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Cold Hybrid Warfare: Science Diplomacy as Superpowers' Geopolitical Statecraft in the Cold War Transatlantic Security Architecture and the Reimagination of World Order

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Abstract: Refuting the conventional view of science diplomacy as Track II diplomacy while highlighting the Cold War as a structure wherein the superpowers initiated a geopolitical approach to science diplomacy, the article coins the term "cold hybrid warfare" to scrutinize how science diplomacy could serve as a covert strategic asset to advance an unpublicized grand strategy in redefining cross-regional security architecture for global hegemony. By focusing on how the United States and the Soviet Union had deployed the collaborative troika of science, technology, and culture for diplomacy to ace each other out of the world order, the findings further suggest that the globalization of regions eventually emerged as the consequence of the superpowers' commitment to a greater transregional connectivity within their respective defense perimeter, marking the paradigm shift from the bipolar order to the multipolar one.

Keywords: cold hybrid warfare, Cold War, science diplomacy, US-European relations, USSR-Latin American relations

Introduction: Science Diplomacy as "Cold Hybrid Warfare"

Science diplomacy has nowadays emerged as a problem-solving mechanism in response to global challenges. Its three key components – science in diplomacy, diplomacy for science, and science for diplomacy – illustrate how science could inform foreign policy decisions, facilitate international communities' engagement in scientific exchange, and transform scientific relations into foreign relations (Royal Society/AAAS 2010, 5–14). Despite their perceived use as Track II diplomacy tools to bridge political gaps during the Cold War (Galluccio 2021, 28), christening science diplomacy as paradiplomacy points toward an intriguing puzzle: What roles do states perform in science diplomacy in relation to the practice of non-state actors (NSAs)?

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While science historians may conclude that regional powers' scientific interactions with the superpowers, coupled with the inclusion of the Global South into international technoscientific institutions, had contributed to an early version of globalization within the United Nations system in the 1970s (Robinson et al. 2023), their view of science diplomacy as a collaborative agency neglects its serving as a geopolitical contest ground while consolidating its myth as Track II diplomacy. In fact, the Track II myth could be attributed to science diplomacy's fulfillment in "soft power," which is postulated by Joseph S. Nye as the "co-optive power."[1]

Yet, what is disarming about Nye's thesis lies exactly in that the states are compelled to begin with the development of science and technology as critical "hard" assets so that culture and diplomacy can follow up as a "soft" medium in conveyance of national interests. Therefore, the potential of science and technology to coerce precedes the "soft" capacities of science diplomacy, whose crust of "power" is reinforced by the state's geopolitical pursuits via its techno-scientific juggernaut, serving ultimately to co-opt rather than merely dragoon other actors into cooperating with its political agenda.

Associated with the puzzle is the research question: How can science diplomacy serve as an integral part of the state-initiated Track I diplomacy for security maximization? Given that geopolitical factors are recognized as key elements of the Cold War (Warner 2013), science diplomacy should be understood, as the study contends, as a geopolitical statecraft, which engages with critical geopolitics by advancing the state's subjective imagination of global political geography (Tuathail 1996, 62), while aligning with classical geopolitics by integrating technological capacity into capitalizing on national geographic opportunities to elucidate the state's geostrategic choices (Owens 1999, 73).

While the shift of geopolitical conditions could push science diplomacy from the "zone of peace and cooperation" to the "diplomacy of coercion" (Zaika and Lagutina 2023), there is limited academic literature analyzing the geopolitics of science diplomacy, notably lacking in historical context. To fill the theoretical lacuna in current studies, the article coins the term "cold hybrid warfare" to characterize science diplomacy as a "soft coercive power," constructed through the collusion between state and non-state actors to serve concealed national interests. By marrying Frank Hoffman's concept of "hybrid warfare"[2] with the idea of "unrestricted warfare,"[3] the term analyzes the superpowers' strategic in-

1 Nye defines it as "the attractiveness of one's culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences," as the contribution of science and technology to military power has increased the burden of "hard power" (Nye 2005, 7, 18–19).

2 It involves state and nonstate actors playing out "different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations" to "blend the lethality of state conflict with the fanatical and protracted fervor of irregular warfare" (Hoffman 2007, 14, 28).

3 It is proposed by two Chinese colonels as the consequence of "[t]he great fusion of technologies […] impelling the domains of politics, economics, the military, culture, diplomacy, and religion to overlap each other" (Qiao and Wang 2002, 162).

tegration of the formal and informal science diplomacy practices to promote their Cold War transatlantic regional security projects – in contrast to their engagements in "hot wars" in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East, where science and technology were otherwise converted to the naked form of military power.

With the cold hybrid warfare positioning science diplomacy in the intersection of two reciprocally reinforced triads (Track I diplomacy/hard power/classical geopolitics and Track II diplomacy/soft power/critical geopolitics), the article argues that science diplomacy – by divertingly opening an opportunity window for the concord of international collaboration – functioned as a tactical smoke screen beclouding the superpowers' ambitious plans of subverting the Cold War world order, manifested through the US reconstruction of Europe as a springboard for global hegemony and the Soviet two-track engagement with Latin America as a distant friend for world revolution.

The article adopts the historical methods in political science, which, by establishing a descriptive "database" for causal relationship determination and event interpretation, aim to situate political actors' contrasting policy preferences and values within their historical circumstances (Sager and Rosser 2016). Based on Thomas Kuhn's finding that different worldviews could lead to divergent scientific paradigms (Kuhn 1996), which makes the incommensurability of scientific visions a parable for the Cold War structure (Babich 2003), to trace out the mutual shaping between the superpowers' cold hybrid warfare and their historical backdrop, the French *Annales* school of historical structuralism will be employed to supplement the historical methods. With the chronological events (*courte durée*), the cyclic regional development (*conjuncture*), and the synchronic global structure (*longue durée*) (Braudel 1958, 727–28, 730–31, 749) arranged in a thematic manner, the article further demonstrates how the Cold War structure possessed a certain resilience to the superpowers' reconfiguration of the geopolitical atlas and how the divergent practices of science diplomacy involved in it eventually reshaped their transatlantic regional security architectures to wear the structure away.[4]

The analysis is bifurcated into two major sections, with each containing several subsections to interweave a comparative dissection of the Soviet and American transatlantic science diplomacy practices. The first major section focuses on the US-European security partnership construction. Its subsections study the Marshall Plan as a "technical business operation" that aligned Western Europe with the containment policy, the US cul-

4 Accordingly, science historian Jeroen Van Dongen's emphasis on the global impact of Cold War on local scientific development (Van Dongen, Hoeneveld, and Streefland 2015), environmental historian Robert B. Marks's elaboration on the historical conjuncture, wherein "strings or strands of things happening in different parts of the world for reasons having to do with local circumstances that then became woven together to become globally important" (Marks 2024, 14), and the belief of James B. Conant, former Harvard President and critic of Kuhn, that conflicts between different scientific weltanschauungs are responsible for the progress of science (Reisch 2014, 387) could be synthesized to explain the "paradigm shift" from the Cold War bipolar structure to the globalized yet multipolar world as the result of science diplomacy.

tural diplomacy aimed at cultivating Europe as a defense partner, the American response to European security regionalism, and the US strategy of reintegrating the region into its global defense architecture. The second major section investigates the Soviet-Latin American cross-regional encounters. The subsections examine the rationale behind the USSR's science diplomatic relations with Latin America, Cuba's role in the Soviet global strategic configuration, the deployment of Soviet science diplomacy in connection with its two-track foreign policy, and the Soviet complementary application of culture and education in science diplomacy. All in all, the article spotlights science diplomacy as cold hybrid warfare for forging transregional security, proceeding veiled grand strategy, and restructuring the international order.

The US and Europe: Alchemizing Science Diplomacy into Region-Making Project for Defense Globalization

The Marshall Plan: Economic Aid in the Form of "Technical Business Operation" and the US Region-Making of Western Europe for Hegemon Building

The struggle for Western Europe had intensified since the onset of the Iron Curtain when the Soviets firmly secured their socialist "Pan-Slavism" in Eastern Europe, while penetrating freshly independent and developing countries to form a global coalition against the capitalist world (Ajrapetyan 2011, 71–72). If the USSR were to control Eurasia's peripheries, the route to the Western Hemisphere would be opened *ante portas* for the socialist superpower (Brzezinski 1986, 22). Accordingly, the policy of containment, advocated by American diplomat George F. Kennan and assumed to be informed by British geographer Halford J. Mackinder's and American political scientist Nicholas J. Spykman's geopolitical insights (Gerace 1991),[5] prevailed in American geopolitical strategy – for it could strategically transform Western Europe as both an offensive frontier and a defensive shield to hold back Soviet ambition.

Recognizing poverty as a hotbed for Communist infiltration, the US sought to reinvigorate the Western European economy by passing the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948 – known as the Marshall Plan – in which the technical side was stressed, as paragraph (3) in section 111 (a) designated the "procurement of and furnishing technical information and assistance" as an approach for assistance (GCMF n.d.). In fact, the assistance program had been intended to take the form of "technical business operation" as early as 1948, with the idea of creating a Western European union with German participation

5 While Mackinder warned traditional maritime powers of Russia as an emerging land power who could control the Eurasian heartland to overwhelm North America by size and resources, the country's uneven accesses to the oceans would constitute its Achilles' heel (Mackinder 1904, 431, 434), leading Spykman to propose the geostrategy of controlling the coastal areas of the Eurasian landmass – the "Rimland" with which Western Europe's geography aligns – to keep the Eurasian power in check (Spykman 1944, 40–41).

for a stable world order conceived (United States Department of State 1976, 511–30). As scientists were sent out to Germany shortly after WWII with the mission of transferring German knowledge to America and strengthening German-American business connections (Gimbel 1990), the "technical business operation" indeed permitted a percolation of German technology into Western Europe, while associating the region economically and technologically with American industries.

The Marshall Plan additionally served as a leverage to dissuade European countries from choosing communism as an alternative future. In fear of a possible Communist victory in the 1948 Italian general election, US Ambassador James C. Dunn supported Christian Democracy, whose members included Catholic elites, technocrats, and social conservatives, by foregrounding the importance of American aid in Italy's post-war construction (L'Unità 1948). Understanding that the French Communists could profit from the workers' dissatisfaction resulting from "unscientific" corporate management, American style management was introduced by the Marshall Plan Administration to rationalize French entrepreneurship, emphasizing the role of "human factor" in animating the working class's "productive spirit" and easing class oppositions (Boltanski 1983, 376–80).

The Marshall Plan's effect was felt by democratic regimes as well as by authoritarian ones. Excluded by the Plan, Francoist Spain missed the opportunity of improving productivity and thus failed to decouple politics from economic management (Carrasco-Gallego 2012, 97–98). Conversely, benefits brought by the Plan with the additional offer of membership to participate in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) drew the then authoritarian Portugal to the orbit of US influence as the counterbalance to the USSR veto of Portuguese United Nations membership (Rodrigues 2013, 165).

Consequently, the Plan rearranged Western Europe's economic constellation under US leadership through America's entrance into bilateral pacts with the participating countries to ensure that financial stability and budget balance would be observed within the domain of each nation-state under US supervision (Carrasco-Gallego 2012, 96). On the other hand, Western European economic and security needs drove their acceptance of US leadership into the so-called "consensual American hegemony," wherein the US promise of increasing productivity was met with tangible technology-driven growth to keep the Western Bloc internationally competitive (Maier 1977, 630–32). Altogether, the Plan checked any possible development of an autarky and contributed to regional integration and transregional reciprocity.

This "consensual hegemony" in turn facilitated American surveillance of its allies' scientific progress when the US placed nuclear knowledge and technology sharing with NATO members under the supervision of the US Atomic Energy Commission (USAEC) and collaborated with the USSR for global nuclear governance within the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Krige 2006b, 172–80). To ensure the supply of uranium would be intended for peaceful use and scientific research, the "consensual hegemony" qualified the US as the resource arbitrator within the Marshall Plan framework by directly involv-

ing in the negotiation of the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) to oblige Belgium's sales of Congolese ores to the "free world" uranium market, smooth the way for France's access to atomic science, and facilitate West Germany's integration into the European common market (Helmreich 1991, 39, 395, 409). Fitting the case in political anthropology, by allocating resources and categorizing allies' labor roles within the US-dominated Atlantic capitalist organization, the logic of power was confirmed structurally to endorse the American version of the post-WWII order in Europe as the most constructive one against the Soviets (Wolf 1990, 590, 593).

The European energy and economic integration project served to promote Western Europe as a reliable partner in politics and diplomacy, as the US sent observers to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), exploiting its participatory role in governing Western European energy security to initiate diplomatic relations between the US and the emerging European Community (EC) (U.S. House of Representatives 2006, 646). A buffer zone was further created eastward for its hegemony when the US transformed the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN) into a middle ground to neutralize the Balkans' political status and lure the Soviet Eastern European satellites into its Western scientific feast (Krige 2006a, 67). As a result, a large group of "transnational elite" emerged in Europe, contributing their creative participation to the US "consensual hegemony" and solidifying the "Americanization" of European science (Krige 2006a, 5–6, 258–59, 265–66).

With the outbreak of the Korean War, the Marshall Plan evolved into the Mutual Security Act (1953–61) to assume a greater responsibility in the economic and political development of Spain and Portugal, prevent a threatening Communist takeover of Greece, and secure the strategic location of Turkey as a deterrent to Soviet influence extending from Eurasia into Europe (Callaway and Matthews 2008, 141–43). Relying on the experiences of aiding Europe, the US Agency for International Development (USAID) – with the passage of the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) in 1961 – was established to promote US values by committing monetary support to Latin American countries to fend off communism (Callaway and Matthews 2008, 40–41, 43–45). By tying regional economic recovery and Atlantic security architecture to science diplomacy, the Marshall Plan set the overture for subsequent foreign aid initiatives and laid the groundwork for US cold hybrid warfare.

American Cultural Diplomacy: The "Marshall Plan of the Mind" for a Pro-American Greater Europe

Coupled with the Marshall Plan was President Harry S. Truman's Point Four Program, which aimed to merge technical assistance, economic aid, and scholarly exchange to extend the "total diplomacy" to the developing world; and with the legislative passage of the Fulbright Act (1946) and the Smith-Mundt Act (1948), the US became the global provider of educational services – facilitated by the Institute of International Education (IIE) and its affiliated Committee on Friendly Relations Among Foreign Students (CFRFS) – with

the hope of changing the foreign perception of American isolationism and exporting a cadre of professionals poised to reconstruct world politics (Bu 1999, 395–98, 406). The intellectual aspect of the Marshall Plan thereby manifested through European individuals' participation in the Fulbright Program, where reciprocal interpersonal scholarly exchange had been viewed as an expression of US "cultural imperialism" by French Communist newspaper *L'Humanité* (Johnson and Colligan 1965, 117). The individual-based approach soon transitioned into the people-based one, which cast about for cultivating friendly relations between nations, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower argued for "a voluntary effort in people-to-people partnership" in the 1950s to counter the Socialist Bloc's educational exchange offers (Bu 1999, 407).

As public financial support was insufficient to meet the growing demand of America's global cultural and educational campaigns since the 1950s, the US government pinned its hopes on "private" philanthropic patronage of "public goods" – whose aim is to mobilize national elites to back the state power's quest for a global civil society, while "nationalizing" the American society by transforming the Foundation-endorsed public opinion into a coherent national consciousness to support US hegemony (Parmar 2015, 6). Therefore, the joint US public-private intellectual venture in Europe could be seen as a double integral project of consolidating Americanism at home while merging Americanism and Europeanism into the Euro-American Atlantic world.

In addition to accenting the intellectual integration of Western Europe with America, the US cultural strategy, amid Europe's division, worked on the relaxation of tensions in East–West relations and the construction of a fresh avenue for US-Soviet engagement. To this end, the Ford Foundation launched international expenditures in the 1950s to export American knowledge and culture to Western Europe, advanced peaceful negotiation with Eastern Europe (Berghahn 2001, 143–77), and financially supported the Inter-University Committee on Travel Grants (IUCTG) to facilitate contact between the US scholarly community and the Soviet counterparts (Richmond 2008, 144).

In fact, the "European" identity was also sought by the Soviets as a semantic strategy to neutralize NATO's attitude toward the Eastern Bloc – with the proposal of creating a pan-European security conference in 1954, which heralded the 1966 Bucharest Declaration and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) in the 1970s (Valls 2016, 2–4). The US government was initially reluctant to accept the Soviet proposal, but as European leaders pleaded for it and West Germany extended its recognition to East Germany in the early 1970s, the Ford Administration sought to reconcile the diverse security policy claims of Europe and America into a coordinated move by participating in the negotiations of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) (Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library & Museum n.d.), the result of which led to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.

In the Act, scientific and technological co-operation were considered as "desirable" by all participating states and placed in the second basket, where possibilities were raised

for cooperation ranging from agriculture to environmental research (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975, 20, 23–26). The third basket that targeted human rights bound the Eastern Bloc to international human rights obligations and enabled political dissidents to air their opinions more freely (Office of the Historian n.d.). With the Ford Foundation's mediation, the US, by accepting the Soviet invitation, not only brokered a détente between Eastern and Western Europe in the diplomatic language of peaceful exchange and cooperation, but also hid its defense ambitions behind the NATO environmental agenda – initiated by the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in 1969 to unite NATO members in tackling natural disasters (Risso 2014, 211) – to develop remote-sensing technologies to engage in atmospheric data collection for global surveillance of environmental and aerospace intelligence (Turchetti 2019, 122–36).

To further frustrate Eurocentrism and anti-Americanism, the joint public-private intellectual enterprise capacitated a dual-track strategy of promoting American Studies programs. It works with the domestic track developing the "American Civilization" curriculum at US higher education institutions and engaging the Harvard University International Summer Seminar in deepening the Euro-American cultural linkage, as well as the foreign track entailing monetary assistance to the British Association for American Studies (BAAS) and the European Association for American Studies (EAAS). The purpose was to foster a group of pro-American "native scholar-power" in the region to prevent any potential European misinterpretation of US foreign policy and grant the US leave to project influence in other regions (Parmar 2015, 99–118).

The two most noteworthy American Studies centers in Europe were named after President John F. Kennedy. In Germany where Cold War tensions were much incandescent, the Free University of Berlin was established with the US support in West Berlin in 1948 as an academically autonomous countermodel to the scholarly etiolated University of Berlin in the Soviet-occupied East Berlin. President Kennedy exploited the opportunity of visiting West Berlin in 1963 to lament on the division of Europe and espouse the university's ideals of truth, justice, and liberty as a future for Berlin, Germany, and Europe (Kennedy 1963). In the same year, the John F. Kennedy Institute for North American Studies (JFKI) opened in honor of him with the participation of the Ford Foundation to promote German political scientist Ernst Fraenkel's vision of American Studies, which allows for a Europe-wide scholarly communication on "scientifically" studying the US (JFKI n.d.). In the Netherlands, the John F. Kennedy Institute/Center for Atlantic Studies (JFK) was created at the University of Tilburg in 1966. The institute served as a paradiplomatic organization and reached out to think tanks and institutes on a trans-European scale, seeking to echo the Ford Foundation's Atlanticist initiatives and realize President Kennedy's vision of bettering transatlantic West–East relations (Scott-Smith 2016). Through the JFKI and JFK institutes, the names of Ford and Kennedy were engraved in the intellectual development of Europe, reshaping Americanology as a transatlantic scholarly subject that thumped out the cadence of congenial Euro-American communication in the hybrid Atlantic theater.

The US endeavors in education and intellectual exchange were complemented by propaganda efforts, as they both served as two facets of the same strategy to assert US hegemony. The separation of educational exchange and political propaganda culminated in the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953 (Bu 1999, 396). The USIA accepted the State Department directorship and served as an important instrument of public diplomacy against European Communist propaganda. Despite its inherent political hue, Voice of America (VOA) – one of the USIA's international broadcasting programs – was able to lessen the state-sponsored character and conceal the ideological tints by relying on scientists' authority to telegraph scientific information and progress of the "free world" (Tsuchiya 2020, 71–72).

Due to the educational value of VOA forum materials, they were requested world-widely for English language acquisition and lecture notes preparation, the substantial demand for which came from Western and Eastern Europe (Tsuchiya 2020, 81–82). The European integration idea of removing trade and political barriers was further championed by the USIA, using the successful example of the union of thirteen American colonies in crafting the US statehood as a vivid illustration (Cull 2008, 120). Additionally, the NATO Information Service (NATIS) produced and distributed short documentaries in NATO member states to demonstrate how the US-initiated aiding plans and organizations could club together economic and defense projects to deepen cross-border cooperation within the Atlantic Community (Risso 2014, 185–86).

To target audience behind the Iron Curtain, the US government-funded Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) was formed in 1950 to spread the Gospel of media freedom, claiming to offer "unbiased, professional" information on local news and broadcast censored topics (RFE/RL n.d.). With the help of the RFE/RL, democratic changes in Eastern Europe took place peacefully, prompting even Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to rely on the RFE/RL broadcasting services to stay current with domestic affairs in the final days of the USSR (Puddington 2000, 284–313). As Benedict Anderson stresses, the advent of radio promoted community consciousness through an "aural representation of the imagined community" (Anderson 2006, 56 n. 28). The success of USIA and RFE/RL in Europe hence aurally transformed the region into an "imagined" Greater Europe community – a concept once shared from Lisbon to Vladivostok – as the macroregional artifact resulting from US hybrid warfare strategy to win the Cold War.

The SDI and its Mirror Image – EDI: The Rise of European Security Community and Its Reintegration with the US Global Security Framework

While the conclusion of the 1972 US-USSR Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes allowed the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) to become the superpowers' joint extravaganza for the benefit of all humanity, its promise was disrupted by President Jimmy Carter who repromoted human rights in US foreign agenda as well as the renewal of US-Soviet geopolitical competition

in a series of Afro-Eurasian conflicts in the late 1970s (Von Bencke 1997, 79–88). Consequently, the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan soured the détente achieved through scientific and cultural exchanges in the 1970s.

Thus, even if superpowers – by subordinating potential great powers to their hegemon – had created a seemingly stable bipolar system, leading to two blocs harboring allies for development purposes (Waltz 1979, 163, 171), this system was unstable in the sense that superpowers continued their grand strategy in preparation for possible risks (Labs 1997). Appropriately, offensive realism with which states aim to maximize their relative power for an ultimate hegemony became a preferred option over defensive realism, which struggles to maintain the balance of power (Mearsheimer 2001, 18–22).[6]

The pattern of oscillating between deterrence and détente would remain as an entrenched structure guaranteed by the mutual assured destruction (MAD) unless changes in the perception of the fundamental threat take place (Yaniv and Katz 1980). President Ronald Reagan thus put forward in 1983 the defensive plan involving new technologies to strategically protect the US and its allies from the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (Reagan 1983) – later known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) or the "Star Wars."

In fact, the Reagan Administration in the early 1980s sought to launch economic warfare against the USSR by embargoing oil and gas technology for the Soviet Siberian gas pipeline project, while unexpectedly subjecting European customers of American technology to export controls and energy shortage and thus causing the European Community to veto the US initiative to strengthen NATO's role in associating military security with economic security (Blinken 1987, 121–22, 126). Reagan's interest in having the US take responsibility for the allies' security under the SDI therefore could be seen as an attempt to reunite Western European allies under Atlanticism.

However, with the exception of the UK, who enjoyed a special relationship with the US and signed the participation agreement in 1985, continental Western Europe voiced their responses to SDI and SDI-related cooperation at odds regarding its technological feasibilities, moral claims, potential European security dependence on the US, and the fear of Soviet justification for continuing research in its ballistic missile defense (BMD) system, etc. (Yost 1988, 278–79, 295–98, 315).

The Atlantic alliance was further torn by German pragmatism and French Gaullism. Despite his tremendous interest in technology transfers that would enable private West German companies and research institutes to access US geospatial technologies, Chancellor

6 From the psychological perspective of game theory, if a player's cooperative offer is betrayed by the other player's uncooperative move, this experience will breed hostility as an element in the "communication structure" to strengthen the player's negative judgment of his opponent (Schelling 1958, 261 n. 41).

Helmut Kohl intentionally played down the possibility of military and security cooperation to avoid controversies in official politics (Yost 1988, 300–03). Yet the French government officially declined the US invitation, and President François Mitterrand insisted on upholding the European autonomy by calling for the European Space Community and European Research Coordination Agency (Eureka) as alternative European agencies for advanced research – even though French defense contractors generally agreed that the inflow of American R&D provided by the SDI would help Western Europe catch up the technological gap with Japan and the US (Fenske 1986, 243–44).

As a result, reservations in cooperation were supplemented with the European fear of "brain drain" to the US and the American anxiety of the flow of SDI technologies to the Soviets via European companies (Broad 1985). The American "technodiplomacy," which governs collaboration and competition in US foreign policy by controlling knowledge sharing and denial (Krige 2020, 104–7), was confronted by the upsurge of European techno-regionalism.

Consequently, the concept of "European Defense Initiative" (EDI) emerged as a European counterpart to the SDI and gained popularity around 1985 – with the goal to form the European geospatial defense system, comprising of the non-nuclear Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missiles (ATBMs) and Extended Air Defense (EAD) for the strategic vision of "High Frontier Europa." However, the EDI was subject to technical difficulties and the NATO defense budget restraint, while the improvement of international environment moreover thwarted the full materialization of the EDI and SDI, as the Soviets concluded the MBFR with the US in 1986 and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) in 1987 (Reiss 1992, 127, 132).[7]

Despite the end of the Cold War having had shelved the contemplated plans of SDI and EDI and compelled the Clinton Administration to focus on the development of National Missile Defense (NMD) instead, the introduction of Theater Air and Missile Defense systems (TAMD) in 1998 inaugurated the concept of Family of Systems (FOS), which merges theater defenses with national ones by emphasizing the interoperability between ballistic and cruise missile defenses (Mayer 2015, 77–78). The legacy of SDI as an overarching security umbrella was therefore restored. It is further attested when the Active Layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (ALTBMD) program was announced by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) as a "system of systems" in 2005 to create a defense network of coordinating national BMDs assets within NATO through battle management, communications, command, control and intelligence (BMC3I) as part of the Global Ballistic Mis-

7 Nevertheless, the waning of the Cold War showed promises of Europe gaining security independence from the US-dominated Atlanticism. With the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in 1991, NATO was conceived for a time as a "safety net" to facilitate the transition of the Western European Union (WEU) from a Western European self-defense union into a pan-European collective security institution within the CSCE framework, wherein member states envisioned solar energy collaboration as a "conversion project" to demilitarize the SDI and smooth out the US influence of the European defense system (Brauch 1991, 19–21, 39).

sile Defense (GBMD) strategy (Mayer 2015, 120–21). As such, the transatlantic security architecture was reinstituted to forestall regional crises, emphasizing allied security cooperation over US technology domination.

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, the acronym EDI now stands for the European Deterrence Initiative, which enables the US to reuse the accumulated Cold War military equipment stockpiles in Europe – known as the Army Prepositioned Stocks (APSs), exploit the NATO enlargement for Pan-European joint exercises, and modernize Central and Eastern European air bases by upgrading their technological infrastructure against the Russian security design of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) (Eichler 2021, 110–11). By championing a unified Europe as a hybrid battlespace for transatlantic military partner engagements against the USSR/Russia within its global security chessboard, the US succeeded in enacting the offshore balancing strategy to lean on its allies for defense without confronting the major threat directly (Mearsheimer 2001, 234–66), while justifying the US hegemon as the "night watchman" in overcoming the anarchic international system (Mearsheimer 2001, 43).

The USSR and Latin America: Warranting the Strategic Depth of Science Diplomacy for an Afro-Eurasian-American Connectivity

Science and Technology in the USSR: Disproportionately Developed yet Comparatively Advanced

Science and technology were considered as critically important to safeguard national interests, military prowess, and the self-asserted ideological superiority of the Soviet Union. The "scientific research institute" – established upon Russia's selective absorption of German, French, and British organizational principles for conducting advanced scientific research – undertook intellectual eminence in the USSR, demonstrating a bricolage of foreign, native, and revolutionary elements in the streak of Soviet science (Graham 1975).

Expectedly, the USSR had developed its own paradigm to gauge scientific necessities and technological standards in its geopolitical pursuits. On the one hand, the USSR's Eurasian character inherited Russia's historical tradition of adapting Western knowledge to keep itself technically competitive to modernize its Oriental periphery (Schimmelpenninck van der Oye 2010). On the other, the Soviet revolutionary nature termed Western science as individualistic "bourgeois science" (Aronova 2021, 10), while the Marxist-Leninist "philosophical front" provided the only officially sanctioned theoretical underpinning for scientific disciplines (Kas'yan 2008, 39–40).

Correspondingly, the USSR Academy of Sciences served as a two-way conduit between the decentralized scientific communities and the centralized Soviet Communist Party, allowing the Central Committee and the Secretariat of the Party to supervise the formula-

tion of science policy, which resulted in the dilemma – that of the party apparatus's pursuit of dominance over science at the expense of research efficiency (Kneen 1984, 4–7). While the worship of technology, or "technolatry," has been identified as an expression of power worship as well as a source contributing to Cold War US militarism, the USSR apparatchiks' duplexity in technology worship and science manipulation for the cost-effective "intellectualization of war" extended the violence of Soviet totalitarianism to its quest for geopolitical hegemony (Rapoport 2019, x, xiv, 168–74, 340–42), hence defining the Soviet science diplomacy as a hybrid means in meeting the ends of world revolution.

Soviet intelligence agencies were equally effective in gathering scientific information. The Committee for State Security (KGB) was known for recruiting Soviet scientists as intelligence officers to conduct industrial espionage for technology acquisition, which was conducive to the Soviet-made atomic bombs (Sudoplatov et al. 1994, 205–8). With the signing of the 1958 Lacy-Zarubin agreement, the KGB was able to leverage people-to-people exchanges for intelligence gathering and covering, with recommendations taken from Soviet diplomats to promote the Communist system and foster a pro-Soviet stance among the visiting American delegates (Krasnyak 2020, 401). Therefore, the USSR's irregular tactics of hiring scientists to advance national security and ideological interests had fashioned the Soviet science for diplomacy as a proletarian, hybrid strategy to infiltrate democratic countries, whose scientific communities' genuineness in international collaboration was treated as Western bourgeois weakness.

Despite the socialist superpower's scientific achievements, its R&D activities were not well-balanced, as nearly two-thirds of research and development funds were doled out to support national defense industries with meager leftovers to increase entrepreneurial productivity (Berdashkevich 2000, 118). Thus, the USSR relied on Eastern Europe, whose geopolitical proximity facilitated its access to Western sources, to import high-technology products through the intra-socialist trade bloc of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) (Popper 1991), making the Soviet economy modernization project an extreme example of the exogenous growth model contingent on Western Europe. In the Latin American context, while the "scientific-technical" side of intelligence work was considered by KGB analysts as a harmless "trabajo clásico" exercised upon host countries, it was also directed toward monitoring American commercial activities in the region and recruiting US overseas citizens to collect technical information (Leonov 1999, 40).

However, what the Soviet intelligence workers could not purloin was the capitalistic "creative destruction" that requires constant downfalls of uncompetitive business and production modes to make way for innovations (Luttwak 2000, 30). Additionally, Soviet science was subject to ideological (mis)guidance that could cause epistemological inconsistencies with the logic of natural science (Egorova 2015). Thus, the USSR was never as successful as the West in terms of economic prosperity and scientific advancement. But compared to the "Third World," no country was as technically accomplished as the USSR, rendering science diplomacy a viable way of Soviet-Latin American interactions.

Strange Bedfellows? Latin America as the USSR's El Dorado and the USSR as Latin America's Exit from Path Dependence

Russia's geopolitical interests in Latin America first developed in the late 18th century when the Russian Empire planned to invade California to logistically support its settlements in Kamchatka and Alaska and challenge Spanish America; and this Pacific impulse soon grew into a Pacific-Atlantic one, when Latin American independence movements in the early 19th century showed promises of Russia exploiting the potential opening of the Isthmus of Panama to connect the Baltic with America's West Coast and the Caribbean (Bartley 1978, 21–22, 155). Although Latin America was not a priority in the Soviet agenda of international politics, the USSR maintained a fluctuating presence in the region, holding a mirror up to Imperial Russia's inconsistent involvement in the area. As early as the end of 1920s and 1930s, the USSR began to develop a geoeconomic interest in Latin America (Vol'skij 1981, 38). But the Stalinist policy of "Socialism in One Country," which prioritized domestic development over global affairs, had postponed any meaningful Soviet engagement with Latin America until the post-Stalin era, when First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev resuscitated Soviet internationalism with the goals of celebrating international friendship and competing globally with the US (Rupprecht 2015, 4–9).

The USSR's influence projection in the region hence demonstrated an unavoidable showdown vis-à-vis the Janus-faced US hegemon, who had to juggle the Latin American "backyard" and the Western European front. The Pan-American "Western Hemisphere" idea, which asserts that peoples in the Americas stick together in a special relationship to one another, ceased to be widely embraced by Latin America when the US shifted its strategic focus to Western Europe in the 1940s (Whitaker 1954, 323), thus facilitating the USSR's rise into an alternative geostrategic partner across the Pacific and Atlantic for Latin America.

Further, as evident in the USAEC tightening its exclusive control over Brazilian atomic minerals exportation and the 1954 US Atomic Energy Act nominating the US as Brazil's sole nuclear partner to block the latter's attempt to approach France and West Germany for access to nuclear science in the early 1950s (Adamson and Turchetti 2021, 55–62), the US constraints on Latin America's capacity to seek unilateral transatlantic scientific cooperation escalated inter-American tensions. Along with the European Economic Community (EEC) refusal to grant Latin American countries associate memberships in the 1960s, which left the region beset with Western European protectionist policies due to the loss of preferential treatment (Weil 1975, 301), the Soviets stepped up as the challenger to the Atlantic Triangle fantasy of the US-Latin American-Western European concord.

Economically speaking, the USSR was interested in selling its surplus oil to the region since the late 1950s and assumed that Latin American economies – primarily focused on import-substitution industrialization in consumer goods rather than capital-intensive heavy industry – could be viewed as a receptive market for Soviet machinery and equipment (Miller 1989, 19–20). On the other hand, Latin American economies suffered from

dependence on economically advanced countries – notably the US – as a result of exporting primary products for foreign loans, which was aggravated by Latin American governments' resistance to meeting workers' and farmers' demands (Leiken 1982, 2). During the surge of nationalism and revolution from the 1950s to the 1970s, anti-Americanism grew in Latin America, prompting governments in the region to reduce foreign dependence through nationalization of foreign assets and the search for more diversified economic relations (Leiken 1982, 3–5). In this context, most Latin American countries were willing to accept Soviet aid, as many of them also shared the same tradition of state-led modernization and emphasized the role of national government in social engineering through the promotion of science, industry, and an export-oriented economy (López-Alves 2011).

Correspondingly, Soviet academic interests in the region expanded with the establishment of the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (ILA RAN) in 1961 and the formation of the Department of European and American Studies at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) in 1978. The ILA, notwithstanding its pretensions to be the academic center for multidisciplinary Latin American studies, also engaged in cooperating with governmental organs to spread the state-sanctioned image of Latin America at home and propagandize the Soviet "goodwill" toward the region's revolutionary movements, while offering Latin American firms consulting service to facilitate their entrance to the Soviet market; while MGIMO, through its direct connections to the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, aimed at networking scholars, policy-makers, and diplomats for Soviet regional policy (Balmaceda 1996, 61, 84–91). Overall, science and culture diplomacy, reckoned as "non-traditional" diplomatic forms by Soviet military theorists, endeavor to complement the state security outlooks and the foreign policy of peaceful co-existence by concomitantly featuring strategic deterrence directed against the US (Garthoff 1979, 393–94).

Building a Geostrategic Foothold: Cuba as the Caribbean Eco-Technological Hub in the Central Asian–Eastern European–Latin American Triangular Trade Network

The Cuban episode deserves a special treatment in the Soviet Latin American adventure. As American naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan stressed in the late 19th century, the opening of the Panama Canal would position the Caribbean as the "great highways of the world," and the US would soon have to depend on the Caribbean defense to protect its commercial intercourse with Europe (Mahan 1898, 33–34). The 1959 Cuban Revolution thereby brought unparalleled geostrategic values to the USSR since socialist Cuba was the first and only Communist regime in Latin America and the Caribbean that could function as the choke point to threaten the US across the Straits of Florida, as it was in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.

Soviet economic aid came immediately to Cuba once Fidel Castro became the national leader. To gear the Cuban economy toward the Soviet system of international trade, the

USSR in 1960 provided Cuba with $100 million credits for paying off Soviet technical assistance; and Soviet technicians were sent out to Cuba, meeting the same time when Cuban students were educated in engineering and technology fields in the USSR (Walters 1966, 74, 81).

The USSR – by introducing Soviet mechanization and fertilizers – economically encouraged Cuban sugar production not only because it could shield Cuba's sugar industry from the impact of US embargo, but also that the low production costs of sugarcane in Cuba facilitated the Soviet-led "socialist division of labor," allowing the Kyrgyz SSR to process raw sugar shipped in from Cuba and distribute the refined sugar to other Union Republics (Dąbrowski, Antczak, and Woodward 1995, 7). This proved to be a socialist win-win situation: for the Soviets, importing sugar spared land resources for domestic grain and beef production; while for Cuba, exporting sugar to the USSR in the 1960s certainly eased its trade balance problems resulting from excessive importation (Tsokhas 1980, 322–25).

The Cuban CMEA membership in 1972 moreover guaranteed sugar sales to other socialist states at preferential prices to maintain Cuba's economic stability and the ostensible international socialist solidarity, despite criticism from several Eastern European countries accusing the USSR of endorsing Cuba's commodity over-dependence (Yordanov 2021, 218, 231–35). Eventually, the Soviet technical aid and Eastern European subsidies on the Cuban sugar industry facilitated Cuba's observership in the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI) in 1986 under Brazil's patronage to defy the US and the EEC's blockade of Cuban sugar from entering the emerging single market of Latin America and the Caribbean, while leveraging Havana's growing regional economic participation to co-opt other Latin American countries to oppose Washington's charges of human rights violation against Cuba in 1987 (Morley 1987, 363).

The USSR was also present in Cuba's energy sector. As part of the scientific-technological cooperation program, the USSR established a special department in the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Oil Refining and Petrochemical Industry (VNIPIneft) to monitor oil quality exported to Cuba (Kochetkova et al. 2017, 13). To reduce transportation costs across the Atlantic, the Soviets worked out the so-called "oil triangle" scheme, obliging Venezuela to offer oil and petroleum products to Cuba in exchange for the USSR's analogous supplies to Eastern Europe (Konyuxovskij and Sedyx 2012, 124). Accordingly, the Soviet financial and technical assistance enabled Cuba to earn hard currency by exporting refined petroleum products in the 1970s and reexporting Soviet crude oil in the 1980s to Western Europe (Pérez-López 1987, 6–9). Similar to the US practice of enrolling Western Europe in the international labor division to secure the Atlantic capitalist system, the Soviets' designation of roles to the Union Republics, Eastern European countries, and Cuba in the Latin American context set the embryonic stage of a transregional Eurasian-Atlantic socialist world.

Additionally, Soviet-Cuban cooperation programs covered a gamut of industries, ranging from light industry to nuclear and space science (Kochetkova et al. 2017, 14). Indeed,

Eastern European cooperation with Cuba on Earth mirrored their collaboration in the outer space, since both parties were enlisted in the Soviet-led satellite communication programs – *Intersputnik* and *Interkosmos*, which allowed Cuba to track Soviet satellites and relay broadcast signals so as to function as a base for the USSR to screen ships in the Caribbean (Schauer 1976, 211–12). With the USSR's support in the 1960s, the Cuban Academy of Sciences was further able to acquire optical data and meteorological satellite imagery to make informed decision for Cuba's development; and the transfer of remote sensing techniques eventually reached Cuba with its participation in the 1975 Interkosmos Working Group for Remote Sensing (Gebelein 2012, 62).

When Cuban cosmonaut Arnaldo Tamayo Méndez – the first Afro-Latin American to enter space – was attached to Soviet spaceflight mission Soyuz 38 in 1980 to demonstrate the application of Cuban sugar in growing monocrystals off the planet, Cuba organized aerial photography missions side by side, deploying the East Germany-made multispectral camera to capture the images of Cuban archipelagos according to his trajectory (Gebelein 2012, 61–62). With hybrid aspects of race, space, and science involved, the Soviets reforged Cuba as an abutment agency to bespeak the prospect for a wider Soviet-Global South cooperation, further forwarding the face-off against the American South, which was plagued by racism and historical underdevelopment – with Mississippi on the northern side of the Gulf of Mexico highlighting the contrast with Cuba's progress.

Feigning Compliance: Technological and Military Aid in Soviet Two-Track Policy and the Security Architecture Shift Along the Atlantic-Pacific Axis

The USSR dedicated its commitment to socialist movements in non-socialist Latin American countries more carefully, as the Organization of American States (OAS) passed the resolution to bar international communism in the Western Hemisphere as early as in 1954, while the US – by establishing the Inter-American Development Bank in 1959 and proposing the Alliance of Progress in 1961 – sought to deepen its Pan-American ties to the region in response to the Cuban Revolution (Lowenthal 1976, 204–5). Therefore, the USSR adhered to the "two-track policy," which worked on advancing the pretended state-to-state relationship, while concurrently providing surreptitious support for revolutionary parties in the region (Domínguez 1995, 2).

At the state-to-state level, as Georgy Mirsky, one of the regular advisors to the Soviet Central Committee, suggested, military coups could enkindle a military-led modernization in the Third World, and therefore he advocated the Soviet support to authoritarian rule overseas (Miller 2019), creating room for the USSR to maneuver pragmatism concerning anti-Communist coups in Latin America and employ science diplomacy to shun ideological differences. The Soviet strategy was also welcomed by Latin American military leaders. As the Brazilian case shows, although the military government led by Castelo Branco from 1964 to 1967 was distraught with communism in Cuba, it was prepared to develop

technical-scientific cooperation with the USSR to industrialize Brazil – a policy oriented to the very end of military regime in 1985 (Caterina 2018).

The development of the Amazon drainage basin thereby witnessed the Soviet contribution; and Brazil counted on Soviet machines and turbines to build its hydroelectric projects, as they were installed during the construction of the Capivara Dam in the 1970s and the Sobradinho Dam in the 1980s (Turrent 1986, 92). However, realizing that Brazil was interested in exploring West Germany's *Ostpolitik* reach to the Global South for nuclear technology transfer, the USSR cautiously exploited the US influence in the 1970s to pressure Brazil into compliance with the international non-proliferation regime, all the while subjecting the military dictatorship to IAEA's control to avoid criticism charged for hindering the developing countries' scientific progress (Bandarra 2021, 351–53).

Likewise, an agreement on Soviet-Argentine economic-commercial and scientific-technical cooperation was signed in 1974 during the last presidential term of Juan Domingo Perón. It facilitated Soviet firms' international bidding in Latin America and pictured the USSR as a reliable financial service provider on the level of the Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank, enabling the Soviet supply of turbines on loan terms to the Argentine-Uruguayan Salto Grande hydroelectric complex (Vacs 1984, 31–33).

The *golpe de Estado* in 1976 marked the *gran salto* in Argentina-USSR relations, as the junta leader Jorge Rafael Videla tacitly approved Communist activities in the country, negotiated for the USSR participation in Argentinian infrastructure construction, and signed fishing agreements with Eastern European countries (Rapoport 1986, 8–9). With the conclusion of the commercial cooperation agreement between the Aeroflot Soviet Airlines and the Aerolíneas Argentinas in 1980, the stated reduced passenger and cargo traffic commission rates specifically reserved for flight connections relating to Sub-Saharan Africa and Southeast Asia (USSR MFA and Argentina MFA 1990, 159–60) further encouraged a cross-regional circulation of people, commodities, and technology products between Afro-Eurasia and Latin America.[8]

The military regimes' flexibility in cooperating with the USSR in science and technology somewhat thwarted the American plan of supporting authoritarian rule in the region for anti-Communist purposes. From the Soviet perspective, the Communists should infiltrate Latin American armies for purposes of "democratizing" them through arms sales – best illustrated in the example of the USSR's rescheduling Peru's debt for purchases of Soviet advanced weapons in the 1970s – with additional hopes of encouraging more sales

8 It is also reported that the Soviets offered satellite surveillance to the Argentine military in the Falklands War in return for their heedlessness of the international embargo on food exports to the USSR since the invasion of Afghanistan (Nicholson 2019). Indeed, the USSR-Argentine science diplomacy venture lasted to the final point of the Argentine military dictatorship, when an additional protocol was signed in 1983 to establish a joint Soviet-Argentine Commission to supervise and manage scientific and technical cooperation through "diplomatic channels" (USSR MFA and Argentina MFA 1990, 185–86).

and exploiting the proposed construction of fishing ports in Peru and Chile for Soviet naval bases in strategic liaison with USSR's submarine base in Cienfuegos, Cuba (Goure and Rothenberg 1980, 241, 249). Therefore, the coordinated projection of the Soviet sea power along the Pacific and Atlantic shorelines was shrouded in the USSR's techno-military cooperation with Latin America.

Truly, the USSR benefited from the Latin American debt crisis in the 1970s and 1980s – for the USSR was willing to provide low-interest financial credits, which were used by Latin American governments to purchase Soviet thermoelectric and hydroelectric equipment as well as energy and petrochemistry items (Blasier and Vacs 1983, 204–06). When military regimes transitioned to civil ones, the Soviet business strategy of pairing budget-friendly loans with machinery promotion ripened in binding the region's development to the USSR's resource security. Consequently, in the Orwellian year of 1984, when Bolivia returned to democracy and appointed a Communist minister to oversee its mining industry, the USSR secured the supply of tin – a resource not self-sufficient within the socialist superpower (Miller 1989, 18–19).

At the non-official level, although comprehensive revolutionary change was not expected by Moscow to succeed in Latin America, the Soviets did involve in parlaying clandestine operations into strategic advantages in the region, with its intelligence base planted in Mexico to complicate the nature of the USSR diplomacy. The Comintern dispatched activists to Mexico as early as 1921, when Mexico became the first country in the Americas to recognize the USSR, to initiate the Sovietization of Latin America by funding revolutionary oppositionist newspapers and encouraging railway workers to strike against industrialists – in support of world revolution (Spenser 2002, 35, 41–44). The geostrategic importance of Mexico, where Soviet activities were rather tolerated, resurfaced as the major support base for intelligence operations in the region since the 1950s; and the USSR resorted to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City as an umbrella for renewed subversive activities – such as contacting revolutionary groups, waging propaganda war against the US, recruiting workers for Soviet intelligence, and providing scholarships for students to receive training in the USSR (Theberge 1974, 33).

The Soviet Latin American revolutionary cause also tackled Chinese influence in the region. The background was that the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s stimulated the USSR to seek official support from Latin American Communist Parties over ideological issues in the "Great Debates" in anticipation of China as a rising power drawing leftist parties in the region into Maoism and Maoist insurgency approach (Xu 2020, 58–62). Even though political interests between Havana and Moscow could be divergent, the USSR relied on Cuba as a pacesetter to lead Latin American Communist Parties to sever institutional ties with the Chinese Communist Party (Xu 2020, 59–60) and employed the Cuban Revolution as the model to support regional revolutionary movements until the US military intervention in the 1965 Dominican Civil War temporarily halted the Soviet ambition of launching a hemispheric revolution (Theberge 1974, 37–38).

After socialist politician Salvador Allende was elected, the Soviets were able to count on Cuban intelligence agents in the Santiago Embassy to train Latin American exile revolutionary groups in urban guerrilla tactics as the indirect approach to challenge the state power – in opposition to North Korean advisors' proposal of ungovernable massive sabotage – and to reposition Chile as a regional anti-imperialist front (Theberge 1974, 39–40). The oust of Allende in 1973 provided a continued reason for Cuba to serve as a base for the USSR to supply the Chilean opposition groups with weapons for armed struggles in reprisal for General Augusto Pinochet's anti-Soviet attitude (CIA 1987), further embellishing Soviet cold hybrid warfare with hot elements.

Once former anti-government insurgents took power in government, the USSR was prepared to deepen its collaboration with these fledgling socialist regimes – a trend intensified when US President Reagan called for a crusade against the USSR (Majdanik 1995, 23). The Cuban-USSR-Eastern European triumvirate offered a wide range of technical assistance to Maurice Bishop's revolutionary government in Grenada; whereas in Nicaragua, the Sandinista government – in the name of self-defense – signed a military agreement with Moscow for receiving military aid from the USSR, Cuba, and Eastern Europe in 1981 and exploited financial credits to purchase agricultural, infrastructure, and communication equipment from the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and Hungary in 1982 against the background of the US "undeclared war" toward the country (Duncan 1984, 168–70, 177–81).

However, Panama's vigilance to the Soviet-Cuban-Nicaraguan suspicious influence (Leiken 1982, 96–97), Moscow's frustration with Managua's economic and aid mismanagement (Miller 1989, 216), the failure of Salvadoran guerrillas to assume power, together with the deepening stagnation of Soviet economy, forced the Gorbachev government to abate support to Cuba and Nicaragua and eventually diminish its subversive activities in the region (Cross 1993, 325–28). Unlike state-to-state interactions, where trade deficit issues could be settled by a barter program enabling the Soviets to supply petroleum in exchange for manufactured goods (Turrent 1986, 91–92), the Soviet technical assistance to Latin American revolutionary parties was not so much a mutually beneficial cooperation as an economic burden for ideological and strategic purposes.

The Soviet miscarriage in forming the transatlantic revolutionary solidarity compelled the USSR to reengage with Latin America in the Asia-Pacific in the late 1980s. It happened when Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Eduard Shevardnadze reiterated the peaceful spirit of Gorbachev's 1986 Vladivostok address for a Pan-Pacific security agenda against the US-initiated SDI program during his visit to Mexico that year, citing the country as one of the middle powers in the redefined security architecture (Latell 1989, 308–10). Coupled with the countertrade involving the Soviets providing infrastructural services in exchange for Latin American primary products, Latin America was seen at that juncture as a source of technology transfer for the USSR to catch up with the West in the information age, as the Soviets imported microchips and pirated Western software from several Latin American countries (Prizel 1990, 192–93).

The Soviet scramble for Latin America against the US hegemon in the end positioned the region as a geopolitically critical player in world affairs, which might be approached with the two-track policy either radically or rationally through the dual Caribbean-Pacific fronts, depending on the hybrid strategic necessities and resources that the USSR could afford to project its global influence, while not ignoring its domestic economic demand. The final version of Soviet Latin American policy – centered around the Pacific – corresponded to the shift of the USSR's strategic focus toward the East, beginning with its military-industrial development in Siberia in the 1970s and culminating in its renewed Far East policy in the 1980s, which strove to foster an open Asia-Pacific regionalism to reintegrate the USSR into the international system to dilute US influence – a legacy that enabled the Russian Federation to entertain the proposal of "comprehensive diplomatic strategy" involving the Russia-India-China "triple alliance" in the 1990s (Braterskij and Kutyrev 2019, 109–10). Taken together, it set the prelude to the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for the multipolar world order against the perceived US "unipolar moment."

Soviet Soft Power Revolutionized: The Mise-en-Scène of Culture and Education in the Choreography of Science Diplomacy

On the cultural and education fronts of the Cold War, the USSR confidently demonstrated its soft power to Latin American spectators. To compete with the CIA-financed Congress for Cultural Freedom (CCF) and wax lyrical about its peace-loving image, the USSR sponsored the World Peace Council (WPC) in 1950 and enlisted the support of many Latin American intellectuals (Iber 2015, 2). Moreover, cultural diplomacy complemented science diplomacy to reverse the foreign image of Soviet backwardness in science and culture so as to lessen regional anti-Sovietism in the non-political realm; and the USSR – by hosting the *Soviet Exhibitions of Science, Technology, and Culture* in Mexico City in 1959, Havana in 1960, and Rio de Janeiro in 1962 – launched the "cultural offensive" to leverage the interlaced display of socialist consumerism and scientific achievement to catalyze Soviet-Latin American scientific and cultural contact into bilateral business agreements (Yost 2015, 13–14, 21, 43–44). As a component of the Soviet cultural diplomacy, the Kremlin orchestrated concert and sports tours to Latin America to showcase the USSR sponsorship of high and popular cultures in the 1950s and 1960s (Rupprecht 2015, 39–42).

In fact, the USSR impressed Latin America even with socialist experiments in its most remote inland territory. As Moscow assigned the Central Asian Union Republics to deepen economic relations with the neighboring states due to their shared cultural heritages and maneuvered Tashkent as the cynosure of the modern Soviet East to garner appreciation from Asia and Northern Africa (Muratbekova 2023, 32), science diplomacy between Soviet Central Asia and Transcaucasia and Latin America took place similarly in the forms of bilateral trade and cultural exchanges.

By inviting several Latin American intellectuals to Central Asia and the Caucasus, the USSR convinced them that these regions presented a successful socialist development model (Rupprecht 2015, 65). Indeed, the Uzbek SSR had developed its foreign trade relations by exporting industrial goods and facilities to a few Latin American countries by the early 1960s – including vacuum tubes to Chile and compressor stations to Argentina (Abutalipov 1964, 44). This indicated the USSR's aspiration to capitalize on the Latin American market by commercially tying it to the Central Asian supply chain of technological products.

In any event, the incorporation of trade and culture into hybrid warfare could camouflage the Soviet ambition of revolutionizing the region using coercive means. If the USSR were to import Brazil's coffee beans, while exporting Russian wheat, Caucasian oil, Soviet music and ballet in place of Marxist literature and Communist revolution, as Brazilian diplomat and writer José Osvaldo de Meira Penna noted, the superpower would be considered as "a really 'friendly' country" (Meira Penna 1970, 90).

A less explored topic in the Soviet transatlantic cultural diplomacy is how cinema could technically promote the art and science of political communication. Vladimir Lenin once associated the popularity of American educational films in the 1910s with Frederik Taylor's scientific system of management, wherein factories – for purposes of actualizing the labor potential and maximizing capitalist profits – employed cinematography to promote discipline among workers (Lenin 1933, 7). To recalibrate the educational value of films for revolutionary ends, Lenin emphasized the cinema as "the most important of all arts" to the Soviets and directed A. V. Lunacharsky, People's Commissar for Education, in 1925 with the task of indoctrinating the masses with Communist ideas through pictures (Lenin 1933, 10).

Surely, films could add a performative dimension to international politics, visualizing the reimagination of global political space in favor of human geography as an instrumental part in critical geopolitics (Carter and Dodds 2014, 6–7). Reputable for its cinematographic expression, the Soviet agitprop technique of re-editing newsreels reached Latin America through the post-revolutionary state-funded *Instituto Cubano de Arte e Industria Cinematográficas* (ICAIC), where Cuban directors grew adroit at using it to forward revolutionary messages to the masses (Hart 2004, 3, 7).

Moreover, the ICAIC's ambition was to transform the Cuban cinema into a "Latin American" one to loom large socialist Cuba's vanguardism in overcoming Latin America's underdevelopment (Myerson 1973, 26). One notable film is the ICAIC-funded, USSR-Cuban co-produced *Soy Cuba* (1964). Despite Castro insisting afterward that the film could have been more revolutionary (Kan 2017), it blends fiction and documentary features to create a mockumentary, depicting the socially subaltern subjects' rise against the Latin American elite politics and culture by eulogizing a revolutionary spirit contributed by a spectrum of ordinary Cubans (Thakkar 2014, 84–86).

While President Richard Nixon, caroling the same tune with the Chinese "panda diplomacy" by gifting musk oxen to the PRC to sow discord in Sino-Soviet relations, had a serious understanding of Cuba using culture as a weapon against US imperialism, Cuban revolutionary films validated his worries by penetrating America through the 1972 New York Film Festival (Myerson 1973, 28–36). With film stock as the medium for political assertion of inflammatory ideology, hybrid warfare's lights and shadows were thus registered in the Cold War depth of field.[9]

On the educational front, to train students from Asia, Africa and Latin America, the Peoples' Friendship University (RUDN) was founded in 1960 – the same year when the Republic of the Congo gained independence – and renamed Patrice Lumumba University one year later to commemorate the Congolese politician's leadership in Africa's independence and nationalist movement. Given that the USSR saw Patrice Lumumba's request for its interference in the Congo Crisis against the CIA- and Belgium-backed Mobutu Sese Seko's coup d'état as an opportunity to extend Soviet influence in central African affairs (Meredith 2006, 107–13), changing the university's name after the murder of Lumumba conveyed a powerful message about the institute's anti-imperialistic stance in educating Third World students.

Yet, the university tailored the curriculum by offering specialized education with industrial internship primarily to satisfy the growth needs of students' home country over developing their political affinity with the Soviet ideology (Rosen 1973, 4–5). This suggested Soviet authorities' pragmatism in differentiating "hard" science from "soft" social science as the developmental drive for under-developed countries – with the Lumumba symbol managed carefully as a memoryscape for advancing the global anti-colonial struggle.[10] Against this background, the Lumumba University attracted Latin American students with left-leaning thoughts. Despite being criticized by some observers as a liability in the USSR's cultural policy due to its draining Soviet taxpayers' money (Katsakioris 2019), the university's education investment in Latin American students had indeed nurtured scholars who would advocate for deepening the USSR-Latin American relations.[11]

Besides providing educational service to the Third World, the Lumumba University had actively reached Latin American higher institutes for academic exchange and coopera-

9 Concomitant with the Soviet-Cuban cinema diplomacy was the fact that the Soviet and Eastern European animation had left the country with the so-called "muñequitos rusos generation," which refers to the group born between 1965 and 1980 watching Soviet cartoons in their prepubescence (Jácome 2012). Owing to the role of this nostalgia diplomacy, the USSR-Cuban transatlantic cultural relations were cemented through the collective memories of the golden era of socialist solidarity.

10 As expected, the Lumumba University model served as a blueprint for other socialist states to establish kindred institutes – with the founding of the Czechoslovakian University of November 17th in 1961 as a remarkable example (Rosen 1973, 13).

11 For example, Carlos Muñiz – Peruvian scholar and an alumnus of the Lumumba University – edited the book *La URSS y América Latina* in 1968 to stress the importance of Latin America's transatlantic diplomatic and economic ties with the USSR (Pedemonte 2015, 237).

tion, starting from 1965 when the Lumumba University signed partnership agreements with the Autonomous University Tomas Frias (Potosí) to 1991 when it celebrated its two-decade partnership with the Technical University of Oruro in Bolivia (Volosyuk and Borzova 2009, 93–96). Accordingly, the Soviet diplomacy for science and science for diplomacy materialized in the exploration of international educational relations to form part of its cold hybrid warfare for an intercontinental anti-imperialist developmental agenda.

While the Soviet government imported Latin American cultural products discerningly and allowed Soviet artists to adapt these foreign elements to express the domestic yearn for exoticism and the USSR internationalist image (Rupprecht 2015, 73–127), Soviet Baltic writers in the 1970s spontaneously shattered the methodical restriction imposed by socialist realism by borrowing the narrative technique of magic realism from Latin American literature to "disclose spirituality in man and nature" (Ciplijauskaitė 1979, 226). Considering General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev's stress on the incorporation of technological achievement into literature in 1972 (Ciplijauskaitė 1979, 221), the Baltic novelists' shift in their narrative preferences could be seen as a transgression against the moribund Soviet ideological judgment in literary criticism and reflected the rise of intelligentsia's humanism in contrast to apparatchiks' technolatry, foreshadowing the Baltics' resistance to the Soviet authorities and the USSR's disintegration as the final blow to Russia's centuries-old dream of connecting the Baltics with the Americas.

Conclusion: From Geopolitical Competition to Global Convergence of Regions

During the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union incorporated science diplomacy into grand strategy, fusing conventional scientific, technological, and cultural exchanges with irregular tactics of influence operation, intelligence gathering, and political infiltration to reimagine the Cold War bipolar configuration – according to their geopolitical interests in transatlantic relations. This phenomenon, primarily focused on co-opting potential collaborators, while restraining the increasingly intense coercive resources enabled by science and technology in favor of avoiding military confrontation between blocs, characterizes the Cold War statecraft of science diplomacy as what this article terms cold hybrid warfare.

In the Euro-American case, the US exploited the asymmetrical superpower-to-state relationship to reengineer Western European nation-states into a liaison security community within the US global hegemon through reconstruction plan, military alliance, economic integration, technoscientific homogenization, and cultural interlinkages. On the other hand, export controls, propaganda warfare, and promotion of human rights were justified in the name of science and technology cooperation to contain the USSR and divide the Eastern Bloc, progressively drawing Eastern Europe closer to Western Europe.

In the Soviet-Latin American case, the USSR, despite its resource limitations and geographical distance, bode its time to instigate the world revolution by concealing the revolutionary fervor in the exotic, yet approachable Soviet culture, promoting techno-military sales at the two-track level of interactions, and reconstructing Cuba as the Latin American socialist stronghold in communication with regional revolutionaries and the Eastern Bloc. Additionally, it maneuvered education exchange as the mechanism not only for scientific information sharing, but also for the global alignment of anti-imperialist front, thus synthesizing hard and soft power into smart power to amplify its influence in the region, where it had lost established interests since Imperial Russia's retreat, and to ensure that Latin America would not unilaterally succumb to the US hegemon.

Parallel to the superpowers' geopolitical struggles was the globalization of world regions through the intra-, inter-, and extra-bloc science diplomacy interactions. The Euro-American co-construction of the Atlantic security architecture merged the cultural Global West with the military-industrial Global North within the US global security framework; whereas the USSR's geopolitical reach to the Global South, represented by Latin America and the Caribbean, enabled it to leverage its blue-water presence and continental interiors to reshape Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Baltics, Siberia, and the Far East collectively as a Global East in association with a revolutionary scheme at the transoceanic Afro-Eurasian-American level.

Both cases pushed for the systemic transformation of the Cold War structure and paved the way for the emergence of the post-Cold War world, wherein regions are replacing nation-states in global governance. In the meantime, the US victory in the Cold War, marked by the NATO eastward expansion and the USSR's disintegration, has hamstrung Russia's perceived geopolitical interests and driven it to press-gang its traditional "spheres of influence" in the "near abroad" into the multipolar global order within which Russia positioned itself as a Eurasian power. The US-USSR superpowers' quest for world order leadership has thereby been recast as the Russo-American strategic competition engaging Russia as a nationalistic great power in challenging the US superpower at the regional and global levels – with hybrid warfare as the reincarnation of cold hybrid warfare.

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