Crisis management system in European Union - how it works?

Abstract: The European Union's development path as a supranational organisation in which a single political, economic, and security space on the European continent prevails was not simple and easy. For many years, the European community's ideological creators have been looking for a supranational model that would simultaneously meet the times' challenges and ensure economic prosperity, internal stability, peace, and security in Europe. Such an organisation should have had a role in the international order. In European politics and science, there have been differences of opinion on whether the EU should develop a crisis management system or not. The need for the EU to develop its capabilities in foreign and security policy has influenced the establishment of the crisis management system as we know it today. Thanks to that, the European Union is an important player in world security, especially through military and civilian operations.

Keywords: European union, CFSP, Crisis management

1. Introduction

The European Union's history represents a period that began in 1952 with the founding of the first major European supranational economic community - the European Coal and Steel Community. In Europe, two more supranational communities were established in 1958 - the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community, which is 1967, together with the European Coal and Steel Community, united into European Communities. In 1993, the European Economic Community, becoming one of the three pillars of the European Union, became part of it as the European Community, and ten years later, with the expiration of the Treaty of Paris, the functions of the European Coal and Steel Community became part of the European Community. Hence the EU. The European Atomic Energy Community has continued to exist as an independent supranational organisation. However, the EU's commitment to establishing a single crisis management system has been significantly influenced by other factors, including:

- the interest of EU member states in strengthening the international role and influence of the EU in protecting their interests in the world,
- the interest of the members and the EU as a whole in preserving international peace, security, spreading democracy, respect for human rights, freedom of movement of people, goods and capital in Europe and the world, and
the aspiration of European nations for greater security autonomy on European security issues than the USA/NATO.

- In formulating the security and foreign policy and the EU's approach, the thesis was that:
- European security is indivisible and a key condition for European prosperity in all other areas;
- The European Union is necessary to build European autonomous capabilities that will enable it to strengthen the security of the Union and its members in all its forms and to protect the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union;
- in addition to European security, the basic interest of the EU is the maintenance of peace and international security following the principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the OSCE;
- developing and strengthening EU cooperation with other subjects of European and international security, the basic way of strengthening European security, and
- The European Union is a global actor, and in addition to economic ones, it must have the political and security capabilities to fulfil such a role.

With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty (EU, 2007), on 1 December 2009, the Union's security and international action capacity has been significantly strengthened and expanded. In addition to the Union's existing security capabilities, established during previous periods, the EU has established additional mechanisms and institutions for joint external action in the Lisbon Treaty.

2. Common Foreign and Security policy

In the first years after establishing the European Communities, it was necessary to harmonise and coordinate its foreign policy. The formal concretisation of the principle of the European Economic Community members' joint foreign policy followed only through the Single European Act - SEA, signed in 1986, which entered into force on July 1, 1987. This act, which is essentially a revision of the Treaties of Rome on the European Economic Communities, among other things, in Part III entitled "Provisions of the Treaty on European Cooperation in the Field of Foreign Policy", Article 30, item 1, provides: "... Members of the European Communities shall jointly seek to formulate and implement a European foreign policy ". Further provisions of this document, also in Part III, set out the objectives, principles, principles, and institutions of the communities responsible for coordinating and encouraging cooperation in the field of common foreign policy, political and economic security. The most significant result of numerous ideas and discussions on ways to affirm and strengthen the role of the future Union in European security and international political and security scene, held at intergovernmental conferences during the formation of the EU, was the establishment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP and its incorporation into the Union (Eliassen, 1998). The special section of the founding treaty of the EU, Chapter V - "Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy", defines the role, goals, and tasks of the CFSP. In the first paragraph, Article J.1 states: "The Union and its Member States shall establish and pursue a common foreign and security policy, guided by the provisions of this Chapter and covering all areas of foreign policy and security (Eliassen, 1998).

The main goals of the CFSP are:

- protection of the common values, fundamental interests, and independence of the Union;
- strengthening the security of the Union and its Member States in all its forms;
- preserving peace and strengthening international security following the principles of the UN Charter and the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter on European Security and Cooperation;
- promotion of international cooperation, and
- developing and strengthening democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

EU Member States undertake (Article J.1, paragraph 4) to actively support the CFSP and refrain from any activity contrary to its interests. The key definition of the content of the CFSP is given in the first paragraph, Article J.4: "The common foreign and security policy covers all issues related to the security of the European Union, including the long-term definition of a common defence policy which could, in due course, lead to a common defence (Eliassen, 1998). First, the new Treaty strengthens, expands, and significantly more functionally networked competencies and relations of key EU institutions in the field of CFSP and external action. Namely, this Agreement expanded and strengthened the existing bodies and authorities and established new structures to support the EU institutions in
implementing the CFSP/CSDP and external action. For the continuity and unity of the Union's appearance on the international scene and the continuity and strengthening of the CFSP and CSDP of the Union, the introduction of a permanent electoral function is essential, the President of the European Council (EU, 2012a) and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (EU, 2012b). Secondly, in addition to the CFSP and CSDP, as the basic pillars and sources of political and military-security capabilities of the Union, the Lisbon Treaty introduces another instrument for strengthening its capabilities on the international stage is The Union, with external action (EU, 2012c).

The objectives of the Union's common foreign policy and action under the Treaty of Lisbon (point 2, Article 21, General Provisions on the Union's external action, Chapter V) are:

- preserving the values, fundamental interests, security, independence, and integrity of the Union;
- strengthening and supporting democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and the principles of international law;
- maintaining peace, preventing conflicts, and strengthening international security following the objectives and principles contained in the United Nations Charter, as well as the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter, including those relating to external borders;
- supporting long-term economic and social development, as well as environmental protection in developing countries, to eradicate poverty;
- encouraging the integration of all countries into the world economy, which includes the gradual elimination of obstacles to international trade;
- contribution to the development of international measures for the preservation and improvement of the quality of the environment and long-term management of the world's natural resources, to ensure long-term development;
- assisting the population, countries, and regions facing natural disasters or caused by human factors;
- Improving the international system based on enhanced multilateral cooperation and good governance of world affairs.

The European External Action Service (EEAS) has been set up to assist the High Representative of the Union in carrying out his duties in foreign policy and external action (EU, 2012d). The EU Foreign Affairs Service's organisation and functioning shall be determined by the Council of the EU, on the proposal of the High Representative, and after consultation with the European Parliament and the Commission's consent. In addition to the concretisation of goals and institutional arrangement of external appearance, ie. The Lisbon Treaty provisions on the expansion of existing and the establishment of new concepts and clauses on cooperation and mutual relations of members, such as the concept of closer cooperation and clauses on solidarity, on mutual assistance in defence against aggression and, establishing permanent structures of cooperation. Under the Lisbon Treaty, similar to the previous ones, the CFSP remains an area of cooperation between the Member States in which specific rules and procedures apply (EU, 2012d). The provisions on the Union's competencies in the field of CFSP (first paragraph, Article 24, Chapter 2, Chapter V of the Treaty) state: "The Union's competences in the field of the common foreign and security policy cover all areas of foreign policy as well as all the security of the Union, including the progressive establishment of a common defence policy that may lead to a common defence ". The common foreign and security policy is determined by the European Council and the Council of the EU, which, as a rule, decide unanimously in these matters unless otherwise regulated by the Treaty (Item 1, paragraph two, Article 24). Also, the same point regulates that the CFSP is implemented by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the member states following the treaties. In the area of CFSP, acts that have legal force over the members cannot be adopted, i.e., the Court of Justice of the EU has no jurisdiction regarding compliance with provisions in this area, except for the functioning of Union institutions (Article 40 TEU) following Article 275 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU.

In addition to defining the general direction of activities and systematic strengthening of cooperation between members, it is now clearly emphasised that the Union adopts decisions in the field of CFSP, which determine the actions and attitudes of the Union towards a certain issue (occurrence) and manner of implementation (Article 25). That is, the new provisions (Article 28, item 1) unequivocally regulate: "When the international situation requires operational action of the Union, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions". The High Representative of the Union and the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the Member States are responsible for coordinating the implementation of the Union's positions and

decisions (Article 32). It can be noticed that the new provisions of the EU Treaty sought to increase the degree of participation of members in creating EU positions in the field of CFSP, but also responsibility for the implementation of decisions, although, as stated, such decisions can not legally have legal force with members. Although the new wording of the Treaty provisions increases the direct involvement of members and responsibility in the creation and implementation of the CFSP, the lack of “communitarianism” in the field of CFSP has not been overcome by this EU Treaty, so it remains a possible weakness of the Union in the future. Especially from the aspect of unity and firmness in taking actions in the field of CFSP and CSDP. The role of the Political and Security Committee - PSC in the CFSP has not changed significantly. In addition to monitoring the international situation concerning the CFSP and, in this regard, giving advisory opinions and proposals to the Council and the High Representative of the Union, according to Art. 38 of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU, this body "under the leadership of the Council and the High Representative, conducts political control and control of the strategic directions of crisis management operations", defined in Article 43 of the Treaty. Thus, the CFSP represents a broad framework of cooperation between EU member states to strengthen the capabilities, responsibilities, and influence of the Union on the European and global political and security scene. As stated, during the two decades of CFSP development, it has established appropriate common sub-policies, institutions, and means (capabilities) for a much more independent response of the Union to the challenges and threats to European security, greater influence in global political and security issues and a more unified approach. In all aspects of international relations.

An important step in creating the full range of EU crisis management capabilities, including conflict prevention, is the European Council's decisions at the Feira (Portugal) meeting, 19–20. June 2000 (EU, 2000a). In addition to analysing the course of realisation of the "Main Goal" of developing military capacities and recommendations for further work on that issue, clear guidelines for strengthening the Union's civilian capacities were adopted at this Summit. That is, the justification of the establishment of the Civil Committee (CIVCOM) was confirmed (EU, 2000b).

As part of the EU's new political-security crisis management structure, the "Civilian Headline Goal" and mechanisms for centralising and managing non-military crisis management resources have been identified. It was concluded that the EU has significant resources for civilian aspects of crisis management, while, on the other hand, the international community is very scarce with such resources. However, although respectable, the members' civilian capacities should be centralised at the Union level voluntarily and further developed. Four priority areas have been identified to develop joint civilian capacities: police (police forces), the rule of law forces, civil administration forces, and civil protection forces. Also, members should have in high readiness and appropriate joint forces to provide civilian assistance. The Civil Committee is in charge of concretising the activities on the development of civilian capacities.

Within the EEAS, a special department, namely, the Crisis Response and Operational Coordination Department, was established to organise the foreign policy of the EU in the field of crisis management. One of the leading objectives of the EU has been to ensure a secure and stable international order that is based on the rule of law and supported by multilateralism. To realise this objective, the EU has selectively employed civilian and military crisis management instruments. Also, through 139 delegations and offices operating worldwide, the EU has been able to follow crises closely to shape its foreign policy accordingly and made its presence felt in the host countries. The instruments employed by the EU in crisis management can be grouped into four different categories following the context that is in focus. The focus situation may be one among the following four scenarios: peace or no armed conflict; escalation; armed conflict; post-conflict phase (Major et al., 2011). Instruments that can be employed in the first and the fourth phases share similarities, whereas there are convergences in instruments that can be deployed in the second and the third phases. For instance, instruments including peace-building, common financial structures, political missions, small-arms control, special representatives, and security sector reform (SSR) can be used both in a context where there is peace or no conflict and in a post-conflict context. In this regard, these instruments serve both crisis-prevention and peace-building purposes. They also have a stabilising impact aiming to remove the crisis's causes in the pre-incidental or post incidental stage of a crisis (Gjozinska, 2014). Likewise, CSDP operations, groups of friends, military rapid-response forces, peace enforcement, and peacekeeping can be used both in a context where the conflict's escalation occurs and in an armed conflict context. Thus, these instruments accomplish the dual purposes of mediation/intervention and conflict management. Unlike the above-mentioned instruments that can be used in different stages of a conflict, some instruments such as reconciliation and transitional justice can be employed—just in a post-conflict phase, with the
goal of peace-building. The EU has mostly utilised instruments that reflect the soft-power of the Union, such as economic instruments. Economic instruments include, on the one hand, financial assistance in the form of funds, whereas on the other, they include economic sanctions. The Union provides financial assistance to the third states and regions where poverty is perceived to be the leading factor to cause a potential crisis or conflict. Hence, the funding aims to eliminate poverty to contribute to stability in a given state or region. Through the employment of economic sanctions, the Union targets third states and their ruling regimes by punishing them for causing a change in their policies, such as human rights violations (Karakir and Karacasulu, 2016).

Table 1. Crisis Management Instruments Employed following Different Phases of Conflict

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<tr>
<th>Phases of Conflict</th>
<th>Context Instruments</th>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 1 Peace or no armed conflict</td>
<td>Crisis prevention: Common financial structures, disarmament and arms control, election observation, peace-building, political missions, sanctions, small arms control, special representatives, SSR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 2 Escalation</td>
<td>Mediation/Intervention: Conflict resolution, CSDP operations, groups of friends, military rapid response forces, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, sanctions, special representatives.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 3 Armed conflict</td>
<td>Conflict management: CIMIC, CSDP operations, friends, humanitarian aid, military rapid response forces, peace enforcement, peacekeeping.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Phase 4 Post-conflict phase</td>
<td>Peace-building: CIMIC, common financial structures, conflict mediation, CSDP operations, DDR, democracy promotion, economic reconstruction, election observation, groups of friends, international tribunals, peace-building, peacekeeping, police missions, political missions, reconciliation and transitional justice, small arms control, special representatives, SSR.</td>
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EU policy on crisis management has evolved through time. Many institutional changes took place to develop a more comprehensive and well-structured approach. Recently, the EU has adopted "principled pragmatism" for crisis management along with an existing large "toolbox." Since the 1990s, it has deployed more than 30 civilian missions and military operations on different continents, mostly in Africa, some of which have already been completed. The leading strength of the EU in crisis management is its capacity for offering efficient instruments within the framework of civilian crisis management. Civilian instruments are accepted as crucial to address political, social, and economic aspects of a conflict and find a sustainable and comprehensive solution accordingly. The EU has demonstrated a better performance in its civilian missions when compared with the leading international institutions like the UN, OSCE, and NATO. Particularly, the EU's economic instruments and police and the rule of law missions have successfully managed crises in various contexts. The other strength of the EU is related to multilateralism's prioritizations as a guiding principle for security building. The EU's multilateralism prioritisation can be observed in its close working relationships with the UN and other international organisations. Although the EU has made remarkable civilian contributions to conflict and post-conflict contexts, the EU response mechanism to crises suffers from many limitations. The first limitation is the lack of agreement among the EU officials on the definition of a "crisis." EU institutions cannot agree on what should be considered a crisis, which leads to misunderstandings and inefficiencies in the EU's responses to crises. The divergence in the definition of a "crisis" also results from a lack of unity on which instruments should be used in tackling the crisis. Another limitation concerning EU crisis management is related to the divisions among member states about their commitments to manage crises that may depend on their national interests. Decisions regarding CSDP are taken unanimously in the Union, but it has not been easy for EU member states to agree on a certain policy. In some cases, there may be little commitment by the member states due to a
lack of interest in the crisis region. There may also be tensions among member states on how to tackle the crises. Also, member states' policies may vary over whether "civilian" or "military" aspects of crisis management should be prioritised. Inadequate budget allocation for crisis management is another limitation. The Eurozone crisis has harm EU member states' economies since the end of 2009. The austerity programs adopted by EU member states have, in turn, led to decreasing financial commitment by the member states to crisis management. For the EU to react more effectively to crises, an increase in funding for crisis management instruments is highly needed. Lastly, limited military capacity is considered to be among the weaknesses of the EU crisis response mechanism. The EU has widely been depicted as a soft-power that prioritises non-military foreign policy tools in responding to crises. Ukraine and the Middle East crises have demonstrated how critical military operation would be, and in this regard, the EU is under-resourced to respond to them (Karakir and Karacasulu, 2016). There are the preconditions to develop a Civilian Compact that would be a breakthrough compared to the past. This would be possible only by expanding the civilian capabilities and addressing the gaps of the previous plans. European institutions and member states should promote clear objectives and effective coordination between military and civilian forces. After the push on EU defence cooperation in 2017, it is time to give new momentum to the civilian sphere by highlighting the connections between internal and external security. The development of the Civilian Compact should aim to provide an efficient method to deal with the crisis, balance stability and democracy, and increase the areas involved. Looking at obstacles, the most difficult one is to win the support of the member states and European institutions. The goal should be to make the whole process more efficient by streamlining the decisions and integrating single member states' expertise. The role and mandate of each agency and the line of command should be clarified to create positive spillover effects. An endeavour of such complexity requires a specific budget, which could become another hindrance in the current European context. The project's efficiency should be improved by designing an evaluation system that considers both internal and external actions and effects. The Civilian Compact is, at the same time, a great opportunity and a challenge for the EU, especially with regards to the Mediterranean and the Sahel regions. On the one hand, the Union has been a sponsor of human rights since its establishment, and the missions developed under the Civilian Compact could enhance this role, with the EU being the leader for operations in the region. On the other hand, the Union has to work to guarantee its internal security, which is crucial to let the European citizens consider the EU to be regarded as a credible actor and understand its added value.


A guiding principle of Lisbon Treaty provisions, which lie at the heart of the very purpose of the EEAS, is the desire to achieve a substantial increase in 'responsiveness' to the opportunities and challenges that exist beyond EU borders. Adequate EU action during external emergencies, which require ad-hoc decision making, is no exemption to this. Crisis response implies the immediate mobilisation of EU resources to deal with the consequences of external crises caused by human-made and natural disasters.

3.1. Crisis Response System

The EEAS Crisis Response & Operational Coordination Department is responsible for activating the EEAS Crisis Response System (Crisis Platform, EU Situation Room, and Crisis Management Board). Therefore, it plays a central role in ensuring both swift and effective mobilisation of actors and instruments across the EU system and the coherence of policies and actions throughout the various phases of the crisis life cycle. The EEAS Crisis Response System (CRS) covers crises that may affect EU security and interests occurring outside the EU, including those affecting the EU delegations or any other EU asset or person in a third country. It equally covers crisis occurring inside the EU if those have an external dimension. CRS ranges from prevention and preparedness to response and recovery, aiming to achieve a comprehensive EU crisis response and management capability. The CRS contributes to ensuring coherence between various aspects of crisis response and management measures, particularly in the security, political, diplomatic, consular, humanitarian, developmental, space-related, environmental, and corporate fields. The CRS secretariat is ensured by the EEAS Crisis Response Department, which plays a key coordinating role that facilitates translating the comprehensive approach into comprehensive action in crisis response and management. The EEAS Crisis Response Department comprises the following three Divisions:
1. **Crisis Response Planning and Operations** is tasked with the overall planning, organisation, and coordination of crisis-related activities, including preparedness, monitoring, and response. In particular, the Division has the responsibility:

   - to assist the EU High Representative in his responsibility to ensure the coherence and coordination of the EU's external action specifically in the field of crisis management and response;
   - to undertake specific missions in crisis areas
   - to coordinate the work of the EU Crisis Platform
   - to closely follow developments in the world to enable the EEAS to respond to potential and emerging crises at short notice

2. **The EU Situation Room** is the EU's crises centre that provides worldwide monitoring and current situation awareness 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, all year round.

3. **Consular Crisis Management** assists in consular policies across the EU and coordinates actions in times of crisis.


**Figure 1. EU Crisis Response Department**

### 3.2. Crisis Platform

EU crisis response & management instruments are subject to different institutional and decision-making processes within and beyond the EEAS. To ensure that responses to emergencies are timely and adequate, effective coordination of the relevant crisis management instruments (civilian and military) is a key priority during the crisis cycle. The Crisis Platform – which comprises a range of services across the EU system and is chaired by the High Representative, the EEAS Executive General (ESG), or the EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response – can be convened on an ad hoc basis and is a crucial mechanism that is activated to guarantee EU responsiveness during external crises. The Platform provides the EEAS and Commission services with clear political and/or strategic guidance to manage a given crisis.

Depending on the characteristics of a particular crisis, the EEAS Crisis Platform can bring together:

- Various EEAS crisis response/management structures: Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD), Crisis Response Department, EU Military Staff (EUMS), Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), Situation Centre (SitCen), EU Situation Room as well as relevant geographical and horizontal EEAS Departments.
- The EU Military Committee (EUMC).
- The relevant European Commission services (ECHO, DEVCO, FPI, etc.).
The secretariat support is ensured by the EEAS Crisis Response Department, which performs an overall operational coordination function in support of the ESG, based on conclusions agreed at the Crisis Platform meetings.

The unexpected onset of the ‘Arab Spring’ in early 2011 and its aftermath put the then recently established EEAS (at the new EU foreign policy system more generally) to its first major test. In that regard, the EEAS Crisis Platform played an important role and has since become an institutionalised element of crisis decision-making within the EU-system.

a. Crisis Response Cycle

Emerging and acute crises require swift responses to alleviate human suffering and avoid or prevent further escalation and instead strive to promote dialogue, reconciliation, and reconstruction and protect EU citizens. Unlike in other areas of foreign policy, the EU's capacity to meet the needs and challenges that (often unexpectedly) arise in natural and human-made emergencies crucially depends on its ability to take, in real-time, ad hoc decisions and actions. In short, when crises erupt – though they seldom follow a predictable pattern – immediate attention and coordination are required. Thus, the response is complementary to medium- to long-term measures and an integral part of a comprehensive approach that includes conflict prevention and peace-building, CSDP missions, or development programs.

3.4. The EU Situation Room

The EU Situation Room is the first point of contact for all information on crises. It is a permanent stand-by body that serves as a situation information hub for all relevant European institutions' stakeholders. It acts as the EEAS switchboard and embeds within situation reports or flash reports all crisis-related information provided, among others, by EU Delegations, EU Member States, EU CSDP Operations and Missions, EUSR teams, and International Organisations. More specifically, the EU Situation Room:

- Monitors and reports on worldwide events on a 24/7 basis, focusing on topics and issues relevant for the EEAS and the EU as a whole;
- Liaises 24/7 with CSDP Missions and Operations through a Watchkeeping Capability, as well as with EU Delegations;
- Supports HRVP and relevant EEAS services, the Council, and cooperates closely with the Commission;
- Plays a role in the EU Integrated Political Crisis Response arrangements (IPCR) to support political coordination and decision-making in major, complex, inter-disciplinary crisis;
- Manages and develops relations with national crisis response and crisis coordination centres of EU Member States;
- Has regular contacts with other regional and international organisations' crisis centres, such as the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (UN DPKO), League of Arab States (LAS), African Union (AU), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

3.5. Consular Crisis Management

Part of the EEAS Crisis Response Department, the Consular Crisis Management Division currently has two roles:

1. assisting the Presidency to coordinate consular policies across the EU (e.g. travel advice, issuance of consular guidelines);
2. to assist the Presidency and/or the Lead States to coordinate action in times of crises.

For normal consular work, Member States do not need the assistance of the EU. Consular assistance and protection are, after all, an exclusive national responsibility. However, not all EU citizens are represented in all third countries. The EU Member States are all present in only three countries: the US, Russia, and China. This means that in all other third countries, one or more Member States are not present. Article 23 of the TFEU gives any unrepresented EU citizen the right to obtain assistance from another Member State's consular services under the same conditions that the Member State assisting would give its citizens.
Conclusion

Although the implementation of crisis management began in the European Union only in the first decade of the 21st century, this was not an obstacle to developing a unified approach of that organisation. A realistic approach to the potentials and resources of the Union for active action in preserving the security of the European continent, but also global peace and security, influenced the new strategic approach to security reflected in the EU Global Strategy. Concerning the approach to resolving conflicts exclusively by military means, which was current in the period after the Second World War, a comprehensive approach to resolving a conflict situation represents a qualitative shift. Analysing the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union and the goals published in the Global Strategy, the European Union is committed to managing conflicts and stabilising the territory affected by them. The establishment of a European Union crisis management mechanism positions the EU as a global actor in security. The EU Crisis Management Mechanism is an effective segment of the CFSP and assures the international community that they have a reliable partner, especially in management emergencies. Apart from military crisis management, the EU is deeply committed to civilian crisis management which will be predominant in years to come.

References


