, etc. can be seen in this context. Most notably, Buzan and Weaver define regions as territorially coherent subsystems and traditional, state-based military-political complexes.[45] They argue that the world is divided into 'regions' and 'powers' with a sole superpower, the United States, and a series of great powers, the European Union, Japan, China etc., and a number of regional powers such as India. Therefor, the RSCT offers a conceptual frame that catches the emergent new structure of international security with a "1 + 4 + regions" formulation.[46] According to this formula, there is one superpower - the United States, four great powers – the European Union, Russia, China and Japan, and numbers of regions (RSCs).[47] Thus, as Kelly rightly pointed out, "RSCT complements neorealism by applying it to newly emerging subsystems."[48] On the level of analysis question, Buzan and Weaver argue that regions are the most important level for the post-Cold War era security among the existing four levels: domestic, regional, inter-regional, and global since there is only one superpower that can operate globally.[49] Polarity, balance of power and distribution of power are as crucial in the RSCT as they are in realist assumptions. Determining any structure of order whether it is regional or global is important to assess coercive powers and its usage. In this sense, the end of the Cold War had a profound impact on the whole pattern of international security. However, the post-Cold War security order still lingers unsettled two decades after the demise of the Soviet Union. A wide range of claims going from nothing has substantially changed[50] through a mitigating disorder[51] to unipolarity[52] or expanding trend of multi polarity[53] or

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45   *Ibid.*, 462.

46   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 40.

47   Buzan and Weaver elaborate nine RSCs; these are North America, South America, Europe, post-Soviet space, Middle East, Southern Africa, South Asia, and East Asia. See: Buzan and Weaver 2004, xvi.

48   Kelly 2007.

49   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 463.

50   According to Ikenberry the attempts to describe post-Cold War order have all failed because there is no such a thing, On the other hand, he accepts that the polarity of the system with the end of the Cold War has changed, but not the world order that created in the middle to late 1940s, which is represented by the organizations such as IMF, WB and UN. See Ikenberry 1996.

51   Carpenter 1991.

52   Krauthammer 1990; Wohlforth 1999.

53   Layne 2006; Layne 1993however, is weak. Contrary to the predictions of Waltzian balance of power theorists, no new great powers have emerged since the end of the Cold War to restore equilibrium to the balance of power by engaging in hard balancing against the United States—that is, at least, not yet. This has led primacists to conclude that there has been no balancing against the United States. Here, however, they conflate the absence of a new distribution of power in the international political system with the absence of balancing behavior by the major second-tier powers. Moreover, the primacists' focus on the failure of new great powers to emerge, and the absence of traditional "hard" (i.e., military.)

a hybrid form of uni-multipolarity[54] can be found in the scholarship. According to Buzan and Weaver, the new pattern of security has not been captured adequately by any of these claims since all of these attempts depart just from the *polarity* in the systemic level and its effects on security as if there is no difference between system level polarity and regional level polarity. The standard account notes that system polarity sets the tone for the entire planet, but regionalism suspects that there are other motives.[55] Moreover, they argue, "polarity may affect, but it does not determine, the character of security relations at the regional level in the post-Cold War era."[56] Therefore, Buzan and Weaver try to look beyond the polarity at the system level and add two more regional variables into the equilibrium: i) boundary, which differentiates the [regional security complex] from its neighbors, ii) securitization (social construction of security issues), which covers the pattern of amity and enmity among units."[57] Thus, they argue that there must be some distinctions between the system level interplay of the global powers, whose capabilities enable them to transcend distance, and the subsystem level interplay of lesser powers whose main security environment is their local region.[58] Nonetheless, we must point out that Buzan and Weaver see the post-Cold War order at the system level as a kind of representation of the unipolarity to certain extend. However, this unipolarity is rather a weak one where smaller regional powers act more freely. It is widely accepted proposition that the United States is the only global level actor that can transcend its power globally, yet it does so in constrained international environment.[59] But, as Buzan and Weaver point it gets difficult when one tries to position other possible great powers such as China, Russia.[60] In this sense, their differentiation between superpower and great power is useful.

> Our argument is that the global level of security at the outset of the twenty-first century can best be understood as one superpower plus four great powers [1+4]. It is necessary to differentiate superpowers and great powers even though both are at the global level, and then to differentiate that level from the one defined by regional powers and RSCs. … In a world of

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54   Huntington 1999, 35–6, cited in Buzan and Weaver, 2003. According to O'Hanlon, the management of deterrence on the level of global security is hybrid one, since the US has established many alliances, multi and bilateral arrangements, institutions and norms to rule the global security collectively. See: O'Hanlon 1992, 13. Cited in Morgan 2003, 256.

55   Kelly 2007.

56   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 4. For a matter of fact, polarity is generally defined as the number of great powers in the system and became established way of thinking about military-political structure at the system level. See: Waltz 1979, Kaplan 1957. For a detailed discussion on the problem of polarity see: Buzan, Jones, and Little 1993, 51–65; Schweller 1999, 36–42.

57   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 53; Cited in Kelly 2007.

58   *Ibid.*, 17–18. Buzan and Weaver also compare weak and strong states by introducing the notion of state strength. Accordingly only strong states can project amity or enmity toward others, whereas weak states cannot compose a security complex. Buzan and Weaver 2003, 20–22.

59   See for the detailed discussion on the constrains that the US, as a superpower, faces while conducting its foreign policy; Brooks and Wohlforth 2008.

60   Buzan and Weaver do not just make categorization between superpower and great power but they also make a differentiation between modern and postmodern states, weak and strong states, zone of peace and zone of war. See for a brief categorization of states Buzan and Weaver 2003, 6–26.

nearly 200 states, super- powers (if they exist) occupy one end of the major power spectrum, and regional powers (states such as Brazil, Egypt, Iran, Nigeria, and South Africa, whose power defines the polarity of their local RSC, but does not extend much beyond) occupy the other end. In between are what can only be called great powers, which are clearly more than just regional powers, but do not meet all of the qualifications for superpower. Superpowers and great powers define the global level of polarity, and the line between them and regional powers is the one that defines the difference between global and regional security dynamics.[61]

Thus, we have a weak unipolar world order at the global level, whereas a numbers of variations in the regional orders from balanced multipolarity (likewise East Asia) to strong unipolarity (likewise the North America) at the regional level. From this point of view, when it comes to deterrence in the post-Cold War environment, it is arguably operational in two levels: deterrence in the global management of security (global level as 1+4) and deterrence in the regional management of security (regional level as 1+4+regions). Additionally, today we have five types of units operating in the newborn system at these different levels. There is only one superpower, namely the United States, which operates globally. Limited numbers of great powers such as China, Russia, England, France, Germany, Japan, and India operate semi-globally, meaning that they can operate within more than one region. Number of regional powers such as Brazil, Saudi Arabia, Iran, South Africa operate regionally, while a number of middle power states, such as Turkey, Sweden operates semi-regionally, meaning that they operate in more than one region without dominating in any of them. Some states operate within the national borders or up to close borders, including countries with nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, such as Syria, North Korea and numbers of different non-state actors operates locally.

Deterrence in the Global Management of Security

At this level, deterrence between different actors has different attributions. Meaning, when we talk about deterrence we generally talk about the nuclear deterrence, which casts itself as 1+4 formula in the post-Cold War era. Today, economically, Russia is not a superpower at all. However, Russia is a great power holding a permanent seat at the United Nations' Security Council, which great impact on East Asia, Central Asia and Eastern Europe.[62] Japan and the European Union, on the other hand, are both great powers on economical scale, yet they lack capabilities to project military power globally. China possesses many of the superpower attributions, yet it is no more than a rising great power or regional power at most comparing to the Untied States. Thus, many great powers have very little to do with the global management of deterrence due to their limited capability. Therefore, it is fair to claim that global deterrence today is a mission particular to the United States.[63] However, in the case of conflict of interest, that generally occur over some regional problems, with one superpower that can easily operate on global scene and at least four great powers that

61   Buzan and Weaver 2003, 32–34.

62   Ozer 2014.

63   Acton 2011, 39.

willing to reach some part of the globe, the global level management of deterrence turns to be very low profile version of the Cold War era nuclear deterrence. As it was the case during the Cold War, collective actor deterrence[64], basically used by the NATO or in some cases by the United Nations actions, is the general mood of deterrence practice on global scale in the post-Cold War era.

Further, at the global level, there is no actual pattern of conflict or amity-enmity patterns between above mentioned super and great powers,which directly affects the pattern of deterrence as well. Thus, not living on the edge of immediate deterrence gives chance to the post-Cold War great powers to be depended on a deterrence posture where nuclear weapons kept as a secondary instrument. Consequently, the most important development of the deterrence at this level is that nuclear deterrence has been pushed into the shade.[65] Indeed, there is a continuing deemphasizing on the role of nuclear weapons among great powers in the post-Cold War era, and they are mostly kept in the reserve. The United States has reduced its arsenal, while pursuing a mix of nuclear and conventional deterrence, as well as defense by building missile defenses. The United Kingdom has cut its nuclear capabilities significantly, but still stays in the area of minimum nuclear deterrence by announcing last year its plans to reduce its total stockpile to no more than 180 warheads over the next 15 years.[66] France still maintains more than 300 nuclear warheads yet denuclearization is a hot topic in France as well.[67] On the other side, as Morgan pointed out, China is the only great power with a growing nuclear capability, and the only country where profound uneasiness about security has heightened concern about nuclear and conventional deterrence.[68] On the other hand, bearing in mind the Russian attitudes towards Syria and the latest events in Ukraine, the associated altercation with Russia have thrown many commentators and policy critics into aggressive perception of Russian policy as well.[69] So, Russia and China are two great powers that might disrupt the global management of security and thus might not be deterred without nuclear option. Hence, nuclear deterrence among the great powers is not likely to be that important as it was during the Cold War, yet not about to disappear completely too.[70] President Obama's efforts to reduce the nuclear weapons in the post-Cold War era[71] while having safe, secure and effective nuclear posture[72] in reserve is a reference to these developments.

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64   Morgan, 2009.

65   Morgan 2003, 247; Paul, Morgan, and Wirtz 2009.

66   Kristensen and Norris 2011.

67   Defence and Correspondent 2014.

68   Morgan 2003, 248.

69   Pillar 2014.

70   Morgan 2003, 254.

71   "Obama Prague Speech On Nuclear Weapons: FULL TEXT" 2009.

72   See: "Department Of Defense: Nuclear Posture Review" 2014.

Deterrence in the Regional Management of Security

At this level, study of deterrence is still ad hoc and underdeveloped. However, there is a need for a growing attention to this level. In this sense, the understanding of regional level of analysis in the management of deterrence is reflected in several recent United States' strategy and policy papers as well. For example the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report suggests that "The United States will work closely with allies and partners across the globe to ensure strong political and military ties, based on a common understanding of the challenges and opportunities of the emerging security environment, and strengthen regional deterrence."[73]

At the regional level, or with better terminology, deterrence in regional management of security, we can talk about deterrence within regions and among regions. Within regions its possible to identify deterrence among great powers, including the Untied States, deterrence among great powers and regional powers (peer or near peer competitors), deterrence among states other than great powers, deterrence among states and non-state actors. Thus, at different regional settings different polarity and different patterns of conflict and alliances appear. In some regions distributions of power is more even in some it is not. In Gulf, Saudi Arabia is absolute hegemon whereas in South Asia there is a balanced multipolarity. In other regions, there are strong historical amity and enmity patterns, whereas in some regions there is not. There are regions with institutionalized regional settings for dealing with security issues, such as the European Union or NATO, in some there is no such institution or they are weak. In other words, every region has its own attributions for the deterrence in the post-Cold War era. Therefore, it is of great importance to study specifically every single case. The requirement and designations of deterrence in Asia and deterrence in Europe are completely different from each other. Let's take the example of the East Asia where there are two great powers, China and Japan, and one near peer competitor, India, four nuclear weapon states, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea, and three nuclear threshold states Japan, South Korea and Taiwan.[74] Plus the United States, with its Asia pivot strategy, is highly connected to the regional security through its bilateral agreements with Japan and South Korea as a way of balancing the rise of China. At this level, deterrence in this region is very case sensitive. Furthermore, the requirements of deterrence to the threats of nuclear escalation from North Korea and the requirements to the threats of North Korean ballistic missiles are very different. Or Chinese handling of every single territorial dispute in the East China Sea requires different deterrence means and tools. At this level, moreover, deterrence cannot be sustained only by nuclear forces, it must contains conventional options as well in combination with other sources of power such as economic and diplomatic tools, which were not perceived as means of deterrence in the classical form of deterrence theory. Therefore, distinction between deterrence and other concepts such as compellence and

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73   "Department Of Defense: Nuclear Posture Review" 2014, 33.

74   Buzan and Weaver, 2003, 93.

coercive diplomacy becomes even more blurring.[75] Overall, management of deterrence at regional level requires more tailored strategies that take into account specific regional dynamics.

When it comes to deterrence among regions, where regions are perceived as actor, it is true that to claim a higher degree of independent actor quality for a region today is evidently controversial. Only the European Union can claim such standing. However, when we talk about coercive diplomacy, it is a historical fact that regional amity and enmity patterns are taken as a manifold part of deterrence calculations. What makes an alliance, meaning a strong level of security links and independencies and common threat perceptions (securitization), is actually what makes more or less a region in the RSCT. Here Lemke's interpretation of what consists a regional security complex is useful for analytical purposes even if it is kind of vague. As pointed earlier, according to Lemke, regional security complexes do not require a high level of intense interaction and any threat can kick up a complex (so, a region).[76] With this interpretation in mind, the study of deterrence between different groups of countries, especially among security communities[77] and formal alliances such as NATO or the United States' bilateral alliances with individual regional countries, can account for deterrence among regions, which overall takes RSCs as unit of analysis. For instance, the NATO nuclear deterrence posture in the post-Cold War era means at most at Eurasian regional context against Russian led alliances. Japan-United States, United States-Korea or United States-Australian bilateral alliances are designed under thinking of Chinese and North Korean alliance in the East Asia and can be studied with respect to each other's.

Conclusion

If RSCs carry no analytic content as a level of analysis, there should not be any need for the development of a distinct regional security setting, and the theories developed for the expiation of deterrence at system level should be applicable without any modifications for the deterrence relations at the global level. However, many, if not almost all, conflicts have regional character and thus theories developed for the study of global conflicts offers very little in terms of their understanding. This is so because each and every region is unique. In some regions states are mostly post-industrialist developed states, govern by democracies, obey international rules and commitments, whereas in other regions states are mostly weak, if not failed states, governed by authoritarians or they can be described as newly emerged democracies or transitioning states. States in some regions are mostly concerned for development and welfare, where as in some others their daily concerns are

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75   See for a detailed discussion on this differentiation: Sperandei 2006.

76   Lemke, 2002.

77   Security Community is a group of states that have integrated to the point where war is not an option in settling disputes among group members. The concept developed by Karl Deutsch in 1960s and examined by many others in various historical and regional contexts. See: Deutsch *et al.* 1969; Adler and Barnett, 1998; Bellamy, 2004; Acharya, 2009.

about pure survival.[78] Therefore, what works or fails to work in one region has limited implications for understanding all other regions.[79] In a similar way, why deterrence work or fail work in one region differs greatly from its applicability in another. Here I am not entering the discussion on whether the nuclear deterrence will work in other regions in the same way it did in East-West relations due to regional characteristics.[80] Those discussions depart mostly at the individual or state level of analysis bringing discussion of leadership types and regime types on state level. What I point is the fact that deterrence requires different attributions and force postures, as well as different set of preferences for every regional security complexes. That is, deterrence cannot be sustained in the Middle East in a similar way as in Europe, where not just types and capacities of actors vary a lot, but also the patterns of conflicts and alliances stem from different factors and attributions. This efforts, to determine the different structures of deterrence, require regional level of analysis within which regional security orders have utmost important considering that regions today do not operate according to the rules and process that were applicable to the global system during the Cold War. Thus, for deterrence studies, as is the basic unit of analysis the individual state, the proper level of analysis is the RSCs in which states are united by the common security problems. However, one of the major puzzles is how to define regions, and regional borders. In this sense, RSCT offers deterrence studies a set of peculiarities in defining regional borders as an analytical framework for operationalizing deterrence theory at the regional level that is RSCs. Using defined RSCs as a level of analysis, deterrence studies can explore more eloquently the factors and actors of the deterrence issues. Briefly, the post-Cold War era, the global security system is unipolar.[81]At the regional level what makes a distinction between different RSC is polarity, types and capacities of states, and patterns of amity and enmity among states. This variation within regional dynamics effects deterrence practice on a number of fronts and make the new deterrence theory and practice more incline to the regional level dynamics.

With all is said and done, in the post-Cold War era, the regional level becomes a relevant level of analysis for the study of deterrence. However, there is a gap between theory and practice of deterrence. On theoretical front, the emerging deterrence literature urgently calls for more elaboration on regional perspectives, whereas in practice deterrence is still trapped in the Cold War mindset. RSCT is one of the approaches that developed a reading of regional dynamics of security and in this sense, offers a relevant point for departure for post-Cold War deterrence theory as well.

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78   See also the discussion of different state capacities and their effects: Buzan and Weaver 2003, 20-23.

79   As many point out our understanding of world affairs reflects a preocupaion with only one regional security: Western interstate sytem. Look for a good review of this Lizze, 2011.

80   See a well-organized example of this discussion: Sagan and Waltz 1995.

81   Krauthammer 1990.

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