

## HEIDEGGER'S UNDERSTANDING OF PHILOSOPHY IN SECONDARY LITERATURE OF HIS FIRST, SECOND, AND THIRD PERIODS OF THOUGHT

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In this paper, aligning with the focus international researchers have dedicated to Heidegger's major works in order to contribute to the elucidation of his teachings, our intention is to establish a hypothesis grounded in Heidegger's secondary literature spanning his first, second, and third periods of thought. This will be accomplished through an examination of his speeches, presentations, lectures, correspondences, notes, interviews, and the like. Thus, the hypothesis of this paper is aimed at demonstrating that Heidegger's body of work does not constitute a static and definitive delineation of philosophy that commences and concludes in a prescribed manner: instead, it represents a contemplation of the concept of philosophy throughout his entire oeuvre, achieved by engaging in the discourse of philosophy, problematizing metaphysics, and scrutinizing ontology. In this vein, this essay delves into Heidegger's understanding of the relationship between philosophy and metaphysics during his first period of thought, his comprehension of the problem of metaphysics in his second period of thought, and his interpretation of the interplay between ontology and theology/theologics in his third period of thought. The ultimate objective is to shed light on Heidegger's methodology, which underpins both his initial phenomenology and subsequent thought: the method of posing questions. Specifically, the act of questioning has led to a critique of the obscuring of the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein, a critique that delivers an essential disruption to philosophical thought. Consequently, this underscores the necessity of establishing the foundations for the task of thinking.

**Keywords:** *philosophy, metaphysics, ontology, theology, theologics, thought, Heidegger*

### *Philosophy as the Metaphysics Getting-under-Way*

Two years after the publication of his major work "Sein und Zeit" – in which the attempted explication of the aforementioned destruction of the history of ontology, guided by the thread of the question of Being, was undertaken – Heidegger delivered an inaugural lecture at the University of Freiburg with the provocative title: "What is Metaphysics?" (Was ist Metaphysik?). It should be particularly emphasized that at the very beginning of this lecture, Heidegger unequivocally emphasizes his renunciation of presumptions and any expectations of there being any discussion of metaphysics, only to subsequently state that philosophy, in accordance with the perspective of common sense, is what Hegel called it: *a turned world* (Hegel 1907: LXV). Thus, Heidegger commences the lecture, which contains the term 'metaphysics' in its title, with a statement that he is relinquishing the expectation that there will indeed be any discourse on metaphysics in the lecture, while supporting Hegel's characterization of philosophy as a turned world – explaining how the duality of the fundamental question of metaphysics leads to this.

Following a kind of *proemium* Heidegger expectedly begins: "We must investigate only Dasein and the other – nothing; solely Dasein and further – nothing; exclusively Dasein and beyond that – nothing" (Heidegger 1976a: 105). Such reiterated repetition of the Dasein leaves the impression that Heidegger will continue to problematize the question of Dasein in line with his major work, but this time, Heidegger shifts to problematizing what is actually 'nothing' in the aforementioned statement. Heidegger had previously, especially in his main work, problematized the concept of 'nothing', which arouses expectations that the exploration of this concept will be continued along the lines of what has been previously established, or that the results of investigating this concept will be deepened. However, the necessity arises for a renewed examination of the concept in each individual work by Heidegger, due to the potential for differences in comparison to his previous presentations. In the course of this lecture, what drew particular attention within the philosophical community and was considered controversial was Heidegger's assertion that science dismisses 'nothing', that science does not have 'nothing' as the object of its study (Walsh 1963: 316).

However, the question of what 'nothing' is leads into a contradiction, as we are always compelled to express that 'nothing' actually 'is' this or that, in which the interrogated 'nothing' becomes 'something'. The question and answer to this question are contradictory; they exclude each other, negate one another, and while logic, as the science of thinking, intends to avoid contradictions, common sense avoids any form of contradiction, and philosophy does not discuss any contradictions except as contradictions. Thus, the impression remains

that at the very beginning of the question of what ‘nothing’ is, it has reached its end: because we should not question contrary to logic, we should not think contrary to common sense, and we should not abandon philosophy. Heidegger does not intend to turn ‘nothing’ into ‘beings’ because ‘nothing’, in its essence, is ‘non-beings’, which leads to the understanding that ‘nothing’ is the opposite of Dasein. Simply put, Heidegger distinguishes between ‘nothing’ and sheer annihilation, nullity, negation, because ‘nothing’ is more fundamental than all of the aforementioned; ‘nothing’ is simply nothing. However, Heidegger does not give up on ‘nothing’; he states that by the very fact that we can debate ‘nothing’, there must exist some kind of possibility that we encounter ‘nothing’, that we grasp ‘nothing’ in some way, and that ultimately we place ‘nothing’ within ‘nothing’, and guided by the rules of logic and by the dictates of common sense, we draw a conclusion about ‘nothing’ based on the foundations of philosophy. In other words, we should be able to encounter ‘nothing’ by the very fact that we can debate it; by the very fact that we somehow know ‘nothing’ and that we commonly speak of ‘nothing’ (for more on this, see: Günther 2016: 24–43).

Following the repeated posing of the question of what the individual objects of individual sciences are, Heidegger arrives at the conclusion that ‘nothing’ is not negation, although ‘nothing’ indeed negates Dasein in its entirety. Thus, he finds the rationale why the sciences completely avoid thinking ‘nothing’ – simply put, the sciences might be left without the subjects of their investigations. In other words, it has been realized that although we do not know what ‘nothing’ is, we know that ‘nothing’ is actually the mere opposite of Dasein and serves as its negation, its annihilation, and its non-beings. What ‘nothing’ is, is not simply the negation of Dasein, just as it is not simply the annihilation of Dasein, or just as it was previously discussed, ‘nothing’ is not mere nullity. However, this does not mean that ‘nothing’ cannot nullify, that ‘nothing’ cannot negate, or that ‘nothing’ does not lead to nullity. Because, in essence, ‘nothing’ is contained within what is negation, what is nullification, or what is nullity. And yet, the question of what ‘nothing’ is accompanies the question of Dasein, from which the relationship of ‘nothing–beings’/‘beings–nothing’ becomes noticeable; likewise, it is evident that discourse about Dasein always implies an oppositional discourse about ‘non–beings’; and particularly, it becomes apparent that in the question of Dasein, the question of ‘nothing’ is always hidden. Heidegger, regarding the question of how to approach what ‘nothing’ is, states that we can never apprehend the entirety of Dasein in order to be able to apprehend the entirety of ‘nothing’, and thus, since we are situated amid Dasein in its entirety, by questioning, we always penetrate into Dasein.

By discerning among fundamental moods and seeking which mood brings a person face to face with ‘nothing’, Heidegger identifies the phenomenon of

anxiety as the one in which 'nothing' reveals itself. Anxiety is neither fear nor dread; it is a unique phenomenon characterized by a peculiar tranquillity. Anxiety is always 'anxiety towards' or 'anxiety for', and never 'anxiety about this' or 'anxiety about that'. On the contrary, it is directed towards what remains indefinite, yet without any deficiency. Heidegger adds that during anxiety, being as a whole withdraws while 'nothing' simultaneously emerges: "In the clarity of vision, which carries fresh memory, we must say: that from which and for which we were anxious was, 'in fact' – nothing. Indeed: nothing itself – as such – was here" (Heidegger 1976a: 112). However, 'nothing' is disclosed in anxiety together with beings as a whole, even though 'nothing' is not being. Therefore, the terms that denote nothingness and have no influence from anxiety should be avoided, as they do not arise from anxiety and are not disclosed during anxiety. Heidegger identifies a problem in this, as in his current exploration, he attempts to grasp what 'nothing' is, yet in anxiety, 'nothing' is disclosed alongside beings as a whole. However, 'nothing' is not Dasein, and thus, attempting to negate Dasein as a whole during anxiety to remain only as 'nothing' comes too late, because 'nothing' always comes along with beings as a whole. If we were in a position to negate beings as a whole, only 'nothing' would remain, but this is never possible, as 'nothing' meets us long before negation, and it comes together with beings as a whole, which we would be negating. Therefore, 'nothing' always emerges together with beings as a whole, not because it attracts being as a whole or vice versa, but because beings as a whole and 'nothing' simply co-emerge. Despite 'nothing' repelling and diverting beings as a whole, beings as a whole still withdraws as 'nothing' approaches. This is the reason why 'nothing' always emerges simultaneously with beings as a whole. Heidegger sees the elucidation of this in the essence of what 'nothing' is, which consists of the nullification of beings as a whole while simultaneously appearing with being as a whole, thus reinforcing the turning away from Dasein. Hence, Heidegger concludes: "With this, the answer to the question of Nothing has been produced. Nothing is no thing, neither something that is immediately equated with Dasein. Nothing is the enabling disclosure of Dasein as such for human existence. Nothing gives not the antithesis to Dasein, but belongs to the essential unfolding of Dasein. In the Sein of Dasein, the nullity of Nothing holds sway" (Heidegger 1976a: 115).

So, the more we turn to Dasein, the more we question Dasein, the more we become lost in Dasein, the more 'nothing' becomes concealed to us, just as when we ask 'nothing', it returns to Dasein in its nullity, negating Dasein, obscuring Dasein – yet, 'nothing' is also intertwined with Dasein, being as a whole. However, when 'nothing' negates, it does not mean negation is the source of nothingness; rather, 'nothing' is the source of negation, as negation is contained within what 'nothing' encompasses, like beings, which is simultane-

ously revealed in anxiety. Thus, ‘nothing’ negates being while not negating only itself. There are numerous relations between Dasein and ‘nothing’ that provoke, on the other hand, numerous questions, as annihilation is involved, and anxiety is involved, so is Dasein. Dasein as Dasein in its entirety discloses itself to human Dasein along with ‘nothing’ as nothingness in the phenomenon of anxiety, a rarity, hence in this being-in-itself, being-in-entirety withdraws, for ‘nothing’ approaches. Following this, ‘nothing’ annihilates Dasein in its entirety, yet it does not annihilate only itself, while in this process, Dasein never disappears or is annulled. Now, finally, in the wake of the initial questions of logic, the guidance of reason, and the frameworks of philosophy, Heidegger concludes: “If, in the realm of questioning about Nothing and about Sein, the power of reason is thus shattered, then the pre-eminence of ‘logic’ within philosophy is thereby decided. The very idea of ‘logic’ resolves into the vortex of a more primordial question” (Heidegger 1976a: 117).

Thus, anxiety reveals itself as a significant mood distinct from fear or dread, yet akin to the mood of boredom, albeit distinctly different. Anxiety emerges unexpectedly, unlike the mood of boredom; we cannot prepare for anxiety, anticipate its arrival, or know when it will depart. In contrast, boredom can be dispelled, for instance, by engaging in something specific, predicting its arrival, and preparing for it. Anxiety is always present somewhere, though its exact location remains unknown. It lurks and seizes unexpectedly, overtaking without warning and departing as if ‘nothing’ had occurred. Anxiety does not tolerate a joyful or serene life; it simply does not tolerate ‘nothing’. It is constantly poised to leap, though it leaps rarely. It negates even being itself, making humans deputies of ‘nothing’. However, this only holds true during the duration of anxiety, as humans cannot induce anxiety in themselves; only anxiety arrives solely and exclusively to humans. In essence, unlike, for example, the mood of boredom that we can enter willingly by embracing leisure and waiting for boredom to seize us, the phenomenon of anxiety is fundamentally different. The mood of anxiety cannot be obtained, sought out, or prepared for. Anxiety is simply ever-present, always in a corner of our existence, vigilantly observing, always in a position to leap, just waiting to pounce, making humans deputies of ‘nothing’. However, as mentioned, this is an extremely rare mood (for more on this, refer to: Escudero 2010: 83–95).

So, by explaining when and how humans become deputies of ‘nothing’, Heidegger states that in this inaugural lecture, ‘nothing’ is expounded, precisely because ‘nothing’ is meant to present metaphysics itself to us. The term ‘metaphysics’ contains the Greek *μετά* which indicates going ‘trans’ as what is ‘beyond’ being as such: because ‘nothing’ transcends Dasein as beings-in-its-entirety, which truly makes ‘nothing’ the real question of metaphysics. To confirm this, Heidegger resorts to the assertion of ancient metaphysics where it is explicitly

stated: *ex nihilo nihil fit* – that is, nothing comes from nothing (for more on this, refer to: Pruss 2007: 291). Heidegger maintains this perspective in his other works as well when he demonstrates how ‘nothing’ can negate Dasein, but ‘nothing’ cannot negate Dasein in the same way it can annul Dasein, but ‘nothing’ cannot destroy Dasein, and so on. After the antiquity of thought, Heidegger notes that Christian metaphysics, as dogmatics, explicitly asserted: *ex nihilo nihil fit ens creatum* – that is, what is created being does not arise from nothing (for more on this, refer to: Maryniarczyk 2016: 217–268). Heidegger elaborates on this in his other works when discussing fundamental metaphysical questions and the basic concepts of ontology from the perspectives of the Middle Ages and scholasticism. Finally, in his concluding remarks on the genesis of ‘nothing’, Heidegger notes that Hegel goes the furthest when he states in his work “Science of Logic” (Wissenschaft der Logik): pure Sein and pure Nothing are therefore the same.

However, contemporary science, with its arrogance and without any justification, could dismiss ‘nothing’, might not consider the problem of ‘nothing’ at all, and could even not negate ‘nothing’. Therefore, the question about ‘nothing’ places us who, despite everything, still inquire about ‘nothing’, into the very question itself, thereby clearly illustrating how philosophy stands above science. In Heidegger’s words: “If a human being exists, philosophy occurs in a certain manner. Philosophy – which we call it – is metaphysics getting under way, in which philosophy comes to itself and to its explicit tasks” (Heidegger 1976a: 122). And finally, in line with this, Hegel’s initial statement about philosophy as a turned world is elucidated, wherein Heidegger explicitly renounces speaking about metaphysics. Simply put, the question about ‘nothing’ as a question opposing the question about ‘beings’, which always accompanies the question about ‘nothing’ as a historical question of ‘non-beings’, indicates that philosophy is the Metaphysics getting under way if a human being exists by philosophizing. In this trajectory, Heidegger, through this inaugural lecture, has posed the question of ‘nothing’ as the authentic question of metaphysics, and philosophy as the metaphysics getting under way.

### ***Overcoming Metaphysics***

Despite titling his inaugural lecture in 1929 as the question of metaphysics to indicate the area of his academic interest, Heidegger, after about a decade, began with the question of notes on the necessity of overcoming metaphysics. So, the corpus of notes from the period between 1936 and 1946 was titled by Heidegger as “Overcoming Metaphysics” (Überwindung der Metaphysik), which contains a total of twenty-eight notes, with the twenty-sixth being published in 1951. The first note immediately starts with the question: What

does overcoming metaphysics actually mean? (cf. Schlawin 1954: 585–595). Heidegger poses such a direct question with this title, although in the lecture from 1946 titled “What Are Poets For?” (Wozu Dichter?), he writes: “(...) we scarcely know the essence of metaphysics; we are inexperienced in speaking of Sein” (Heidegger 1977e: 276). Nevertheless, after such words, posing the question of overcoming metaphysics is not surprising to Heidegger, just as in the lecture from 1929 titled “What Is Metaphysics?” (Was ist Metaphysik?), he immediately states in the first sentences that he renounces the presupposition that there will be any discussion of metaphysics in the lecture. Accordingly, answering the question of overcoming metaphysics begins negatively, by explaining what overcoming metaphysics does not mean, and overcoming metaphysics certainly does not mean suppressing metaphysics in any way. In the initial notes of the collected corpus of notes written between 1936 and 1946, Heidegger tries to explain that speaking of overcoming metaphysics is possible because metaphysics has become something that is excessively past, something marginalized; metaphysics has become something simply unnecessary (cf. Blond 2010: 5). In the lecture from 1943 titled “Nietzsche’s Words: God Is Dead” (Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’), Heidegger attempted to provide a more concrete answer to the question of metaphysics: “Every metaphysical thinking is ontology or nothing at all” (Heidegger 1977d: 210). Thus, overcoming metaphysics cannot simply mean the annihilation of metaphysics as a way of thinking. Metaphysics cannot be merely excluded or prohibited; it cannot be annihilated as a thing of the past, given the ontology contained within it. Because of this, metaphysics continues to exist independently, and according to Heidegger, overcoming can last even longer than the entire history of metaphysics. Therefore, overcoming metaphysics is not the suppression of metaphysics because metaphysics is still present. However, the relation to metaphysics is such that it is overcome because it cannot be discarded as a teaching that is no longer needed. Heidegger explicitly states this when he writes in one of the notes from the corpus of notes written between 1936 and 1946: “If this is the case, we must not imagine that we are standing outside metaphysics just because we suspect its end” (Heidegger 2000c: 70).

Heidegger further argues that overcoming metaphysics is not something new, but rather, it has become more apparent through the modern view of ontology, which was delivered through transcendental philosophy in the form of the theory of knowledge, which Heidegger understands as ontology and metaphysics based on truth as certainty (cf. Alweiss 2007: 355). In the lecture titled “Hegel’s Concept of Experience” (Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung) from 1942/1943, Heidegger explains: “In its thinking, metaphysics seeks its fundamental certainty in the undoubted certainty of what it thinks” (Heidegger 1977c: 129). Therefore, certainty is delivered through the requirement imposed on modern metaphysics,

which is based on certainty. Such requirements for overcoming metaphysics are not surprising but expected.

Heidegger, in his lectures and in the corpus of notes, confirms this by returning to the original teachings of antiquity and later to the Roman teachings about what began in antiquity. He then discusses the modern response to antiquity and Rome, usually concluding with Kant, Hegel, or Nietzsche. In the lecture "What Are Poets For?" (Wozu Dichter?) from 1946, Heidegger writes: "Since the 'unique three' – Heraclitus, Dionysus, and Christ – have departed from the world, the evening of the epoch approaches its night. World night extends its darkness" (Heidegger 1977e: 269). These relationships between antiquity, Rome, and modernity are deeply ingrained in Heidegger's thinking, so even though modernity is still ongoing, he rushes towards its completion while Rome, which exposed what modernity would vigorously demand an answer to, is not noticed to be steeped in antiquity. In the lecture titled "Anaximander's Saying" (Der Spruch des Anaximander) from 1946, Heidegger states: "ἐνέργεια about which Aristotle thinks as the basic attribute of presence, εἶόν; ἰδέα about which Plato thinks as the basic attribute of presence; Λόγος about which Heraclitus thinks as the basic attribute of presence; Μοῖρα about which Parmenides thinks as the basic attribute of presence; Χρεών about which Anaximander thinks as that which co-occurs in presence – they all mean the same. In the hidden richness of the same, each thinker has thought of unity, the unifying One, about Ἐν" (Heidegger 1977a: 342). Heidegger wants to show that the problem of Being he has been working on for years is actually a problem that was presented in antiquity but what Heidegger initiated through his projects is to point out the presuppositions of Sein that are reflected in the entire history of ontology. Therefore, Heidegger makes explicit this point when he states in one of the notes from the corpus of notes written between 1936 and 1946: "Overcoming metaphysics is Sein thought with respect to the history of Sein. It is the sign of the initial overcoming of the oblivion of Sein" (Heidegger 2000c: 71) – thus indicating that overcoming implies surpassing metaphysics by outdoing it with its own help. In the lecture from 1943 titled "Nietzsche's Words: God Is Dead" (Nietzsches Wort 'Gott ist tot'), Heidegger provides a more detailed explanation: "The history of Sein begins, necessarily, with the oblivion of Sein" (Heidegger 1977d: 263). It necessarily follows that overcoming metaphysics is a direct consequence of the oblivion of Sein, a forgetfulness that continues even as it is forgotten. Heidegger explains that even though metaphysics throughout its history has spoken about Sein in various ways and has questioned Sein through ontological differences, it is still forgetful.

Following this, philosophy as the metaphysics getting under way sees its end because the question of Sein has been posed. However, despite the questioning of Sein, what still occurs is the forgetting of Sein itself. It's the question



of Sein as the fundamental question of ontology that leads to discussions of overcoming metaphysics, not metaphysics that has already been overcome. In the same lecture, the 1943 lecture, Heidegger clarifies what he means: “(...) it can be assumed that philosophy as a discipline, as a cultural creation, disappears, that it can disappear in its current form because – if it was genuine – it has already expressed reality of the real in its language, and thus introduced Dasein as such into the history of its Sein” (Heidegger 1977d: 256). No matter how much Heidegger points to the problems of ontology, overcoming metaphysics, and even the end of philosophy, he starts from the forgetting of Sein as the basis for his claims. Simply operating with the word ‘Sein’ does not mean that we have a concept of Sein, that we understand the meaning of the concept of Sein, especially that we understand what Sein is. Thus, in 1946, in his lecture titled “Anaximander’s Saying” (Der Spruch des Anaximander), Heidegger explicitly notes about the forgetting of Sein: “The forgetting of Sein is the forgetting of the difference between Sein and Dasein” (Heidegger 1977a: 364) – adding: “The forgetting of the difference, with which the destiny of Sein begins and is completed, is nevertheless not a deficiency but the richest and greatest event in which the history of the Western world unfolds. This is the event of metaphysics” (Heidegger 1977a: 365). Such an event began significantly with the adoption of words from antiquity and their translation into the Latin language. This did not mean that the concept of Sein was transferred, as translation does not necessarily entail the transfer, just as translation from Latin to German did not resolve the problem of Sein but made it even more nebulous. In line with this, in the lecture titled “The Origin of the Work of Art” (Der Ursprung der Kunstwerkes) from 1936, Heidegger notes: “Roman thought takes over Greek words without corresponding, original experience of what they mean, without Greek words. The groundlessness of Western thought begins with this translation” (Heidegger 1977b: 8).

Here, we are dealing with the problem of metaphysics as a problem of fundamental ontological concepts. Although Heidegger points to the problem of metaphysics as something that sets philosophy in motion, metaphysics thought of as Platonism has become entangled in itself in recent efforts to overturn it, but it still remains metaphysics. In 1943, in the lecture titled “Nietzsche’s Words: God Is Dead” (Nietzsches Wort ‘Gott ist tot’), Heidegger notes: “The elimination (of the suprasensory) ends in absurdity. Yet, it remains unthought and insurmountable presupposition in the dazzled attempts to evade the non-sensical” (Heidegger 1977d: 209). Shortly thereafter, in the same lecture, Heidegger attempts to explain what this problem is really about: “The words ‘God is dead’ mean: the suprasensory world is without effective power. The end of metaphysics has come, i.e., for Nietzsche, Western philosophy as understood as Platonism. Nietzsche understands his own philosophy as a movement against metaphysics

– for him, this means against Platonism” (Heidegger 1977d: 217). Therefore, the epoch of completed metaphysics is just beginning and is in its inception, which was initiated by Nietzsche within his efforts to clear away the past and speak of the future as the forthcoming. Or, in Heidegger's words recorded in the corpus of notes written from 1936 to 1946: “With Nietzsche's metaphysics, philosophy is completed. That means: it has passed through the range of its predetermined possibilities. Completed metaphysics, which is the foundation of a planetary way of thinking, provides the basis for an earthly order that will apparently last a long time. Such an order no longer needs philosophy because it has it in its foundations. But the end of philosophy is not the end of thinking – thinking is only arriving at new beginnings” (Heidegger 2000c: 81).

So, as a concluding note on overcoming metaphysics, we can quote Heidegger's words from the 1946 lecture titled “Anaximander's Saying” (Der Spruch des Anaximander), in which it is written: “Neither is it clear and established what we ourselves think in the words of our own language ‘Seiende’ and ‘Sein,’ nor is it clear and established whether what we have in mind each time refers to what the Greeks say in the words *ov* and *εἶναι*, nor is it clear and established what the words *ov* and *εἶναι* mean in Greek thought, nor, under such circumstances, can it ever be examined whether and to what extent our thinking corresponds to Greek thinking. These simple relationships are completely tangled, and no one thinks about them at all, but in them and hovering above them has spread the endless story of Sein” (Heidegger 1977a: 335).

### *Onto-Theo-Logics*

In line with the problem of beings that we face, Heidegger writes in 1949, in the Introduction to his inaugural lecture from 1929 titled “What is Metaphysics?” (Was ist Metaphysik?): “But this ‘overcoming of metaphysics’ does not eliminate metaphysics. As long as man remains the *animal rationale*, he is the *animal metaphysicum*. As long as man understands himself as a thinking being, he belongs to metaphysics, according to Kant, to the nature of man” (Heidegger 1976c: 367–368). Accordingly, Heidegger considers it necessary to rethink the essence of metaphysics. That is why, in his 1957 lecture titled “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” (Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik), he attempts to engage in a conversation with Hegel. He provides more explicit reasons for invoking Hegel regarding the need to contemplate the essence of metaphysics a year later – in 1958, during a plenary session of the Heidelberg Academy of Sciences and Humanities – in a lecture titled “Hegel and the Greeks” (Hegel und die Griechen). Here, he quotes a passage from Hegel's work: “In philosophy as such, in its present, final stage, everything that has developed over millennia is contained; it is the result

of everything that preceded it”. In line with this, Heidegger finds it necessary to engage in a conversation with Hegel so that he can step back from metaphysics, following Hegel’s achievements, and arrive at the essence of metaphysics because we are dealing with philosophy in its final stage. Thus, Heidegger begins the lecture from 1957 titled “The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics” (*Die Onto-Theo-Logische Verfassung der Metaphysik*) with the words: “For Hegel, the object of thought is Sein with regard to the Dasein in absolute thinking and as absolute thinking. For us, the object of thought is the same, i.e., Sein, but Sein with regard to its difference from Dasein. To put it even more clearly: for Hegel, the object of thought is thought as an absolute concept. For us, the object of thought, as previously named, is difference as difference” (Heidegger 2006: 56).

Heidegger finds it necessary, in order to engage in a conversation with Hegel finally, to take a step back to the forgetting of the difference between Sein and Dasein. He describes this forgetting as the concealment of what the difference is and claims that this forgetting belongs to the difference itself because the difference belongs to the forgetting. In a lecture from 1951 titled “Aletheia”, Heidegger states: “The existing indifference toward the essence of forgetting is by no means merely the result of the superficiality of our present way of life. What happens in such indifference also arises from the essence of forgetting” (Heidegger 2000a: 272). Therefore, here, Heidegger revives earlier problems of his thinking: the initial assumption of his major work and his first period of thought, the problem of Sein, the problem of Dasein, the problem of thinking of Sein as Sein, the problem of forgetting Sein, and the problem of the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein and the problem of forgetting this difference. In the lecture from 1957 about the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics, Heidegger notes: “The difference between Sein and Dasein is the place within which metaphysics, Western thought in the entirety of its existence, can be what it is. A step back, therefore, moves from metaphysics into the essence of metaphysics” (Heidegger 2006: 60). So, this time, the difference is presented as the place from which one should embark on the exploration of the essence of metaphysics. In the Introduction from 1949 to his inaugural lecture from 1929 titled “What is Metaphysics?” (*Was ist Metaphysik?*), Heidegger writes: “Metaphysical statements move in a marvellous way from their beginning to their completion in an uninterrupted interchange of Sein with Dasein” (Heidegger 1976c: 370). Heidegger calls the interchange of Sein with Dasein and the pointing out of such an interchange “the forgetting of Sein”. This is why he emphasizes the ontological difference between Sein and Dasein, which has fallen into the oblivion of difference – an oblivion that is the concealment of what difference is and, in this way, belongs to difference itself.

In this process of returning, Heidegger points to Hegel's statement written in parentheses: "(and indisputably, the highest right to begin with it would be attributed to god)" (Hegel 1841: 69). Therefore, Heidegger concludes that if science should begin with god, it should be the science of god: theology. However, it should be noted that theology, as Heidegger understands it here, is not the same as the concept of theology in its ancient origins. Heidegger makes this clear because theology in the past referred to something like mythical and poetic discourse about gods, not the god of a specific religion or a god defined by dogma, but rather gods themselves. Heidegger states: "Western metaphysics, on the other hand, from its inception in the Greeks, even before it was associated with these titles, was ontology and theology" (Heidegger 2006: 63). However, Heidegger clarifies that it would be thoughtless to claim that metaphysics is theology because it is ontology. Instead, he states: "It would be more accurate to say: Metaphysics is theology, discourse about god, because god comes into philosophy" (Heidegger 2006: 64). But how does god come into philosophy? How do you ask these questions while considering Hegel? Hegel describes speculative philosophy as the science of logic and not theology as is the case in Heidegger's statements. For Hegel, science is the development of knowledge within a systematic framework, and logic is derived from the fundamental concept of λόγος as meditative presence. For Heidegger, this clarifies why, for Hegel, science is actually metaphysics because thinking is the subject of logic, and Being is the object of thinking – in other words, Being as the foundational ground. Therefore, Heidegger states: "Metaphysics thinks Dasein as such, i.e., in general. Metaphysics thinks Dasein as such, i.e., as a whole. Metaphysics thinks the Sein of Dasein as both the articulated unity of the most general, i.e., what is everywhere the Same, and the foundational unity of self-consciousness, i.e., the highest being above all. Thus, from the beginning, Sein of Dasein has been thought of as the founding foundation, the reason" (Heidegger 2006: 65–66).

So, once again, we are witnessing a thorough examination of the fundamental concepts of ontology and metaphysics in their entirety in order to answer the question of the essence of metaphysics in relation to Hegel. In his 1951 lecture titled "Logos", Heidegger notes: "From the beginning of Western thought, the Sein of Dasein emerges as the only thing worthy of thought" (Heidegger 2000b: 232). In this context, Heidegger aims to explore the relationship between ontology and theology in metaphysics, as well as the questions of Sein and Dasein. He consistently emphasizes the primacy of Sein over Dasein, even though Sein is always the Sein of a Dasein. Heidegger also points out that these terms, ontology, theology, and onto-theology, have been used countless times and have lost their weight. Therefore, Heidegger suggests that it would be more accurate to speak of onto-logic, theo-logic, and onto-theo-logic. He

explains that onto-logic, theo-logic, and onto-theo-logic should replace onto-logy, theo-logy, and onto-theo-logy because, as he states in his 1958 lecture titled “Hegel and the Greeks” (Hegel und die Griechen): “For Hegel, Sein and thought are the same...” (Heidegger 1976b: 430).

In the very step backward, one discovers how Heidegger conceives metaphysics as theo-logic: “The Sein of asein presents itself fundamentally in the sense of foundation (principle) only as *causa sui*. Thus, the metaphysical concept of god is named” (Heidegger 2006: 67). Consequently, having clarified the concept of metaphysics as theo-logic, Heidegger proceeds to discuss the terms that are the subject of the present lecture: metaphysics, onto-logic, theo-logic, onto-theo-logic. This is because taking a step back from metaphysics to the essence of metaphysics is insufficient unless we enumerate everything that metaphysics encompasses and clarify the relationships between all of these concepts. Following this line of thought, Heidegger explains that metaphysics is not only theo-logic but also onto-logic, and metaphysics is theo-logic because onto-logic is what indicates a certain primacy of onto-logic over theo-logic, as metaphysics proceeds through Dasein, including god, to arrive at onto-logic. Heidegger, in his 1953 lecture titled “Who is Nietzsche’s Zarathustra?” (Wer ist Nietzsches Zarathustra), writes: “However much Dasein as such may present itself, man represents it with regard to its Sein. Thus, he always goes from Dasein to ein. ‘To go from’ in Greek is called: μετὰ (meta). Therefore, every human relationship to Dasein as such is inherently metaphysical” (Heidegger 2000d: 111). Hence, after elucidating what was previously unclear, there remains the task of providing a more detailed clarification of the unity of onto-logic and theo-logic in the essence of metaphysics, that is, the question of the co-belonging of onto-logic and theo-logic in the essence of metaphysics. Or, in Heidegger’s words: “(...) what is inquired into and thought in ontologies and theologies is Dasein as such in general and first, in-unity with Dasein as such, the highest and ultimate. The unity of this One is such that the ultimate determines the first in its own way, and the first in its own way determines the ultimate. The difference between both ways of determining belongs to the difference we have named but not yet thought” (Heidegger 2006: 68).

Subsequently, after the discussion of what has been expounded and the presentation of the essence of metaphysics, Heidegger returns to the question of difference. He argues that Sein is always the Sein of a Dasein, just as Dasein are always Dasein of Sein, which indicates an inherent difference. Therefore, after these seemingly repetitive discussions of Sein and Dasein, it becomes necessary to examine difference itself. Heidegger intends to achieve this by retracing his steps to a point where he finds that Sein presents itself as self-revealing transcendence, while Dasein present themselves as self-concealing arrival, leading to the distinction between them referred to as “gap”. In Heidegger’s words:

“What has been said primarily applies to our attempt to think the difference as ‘gap’ of self-revealing transcendence and self-concealing arrival by taking a step back from the forgetfulness of difference as such” (Heidegger 2006: 73). This process not only uncovers difference but also reveals the origin of the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics. Heidegger explores this by delving into λόγος, which is said to contain Being and difference within it, and, in it, gap is illuminated: “Metaphysics responds to Sein as ‘logos’, so, therefore, its fundamental characteristic is everywhere logic, but a logic that thinks the Sein of Dasein, therefore, logic determined starting from the differential difference: onto-theo-logic” (Heidegger 2006: 76). Immediately following this, Heidegger adds: “The onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics derives from the reign of difference in which Sein as the foundation and Dasein as the grounded-grounding differentiate themselves into mutual dependence and bring about the gap” (Heidegger 2006: 76). In this way, Heidegger aimed to demonstrate how God enters philosophy, particularly in the essence of metaphysics as theo-logic, when metaphysics considers Dasein in its entirety with respect to the highest and all-encompassing Dasein, just as onto-logic considers Sein as the foundation that grounds Dasein, including the highest Dasein. Difference has revealed the distinction between Sein and Dasein, and gap indicates the difference between onto-logic as the science of Sein that grounds Dasein and theo-logic as the science of Dasein in its entirety. This implies that god enters philosophy with a gap. Therefore, Heidegger suggests that we should think of the gap as the site of what is difference, which points to the distinction between Sein and Dasein. In his attempt to make a distinction between theo-logy and theo-logic as the difference between god in theology and god in philosophy, Heidegger states that *causa sui*, as the subject of theo-logic, is not something that one kneels before, prays to, sings to, or worships. It is not theology but rather something within philosophy, theo-logic, if we think back from Hegel. Ultimately, Heidegger concludes: “No one can know whether, when, where, and how this step of thinking will become a genuine path, course, and path-building” (Heidegger 2006: 317). Precisely on this path, Heidegger, in the third period of his thought, insists on the path of thinking, advocating the thesis of the end of philosophy.

### *Closing Speech*

Notably, we can observe how Heidegger, throughout his first, second, and third periods of thought, did not start with a predetermined concept of philosophy. Instead, he problematized philosophy throughout his entire body of work, which underscores the unique nature of his thinking. What some might call contradictions, Heidegger would label as a continuous re-exam-

ination of what had already been examined, but evidently, never thoroughly enough. Thus, while scrutinizing what philosophy is in his first period of thought, he progressed to the idea that philosophy is essentially the mobilization of metaphysics in his second period. In his third period, he questioned the essence of metaphysics itself, signalling the relationship between philosophy and theology/theologikē and delving into the essence of metaphysics as what sets philosophy into motion. In this manner, the previously posited hypothesis is demonstrated: Heidegger's work does not revolve around a static and final determination of philosophy from which one starts and with which one ends. Instead, it involves contemplating the concept of philosophy throughout his entire body of work, through discussions of philosophy, problematization of metaphysics, and inquiries into ontology. His continual questioning of the concept of philosophy and the constant posing of questions elucidated the act of questioning as Heidegger's fundamental method that underpins all his methodological positions, from phenomenology to thinking. Incidentally, the ultimate goal of this work has been achieved: the explication of Heidegger's method of questioning, upon which both his early phenomenology and later thinking are founded. Through the act of questioning, the critique of the obscuring of the ontological difference between Being and beings has been reached, which Heidegger identified as a fundamental hindrance to philosophical thought. Consequently, it was deemed necessary to lay the foundations for the task of thinking.

In conclusion, it was aimed to provide evidence for the established hypothesis through Heidegger's secondary literature in his first, second, and third periods of thought, following his speeches, presentations, lectures, letters, notes, interviews, and so forth. Ultimately, it has been demonstrated that in Heidegger's work, philosophy is not a static and final determination from which one starts and ends. Instead, it involves contemplating the concept of philosophy throughout his entire body of work, through discussions of philosophy, problematization of metaphysics, and inquiries into ontology.

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