

ANALYTICAL CAUSATION IN ISLAMIC PHILOSOPHY

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Analytical causation is a type of causation that is often overlooked in philosophical textbooks. This type of causation is contrasted with external causation. In modern times, contemporary philosophers have made efforts to show the importance of this category of causation. Nevertheless, there are many ambiguities surrounding the nature of this type of causation that must be removed before it can find its proper place in Islamic philosophy. First of all, the nature of this category of causation must be determined. In order to accomplish this, the terms *concept*, *meaning*, *instance* and *individual* should be defined. The clarification of these terms shows that philosophy is essentially concerned with meaning. Secondly, it must be shown how one thing can be the instance of numerous concepts and meanings without any contradiction arising. These two premises can help clarify how analytical causation is not philosophically problematic; rather, it is imperative and necessary. Historically speaking, Islamic philosophers never explicitly mentioned *analytical causation* as a separate type of causation. Nevertheless, in many places, they used the term *causation* to refer to cases where there is no external existential distinction between a cause and its effect. Muslim philosophers unanimously agree upon the principle that states that *there is no mutual concomitance without causation*. Based upon this principle, it is possible to demonstrate that there is causation between things that do not possess external existential distinction with one another but that mutually necessitate one another, such as existence and quiddity, two essentially necessary beings (such as the names of God and His essence) and two essentially impossible beings (such as a vicious circle and the priority of something over itself). This in turn shows the possibility of analytical causation. Another important discussion related to the subject of analytical causation is the differences between analytical and external causation. Although these

two categories of causation have properties in common, there are also some fundamental distinctions between them. By way of example, in analytical causation, causation is a secondary intelligible. This is why it is a primary intelligible in external causation. What is more, in analytical causation, cause and effect are not instances of contraries. There are other distinctions between analytical and external causation. These and other important aspects of this discussion will be examined in this paper.

Keywords: *causation, analytical causation, external causation, mutual concomitance, secondary intelligible*

Introduction

The division of existence – or the existent – into cause and effect is one of the primary divisions of existence. Meaning, these two meanings are predicated for existence or the existent without any medium – like the division of existence into the necessary and the possible. It is for this reason that the discussion on causation is one of the most important discussions of philosophy. In fact, in ancient Greece, the discussion on causation was so imperative and vast that philosophy itself was called the *Science of Causes* (Mutahhari 2007: VI/94). Historically speaking, in Islamic philosophy discussions such as the principle of causation, the nature of causation, its categories and its properties were always debated by Muslim philosophers. Muslim philosophers generally considered the principle of causation – i.e. the idea that every essentially possible being needs a cause – to either be self-evident or close to self-evident. So important was this principle for Muslim philosophers that they used it to explain all of the ontological and epistemological relations of the Universe. There was not a philosopher that did not accept this principle.

It has often been stated that the most important, as well as difficult, task in a philosophical problem is the acquisition of a proper depiction of the problem itself. This is because a proper depiction of the nature of the philosophical problem facilitates the delineation of the truth or falsity of the views regarding it. It is for this reason that we will attempt to explain and clarify the meaning of *causation* in general before we begin speaking about analytical causation. The discussions regarding the categories of causation and its functions are subsequent to the discussion regarding the definition of causation. This shows why it is important to first delineate the meaning of causation in this paper. Once a proper understanding of the meaning of causation is acquired, it will be easy to consider analytical causation as one of its categories. Islamic philosophers have not generally explicitly men-

tioned *analytical causation* as a category of causation. Nevertheless, there are many indications that they accepted, albeit subconsciously, the possibility of this category of causation. We will attempt to clarify the nature of analytical causation in this paper and its distinctions with external causation. Following this, we will affirm the existence of this type of causation. With the clarification and affirmation of this category of causation, a new division of causation will manifest itself in Islamic philosophy.

The Meaning of Causation

The clarification of the meaning of causation requires us to first explain two matters.

Five Terms: Concept, Meaning, Instance, Reality, Individual

It is necessary to distinguish these four terms from one another and properly demarcate their epistemological status as well.

Concept

A *concept* is something that exists in the mind. At the same time, it relates something in the external world. A concept is also called *acquired knowledge*. Sometimes, a concept is referred to as the *form* of something that is acquired from it by the mind. It is necessary to remember that a concept relates that which it represents in an essential and natural manner. This is in contrast to the manner in which words relate that which they represent. This is because they only relate what they represent in an artificial and conventional manner. It is for this reason that the indication of a word with respect to its meaning is not essential to it; rather, it is accidental for it.

Meaning

A *meaning* is what is essentially related by a concept. It also possesses the capability of being that which a word is designated to represent. Sometimes a word is designated to represent it and other times it is left undesignated. A meaning is not necessarily existent. This is because, by way of example, the concept of ‘Zayd’ possesses a meaning even if it is not existent in the external world. In the proposition, ‘Zayd is just’, the justice of Zayd – which is the gist of this proposition – is a real meaning, even if the justice of Zayd does not exist in the external world. Even impossible things – such as a vicious circle of causation – have meanings, even if they do not exist. Hence, every

concept (even the paradoxical ones) and every affirmation (even the false ones) possesses a meaning that it essentially relates. The place of a meaning is the place that is reality, in the general sense of the term. A meaning may be in the realm of existence, in the realm of non-existence or the realm of convention. It is necessary to remember that it is possible for there to be a meaning which is not intended by any word or for which we may not have any concept by means of which it may be related. Some of the divine names for example, are meanings for which we do not have any concepts. Nevertheless, they are still meanings. This is because it is possible for a word to be designated for them or for a concept to relate them. This possibility is enough for them to really be meanings.

Instance

An *instance* is a meaning that has been conditioned with a condition. For example, 'man' is a meaning. However, a '*knowledgeable* man' is a meaning that has been conditioned with knowledge and therefore, it is an instance. 'Zayd' is also an example of an instance. Therefore, an instance can be universal and it can also be particular. Also, from what has been stated, it is possible to conclude that an instance is something in which various meanings combine with one another and for which various meanings are true.

Individual

An *individual* is a particular instance. In other words, it is a specific type of instance. Therefore, it is possible to define an *individual* as a particular instance of a meaning in which various meanings exist.

Reality

The *reality* of every meaning is the suitable place of that meaning. Of course, this *reality* is general and includes existence, non-existence and convention. It is possible for a meaning to lack reality. For example, the concept of the *existence of a Phoenix*, is a concept that possesses a meaning but lacks reality. This is because in the realm of existence, there is no such thing as the *existence of a Phoenix*.

The Combination of Various Meanings in One Existence

One of the most important principles of Islamic philosophy is the possibility of the combination of various meanings and truths in one existence

(Mulla Sadra 1981: III/325–326, 329; VI/282, 335). Usually, this principle is mentioned in the section of philosophy concerned with the divine names and attributes. Muslim philosophers use it to demonstrate the idea that there is no contradiction between the simple existence of the Truth and the existence of a multiplicity of names and attributes in Him. It is obvious that the occurrence of a multiplicity of meanings is not limited to the case where they occur for a simple existence, such as the Truth; rather, it also includes the case where they occur for a composite being, such as the variety of immaterial and material beings of the universe. It is also necessary to remember that in this principle, the term *meaning* includes existence and the properties of existence as well as quiddity and the properties of quiddity.

Two Important Points

From the two abovementioned premises it is possible to draw two imperative conclusions. The first is that it is meanings that occur or do not occur in reality. It is for this reason that it is the discussion regarding the affirmation or negation of the occurrence of a meaning in reality that is essentially intended in philosophy, which discusses what occurs in reality and what does not occur therein. Hence, it is possible to say that in most of the problems of philosophy the discussion is about meanings. For example, the discussion on the principality of existence or quiddity is a discussion regarding the essential occurrence of the meaning of existence or the meaning of quiddity in reality. Consequently, in philosophy, the discussion regarding cause and effect should be about the meaning of cause and the meaning of effect. The second conclusion that can be derived from the two abovementioned principles is that the multiplicity of meanings does not necessarily lead to the multiplicity of existence; rather, it is possible for a multiplicity of meanings to exist in one existent.

The Definition of Causation

Philosophers have presented various definitions of causation. Nevertheless, it seems that causation really only possesses one meaning. That is a general meaning that was mentioned by the ancient philosophers: Causation is the relation of dependence between two things, in which the thing that depends is called the 'effect' and the thing upon which it depends is called the 'cause' (Jawadi Amuli 2004: IX/119). According to this definition, anything that plays a role in the occurrence of something is a cause. Therefore, it is correct to call the parts, conditions, preparations and preliminaries of the existence of a thing its *causes*.

Here, it is necessary to add that causation essentially occurs between two meanings. In other words, cause and effect are two meanings, the latter of which depends upon the former.

Consequently, if the meaning of cause and the meaning of effect exist in two separate existences, then the relation between those two meanings will be an external causation. However, if the meaning of cause and the meaning of effect do not exist in two separate existences, then the relation between those two meanings will be an analytical causation. Hence, external causation and analytical causation are two categories of causation in the general sense of the term.

External vs. Analytical Causation

The Nature of External Causation

Based upon what was stated above, external causation is the relation of dependence between two meanings that exist in two separate existences.

It is possible for the following objection to arise here: If causation is the relation of dependence that exists between two meanings, then external causation should not really be a category of causation. This is because in external causation the relation of dependence actually exists between two instances (i.e. two existences). However, external causation is definitely and unanimously a category of causation. Consequently, it is not proper to define causation as the relation of dependency between two meanings; rather, it should be defined as the relation of dependency between two existences. If this is true, then analytical causation will not be a category of causation.

In response to this objection, we may say that it is true that in external causation there are two instances that are distinct in existence. In other words, in external causation, the existence of the cause is distinct from the existence of the effect. However, this does not contradict the aforementioned definition of causation. This is because the relation of dependency *essentially* exists between the two meanings that *happen to* exist in two different existences. This relation of dependency can only *accidentally* be ascribed to the two existences in which the two meanings separately exist. In other words, this objection is an instance of the fallacy of taking that which is accidental (i.e. the two existences) in place of that which is essential (i.e. the two meanings). Consequently, there is no problem in defining causation as the relation of dependency between two meanings.

It should also be noted that in every case where there is a distinction in existence there will be a distinction in meaning. However, the converse of this is not true.

The Nature of Analytical Causation

It is possible to define analytical causation as the relation of dependency between two meanings that do not possess two distinct existences and that the intellect arrives at by means of an analysis of reality.

It is possible to point to numerous instances of such a category of causation in Islamic philosophy. For example, based upon the philosophical postulates of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra, the causation of substance for accident is an instance of analytical causation. This is because he does not consider accidents to possess a separate existence from the substance that is their cause. Also, the causation of essential possibility with respect to the need for a cause, which is mentioned in the reason why something needs a cause, is an instance of analytical causation. The causation of the middle term of an argument for the affirmation of the major term for the minor term in the pure categorical syllogism is a case of analytical causation. What is more, quiddity is an analytical cause for its necessary concomitants (Mulla Sadra 1981: II/181, 212; V/127). The causation of the non-existence of a cause for the non-existence of the effect is also an instance of analytical causation. And, if truth be told, motion is an analytical cause for time (Ibid: III/180). What is more, if a differentia is the cause for its genus, then it can only be an analytical cause (Ibid: V/287). Finally, the essential properties of a quiddity are analytical causes of the essence of that quiddity. This is because all of these cases are considered examples of cause and effect, due to the fact that there is there is a relation of mutual concomitance in each of these cases. Nevertheless, there is no existential distinction between that which is considered a cause and its effect. Hence, some causes are not existentially distinct from their effects. So, it is not necessary for a cause to be existentially distinct from its effect for it to be a cause; rather, it may be existentially identical to it. We call this type of causation *analytical causation*. It is necessary to note that this term is something that can be found in the works of other philosophers as well. For example, Mulla Sadra mentions it in two places. He considers the causation of motion for time, form for matter and the causation of a differentia for its genus to be *analytical*. For example:

...so after an *analysis* and a separation [of the meaning of motion from time], it [i.e. the intellect] affirms the *causation* of some of them [i.e. motion] for others [i.e. time]... (Mulla Sadra 1981: III/180; V/287).

Also:

...rather, when this one thing becomes multiple by means of a *consideration* of the intellect, it [i.e. the intellect] affirms that some of them [i.e. form] are the *cause* for the other [i.e. matter]. And, there is no problem in there being in existence one thing for which intellectual multiplicity occurs and between which causation and effect exist from the point of view of multiplicity, such as occurs in the parts of the definition of a quiddity, like blackness, i.e. its genus and its differentia. This is because after an *analysis*, the intellect affirms that its differentia... is the *cause* for its genus... (Mulla Sadra 1981: V/287).

It should also be noted that in this definition, the term 'reality' refers to reality in the general sense of the term, which includes existence, non-existence and convention. What is more, in this definition, the term *existence* refers to existence in the specific sense of the term, not its general sense. Based upon the aforementioned definition, at least two distinct types of analytical causation exist. 1. The first is the case where the two meanings of cause and effect occur in one existential instance. 2. The second is the case where the two meanings of cause and effect occur in one or two non-existential instances. Consequently, analytical causation exists in the case where the meanings of cause and effect do not have two distinct existential instances. Nevertheless, they may still possess two instances, if those instances are not existential. They may also possess one existential instance or even one non-existential instance. Thus, if the instance of cause and effect is existential, it should be one; otherwise, the causation will not be analytical.

An Ontological Analysis of External and Analytical Causation

In one category of this division, causation is attributed with being *external*. This term however, possesses an array of meanings. The question therefore arises as to what meaning it is being used in when causation is attributed with it. The term *being external* is used in at least four distinct meanings. 1. In its vastest meaning, it is used in the sense of *occurring*, in the absolute sense. This is also the meaning of *being real* in the general sense. 2. In a second meaning, this term is used to refer to *existence, in the specific sense of the term*, which possesses the property of being in the external world in an essential manner and which is the primary source of the effects that emanate from something. 3. In a third sense, it refers to the property of being *existent in the specific sense*. This meaning includes being in the external world in an essential manner and in a subordinate manner. 4. The fourth meaning of this term refers to the meaning that is contrary to the property of being in the mind.

In our discussion, the term *being external* (which one of the categories of this division) is attributed to, is used in the third sense. This is because analytical causation is also *external* in the first and fourth sense of the term. Also, external causation is not external in the second sense. Consequently, external causation is external in the third sense. Thus, it means that in this category, causation is existent in a general sense, regardless of whether it is essentially existent or existent in a subordinate manner.

It is possible for someone to raise the following question here: External reality is filled with existence. And, existence is *essentially* existent. Consequently, there is no room for something that is subordinately existent. So, in this discussion, the term *being external* should refer to the second meaning of this term, not the third meaning. The answer to this query is that this way of thinking stems from the popular interpretation of the principality of existence, in which the occurrence of quiddity is only considered metaphorical. However, it is important to remember that in the discussion on the principality of existence, the term *principle* refers to that which is *essentially* existence. Thus, when we say that quiddity is *unreal* it simply means that it is not *essentially* existent, not that it is not existent at all, even if it be in an *accidental* and *subordinate* manner. In other words, the proper interpretation of the principality of existence and the unreality of quiddity is that existence is *essentially* existent and quiddity is *subordinately* existent, i.e. it is existent by means of existence. Therefore, in our discussion, the term *being external* refers to being existent, in the absolute sense and for this reason it includes all primary intelligibles, regardless of whether they are existence or the meanings that are existent by means of existence, such as quiddity.

It is possible for someone to raise the following objection here: The definition of external causation leads to the conclusion that the term *being external* refers to the second meaning of this term, i.e. being existent in the specific sense, which is a property of existence in the specific sense. This is because causation is a relation. And, the properties of a relation are dependent upon the two sides that it is related to. In external causation, the relation of causation and effectation exist between two meanings each of which possesses a separate essential existence. Thus, this relation should also possess such an essential existence. In other words, the attribute 'being *external*' is related to the two sides of the relation of causation. Since the two sides of the relation of causation possess an *existence, in the specific sense of the term* the causation is attributed to *being external* in this sense.

It is possible to respond to this objection in two ways: In the case at hand, it is *causation* that is attributed to *being external*. At the same time, *causation* is a relation. So, a relation is being attributed to being external. However, a relation is different from the meaning of *existence*. Thus, something else

besides existence is being attributed to being in the external world. Therefore, we cannot say that causation is attributed to being external in the second sense; otherwise, it would mean that something else besides existence in the specific sense of the term is existence in the specific sense of the term, which is a contradiction and therefore impossible. Thus, it is necessary to say that here being in the external world refers to the third meaning. What is more, causation is a relation between two existences in the specific sense of the term, as the person making the objection admitted to. At the same time, a relation is existent by means of the two sides it is related to. Hence, this causation is existent *by means* of existence. So, it is existent in a subordinate, not an essential manner. So, it is impossible to take the term *being existent* to refer to the second meaning; rather, it should be taken in a general sense of something existent, regardless of whether it is existent in an essential or subordinate manner. Secondly, when they say that a relation is subordinate to the two sides it relates this means that it is subordinate to it in the properties that it is attributed to, not in the manner in which it is attributed to them. For example, if the two sides of the relation are related to exist in the mind, the relation will also be in the mind, i.e. it will be mental. However, the relation is only attributed to being mental in a subordinate sense, not an essential sense, like the two sides it is related to. Hence, if the two sides of the relation of external causation are essentially existent, this does not mean that the relation of external causation should also be essentially existent.

In contrast, the attribute of *being analytical* refers to the idea that the relation of causation does not possess the property of being existent, regardless of whether it is an essential or subordinate manner. In other words, analytical causation does not have anything that parallels it in the external world. Nevertheless, this does not contradict the idea that it may have a source of abstraction in the external world. In many cases, the thing that does not possess something that parallels it in the external world is referred to as a *secondary intelligible*. It may also be referred to as being *unreal*.

It is keeping this distinction in mind that it is possible to say that external causation is a primary intelligible while analytical causation is a secondary intelligible. To put it in other terms, external causation possesses something that parallels it in the external world while analytical causation does not possess something that parallels it in the external world.

To clarify this claim, it is necessary for us to gain a better understanding of the category under which causation is subsumed. Philosophers unanimously agree that the causation is a relative concept and is subsumed under the category of relation (*al-idafah*).

Lexically, the term *al-idafah* refers to a relation. Technically, however, it is generally defined by Islamic philosophers as a *repeated relation* (Bahmanyar

1996: 411). In this sense, *al-idafah* in the technical sense is more specific than *al-idafah* in the lexical sense. This is because it is a repeated relation. However, the proper definition of *al-idafah* is *a repeated accident that is acquired by means of a single relation* (Tabatabai 1981: II/482). Thus, there is no difference between the category of *al-idafah* and the other relative accidents from the point of view of the relation. In other words, in the category that is *al-idafah*, an accident is repeated by means of the relation. For example, when a book is on a table, a single relation occurs between the book and the table. However, by means of this single relation, two accidents come into existence, one of which occurs for the book and the other of which occurs for the table. For example, we say that the book is *above* the table and the table is *below* the book. However, in other relative categories, only one accident comes into existence by means of the relation. For example, by means of the relation of the book with its place, a single accident comes into existence that the book is attributed to. This is *the place (al-ayn)* of the book. In other words, no accident occurs for the place itself. It is clear that the relation of causation falls under the category of *al-idafah*. This is because from the relation between cause and effect, two attributes come into existence, one of which the cause is attributed to and the other of which the effect is attributed to.

It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the existence of the category of *al-idafah* in order to determine whether causation is absolutely or relatively a primary or secondary intelligible. In this regard, there are three main views, which we will point to hereunder:

1. The first view is that relations are absolutely secondary philosophical intelligibles (Misbah Yazdi 1984: II/268).
2. The second view is that relations are essentially primary intelligibles.
3. The third view is that relations vary from one another. Some of them are secondary logical intelligibles, others are secondary philosophical intelligibles and others are primary intelligibles. It seems that this is the correct view regarding this subject. Of course, this is a topic that should be discussed in its own place. Right now, we will consider this a given in this discussion. It goes without saying, that if all relations were secondary intelligibles, then both of the categories of causation that we are speaking about here would be secondary intelligibles. And, if all relations were primary intelligibles, then both of the categories of causation would be primary intelligibles. However, the propriety of the third view allows us to say that some categories of causation are primary intelligibles and others are secondary intelligibles.

It should be noted that it is impossible for a relation to exist between something and itself. In other words, it is necessary for there to be a distinction between the two sides of a relation in the place where the relation is existent. For this reason, the category of relation, and consequently, the relation of causation, depends upon the distinction and duality of the two sides of the relation, such as cause and effect. It is for this reason that if the two sides of the relation are distinct in external existence, the relation will be existent in the external world and therefore be a primary intelligible, such as the relation between a father and his son. And, if the two sides of the relation are distinct in the mind, then the relation will be existent in the mind and be a secondary logical intelligible, such as the relation between the subject and the predicate of a proposition. However, if the two sides of the relation are not distinct in the mind or the external world, rather, their duality and distinction is dependent upon an analysis of a single thing in the external world or the mind, then the relation will be present in mental analysis and therefore be a secondary philosophical intelligible. An example of this is the relation between existence and quiddity. Existence and quiddity are always united together, in the mind and the external world. There is no duality between them unless the mind analyzes them and separates them from one another through a mental analysis and deliberation. Thus, the relation between them exists not in the mind or the external world; rather, it is only existent in the analysis and deliberation of the mind. The same is true of the analytical cause and the analytical effect.

It should also be noted that in many places, the term *secondary intelligible* is referred to as *unreal intelligible*. While this terminology is not without reason, it seems that it is better to use the term *analytical intelligible*. This is because the term *unreal* has many meanings, one of which implies that the thing attributed to being *unreal* has no share of reality in any way whatsoever. At the same time, attributing analytical causation, or any other relation, with this meaning of unreality is inappropriate. For this reason, it seems more prudent to attribute the *intelligible* that is ascribed to relations in general as being *analytical*, not *unreal* so as to avoid this confusion. To explain this further, absolute unreality refers to something that does not exist without the convention of someone who convenes. For example, the ignorance of Zayd is something non-existent. Therefore, it does not possess something that parallels it in the external world. Hence, it is *unreal* in this sense, i.e. in the sense that is contrasted with things that do possess something that parallels them in the external world. However, it is not *unreal* in the sense of something that depends upon the convention of someone who convenes. This is because no matter how much one convenes upon the non-existence

of God, it does not make Him non-existent. Therefore, every unreal thing in the specific sense of the term is a secondary intelligible, as it does not possess something that parallels it in the external world. However, the converse of this is not true, i.e. not every secondary intelligible is unreal in the specific sense of the term, even though it is unreal in general sense of the term. To put it in yet other terms, the criteria of something being a secondary intelligible is that it does not possess something that parallels it in the external world. Nevertheless, the thing from which it is abstracted may be in the realm of existence, non-existence or the realm of consideration. In order to convey this general sense of *unreality* we will use the term *analytical* in place of *unreal*, so as to not confuse with the unreal in the specific sense. In any case, it is for this reason that analytical causation can occur in the realm of existence, the realm of non-existence or the realm of convention.

*The Subconscious Acceptance of
Analytical Causation in Islamic Philosophy*

Islamic philosophers have often used the term *causation* in cases that we mentioned as examples of analytical causation, i.e. those cases where cause and effect are not distinct in external existence. For example, in contrast to the theologians, philosophers generally say that essential possibility is the *cause* for the dependency of an effect upon its cause. What is more, they say that the essential property of something is the cause of that which it is essential for. Mulla Sadra also states that motion is the cause of time and differentia is the cause for genus. This is why in none of these cases is the external existence of the effect distinct from the external existence of the cause. This indicates that even if these philosophers did not explicitly mention the term *analytical causation*, at least they accepted its possibility in principle.

Also, there are also other examples in Islamic philosophy that have not been explicitly described by philosophers as being instances of causation but that may be described as being such based upon the postulates of these philosophers themselves. Philosophers explicitly state that the relation of mutual concomitance (i.e. the relation of mutual necessitation, in which two things reciprocally necessitate one another) only exists in the case where the relation of causation and effectation exists between the thing that necessitates and the thing that it necessitates or the case where these two things are the effects of a common cause. It is for this reason that they say that the criterion for mutual concomitance is causation. It is for this reason that it is possible to state that *there is no concomitance without causation* (Mulla Sadra 1981: I/94). On the other hand, these same philosophers say that in many cases, a relation of mutual concomitance exists between things that are non-existent.

They also say that this relation exists between existence and quiddity or two things that are essentially necessary (such as the names of God and His essence) or two things that are essentially impossible (such as a vicious circle and the priority of something over itself). Consequently, it would be necessary to state that a relation of causation exists in these cases. This is why in these cases, the two sides of the relation of concomitance and causation do not possess separate external existences. So, there would be no choice for them but to say that there is another category of causation in these cases that is different from the ordinary meaning of causation, where cause and effect are separate in external existence. This is exactly what we call *analytical causation*. Thus, even if these philosophers did not explicitly accept analytical causation, they would be forced to accept its possibility based upon their philosophical postulates.

It is possible for someone to raise the following objection here: While it is true that there is no mutual concomitance and necessity without causation, this principle is specifically related to cases where the two sides of the mutual concomitance are separate in their external existence. For example, Mulla Sadra explicitly states that even though there is a mutual necessity between existence and quiddity, there is no causation between them (Mulla Sadra 1981: I/91–92). Therefore, in the abovementioned principle, the term *mutual concomitance* refers to external concomitance, not analytical concomitance. Hence, the conclusion of the abovementioned argument is more specific than its claim.

In response to this objection, it is possible to state that, first of all, when mentioning this principle, philosophers never separate external concomitance from analytical concomitance; rather, they always mention concomitance in an absolute and general manner. For this reason, apparently the necessary correlation between concomitance and causation is general and also includes analytical concomitance and causation.

Secondly, even Mulla Sadra states that the thing that necessitates from something is the *effect* of that which it necessitates from (Mulla Sadra 1981: II/212). What is more, in some places he states that quiddity is the cause of that which necessitates from it (such as possibility) (Mulla Sadra 1981: II/181, 212; V/127). This shows that the aforementioned principle is general and also includes the cases where there is no external distinction between that which necessitates and that which it necessitates. It can therefore be concluded that if some cases he states that there is no causation between quiddity and possibility (or between that which necessitates and that which it necessitates), he is referring to external causation, not analytical causation.

Thirdly, the use of the terms *a priori*, *a posteriori* and *proof* for various

categories of the demonstrations that are formed using the pure categorical syllogism indicates that the abovementioned principle also includes analytical concomitance and causation. In order to clarify this matter, it is necessary to mention two important matters here:

1. Philosophers unanimously agree that predication implies that there is a unity between the subject and the predicate of the proposition in which the latter is predicated for the former. Therefore, in the pure categorical syllogism, there is a unity between the minor term and the middle term of the argument. The same is true of the middle term and the major term. Therefore, there should be an existential unity between the minor term, the middle term and the major term – at least in some cases of predication.
2. On the other hand, the philosophers generally agree that there is a mutual concomitance between the premises of a demonstration and its conclusion. In other words, a mutual necessity between the premises of a demonstration and its conclusion is necessary in every demonstration. Based upon the principle that states that *there is no mutual concomitance between things in which causation is not present*, causation must exist between the premises of a demonstration and its conclusion. It is for this reason that they have stated that the affirmation of a proposition by means of demonstration can occur in one of three ways: One may either use a cause to prove its effect, or use an effect to prove its cause or use the effect of a common cause to prove the other effect of that cause. Hence, philosophers have used the aforementioned principle to prove the division of demonstration into its three famous categories.

However, if we say that the aforementioned principle is only related to external causation, this would mean that the three aforementioned categories of demonstration do not exist when formatted in the form of a categorical syllogism. This is because in the categorical syllogism, there is a unity between the minor, middle and major terms of the syllogism. This is why they definitely consider the aforementioned categories of demonstration to exist in the cases where the demonstration is formulated in the form of two pure categorical propositions. This coincidentally shows that subconsciously, philosophers accept analytical causation.

By way of example, in the *Burhan al-Shifa*, Ibn Sina mentions the following example for the demonstration in which one proves an effect by its cause: Zayd is a human being. Every human being is an animal. In conclusion, Zayd is a human being (Ibn Sina 1984: VIII/81). It is clear that there

is an existential unity between Zayd, the property of being a human being and the property of being an animal. This is why they are predicated of one another. At the same time, Zayd being a human being is considered the cause for him being an animal. This is because man is essentially an animal and if Zayd is an animal it is caused by him being a human being. Thus, in this case, causation exists without there being any existential distinction between the cause and its effect. Thus, causation may be analytical and it is not necessary for there to be an existential distinction between cause and effect.

The Distinctions between External and Analytical Causation

There are many distinctions between external and analytical causation. Hereunder, we will point to some of them.

1. First of all, in external causation, the distinction between cause and effect is in the external world. This is why, in analytical causation, this distinction is not in the external world; rather, it is in the analysis of the mind. Causation necessitates a distinction between cause and effect. In other words, it is not possible for something to be the cause of itself. This is because the cause is prior to the effect and nothing can be prior to itself. Hence, nothing can be the cause or the effect of itself. However, this distinction is sometimes in the external world and other times it is in the analysis of the mind. External distinction occurs in the case where the cause possesses an external existence that is distinct from the external existence of the effect. However, in analytical causation, the cause simply possesses an existence that is distinct from the effect in the analysis of the mind. In other words, in the external realm of existence, they do not possess two distinct existences.

2. Analytical causes are not contrary to their effects. This is in contrast to external causes and their effects. The latter are indeed instances of contraries. There is a consensus of opinion regarding the idea that cause and effect are relative concepts. However, there is debate amongst philosophers as to whether or not it is necessary for two relative concepts to always be instances of contrariety or not. In contrast to the popular opinion, it is not necessary for relative concepts to always be instances of contrariety (Mulla Sadra 1981: VI/172). Two relative concepts are two attributes that are acquired by means of a relation. If this relation is external, then the two aforementioned attributes will be instances of contraries. On the other hand, if the relation is analytical, then the two aforementioned relative attributes will not be contraries. This is because contraries do not combine in a single existence. This is why the assumption is that the two relative concepts do combine in a com-

mon existence in the second case. Hence, not all instances of relative concepts are contrary to one another. So, the criterion for two relative concepts being contrary to one another lies in the manner of the relation that creates them. Since the relation in analytical causation is analytical, not external, the analytical cause and the analytical effect will not be contrary to one another. It should also be noted that it is based upon this very philosophical postulate (i.e. that it is not necessary for two relative concepts to be contrary to one another) that Mulla Sadra resolves the problem of the unity of the intellect and the intelligible. Of course, Allamah Tabatabai also considers it possible for two relative concepts not to be contrary to one another; nevertheless, he says this is not true for the relative concepts that are cause and effect. This is because he considers their existential combination to lead to the priority of something over itself. It is for this reason that he states that there is nothing philosophical problematic in the unity of the intellect and the intelligible, in contrast to the unity of cause and effect. What is more, Allamah Tabatabai is of the opinion that Mulla Sadra is also of the opinion that causation and effect cannot combine in one external being. He states that Mulla Sadra has mentioned this impossibility in many cases and if, in some cases, he says the contrary, it is due to negligence (Tabatabai 1981: VI/34).

Of course, it is necessary to remember that if causation and effect exist in one external being, this does not lead to the priority of something over itself. This is because the assumption is that in this case, the unity between cause and effect is in the external world. However, the causation and effect that exists between them does not exist in the external world; rather, it only exists in the mind, where the assumption is that they are two things. Consequently, the unity between two relative concepts is also possible in this case as well.

3. The third difference that exists between external and analytical causation is that external causation is a primary intelligible. This is why analytical causation is a secondary philosophical intelligible. In other words, the first type of causation possesses something that parallels it in the external world, in contrast to the second.

4. A fourth distinction between external and analytical causation is that external causation only occurs in external existence. This is why analytical causation may occur in existence, in non-existence as well as in conventional matters. It was stated that analytical causation occurs where there is no distinction between cause and effect in external existence but the intellect sees a relation of dependency between the two things in *reality* in its analysis. This *reality* includes existence, non-existence and convention. In other words, the level of reality from which the cause and the effect are abstracted

by the mind may be an instance of existence, an instance of non-existence or an instance of convention.

The following cases may be mentioned of the case where the analytical cause and the analytical effect are abstracted from a single existence: The causation of the specific forms for the accidents that occur for them, the causation of quiddity for possibility and the causation of possibility for dependency. This is because in all of these cases, the mind abstracts cause and effect from a single existence.

On the contrary, in the following cases, the cause and the effect are abstracted from a single case of non-existence: The causation of the non-existence of the cause for the non-existence of the effect (such as the causation of the non-existence of the clouds for the non-existence of rain).

Finally, the following may be mentioned as an example of the case where cause and effect are abstracted from convention: The causation of ownership for the permissibility of usage.

For this reason, it is possible to state that analytical causation occurs at three levels of reality. This is in contrast to external causation, which only occurs at the level of reality that is existence. This is because external causation occurs only in the case where cause and effect possess two distinct external existences. It is clear that such a type of causation cannot occur in non-existence or convention.

5. Finally, in analytical causation it is not necessary for the effect to be a possible entity; rather, it may be necessary or impossible. It is for this reason that the principle that states that *every effect is essentially possible*, is not related to analytical causation; rather, it is specifically related to external causation. In external causation, the effect is necessarily a possible entity. In analytical causation, however, the effect may be a possible entity and it may also be an impossible or necessary entity. For example, the accidents of a specific form are possible entities. At the same time, according to Mulla Sadra, they are manifestations of the substance that is the specific form. For this reason, they exist with the same existence that their cause exists with. The priority of something over itself is the analytical effect of vicious circle. At the same time, the priority of something over itself is impossible. So, in this case, the analytical effect is impossible. The knowledge and power of God are effects of His life. At the same time, they exist with a single existence. So, they are analytical effects. However, the power and knowledge of God are necessary. So, in this case, the analytical effect is something necessary. By way of passing, it should be mentioned here that these divine attributes lead to a sort of *composition* in God. However, since this composition is only in the analysis of the mind, it is not contrary to the essential necessity of His

existence. This is contrary to what is commonly understood regarding the divine simplicity. Most philosophers absolutely negate composition in all of its forms from God, under the assumption that any form of composition would be contrary to the essential necessity of His existence. This is why God's existence is external. Thus, an analytical composition would not be contrary to its essential Necessity, which, like its subject, is external.

6. Another important distinction between external and analytical causation is that the latter is true even based upon the Personal Unity of Existence. It has been mentioned that in vague terms, causation is only true when there is a distinction between cause and effect. Otherwise, it necessitates that something be the cause of itself, which is impossible. Now, if causation is external, then the cause is distinct from its effect in external existence. However, if causation is analytical, then the cause is only distinct from its effect in meaning, even if there is no distinction between them in external existence. Therefore, based upon the theory of the Personal Unity of Existence, which states that there is only one being (i.e. God) that really exists, external causation is impossible. This is because according to this theory, there is no multiplicity in external existence. Therefore, external causation cannot occur between them. At the same time, external causation cannot occur between something and itself. Therefore, if one did not believe in the possibility of analytical causation but adhered to the theory of the Personal Unity of Existence, then causation – as an explanation of the relation between God and His creatures – would be replaced by manifestation. God would not be the cause of the world nor would the world be the effect of God; rather, God would be that which *manifested* the world and the world would be His *manifestation*. However, analytical causation is still possible for one who adheres to this mystical theory. This is because the multiplicity of external existence is not a condition of this type of causation. So, one could say that from the point of view of external causation, God is not the cause of the world nor is the world the effect of God; rather, it is the manifestation of God and God is what manifests it. However, from the point of view of analytical causation, God is the cause of the world and the world is the effect of God. The same can also be stated regarding the relation between the creatures themselves. It is interesting to note that some of the adherents of the Personal Unity of Existence were aware of this fact and have mentioned it in their mystical works. For example:

The person who says that the Stable Entities are specific epistemic existences does not say that an external multiplicity occurs at the level of [the divine] knowledge. This is because these existences are subsumed

within the [divine] names and the [divine] names are contained within the [divine] Essence. And, the multiplicity is based upon an analysis, nothing else. And, the occurrence of the Stable Entities by means of the [divine] names and the occurrence of the [divine] names by means of the [divine] essence are by an emanation; however, this is based upon an intellectual analysis (Ashtiyani 1996: 161).

What is more, analytical causation also occurs between the various names, attributes and essence of God. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that analytical causation is true even based upon the Personal Unity of Existence. This is why external causation is not true based upon the Personal Unity of Existence.

7. It is possible for the analytical cause to possess a reality and occurrence that is weaker than that of its effect. In contrast, in external causation the cause is always stronger than its effect from the point of view of its reality and occurrence. For example, God is the external cause of His creatures. At the same time, He possesses a stronger reality and occurrence than them. However, in the case of analytical causation, in some cases it is possible for the cause to be weaker in terms of reality and occurrence than its effect. The example of this is the quiddity of God which is the cause of His existence. Of course, this is based upon the assumption that God possesses a quiddity and that it is the cause for its existence, which is not unanimously accepted. Nevertheless, if one were to accept both of these premises, then one would have to say that His quiddity is the analytical cause for His existence. This is because His quiddity and His existence exist by means of one existence and there is no multiplicity of external existences at play here. Of course, these two are separate meanings that become distinct in mental analysis. The mind separates these meanings from one another and understands that His quiddity is the cause for His existence. Nonetheless, these two are not on the same footing as far as their degree of reality and occurrence are concerned. This is because the reality and occurrence of His existence is stronger than that of His quiddity. This is because existence is essentially real while other things are only secondarily and subordinately real. And, this is what the principality of existence necessitates. Also, Mulla Sadra says that it is possible for a non-existential cause to be weaker in terms of reality and occurrence than its non-existential effect. He says:

Regarding the causation of the non-existence of each of the parts of the composition with respect to its non-existence the truth is that it is only in a subordinate manner because it is accompanied by means of that which is essentially the cause. This is because the thing that is essentially the cause of

the non-existence of the effect is the nature of the non-existence of *one* of its causes, such as the conditions, parts, etc. And, that is something universal and vague and there is no multiplicity in it in itself. And, even though its individuals are not multiple they are not particularly the [essential] cause [of the non-existence of the composition]; rather, the cause is the thing that is common [to them]. *And in the causes of non-existence there is no problem in the cause being weaker than its effect in terms of reality [and occurrence]* (Mulla Sadra 1981: I/165–166).

8. The quiddity of the creature is the external, not analytical effect of God and the analytical, not external effect of its own existence. In the discussions on the principality of existence it has been mentioned that quiddity is existent in the external world by means its very existence. In other words, these two are identical to one another. Therefore, just as the existence of the creature is the external effect of God, its quiddity, which is united with it, is also the external effect of God. If the existence of the creature is the external effect of God, then everything that is identical to it will also be the external effect of God. The quiddity of the creature will therefore also be the external effect of God. For example, the quiddity of man is identical to the existence of man. This quiddity is the external effect of God, like its existence. On the other hand, every quiddity is the analytical effect of its own existence. This because on one hand it does not essentially possess existence; rather, it takes its existence from its existence. And, on the other hand, it is united with its existence. So, its existence is its analytical cause. Thus, the quiddity of the creature is the external effect of God and the analytical effect of its own existence. It should also be noted that the same is also true of the necessary concomitants of the quiddity of the creature, which are identical to the quiddity of the creature and through it are also identical to its existence. These are also the external effects of God. This is because since the existence of the creature is the external effect of God, everything that is united with it is also the external effect of God. Nonetheless, these necessary concomitants are the direct analytical effects of the quiddity of the creature and the indirect analytical effects of its existence.

The Division of Causation

It has been clarified that causation is a relation of dependency between two meanings. That which is dependent is called the *effect* and that upon which it depends is called the *cause*. It should also be remembered that causation is a real relation, but in the general sense of being real. Therefore, it does not specifically belong to existence or meanings that are existent.

Therefore, it is possible to conceive of it as occurring in other levels of reality, such as the realm of non-existence or the realm of convention. Based upon this, it is possible to divide it into various categories based upon the level of reality in which it occurs. Hereunder, we will mention the division of causation:

1. The first category of causation is what we will term the *real, objective, external causation*. An example of this is the causation of God with respect to the beings that are His creatures. Of course, this is based upon the assumption that there is a real multiplicity in existence. The philosophers generally divide this type of causation into complete and incomplete causation. Then, they divide the incomplete cause into the four Aristotelian causes, i.e. the formal, material, efficient and final cause.
2. The second category of causation is the *real, objective, analytical causation*. The example of this is the causation of existence for quiddity, the causation of possibility for the need for a cause and the causation of the non-existence of the cause for the non-existence of the effect.
3. The third category of causation is the *real, subjective external causation*. The example of this is causation of the minor and major premises of a demonstration for its conclusion based upon the beliefs of the Peripatetic philosophers.
4. The fourth category of causation is the *real, subjective and analytical causation*. The example of this is the causation of the minor and major premises of a demonstration for its conclusion based upon the premises of the philosophy of Mulla Sadra.
5. The fifth category of causation is the *conventional and external causation*. The example of this type of causation is the pronouncement of the formula of marriage, which is the cause for the occurrence of the marriage relationship. In this case, religion has convened to consider this pronouncement the cause for the occurrence of the aforementioned relation. However, this type of causation is external, not analytical. This is because this pronouncement is externally distinct from the actual relation that is its effect.
6. The sixth category of causation is the *conventional and analytical causation*. The example of this category of causation is the causation of ownership for the permissibility of usage. This is because these two properties exist with one existence in the being of the owner.

It should be noted that in the realm of convention, there is no distinc-

tion between the realm of objectivity and subjectivity. Hence, conventional causation only possesses these two categories.

It is possible for someone to raise the following objection here: Causation is an objective meaning. Therefore, it is not possible to consider subjective causation as a category of causation. This is because the subject of a division should be present in all of its categories. This is why subjectivity and objectivity are contrary to one another. Therefore, the subject of division of causation cannot exist in subjective causation. Consequently, the latter is not a category of the former.

In order to understand the answer to this query, it is necessary to remember that the term *objectivity* possesses three distinct meanings. Obviously, in the aforementioned objection these meanings have not been properly separated from one another.

1. The first meaning includes reality in the general sense of the term, i.e. the reality that includes existence, non-existence and convention.
2. The second meaning only includes existence in the specific sense.
3. The third meaning only includes the external world, in contrast to the mind and understanding, which is itself a level of the first and second meanings of objectivity.

Based upon this division, it is possible to say that if we consider causation to be an *objective* meaning it is in the first sense of the term, which also includes the subjective. In other words, subjective causation is a level of the objective in the first sense. Consequently, the aforementioned objection is invalid.

It should also be mentioned that the aforementioned division of causation is a new division of causation that is based upon the assumption of the possibility of analytical causation. For this reason, it is possible to add some of the sub-divisions of *real, objective, external causation* – which the previous philosophers assumed was the only category of external causation – to the other primary categories of causation – which we have now discovered based upon the possibility of analytical causation. By way of example, the previous philosophers divided *real, objective, external causation* into the complete and the incomplete cause. It is now possible to consider this a sub-division of the other categories of causation that we have now discovered based upon the possibility of analytical causation. Also, it is possible to divide the *real, objective, analytical causation* into that which occurs in the realm of existence and that which occurs in the realm of non-existence. Subsequently, we may divide each of these into that which occurs in the possible, that which occurs

in the necessary and that which occurs in both. What is more, the realm of convention possesses many divisions and the two aforementioned types of conventional causation may be considered in each of those divisions. Consequently, any comprehensive division of causation would be very vast and require a separate investigation.

The Consequences of the Acceptance of Analytical Causation

After mentioning the definition of analytical causation and its distinctions from external causation, it is necessary to mention some of the consequences of the acceptance of the possibility of such a type of causation. The following are some of the consequences of this acceptance:

1. Based upon the acceptance of the possibility of analytical causation, it will be possible to present *a priori* demonstrations in philosophical discussions. In order to understand this matter properly, it is necessary to say a few words about demonstration and its role in philosophical investigation. A demonstration is a syllogism in which the premises are certain – in the specific sense of the term¹ – and that leads to a certain conclusion. The premises of a demonstration are always the cause of the certainty in its conclusion. Meaning, the middle term is the cause for the affirmation of the major term for the minor term. Now, if this middle term is simply the cause for this affirmation, then the demonstration is called an *a posteriori* demonstration. However, if, aside from this, the middle term is also the cause for the occurrence of the major term for the minor term, then in this case the demonstration is called an *a priori* demonstration. It is the opinion of the majority of philosophers that the *a posteriori* demonstration does not lead to certainty in the conclusion and is therefore not really a demonstration in the technical sense of the term. This is why the *a priori* demonstration does lead to this certainty and because of this is really a demonstration in the technical sense. These philosophers also state that it is necessary for the conclusions of philosophical discussions to be certain; otherwise, they lose their quality of being philosophical. However, it is the opinion of some philosophers that *a priori* demonstrations cannot be used in philosophy as well, albeit for another reason. The reason for this is that the subject of the science and problems of philosophy is ab-

1 Certainty in the specific sense of the term refers to the certain belief in a proposition that is in accordance with reality and is stable.

solute existence, which includes all real things. At the same time, the predicates of these problems must be equal to their subjects. For this reason, they also include all real things. For this reason, there is no real cause for the occurrence of these predicates for their subjects – since there is nothing real outside of reality and it is necessary for a cause to be existentially distinct from its effect. For this reason, it is impossible for an *a priori* demonstration to be used in philosophy. However, this does not mean that the manner of argumentation in philosophy does not lead to certainty. This is because there is another type of argumentation that can be used in which the conclusion arrived at is still certain. They call this *Argumentation by means of General Mutual Concomitants*. These *general mutual concomitants* are two things that are united in existence. To be precise, the actual reason why the certainty in one of these concomitants leads to the certainty in the other is that they are united in existence. According to these philosophers, even though these two united concomitants mutually necessitate one another, there is no real causation between them. This is because it is necessary for a cause to be existentially distinct from its effect. Meaning, it is necessary for them to be independent of one another.

However, based upon what we have explained regarding the possibility of analytical causation, it is clear that this line of thinking is fallacious. This is because, first of all, mutual necessity can only exist where there is causation, as the majority of philosophers have stated. Secondly, it is not necessary for a cause to be ontologically distinct and independent from its effect; rather, it is possible for them to be united in existence. Hence, it is possible for an *a priori* demonstration to be used in philosophy.

2. Based upon what was stated in the first conclusion, it is possible to state that if one were to deny the possibility of analytical causation, the *a priori* demonstration would only possess one instance, i.e. the instance in which the middle term is the external cause of the conclusion. However, since analytical causation is possible, it is possible to divide *a priori* demonstration into two categories: the external *a priori* demonstration, in which the middle term is the external cause of the conclusion, and the analytical *a priori* demonstration, in which the middle term is the analytical cause of the conclusion.
3. God is an essentially Necessary Being. For this reason, His existence does not have an external cause. For this reason, philosophers generally consider it impossible to present an *external a priori* demonstration

for His existence. At the same time, these philosophers do not accept analytical causation. Hence, they say that it is impossible to present any type of *a priori* demonstration for His existence. However, since analytical causation is possible, as we have shown in this article, an *analytical a priori* demonstration can be presented for His existence. Consequently, an *a priori* demonstration for His existence exists.

4. Based upon the possibility of analytical causation, it is possible to divide causal priority, i.e. the priority of a complete cause over its effect, into *analytical causal priority*, which is the priority of an analytical complete cause over its analytical effect, and *external causal priority*, which is the priority of an external complete cause over its effect. The same is true of natural priority, which is the priority of an incomplete cause over its effect.
5. Based upon the possibility of analytical causation, it is possible to divide casual simultaneity, i.e. the simultaneity of two effects of a common cause, into two categories. The first is *external causal simultaneity*, in which the two effects and their common cause are existentially separate from one another, and the second is *analytical causal simultaneity*, in which the two effects and their common cause all exist by means of a single existence. An example of the second is the power and knowledge of God, which are effects of a common cause, i.e. God's life, and are therefore causally simultaneous. However, these two effects are united with one another and with their cause in external existence. For this reason, they are analytically causally simultaneous.

Conclusion

A proper definition of causation demands an understanding of the meanings of the terms *concept*, *meaning*, *instance*, *individual* and *reality*. The philosopher is primarily concerned with meaning and his philosophical discussions are conducted at the level of meaning. If concepts are mentioned they are only paths to meaning and do not possess any essential importance. Also, the multiplicity of concepts or meanings does not necessarily lead to the multiplicity of instances; rather, it is only when those meanings are distinct in external existence that a multiplicity of instances will arise. Based upon these two premises it is possible to state that causation is the *relation of dependence between two meanings*. This definition is general and is not limited to the case where causation is between two meanings that have separate external existences; rather, it also includes the case where the meaning of

cause and the meaning of effect do not possess two separate existences. The latter is what we call *analytical causation*. An observation of the works of the philosophers of the past indicates that they at least subconsciously accepted analytical causation. This is because they used the term *causation* in places where there was no external existential separation between cause and effect. One of the glaring examples of this is *a priori* and *a posteriori* demonstration that is formed in the form of a pure categorical syllogism. This is because the terms of such demonstrations are united with one another in existence. Nevertheless, a causal relation exists between them. Of course, some have claimed that the philosophers have used the term *causation* only metaphorically in these cases. This however, is claim that can be debated. What is more, based upon the principle that states that *there is no mutual concomitance without causation*, it is possible to conclude the possibility of analytical causation. This is because in many cases, there is no external existential separation between two things that are mutually necessary with respect to one another, such the life of God and His knowledge and power.

The actual meaning of causation is shared by external and analytical causation. Nevertheless, each of these two categories of causation possesses their own distinctions. The relation of causation in analytical causation does not possess something that parallels it in the external world. For this reason, analytical causation is a secondary intelligible. Also, even though the two sides of the relation of analytical causation are relative concepts, they are not contrary to one another. Analytical causation occurs in the realms of existence, non-existence and convention. And, the analytical effect includes the possible, the impossible and the necessary. This is why the external causation possesses something that parallels it in the external world and it is a primary intelligible. For this reason, the two sides of the relation of external causation are relative concepts and also contraries. External causation only occurs in the realm of existence in the specific sense of the term. Also, the external effect is only the possible being. The acceptance of analytical causation has numerous philosophical consequences. What is more, its acceptance leads to the presentation of a new division of causation, which we pointed to at the end of this article.

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