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Upravljanje primenom veštačke inteligencije u vojne svrhe

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Sažetak: Veštačka inteligencija (VI) suštinski menja karakter savremenog ratovanja. Iako nudi značajne prednosti, poput veće preciznosti, operativne efikasnosti, bržeg donošenja odluka i boljeg potencijala za zaštitu civila, ona istovremeno pokreće ozbiljna pitanja odgovornosti, smislene ljudske kontrole i rizika od eskalacije sukoba. Poseban izazov predstavljaju mogućnosti zloupotrebe i neželjene posledice u složenim i asimetričnim operativnim okruženjima. Shodno tome, regulisanje upotrebe veštačke inteligencije u vojne svrhe postalo je prioritarno pitanje na međunarodnoj agendi. U ovom radu razmatraju se aktuelni naponi za normativno uređenje ove oblasti na globalnom, regionalnom i nacionalnom nivou. Poseban osvrt dat je na inicijative u okviru Ujedinjenih nacija, stavove ključnih međunarodnih aktera, kao i na nove regulatorne pristupe u Evropskoj uniji, NATO-u i odabranim državama. Okosnicu ovih nastojanja čini rasprava o smrtonosnim autonomnim oružanim sistemima (LAWS), koja oslikava dublje podele u pogledu uloge autonomije pri upotrebi sile i primene međunarodnog humanitarnog prava. Uprkos napretku u normativnim i političkim debatama, još uvek ne postoji pravno obavezujući međunarodni akt specifično posvećen vojnoj primeni veštačke inteligencije. Regulatorni okvir je stoga fragmentisan i uslovljen različitim nacionalnim prioritetima, tehnološkim kapacitetima i pravnim tumačenjima, što ukazuje na to da će buduće upravljanje ovom sferom obeležiti kontinuirane rasprave i suprotstavljeni interesi.

Keywords: veštačka inteligencija, primena veštačke inteligencije u vojne svrhe, smrtonosni autonomni oružani sistemi, međunarodno humanitarno pravo, upravljanje

Governing the Use of Artificial Intelligence for Military Purposes

Abstract: Artificial intelligence (AI) is reshaping the character of modern warfare. While AI offers advantages such as improved precision, efficiency, decision-making, and civilian protection, it also raises concerns related to accountability, meaningful human control, escalation, misuse, and unintended consequences, particularly in asymmetric and complex environments. In response, the regulation of military AI has become an increasingly prominent issue on the international agenda. This paper examines current efforts to regulate the military use of AI at the global, regional, and national levels, with particular attention to recent initiatives within the United Nations (UN), the positions of international actors, and emerging approaches within the European Union (EU), NATO, and individual states. A central theme across these efforts is the debate on lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), which reflects broader divisions over the role of autonomy in the use of force and the application of international humanitarian law. Despite notable progress, no binding international instrument dedicated explicitly to regulating military AI currently exists. The regulatory landscape, therefore, remains fragmented and shaped by differing national priorities, technological capabilities, and legal interpretations, indicating that future governance will continue to evolve amid ongoing discussions and competing interests.

Keywords: artificial intelligence, military applications of artificial intelligence, lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS), international humanitarian law, governance

1. Introduction

In defence studies, it is often emphasized that the capacity to understand and anticipate the future of warfare, particularly the technologies that will shape it, is usually regarded as a central analytical ambition of the discipline (Franke, 2018). The technologies associated with artificial intelligence have been developing for decades; however, a key question remains: did scholars and practitioners truly foresee the depth of the transformation AI would bring to the battlefield? Contemporary conflicts, such as those in Ukraine and Gaza, are increasingly

described as „AI-driven“ or „algorithmic“ wars. From data analytics and surveillance to autonomous weapon systems, AI is reshaping the very character of modern warfare (Wells, 2025; Hibbert & Overton, 2025). At the same time, these advancements raise serious concerns, including the risk of a global AI arms race, the erosion of meaningful human control over critical decisions, and the ethical implications of delegating life and death judgments to machines (Asaro, 2012; Amoroso & Tamburini, 2020; Kohn et al., 2024; Jensen, Atalan & Macias, 2024; Osimen, Newo & Fulani, 2024; Johnson, 2020).

In analysing the development and impact of technology on the character of warfare, van Creveld (1989) employs a simple yet powerful analogy of the ripples caused by a stone thrown into water. He argues that technological effects are most pronounced at the point of impact, while the expanding ripples gradually weaken and become less visible. The farther they travel, the more likely they are to lose their distinct identity, intermingling with waves generated by other stones or reflected from water's edges. Similarly, weapons and weapon systems exert their most significant influence in direct combat, but war encompasses far more than the battlefield. It also includes tactics, strategy, logistics, operations, command and control, and numerous additional factors.

Applying this analogy to the development and military employment of AI reveals clear parallels. The most potent effects of AI can be observed at the tactical level, through autonomous platforms, AI-driven targeting systems, and rapid situational analysis (Baxter, 2024). As AI diffuses into the operational and strategic domains, its influence becomes broader yet less immediately perceptible, shaping the preparations and conduct of military operations (Vestner, 2024; Burton & Soare, 2019). At the broadest level, AI becomes embedded within wider structures of doctrine, deterrence, the emerging global AI arms race, and ongoing debates on arms-control regimes (Jensen, Atalan & Macias, 2024; Osimen, Newo & Fulani, 2024; Johnson, 2020). Given this diffusion and interdependence of effects, the demand for clear international regulations and norms governing the military use of AI is becoming increasingly urgent.

In the context of the development and use of AI tools for military purposes, it is essential to note that they differ significantly in the level of autonomy involved in decision-making regarding the use of force. Consequently, the question of regulating these tools also varies substantially. A critical starting point for understanding governance challenges lies in distinguishing between AI systems that support human decision-making and those that are capable of operating independently in the use of force. These categories differ not only technologically but also normatively, as they imply fundamentally different risks and regulatory expectations. For example, AI systems designed to process vast amounts of data and support human decision-making, such as the U.S. Project Maven, are widely accepted and implemented in practice when proper oversight is in place (Zequeira, 2024; Nguyen, 2025).

In contrast, systems intended to operate independently, namely lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), raise numerous legal and ethical dilemmas. While there is a prevailing belief that such technologies enhance military precision and efficiency and reduce casualties (Petman, 2017; Vergun, 2019; Zequeira, 2024; Márquez-Díaz, 2024), critics argue that delegating life-and-death decisions to autonomous systems undermines human dignity, creates accountability gaps, and raises profound moral objections. Moreover, the complexity of modern warfare casts doubt on whether these systems can reliably uphold core principles of international humanitarian law (IHL), prompting calls for legally binding restrictions or prohibitions on weapons that operate without meaningful human control (Heyns, 2016; Human Rights Watch & International Human Rights Clinic, 2012; Davison, 2018; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2023).

This paper examines current efforts to regulate the military use of artificial intelligence across global, regional, and national levels. It identifies the main challenges arising from the development and deployment of autonomous systems, with particular attention to the debate surrounding LAWS. Methodologically, this study applies a qualitative, desk-based document analysis, examining relevant primary and secondary sources. The review includes United Nations (UN) resolutions, declarations, and guidelines; strategic and regulatory acts of the European Union (EU) and NATO; national strategies and policy papers of selected states; and publications of international organizations. Regarding national-level approaches, the paper focuses on the United States, Russia, and China as illustrative case studies. These states are selected due to their status as major military powers, their advanced technological capabilities, and the availability of publicly published strategies and policy documents addressing the military use of artificial intelligence. This selection enables a transparent, document-based analysis and does not aim to provide an exhaustive comparative assessment, but rather to illustrate divergent strategic and regulatory approaches that shape the emerging international governance landscape. In addition, the analysis incorporates relevant scientific and expert literature. The analysis aims to map current regulatory efforts concerning the military application of AI and to identify the principal challenges associated with their

development and implementation. The study is divided into several sections, including an overview of global initiatives, regional approaches, national strategies, and a focused discussion of LAWS regulation. This structure provides a clearer understanding of how regulatory developments unfold across different levels.

2. Global Governance of Military AI

Although a specific international treaty exclusively dedicated to the development and use of AI for military purposes has yet to be adopted, existing international regulations, primarily IHL, provide essential and binding legal frameworks. According to IHL, all parties are required to adhere to its principles in the development and use of any weapon, including systems incorporating AI components. The fundamental principles of IHL, distinction, proportionality, and precaution in attack, must be upheld even when AI technologies are employed (Bruun & Bo, 2025).

Beyond these principles of IHL, a significant milestone in the global regulation of military AI occurred in December 2024, when the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution A/RES/79/239, titled „Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain and its Implications for International Peace and Security“ (United Nations General Assembly, 2024). This resolution constitutes a significant international legal instrument that acknowledges the growing challenges and opportunities posed by AI in the military sphere. It reaffirms that the UN Charter, IHL, and international human rights law (IHRL) apply to all stages of the lifecycle of AI-enabled military systems, from pre-design and development to testing, deployment, and decommissioning. The resolution emphasizes the need to maintain human control over the use of force. It expresses concern over a wide range of risks, including arms races, conflict escalation, miscalculations, technology proliferation to non-state actors, and ethical and algorithmic biases with potentially harmful consequences for marginalized groups. At the same time, it recognizes the potential benefits of AI, particularly in enhancing the protection of civilians and improving compliance with IHL. The resolution calls on states to promote responsible use of AI through multilateral mechanisms in cooperation with academia, civil society, and the private sector, while strengthening global cooperation and support for developing countries. Furthermore, it requests the UN Secretary-General to collect the views of Member States and relevant stakeholders regarding broader security-related aspects of military AI, beyond the specific focus on LAWS, as a basis for further normative and policy discussions within the UN (United Nations General Assembly, 2024).

This resolution was preceded by two critical summits under the banner „Responsible AI in the Military Domain“ (REAIM). The first summit was held in The Hague in February 2023, and the second in Seoul in September 2024. These forums brought together dozens of states, scientists, and experts to discuss a broad range of military applications of AI, and to promote voluntary commitments to its responsible use. At the same time, during the Hague Summit, the Global Commission on Responsible AI in the Military Domain (GC REAIM) was established as an international body of experts to support the responsible governance of AI in the military context (The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, n.d.). Also at the summit, the United States led the launch of a Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of AI and Autonomy, which outlines ten core principles ranging from compliance with international law and transparency to reliability, human oversight, and sharing of best practices (U.S. Department of State, 2023).

Following the first REAIM Summit, several government representatives issued a joint Call to Action on the responsible development, deployment, and use of AI in the military domain. The document emphasises that AI applications can enhance decision-making, the precision of military operations, and civilian protection. Still, they also entail significant risks, including unpredictable consequences, escalation of conflicts, uncertainty regarding accountability, and the potential for misuse. The key findings underscore the necessity of preserving human responsibility in decision-making, establishing technical and ethical standards, strengthening knowledge exchange among states and stakeholders, and emphasizing education and capacity-building regarding the limitations and dangers of AI systems. The Call advocates adopting national frameworks and strategies, highlighting the importance of data protection, transparency, standardisation, and the roles of civil society and academic institutions in analysing and developing practical solutions. It concludes with an appeal to continue inclusive, global, and interdisciplinary dialogue to ensure the responsible use of AI in compliance with international law and in service of international peace and security (Elsa Lab Defence, 2023).

In parallel with these initiatives, approximately 60 countries endorsed the Blueprint for Action at the Seoul Summit in 2024 (Harjani, 2025). The document acknowledges that AI brings substantial benefits to military operations, from surveillance and reconnaissance to command, logistics, and analysis. Still, it also warns of serious humanitarian, legal, technological, and ethical risks. Key findings include the necessity for AI in the military domain to be developed and deployed in accordance with international law, particularly IHL; the critical

importance of retaining human responsibility and control in key military decisions; and the need for establishing national and global strategies, legal frameworks, standards, and testing mechanisms. A special emphasis is placed on concerns regarding the potential misuse of AI, including autonomous weapons, cyber operations, and scenarios that may aggravate geopolitical tensions (REAIM, 2024).

These two summits, along with the Political Declaration, provide helpful context for UN Resolution A/RES/9/239. In its official submission to the Secretary-General in response to the Resolution, GC REAIM emphasized that the military use of AI simultaneously introduces significant opportunities and serious risks to international peace and security. The Commission highlighted the need to develop clear, technically grounded, and legally binding governance frameworks that ensure human accountability in decision-making, in full compliance with international law, particularly IHL. Among the potential benefits of AI, the Commission identified improvements in military operational precision and efficiency, enhanced early-warning mechanisms, strengthened civilian protection, and reduced human error and bias in critical decisions. On the other hand, the Commission warned of considerable risks, including destabilization through arms race, the use of AI for repressive purposes and human rights violations, and the erosion of inter-state trust. A particular concern was the possible integration of AI into nuclear command and control systems, the development of autonomous weapons, and the exacerbation of asymmetric conflicts. Therefore, the Commission called for multilateral cooperation, trust-building, and the establishment of transparency mechanisms, including technical standards and oversight throughout the AI system lifecycle, to ensure responsible use and safeguard the stability of the international order (UNODA, 2024).

The recommendations to the Secretary-General regarding the implementation of the adopted resolution A/RES/9/239 were also provided by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in its „Submission to the United Nations Secretary-General on Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain“. The document underscores the importance of a human-centred approach, in which AI systems serve as tools of support rather than substitutes for human judgment and responsibility in decisions that affect the lives, safety, and dignity of individuals in armed conflict (ICRC, 2025).

3. Regional and Alliance-Based Frameworks

While multilateral efforts define shared norms, regional organisations and military alliances are increasingly playing a role in operationalising principles and standards for AI-enabled capabilities. In the context of the EU, the first document addressing AI was adopted in 2017 and pertains to the European Parliament Resolution on Civil Law Rules on Robotics. This resolution established general and ethical principles for the development of robotics and AI in a civilian context, while also highlighting restrictions and prohibitions on modifying robots for military purposes (Rokvić, 2025). Furthermore, in 2019, several EU member states issued the document titled „Digitalization and Artificial Intelligence in Defence“, stating that „the main drivers for using AI applications include achieving superior military capabilities, higher cost-efficiency, and reducing human workload.“ According to the document, this „provides armed forces with new capabilities and opportunities both on the physical and virtual battlefield“ (Food for Thought Paper, 2019). This underscores the necessity of adequate regulation and control over the development and use of AI for military purposes. However, the most significant legal act regarding AI within the EU, the Artificial Intelligence Act, which entered into force on August 1, 2024, explicitly excludes AI systems developed or used for military purposes, national defence, and the safeguarding of national interests. This exemption is in accordance with Article 4(2) of the Treaty on the EU, which assigns exclusive responsibility for national security and defence to the member states (Rokvić, 2025). In addition to the aforementioned regulatory instruments, the EU has adopted several resolutions on the regulation of autonomous weapons (Rokvić, 2025).

Given the context of AI's military application, it is necessary to consider the perspective of military alliances. In October 2021, NATO adopted its first Artificial Intelligence Strategy (NATO, 2021), which defines Six Principles for the Responsible Use of AI in Defence (NATO, 2024). These principles include lawfulness, requiring that all AI applications comply with national and international law; responsibility and accountability, mandating the precise allocation of human responsibility for the outcomes of AI systems; explainability and traceability, ensuring transparency in design and the ability to track AI decision-making processes; reliability, requiring that AI systems be rigorously tested to function predictably and safely; governability and bias mitigation, ensuring that human operators retain the ability to intervene, correct, or deactivate the system, and the elimination of algorithmic bias and compliance with the principles of non-discrimination. To move from principles to practical implementation, NATO established the Data and AI Review Board (DARB) to develop concrete mechanisms for assessing the compliance of new AI applications with these principles (NATO, 2022).

4. National Defense and Military AI Strategies

The absence of binding global regulation has contributed to the emergence of diverse national models, strategic, competitive, and security-driven, that shape the trajectory of military AI adoption. The United States was among the first to establish a formal strategy. In late 2018, the Department of Defence issued the document „Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security and Prosperity,“ which outlines plans to accelerate the integration of AI across all defence sectors to maintain U.S. strategic advantage (Department of Defence, 2018). Russia also ranks among the major powers in formulating a national AI document that includes defence-related applications. In July 2022, the Russian government adopted the „Concept of the Russian Armed Forces Activity in the Development and Use of Weapon Systems Using Artificial Intelligence Technology,“ which functions as a strategic framework guiding Russia’s approach to the integration and use of AI in military capabilities (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2023). In China, although it is a major actor in AI, the country has not adopted a separate national defence-related AI strategy. Instead, China pursues a „military-civil fusion“, in which civilian technological advancements are systematically integrated into military applications to develop advanced weapons systems rapidly. As early as 2017, through the „New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan“, China set a national objective to become the global leader in AI by 2023 (Rokvić, 2024). This list does not exhaust all states that have adopted documents regulating the development and use of AI for military purposes. Still, a comprehensive overview of each would exceed the scope of this paper.

The reviewed documents, particularly those at the global level, emphasise that while AI offers significant advantages for military operations, such as improved precision, decision-making, and civilian protection, it also introduces substantial risks that require urgent and coordinated international governance. Among the most pressing concerns are conflict escalation, arms races, misuse by non-state actors, algorithmic bias, legal uncertainty, and the erosion of trust among states. A recurring focus is the threat posed by autonomous weapons systems, especially their potential to operate without meaningful human oversight. Their unpredictability increases the likelihood of unlawful attacks and unintended escalation, while also raising serious accountability issues when decisions to use lethal force are delegated to machines. Additional concerns include their possible misuse in cyber operations and integration into nuclear command systems. These risks underscore the need for transparent oversight, ethical and technical safeguards, and the preservation of human responsibility in the use of force. Therefore, the following section will focus specifically on the regulation of autonomous weapons systems.

5. The Debate on LAWS

In the context of developing and employing AI tools for military purposes, LAWS have generated by far the most debate and division within the academic and professional community. At the outset, it is essential to emphasize that there is no consensus on a single definition of LAWS (Kmentt, 2025), which, in turn, leads to differing interpretations of these systems, including both their perceived benefits and potential drawbacks. On the one hand, there is a prevailing belief that LAWS can process information rapidly, enabling faster and more precise decision-making in combat (Baxter, 2024). Replacing human soldiers may reduce casualties and prompt them to act more cautiously in uncertain situations (Petman, 2017). Proponents of autonomous weapon systems, including those arguing that existing international humanitarian law and Article 36 weapons reviews provide sufficient oversight (Meier, 2016), as well as States emphasizing strategic and operational advantages, contend that autonomy can enhance precision, reduce military casualties, and mitigate human error within current legal frameworks. By contrast, scholars and institutions advocating prohibition or strict regulation (Heyns, 2016; Human Rights Watch & International Human Rights Clinic, 2012; Davison, 2018; Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, 2014; United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, 2023) maintain that delegating life-and-death decisions to machines undermines human dignity and erodes the principles of distinction, proportionality, and accountability, while introducing risks of systemic unpredictability, algorithmic bias, and democratic harm. Ultimately, the divide is not merely technological but normative: supporters view risks as manageable through regulation and improved design, whereas critics argue they are inherent to the concept of autonomous force.

Citing legal and moral grounds, Human Rights Watch and a coalition of non-governmental organizations united under the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots have emerged as the principal protagonists in opposing these technologies. Thanks to their advocacy efforts, the discussion on LAWS has been elevated to the international level. One of the earliest official reports to highlight the dangers associated with LAWS was the 2013 report by Christof Heyns, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions (United Nations General Assembly, 2013). He underscored the need for meaningful human control over the use of force, arguing that autonomous machines are inherently unable to make the nuanced, context-specific judgments

required to safeguard human life. Since then, numerous discussions have taken place under the auspices of the UN and within the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) to establish appropriate regulatory approaches to this issue. The Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on LAWS, established under the CCW in 2016, serves as the principal forum for examining emerging military technologies related to LAWS and formulating potential regulatory approaches. Meeting annually since 2017, the Group has progressively deepened the global debate on autonomous weapons. Over time, its discussions have addressed a broad range of technical, legal, political, security, humanitarian, and ethical issues. However, despite meaningful progress and growing momentum, fundamental disagreements persist, especially over whether new legally binding norms are required, resulting in continued lack of consensus on the future regulation of LAWS (UNODA, 2023). Many states, primarily the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, Israel, and others, are investing in the development of military systems with varying degrees of autonomy (Human Rights Watch, 2020), aiming to enhance precision, decision-making speed, and operational efficiency. Within the framework of CCW, the United States and Russia oppose a preemptive ban, arguing that LAWS may enhance precision, reduce harm to civilians, and can be adequately governed by existing IHL. At the same time, Russia additionally stresses the lack of a legal precedent for prohibiting an entire weapons category in advance. China advances a more selective approach, supporting a ban only on „unacceptable“ LAWS, defined as fully autonomous, lethal systems incapable of human intervention, indiscriminate in effect, or capable of autonomous learning, while rejecting broader restrictions on other „acceptable“ LAWS (Kelley, 2025). This trend reflects an accelerating global technological competition and the potential emergence of a new AI-driven arms race.

In a statement addressed to the GGE in March 2019, the UN Secretary-General emphasized that „machines with the power and discretion to take lives without human involvement are politically unacceptable, morally repugnant and should be banned by international law“ (United Nations, 2025). In his New Agenda for Peace, the Secretary-General reiterated this call, recommending that states adopt, by 2026, a legally binding instrument banning LAWS that operate without human control or supervision and cannot be used in accordance with IHL, and regulating all other types of autonomous weapons systems (United Nations, 2023). He noted that, in the absence of specific multilateral regulation, the design, development, and use of such systems raise humanitarian, legal, security, and ethical concerns and constitute a direct threat to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Some progress was made in 2023 with the adoption of the first UN resolution (78/241), which expressed concern that such weapons may lead to an arms race, conflict, and increased risks to civilians due to potential failures in AI decision-making (United Nations General Assembly, 2023). Subsequently, in December 2024, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 79/62, which, for the first time, formally recognized the growing dangers posed by autonomous weapons systems and institutionalized the global debate on this issue (United Nations General Assembly, 2024). This development paves the way for an international treaty to prohibit or regulate LAWS, thereby addressing humanitarian, legal, and ethical concerns associated with their use. Achieving meaningful progress will require sufficient political will on the part of states to initiate negotiations, define concrete standards, and adopt a legally binding instrument. However, states remain divided over regulation and prohibition. Several states have voiced concern that the unchecked development of these technologies could trigger an uncontrolled arms race and lower the threshold for entering into armed conflict. Countries such as Austria, Ireland, and Brazil have for years advocated a pre-emptive prohibition on fully autonomous weapons. In contrast, others, including the U.S., Russia, and Israel, argue that existing laws on armed conflict remain sufficient and oppose the introduction of new restrictions (Human Rights Watch, 2020). In September 2025, the UN Security Council held an open debate on AI, during which a clear warning was issued that AI „must not be allowed onto the battlefield without oversight and regulation“ (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2025).

6. Conclusion

The review of existing documents and initiatives demonstrates that the military use of AI is recognized as an increasingly important issue at the global, regional, and national levels. However, despite growing attention and several notable developments, there is still no binding international instrument dedicated to regulating military AI. The existing approaches remain dispersed, and the current governance architecture is characterized by limited alignment and persistent differences among states regarding the scope and nature of future norms.

The question of autonomy in the use of force represents the central point of divergence. While some actors emphasize the potential benefits of AI to improve precision, efficiency, and civilian protection, others warn of risks to accountability, the erosion of human control, and the possibility of unintended consequences, particularly in complex and asymmetric environments. The debate surrounding LAWS reflects these fundamental divides and illustrates the broader challenges of establishing clear, universally accepted standards.

Given the rapid development of AI technologies and their growing influence on the character and conduct of warfare, the need for precise regulation remains increasingly evident. Yet, the pace of technological advancement and the absence of consensus continue to hinder progress. As a result, current efforts suggest gradual movement but leave open significant questions regarding verification, accountability, and the future direction of governance. The evolving landscape indicates that the regulation of military AI will remain a critical topic, shaped by ongoing discussions and the interplay between national interests, technological capabilities, legal frameworks, and security considerations.

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